


**Cryptography in World War II**  
 Jefferson Institute for Lifelong Learning at UVa  
 Spring 2006 David Evans

**Class 1:  
Introduction  
and  
Cryptography  
before  
World War II**



Bletchley Park, Summer 2004

<http://www.cs.virginia.edu/jillcrypto>

## Overview

1. Introduction, Pre-WWII cryptology
2. Lorenz Cipher (Fish)
  - Used by Nazis for high command messages
  - First programmable electronic computer built to break it
3. Enigma Cipher
  - Used by German Navy, Army, Air Force
  - Broken by team including Alan Turing
4. Post-WWII
  - Modern symmetric ciphers
  - Public-Key Cryptography


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## Menu

- Introduction to Cryptology
  - Terminology
  - Principles
  - Brief history of 4000 years of Cryptology
- Cryptology before World War II
  - A simple substitution cipher
  - [Break]
  - Breaking substitution cipher
  - Vigenère Cipher

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## Jefferson Wheel Cipher



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## What is cryptology?

- Greek: "krypto" = hide
- Cryptology – science of hiding
  - Cryptography, Cryptanalysis – hide meaning of a message
  - Steganography, Steganalysis – hide existence of a message
- Cryptography – secret writing
- Cryptanalysis – analyzing (breaking) secrets
 

*Cryptanalysis* is what attacker does

*Decipher* or *Decryption* is what legitimate receiver does

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## Cryptology and Security


Cryptology is a branch of *mathematics*.

Security is about *people*.


Attackers try find the weakest link. In most cases, this is not the mathematics.

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# Introductions



# Introductions



# Cryptosystem

$$\text{Ciphertext} = E(\text{Plaintext})$$

Required property:  $E$  must be invertible

$$\text{Plaintext} = D(\text{Ciphertext})$$

Desired properties:

- Without knowing  $D$  must be "hard" to invert  $E$  and  $D$  should be easy to compute
- Possible to have lots of different  $E$  and  $D$


"The enemy knows the system being used."

Claude Shannon

# Kerckhoff's Principle

- French handbook of military cryptography, 1883
- Cryptography **always** involves:
  - Transformation
  - Secret
- Security should depend only on the key**
- Don't assume enemy won't know algorithm
  - Can capture machines, find patents, etc.
  - Too expensive to invent new algorithm if it might have been compromised

Axis powers often forgot this



## Symmetric Cryptosystem

$$\text{Ciphertext} = E(K, \text{Message})$$


$$\text{Message} = D(K, \text{Ciphertext})$$

Desired properties:


1. Kerckhoff's: secrecy depends only on  $K$
2. Without knowing  $K$  must be "hard" to invert
3. Easy to compute  $E$  and  $D$

All cryptosystems until 1970s were like this. Asymmetric cryptosystems allow encryption and decryption keys to be different.

## Really Brief History First 4000 years



## Really Brief History - last 100+ years



## Themes

- Arms race: cryptographers vs. cryptanalysts
  - Often disconnect between two (e.g., Mary Queen of Scots uses monoalphabetic cipher long after known breakable)
- Motivated by war (more recently: commerce)
- Driven by advances in technology, mathematics
  - Linguists, classicists, mathematicians, computer scientists, physicists
- Secrecy often means advances rediscovered and mis-credited

## Types of Attacks

- Ciphertext-only - How much Ciphertext?
- Known Plaintext - often "Guessed Plaintext"
- Chosen Plaintext (get ciphertext)
  - Not as uncommon as it sounds!
- Chosen Ciphertext (get plaintext)
- Dumpster Diving
- Social Engineering
- "Rubber-hose cryptanalysis"
  - Cryptanalyst uses threats, blackmail, torture, bribery to get the key

## Security vs. Pragmatics

- Trade-off between security and effort
  - Time to encrypt, cost and size of equipment, key sizes, change frequency
  - One-time pad (1918) offers theoretically "perfect" security, but unacceptable cost
    - Compromises lead to insecurity (class 2)
- Commerce
  - Don't spend \$10M to protect \$1M
  - Don't protect \$1B with encryption that can be broken for \$1M
- Military
  - Values (and attacker resources) much harder to measure

## Simple Substitution Cipher

- Substitute each letter based on mapping
- Key is alphabet mapping:  
a → J, b → L, c → B, d → R, ..., z → F
- How secure is this cipher?

## Key Space

- Number of possible keys  
26 (ways to choose what a maps to)  
\* 25 (b can map to anything else)  
\* 24 (c can map to anything else)  
... \* 1 (only one choice left for z)  
= 26! = 403291461126605635584000000

If every person on earth tried one per second, it would take 5B years to try them all.

## Really Secure?

- Key space gives the upper bound
  - Worst possible approach for the cryptanalyst is to try all possible keys
- Clever attacker may find better approach:
  - Eliminate lots of possible keys quickly
  - Find patterns in ciphertext
  - Find way to test keys incrementally

## Monoalphabetic Cipher

"XBW HGQW XS ACFPSUWG FWPGWXF CF AWWKZV CDQGJCDWA CD BHYJD DJXHGW; WUWD XBW ZWJFX PHGCSHF YCDA CF GSHFWA LV XBW KGSYCFW SI FBJGCDQ RDSOZWAQW OCXBBWZA IGSY SXBWGF."

## Frequency Analysis

"XBW HGQW XS ACFPSUWG FWPGWXF CF AWWKZV CDQGJCDWA CD BHYJD DJXHGW; WUWD XBW ZWJFX PHGCSHF YCDA CF GSHFWA LV XBW KGSYCFW SI FBJGCDQ RDSOZWAQW OCXBBWZA IGSY SXBWGF."

|       |                   |
|-------|-------------------|
| W: 20 | "Normal" English: |
| C: 11 | e 12%             |
| F: 11 | t 9%              |
| G: 11 | a 8%              |

## Pattern Analysis

"XBe HGQe XS ACFPSUeG FePGeXF CF AeEKZV CDQGJCDeA CD BHYJD DJXHGe; eUeD XBe ZeJFX PHGCSHF YCDA CF GSHFeA LV XBe KGSYCFe SI FBJGCDQ RDSOZeAQe OCXBBeZA IGSY SXBeGF."

XBe = "the"  
Most common trigrams in English:  
the = 6.4%  
and = 3.4%

## Guessing

"the HGQe tS ACFPSueG FePGetF CF  
AeeKZV CDQGJCDeA CD hHYJD DJtHGe;  
eUeD the ZeJFt PHGCSHF YCDA CF  
GSHFeA LV the KGSYCFE SI FhJGCDQ  
RDSOZeAQe OChtheZA IGSY StheGF."

S = "o"

## Guessing

"the HGQe to ACFPoUeG FePGetF CF  
AeeKZV CDQGJCDeA CD hHYJD DJtHGe;  
eUeD the ZeJFt PHGCoHF YCDA CF  
GoHFeA LV the KGoYCFE oI FhJGCDQ  
RDoOZeAQe OChtheZA IGoy otheGF."

otheGF = "others"

## Guessing

"the HrQe to ACsPoUer sePrets Cs  
AeeKZV CDQrJCDeA CD hHYJD DJtHre;  
eUeD the ZeJst PHrCoHs YCDA Cs  
roHseA LV the KroYcSe oI shJrCDQ  
RDoOZeAQe OChtheZA IroY others."

"sePrets" = "secrets"

## Guessing

"the HrQe to ACscoUer secrets Cs  
AeeKZV CDQrJCDeA CD hHYJD DJtHre;  
eUeD the ZeJst chRCoHs YCDA Cs  
roHseA LV the KroYcSe oI shJrCDQ  
RDoOZeAQe OChtheZA IroY others."

"ACscoUer" = "discover"

## Guessing

"the HrQe to discover secrets is  
deekZV iDQrJiDeD iD hHYJD DJtHre;  
eVeD the ZeJst chRiOhs YiDd is  
roHsed LV the KroYise oI shJriDQ  
RDoOzedQe oithhezD IroY others."

## Monoalphabetic Cipher

"The urge to discover secrets is deeply  
ingrained in human nature; even the  
least curious mind is roused by the  
promise of sharing knowledge  
withheld from others."

- John Chadwick,

*The Decipherment of Linear B*



## Babbage's Attack

- Use repetition to guess key length:  
Sequence XFO appears at 65, 71, 122, 176.  
Spacings =  $(71 - 65) = 6 = 3 * 2$   
 $(122 - 65) = 57 = 3 * 19$   
 $(176 - 122) = 54 = 3 * 18$   
Key is probably 3 letters long.

## Key length - Frequency

- Once you know key length, can slice ciphertext and use frequencies:  
 $L_0$ : DLQLCNSOLSQRNKG BSEVYNDOIOXAXYRSOSGYKY  
VZXVOXCDNOOSOCOWDKOORYOEVS RBXENI  
Frequencies: O: 12, S: 7, Guess O = e  
 $C_i = (P_i + K_{i \bmod N}) \bmod Z$   
'O' = ('e' +  $K_0$ ) mod 26  
 $14 = 5 + 9 \Rightarrow K_0 = 'K'$

## Sometimes, not so lucky...

- $L_1$ : LMISQITVYJSSSIAHYECYSXOXGWYGMRRXEGWRPEJXSI  
SLIGHTVXSILWHXYXJPERISWTM  
S: 9, X: 7; I: 6 guess S = 'e'  
'S' = ('e' +  $K_1$ ) mod 26  
 $19 = 5 + 14 \Rightarrow K_1 = 'N'$   
'X' = ('e' +  $K_1$ ) mod 26  
 $24 = 5 + 19 \Rightarrow K_1 = 'M'$   
'I' = ('e' +  $K_1$ ) mod 26  
 $10 = 5 + 5 \Rightarrow K_1 = 'E'$

## Vigenère Simplification

- Use binary alphabet {0, 1}:  
 $C_i = (P_i + K_{i \bmod N}) \bmod 2$   
 $C_i = P_i \oplus K_{i \bmod N}$
- Use a key as long as P:  
 $C_i = P_i \oplus K_i$
- One-time pad - perfect cipher!

## Perfectly Secure Cipher: One-Time Pad

- Mauborgne/Vernam [1917]
- XOR ( $\oplus$ ):  
 $0 \oplus 0 = 0$     $1 \oplus 0 = 1$   
 $0 \oplus 1 = 1$     $1 \oplus 1 = 0$   
  
 $a \oplus a = 0$   
 $a \oplus 0 = a$   
 $a \oplus b \oplus b = a$
- $E(P, K) = P \oplus K$   
 $D(C, K) = C \oplus K = (P \oplus K) \oplus K = P$

## Why perfectly secure?

For any given ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally possible.


Ciphertext:     **01001**  
Key1:            **01001**  
Plaintext1:     **00000**  
Key2:            **10110**  
Plaintext2:     **11111**

## Perfect Security Solved?

- Cannot reuse K
  - What if receiver has
$$C_1 = P_1 \oplus K \text{ and } C_2 = P_2 \oplus K$$
$$C_1 \oplus C_2 = P_1 \oplus K \oplus P_2 \oplus K$$
$$= P_1 \oplus P_2$$
- Need to generate truly random bit sequence as long as all messages
- Need to securely distribute key

## Next week: "One-Time" Pads in Practice

- Lorenz Machine
- Nazi high command in WWII
  - Operator errors: reused key
- Pad generated by 12 rotors
  - Not really random



## Public Lecture Tonight

- David Goldschmidt, "Communications Security: A Case History"
  - Director of Center for Communications Research, Princeton
  - Enigma and how it was broken
- 7:30pm Tonight
- UVa Physics Building, Room 203

We will cover some of the same material in the third class.