# Privacy Protection for Social Networking APIs


Adrienne Felt and David Evans
University of Virginia

W2SP, May 2008

# privacy protection for social networking APIs

#### Facebook Platform

- Third parties get screen real estate
- User information available to developers
  - Installed users and their friends
- Backend code and databases are on thirdparty servers



3. API calls

I. profile.php?



facebook 🖈

facebook 🕆



2. app content?

4. app content FBML





5. Convert to HTML



3. API calls

I. profile.php?



facebook 🕆

facebook 🕆

user=12345

2. app content?

4. app content FBML





5. Convert to HTML



+ permissions check

3. API calls

I. profile.php?



6. full page HTML/JS



facebook 🛧

facebook 🕆

5. Convert to HTML



2. app content?

4. app content FBML




3. API calls

I. profile.php?



facebook 🕈

facebook 🖈



2. app content?

4. app content

**FBML** 





5. Convert to HTML



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facebook n

facebook 🕈

user=12345

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4. app content **FBML** 









3. API calls

I. profile.php?





6. full page HTML/JS



5. Convert to HTML





4. app content FBML







#### **FBML**

- No need to make API calls for many cases
- Large subset of HTML
- + extra fancy Facebook tags
  - fb:pronoun, fb:if-is-friends-with-viewer fb:board, fb: comments, fb:random

# FBML example





# Facebook Policy



## Applications need data

- Can harness social graphs & connections
- Tailor applications to user interests


## Should they have data?

- Developers can't always be screened
- Once data is off the server...can't police it
- Even trusted applications are security weak points

## Application Needs

What kind of data?

How is it used?



study of 150 most popular apps, fall 07

## Privacy protection

- Only give applications information if they need it
  - Abstract the user with FBML tags
- Minimize how they need it
  - More sophisticated tags



W2SP 08

privacy protection for social networking APIs

# Privacy Goals

- User IDs can't be mapped back to user names
  - Application-specific IDs
- User account information is invisible
  - FBML tags keyed by IDs

## Application IDs

- User IDs are encrypted with an application key
  - Can't be used to reverse lookup users
- Returned by tags like the friend-selector

# Privacy by proxy

I. profile.php?



facebook 🕆

facebook 🕆

user<sub>enc</sub>=12345

2. app content?

5. full page

HTML/JS

4. Convert to HTML

November 8, 1986

3. app content

**FBML** 

<user="12345"
field="birthday">

#### Permissions Check

I. profile.php?



facebook 🖈

facebook #

5. full page HTML/JS


November 8, 1986

4. Convert to HTML

check page viewer & page owner

2. app content?

 $user_{enc}=12345$ 





**FBML** 


<user="12345" field="birthday">

#### Public Information

- Attacker could iterate through IDs to list public information
- Disallow lookup of strangers
  - Only owner privileges affected


## Functionality


breakdown of 150 most popular apps, fall 07





#### Contact List

- Superset of friend list
- New addition: one-way relationships
- Alice messages Bob;
   Now Bob can "see" Alice.









### Impact of contact lists

- Message-passing works fine now
- Top scorers still affected
  - Not crucial to application
  - In-game profiles, nicknames

## **OpenSocial**

- Google provides a "standardized" API
- Still in beta, differs slightly between sites
- Applications written in XML and then transformed

#### Conclusion

- Most applications don't need access to full user information
- Many can be satisfied with anonymous users and server-side transformations
- Applicable to both Facebook and OpenSocial

### Questions?

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