What Every Computer **Scientist Should Know** About Security



David Evans University of Virginia http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans/

cs290 Spring 2008 21 February 2008






Human **Should Know** About Security

David Evans University of Virginia

cs290 Spring 2008 21 February 2008


www.cs.virginia.edu/ evans/





"Many children are taught never to talk to strangers, an extreme precaution with minimal security benefit."





"Emma Lion loves to make new friends, but Mama tells her to be careful and never talk to strangers. Emma sees new people to meet everywhere she goes. How will she know who is a stranger?"



Security

• Technical questions

- Figuring out who is not a "stranger" (authentication)
- Controlling access to resources (*protection* and *authorization*)
- Value judgments
 - Managing risk vs. benefit (policy)
- Deterrents
 - If you get caught, bad things happen to you

Protecting assets from misuse

Quiz

Authentication, Protection, Authorization, Policy, or Deterrent?



Authentication, Protection, Authorization, Policy, or Deterrent?



Authentication, Protection, Authorization, Policy, or Deterrent?

British Parliament, Dec 2007





Principles for Designing and Building Secure Systems

Principle 0:


Know what you are protecting, and what the threats are.











Encryption

- E is an encryption function: algorithm for scrambling bits in a way that depends on K
- K is a secret key shared between card and reader (backend database)

 $x = \mathsf{E}_{\mathsf{K}}(r)$

Threat: Eavesdropper cloning cards. **Requirement**: attacker who overhears *x* and *r* (even many pairs) should not be able to guess K

Recall Principle 1:

Keeping secrets is hard.

Design systems so that they don't depend on secrets being kept from adversaries.

If you need a secret, make it small and well defined.


Security should depend only on keeping K secret (not on keeping algorithm or protocol secret)


NXP Mifare Classic RFID Tag


- Billions of units deployed
- Cost < \$1
- Planned for nationwide deployment in Netherlands
- Uses secret encryption algorithm





Reverse-Engineering a Cryptographic RFID Tag. Karsten Nohl, David Evans, Starbug, Henryk Plötz, Feb 2008.











Failure of Security through Obscurity

- If there are enough possible keys, it shouldn't matter if attacker knows E (if it is a good encryption algorithm)
- Mifare algorithm has several weaknesses that made it easier to find K without needing to try all possible keys

Principle 2: Need to Know Basis


Once you release information, there is no way to get it back.


Give out as little as necessary to enable useful things.

Principle of "Least Authority"

"The debate about the OV-Chipcard is symbolic, as we discovered yesterday at the hearing, for the choice: open or closed software. The bankruptcy of closed source software shone solidly in the limelight yesterday. GroenLinks [a Dutch political party] has urged for a long time that the government should work with opensource software. Yesterday it became painfully obvious that we may pay a high price due to the fact that this advice was not followed for the OV-Chipcard." – Dutch parliamentary discussion, January 16th 2008









Recall Principle 2: Need to Know Basis

Once you release information, there is no way to get it back. Be careful about what you release.

No need to give applications access to information they don't use





On TV.c	
cinet BLOGS	THE TARTAN Computation 244
	ee eeus olijhch fanas sports pilliox archives paes mere 11. 2001 - Son the politic archives pilliox
Today of Cite1 Freedows Trews Compare Price	
	tudy shows dangers in Facebook apps
	MS Amanda Wilczymiki h day, studentu are bombanded with recessits to become a Greek
	, a Dieney princess, and the biggest brain - on Facebook, that is.
of privacy and security issues	er 15.000 Facebook applications exist today, effering a variety of abilities to the social networking vehator. However, according to
	ev study from the University of Virginia, users risk lasing their race by simply ration their as bottest thingle or discovering their
	al desperate bouwerlde.
Exclusive: The next Facebook privacy scandal	exerces found that among the sgin most popular third party about plugins, yo-7 percent have access to unnecessary private
Posted by Chris Soghoian 3 comments	
Facebook is no stranger to the complaints of privacy activists. First, it was t	
feature back in 2006. Most recently, the company's Beacon service drew wid Today's News	
This blog post will outline yet another major privacy issue, in which Facebool exposes user data.	- 65
	(in specieds Game Delening - Art Edited)
Facebook launched its widely popular application developer program back in Study Raises New Privacy Concerns About Facebook	
press time, there were more than 14,000 applications. Some, including most are made by companies, while a few of the popular apps, and a significant m	
of the less popular applications are made by individual developers. Undergraduate provectors at the	to University of Viscinia and that
The II arrand Cuitone EDITION	Jonathan Zittrain
The Harvard Crimson	Professor of Internet Governance and Regulation. Oxford Internet Institute
W	
P. News	Biog About Research & Academic Publications Invited Presentations
Study Finds Privacy Lapse in Facebook Apps	Revisiting client-side filtering Just another update #
Published On 2/8/2008 1:49:45 AM By RACHEL A, STARK	
Crimson Staff Writer	Should Facebook preemptively protect users
Playing Jetman on Facebook.com may cause you to lose more than just the game. Your priv-	against rogue apps?
r raying semian on racessor.com may cause you to tose more than just the game. Four priva	Proteined by 2 Hondary std., 2004 in *Otherway, generatively, web 2.50 Enteronising U/a serier Addresse Felt has developed an intributing aroument about
Facebook application developers-who can be anybody-are unnecessarily given full acces	IS I privacy for Web 2.0 apps like those on the Pacebook development platform. It will get
Adrienne Felt, a senior at the University of Virginia who conducted the study, looked at the top	lots of news coverage, much of it boiling down to reports that don't capture the richness of the problem. Here's how Felt puts it:
only 9.3 percent of these applications required private information—yet Facebook currently gi	
	ability to see anything that Jane can see. This means that the application
Felt said that application developers can see a user's birthday religion sexual orientation re	

from c|net article:

I asked Facebook's [chief privacy officer] Kelly what his company is doing to ensure that application developers do not violate the rules by saving a copy of user data that passes through their servers. He cited "extensive security mechanisms operating behind the scenes," although, he refused to expand on this, due to "security reasons." He wasn't too happy when I accused him of practicing **security though obscurity**, a concept widely mocked in security circles. He dismissed my charge as a mischaracterization.

Recap

- Principle 0: Know what you are protecting, and what the threats are.
- Principle 1 (security-through-obscurity doesn't work): Design systems so that they don't depend on secrets being kept from adversaries.
- Principle 2 (least authority): Give others what they need to do useful work, but not more.

Not everything you need to know about security

Questions

http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans My home page http://www.cs.virginia.edu/wheel Research group blog

If you steal property, you must report its fair market value in your income in the year you steal it unless in the same year, you return it to its rightful owner. <u>Your Federal Income Tax</u>,

IRS Publication 17 (p. 90)