Context-Sensitive Fencing: Securing Speculative Execution via Microcode Customization

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Abstract

This paper describes context-sensitive fencing (CSF), a microcode-level defense against multiple variants of the Spectre attack. CSF leverages the ability to dynamically alter the decoding of the instruction stream, to seamlessly inject new micro-ops, including fences, only when dynamic conditions indicate they are needed. This enables the processor to fully protect against attacks, but with minimal impact on the efficacy of key performance features such as speculative execution.

This research also examines several alternative fence implementations, and introduces three new types of fences which allow most dynamic reordering of loads and stores, but in such a way that prevents speculative accesses from changing visible cache state. These optimizations reduce the performance overhead of the defense mechanism, compared to state-of-the-art software-based fencing mechanisms by a factor of six.

1. Introduction

Maximizing performance has been a major driving force in the economics of the microprocessor industry. Modern processor architectures feature highly complex and sophisticated performance optimizations. However, scaling performance without considering security implications could have serious negative consequences, as evidenced by the recent pile of lawsuits [79] concerning the Meltdown [54] and Spectre [51] class of microarchitectural attacks. These events have highlighted the need to architect systems that can not only run at high speed, but can also exhibit high resilience against security attacks, not just one or the other. The goal of this work is to secure a particular performance optimization integral to modern processor architectures – speculative execution – against the Spectre class of microarchitectural attacks, while maintaining acceptably high levels of performance.

Modern processors employ branch speculation and out-of-order execution to take advantage of the available instruction-level parallelism beyond control-flow boundaries, thereby improving the overall CPU resource utilization and sustaining high throughput. Spectre attacks exploit speculative execution by leaking secret information along misspeculated paths via cache-based and other timing side channels. Owing to their ability to mistrain the branch predictor to deliberately steer execution to an attacker-intended control-flow path [46, 52], these attacks have notably demonstrated the potential to break all confidentiality and completely bypass important hardware/software security mechanisms such as ASLR, even via remotely accessed covert channels [64].

Mitigating Spectre is a particularly hard problem since it could potentially cause highly intrusive changes to the existing out-of-order processor design, severely limiting performance. Although Intel has announced microcode update patches to mitigate certain variants of the attack, a majority of the high impact vulnerabilities still largely rely on software patching [42, 62]. State-of-the-art software countermeasures take advantage of fences that mute specific effects of speculative execution by constraining the order of certain memory operations, or in some cases by completely serializing a portion of the dynamic instruction stream. Liberal fence insertion (e.g., at every bounds check) can mitigate the attacks, but doing so severely hurts performance; however, spraying fences more strategically at appropriate locations in the code requires extensive patching of software via recompilation or binary translation – resulting in significant engineering effort and long delays to deployment. We need hardware architectures that can more seamlessly react to such attacks via unobtrusive field updates.

This work proposes context-sensitive fencing, a novel microcode-level defense against Spectre. The key components of the defense strategy include: (a) a microcode customization mechanism that allows processors to surgically insert fences into the dynamic instruction stream to mitigate undesirable side-effects of speculative execution, (b) a decoder-level information flow tracking (DLIFT) framework that identifies potentially unsafe execution patterns to trigger microcode customization, and (c) mistraining mitigations that secure the branch predictor and the return address stack.

To perform secure microcode customization with minimal impact on performance, this work leverages context-sensitive decoding (CSD) [68], a recently proposed extension to Intel’s (and others’) micro-op translation mechanism that enables on-demand and context-sensitive customization of the dynamic micro-op instruction stream. In addition, this work also takes advantage of the reconfiguration framework offered by CSD, allowing the operating system and other trusted entities to dynamically control the frequency, type, and behavior of speculation fences that are surgically inserted into the micro-op stream to secure speculative execution.

This work analyzes a significantly expanded suite of fences, considering different possible enforcement stages and enforcement strategies. In particular, we introduce a new fence that prevents speculative updates to cache state with minimal interference in the dynamic scheduling of instructions.

Context-sensitive fencing has the ability to automatically identify fence insertion points via a novel decoder-level information flow tracking-based detection mechanism. Since the processor front-end typically churns instructions at a much higher rate than the rest of the pipeline, information-flow tracking at the decoder-level is prone to frequent overtainting and undertainting scenarios. While overtainting could hurt performance due to the increased frequency of fence insertion,
undertainting could undermine the security of the system for a brief window. By solving these challenges through an early and low-overhead mistaint detection and recovery mechanism, this paper further establishes the viability of decoder-level information flow tracking as an effective attack detection mechanism.

This work further proposes novel micro-op flows that protect the branch predictor and the return address stack against mistaining and/or reverse engineering across different protection domains. While similar in spirit to the proposed Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) instruction by Intel, these micro-op flows apply more generally to a broader class of branch predictors and return address stacks, and offer more fine-grained control.

This research makes the following major contributions:

- It introduces context-sensitive fencing, a mechanism that leverages a dynamic decoding architecture to inject fences between control flow and loads, without recompilation or binary translation.
- It examines several variants of existing fences, and introduces three new fences, which allows aggressive reordering of loads and stores without exposing any microarchitectural evidence, in the cache, of speculative accesses that cross the fence.
- It introduces a decoder-level dynamic information flow tracker, DLIFT, which allows accurate tracking of taints early in the pipeline, giving the pipeline the ability to identify tainted accesses before the stages that enable speculative execution.
- It introduces a simple dynamic mechanism that eliminates redundant (per basic block) fences.
- The combination of optimizations introduced in this paper reduce the cost of a fence-based Spectre mitigation technique from 48% overhead (for a conservative scheme) to less than 8%.
- It also introduces a decode-level branch predictor isolation technique that mitigates branch mis-training variants of Spectre.

2. Background and Related Work

Speculative Execution. Dynamic control speculation is a well-known instruction throughput optimization technique used, especially in out-of-order processors, to predict the branch outcome and execute instructions along the predicted path, while waiting for the actual branch outcome to be evaluated at a later pipeline stage. In the event of a misprediction, the processor rolls back execution along the mispredicted path and redirects control to the right branch target. Although speculative execution is largely programmer-invisible in terms of committed architectural register and memory state, in all known instances it leaves some microarchitectural side effects that can be observed through well-established side channels.

Microarchitectural Attacks. Microarchitectural attacks leak secret information of a victim process by observing microarchitectural effects of certain performance/power optimizations such as caches, branch speculation, memory disambiguation, and even DVFS, through side-channels such as memory bus activity [4], power consumption characteristics [8], branch access patterns [2, 29], faults [47, 40], acoustics [33, 32], electromagnetic effects [30], functional unit timing characteristics [78], and most notably cache access patterns [3, 7, 58, 82, 83, 31, 55, 80].

Cache-based side-channel attacks have been shown to reveal secret information such as cryptographic keys [36, 82, 27], keystrokes [35], and browsing activity [60] by co-locating a spy process alongside a victim in such a way that they share cache memory. The attack unfolds through a pre-attack step in which a spy process fills/flushes specific cache sets, so that the victim leaves observable side effects in terms of its cache access patterns, that can be later inferred by the spy process by timing the access to particular cache blocks.

Exploiting Speculative Execution. This work tackles a highly evasive class of microarchitectural attacks called Spectre [51] that leaks information by exploiting side effects of speculative execution through cache-based side channels. These attacks not only exploit unintended side effects due to speculation, but have the ability to deliberately mislead execution into attacker-intended paths by mistraining the branch predictor and other associated structures. Several variants of the attack have been described (shown in Table 1) that can potentially bypass software security/integrity protection mechanisms such as bounds checking and ASLR [65].

Figure 1 shows a vulnerable code target for the variant-1 attack. The code fragment is composed of a conditional branch that performs a bounds check, and a Spectre gadget that results in an observable microarchitectural side effect upon execution. Upon mispeculation, the bounds check is bypassed and the Spectre gadget executes, leaving an observable cache footprint to the attacker, that remains even after the processor detects the misprediction and rolls back execution. In the simplest variant of the attack where the attacker controls both $x$ and $y$, the attacker can potentially leak the entire address space of the victim.

The variant-2 Spectre attack further allows the attacker to hijack speculative execution by mistraining the branch predictor and associated structures, enabling a ROP-style attack [63] that stitches together Spectre gadgets. To mount such an attack, a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>Vulnerability Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spectre v1</td>
<td>Branch Target Injection (BTI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spectre v2</td>
<td>Rogue Data Cache Load (RDCL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spectre v3</td>
<td>Rogue System Register Read (RSRD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spectre v4</td>
<td>Speculative Store Bypass (SSB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spectre v5</td>
<td>Lazy FP State Restore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spectre v6</td>
<td>Branches Checks Bypass Store (BCBS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectre v7</td>
<td>Read-only Protection Bypass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectre v8</td>
<td>ret2spec and SpecRSB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NetSpectre</td>
<td>Remote Bounds Check Bypass</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Code Example for Spectre Variant 1
co-located adversary process that shares the branch predictor (e.g., a browser process with several user threads) with the victim, first forces an artificial BTB (Branch Target Buffer) entry collision using a carefully chosen indirect branch address. The attacker next poisons the value of the colliding BTB entry by repeatedly executing its own branch whose target is the address of a Spectre gadget. After successful mistraining of the branch predictor, the processor now predicts the victim’s indirect branch that collides in the BTB to be the attacker-chosen Spectre gadget and starts speculatively executing it.

The variant 3 attack (a.k.a. Meltdown) exploits the fact that most out-of-order processors that employ dynamic speculation handle exceptions arising from speculatively executed instructions at instruction retirement (i.e., commit stage), rather than during instruction execution. Therefore, a non-privileged memory access can find its way to the cache and leave a footprint, allowing an attacker to now effectively read arbitrary memory contents of another process or even the kernel or the hypervisor, through careful cache-based side channel analysis.

The literature describes multiple attacks that conform to the above variants, but exploit different attack targets and/or different side channels. These include SgxSpectre [14] that bypasses Intel’s SGX [41] security mechanisms to steal secrets from SGX enclaves, the MeltdownPrime/SpectrePrime [70] that leverage a PRIME+PROBE [55] cache attack instead of FLUSH+RELOAD [82] by exploiting the side effects of cache line invalidation mechanisms in modern cache coherence protocols, and the NetSpectre attack that leaks information across independent virtual machines on Google Cloud via an AVX-based covert channel [64].

The variant-4 Spectre attack exploits microarchitectural side effects of the memory disambiguation feature employed by most out-of-order processors in order to allow loads to be speculatively ordered and executed before any outstanding store whose effective address has not been calculated yet. Upon misspeculation, i.e., if the load address has a conflict with the outstanding store, the processor flushes the pipeline and triggers the re-execution of the load and all subsequent instructions [45], while the microarchitectural side effects of the misspeculation linger, resulting in memory disclosures similar to variant 1 and 3. Similarly, the NG variant-3 attack [66] leverages the lazy x87 floating-point restore functionality of Intel CPUs to read floating-point registers of a victim process.

The Spectre variants 1.1 and 1.2, dubbed Speculative Buffer Overflows [49], exploit the store-to-load forwarding optimization to stitch together Spectre gadgets. More specifically, these attacks bypass a stack buffer overflow check similar to variant-1 and execute a Spectre gadget that speculatively stores malicious content (the address of the next Spectre gadget) into the return address on the stack. Store-to-load forwarding combined with the fact that most modern processors break down the return instruction into micro-ops that load the return address from the stack before transferring control, then result in a ROP-style execution of Spectre gadgets that leave a trail of microarchitectural state behind. The variant-5 attack [52] achieves similar effect, by instead mistraining the return address stack employed by most processor to speculatively predict the target of a procedure return.

**Spectre Mitigations.** The current set of mitigations for Spectre range from simple coding guidelines[11] to proposals that advocate exposing microarchitectural details in the ISA [57]. To mitigate Meltdown, Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) [18, 34] has been proposed and recently patched to the Linux kernel, incurring about 6% in performance. To mitigate Spectre v1, multiple chip manufacturers including Intel[42], ARM[6], and AMD[5], have suggested instrumenting code with serializing instructions or fences to inhibit speculation at specific points in execution. However, the associated performance overhead with liberal fence insertion could be as high as 10x [59]. While it is possible to perform compiler-directed code instrumentation with fences at a lower performance overhead [62], locating the potential Spectre targets using static analysis is non-trivial and could therefore result in less than full coverage [50]. Speculative Load Hardening [12, 13] and YSNB (You Shall Not Bypass) [59] proposes to alleviate the high overheads for fences and serializing instructions by injecting an artificial data dependency between the conditional branch and the Spectre gadget. These proposals incur 36-60% overhead in performance.

To cope with variant-2, both Intel and AMD have announced microcode update patches that introduce new fence instructions [42, 5] that prevent instructions preceding the fence from controlling the indirect branch prediction of branches that follow the fence. The fences also prevent software with lower privileges from influencing the indirect branch prediction of software with higher privileges. Furthermore, these patches restrict indirect branch prediction from being controlled by co-located threads via simultaneous multithreading [71, 72]. Furthermore, the use of retpolines [42, 43, 73] have been advocated to replace indirect jumps and calls with an equivalent push+ret instruction sequence, in order to bypass the indirect branch predictor. However, they could further expand the attack surface in the wake of v5, v1.1, and v1.2 attacks.

On the hardware front, SafeSpec [48] proposes mitigating side effects of speculative execution by adding new shadow user-invisible structures for caches and TLBs that store transient results from speculative instructions, and committing them to main cache/TLB only if the speculation was deemed correct and the corresponding instructions gracefully retire. Although SafeSpec makes disruptive changes to the processor/memory architecture and consistency models, it makes significant strides in secure hardware design with minimal performance impact. Finally, Dong, et al. [28] propose leveraging Virtual Ghost [23] to protect applications running on a compromised OS kernel from Spectre.

**Secure Instruction Stream Customization.** Prior work has established that instruction customization is an effective means to instrument the dynamic execution stream with security checks, and thereby mitigate several attack vectors at a relatively low performance overhead. Instruction stream customization has been proposed and evaluated in various forms and levels, ranging from secure virtual architectures at the
ISA and compiler level [24] to full-blown processor binary translation at the microcode level [61, 26, 10, 75]. Corliss, et al. [19, 20, 21] propose Dynamic Instruction Stream Editing (DISE), a macro-engine that customizes the dynamic instruction stream at the decoder level, by pattern-matching user-defined production rules pushed into the decoder. Taram, et al. [68] propose context-sensitive decoding that leverages the CISC to RISC translation feature of modern instruction set decoders to dynamically alter the behavior of programmer-visible instructions without recompilation or binary translation. While we leverage these approaches in this research, this work targets a different class of emerging attacks, and proposes several additional techniques beyond microcode customization.

**Information Flow Tracking.** Suh, et al [67] first proposed the idea of Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) that tags data from untrusted channels as spurious, and further tracks the information flow of spurious data, flagging any violation of an enforced security policy. Multiple hardware information flow tracking techniques have been described at various levels of the hardware [15, 76, 69, 22, 17, 74, 25, 16] as a detection mechanism to circumvent code injection [81], cross-site scripting attacks [25, 77], buffer overflows [25, 81], and SQL injection [53, 37, 38, 84, 25]. This work proposes decoder-level information-flow tracking as a detection mechanism for Spectre, and addresses several associated challenges.

### 3. Assumptions and Threat Model

Among the Spectre variants, the Bounds Check Bypass (variant-I) is the one which has had the highest impact in terms of affected platforms and devices. Therefore, the main focus of this work is to mitigate the variant-I attack, at an acceptable level of performance. However, owing to the flexibility advantages of microcode customization, we also propose new mitigations against other Spectre variants documented in Table 1.

We assume that the goal of the attacker is to read arbitrary memory contents by exploiting a Spectre gadget. Also, without loss of generality, in this work we defend against a Spectre attacker that targets the most obvious and the most important victim, i.e., the OS kernel, but our framework allows us to extend the proposed techniques to mitigate different targets such as virtual machines and browsers. Our attack model assumes an adversary with the following capabilities:

- **Information Leakage.** We assume that the adversary has the ability to access registers, flush, or evict any cache line including that of the kernel at any particular time. Also, they can make precise timing measurements using instructions such as rdtsc and rdtscp.

- **Location.** We assume that the adversary is colocated with the victim, and can not only leak information through cache-based side channels, but can also misinterpret shared branch predictor structures including branch target buffers and return address stacks, and can further influence the branch outcome of the victim, as described in the variant-2 attack.

### 4. Architectural Overview

Figure 2 gives the architectural overview of our defense strategy – *context-sensitive fencing*. The central piece of the proposed architecture is an x86 microcode engine that has context-sensitive decoding (CSD) capabilities [68], allowing it to optionally translate a native x86 instruction into a customizable, alternate set of micro-ops. In this work, we leverage this capability to perform the surgical insertion of speculation fences (some existing and some newly proposed) at potentially vulnerable Spectre code targets. To this end, we introduce new custom micro-op flows and new configuration mechanisms that trigger such micro-op flows.

The CSD-enabled microcode engine is provisioned with fine-grained reconfiguration capabilities via a set of model-specific registers (MSRs) that can control the frequency, type, and enforcement criteria of speculation fences inserted into the dynamic instruction stream. Such a fine-grained reconfiguration capability is especially important to this work because speculation fences are particularly expensive, allowing us to surgically insert fences that impose varying degrees of restrictions on speculative execution, depending upon the runtime conditions, current level of threat, and the nature of the code being executed.

Moreover, the context-sensitive fencing framework also benefits from a novel decoder-level information flow tracking (DLIFT) engine that has the ability to identify malicious in-
work also includes hardware and microcode-level mechanisms for

5.1. Microcode Customization

Speculation fences are a processor’s primary mechanism to override speculative execution. For Spectre Variant 1, context-sensitive fencing works with CSD by providing alternate decodings of all load instructions, with the alternate decoding always including a fence micro-op that appears before the load micro-op. The alternate decoding will then be triggered or not based on runtime conditions. The first consideration, then, is what fence instruction to incorporate. Most processors already provide a variety of fences and serializing instructions. We first study the performance and security impact of the existing suite of fences and serializing instructions, and then explore and propose new speculation fences and context-sensitive fencing techniques that manage the impact on performance. For Spectre variant 2, CSF works with CSD by providing alternate decodings of some control flow, and possibly insert fences and/or branch predictor resetting micro-ops — more detail is in Section 5.3.

5.1.1. Serializing Instructions and Memory Fences.

Serializing instructions are the strictest amongst all speculation fences and completely override speculative execution. Upon decoding a serializing instruction, the processor stalls fetching any subsequent instruction until all instructions preceding the serializing instruction retire. Due to the high pipeline depth and issue width of modern out-of-order superscalars, the usage of serializing instructions could result in long delays and considerable throughput loss. Memory fences, on the other hand, enforce a memory serialization point in the program instruction stream. More specifically, these fences ensure that memory operations that appear in execution after the fence are stalled until all the outstanding memory requests (including the fence) complete execution.

Table 2 shows a complete list of Intel’s existing serializing instructions and fences [45]. Most of the serializing instructions need to be run in privileged mode which restricts their usage in defenses for victims that lack sufficient privileges (e.g., browsers). Moreover, a majority of them modify the state or contents of architectural registers, the program counter, cache, TLB, etc. and only serialize execution as a side effect, thereby requiring an additional backup/restore step when used for the sole purpose of serializing execution. An exception to this is the MOV to debug register instruction that does not corrupt any architectural state, if not actually in debug mode.

The SFENCE instruction does not allow stores to pass through it, but does not affect loads. i.e., it enforces that all stores that precede the SFENCE are executed to completion before any store that succeeds the SFENCE is fetched. The MFENCE instruction restricts all memory operations from passing through it. Unlike SFENCE and MFENCE that are memory ordering operations, LFENCE performs a serializing operation. In particular, LFENCE does not stop the processor from fetching and decoding instructions that appear after the LFENCE, but it restricts the dispatch of such instructions, until the instructions preceding the LFENCE complete execution. Since LFENCE serializes execution and yet makes some progress in the front-end, it has been recommended by Intel as a low-overhead fence that can be inserted at vulnerable points in execution to defend against Spectre [42]. In other words, while serializing instructions such as CPUID are enforced at Fetch, LFENCE is enforced at the instruction queue level. Therefore, in this work, we start with the LFENCE, and propose new fences that come with fewer restrictions, different enforcement policies, and/or sport additional optimizations.
5.1.2. Fence Enforcement Policies

It is important to note that none of the existing instructions that provide fence support were actually created for the purpose we (or the whole industry) need for Spectre mitigation. Thus, this work will examine existing fences, variants of existing fences, and also introduce a new fence primitive. To better understand the design landscape, we examine several possible properties of fences in this section.

**Early vs. Late Enforcement.** We first categorize fences into *early-enforced* and *late-enforced* fences, based on the pipeline stage at which they are enforced. In particular, we refer to any serializing instruction, such as an LFENCE, that is enforced at the instruction queue or earlier in the pipeline as *early-enforced*. If the fence is enforced at a later stage such as the reservation station, the load/store queue, or the cache controller, we refer to it as a *late-enforced* fence. Late enforcement, in essence, shifts the fence enforcement point towards the leaking structure (e.g., the cache), reducing the impact on instructions that do not access that structure, and allowing for the enforcement of more fine-grained serialization rules (e.g., allow cache hits but not misses).

It is important to note that the later a fence is enforced, the fewer the side channels it protects against. For example, Intel’s LFENCE prevents information leakage through all microarchitectural structures that appear after the instruction queue. However, to prevent information leakage through the instruction cache side channel, we would have to resort to a regular serializing instruction or an MFENCE, resulting in prohibitively high performance overheads. Similarly, a fence enforced at the data cache controller level would only mitigate data cache-based side channels and will not protect against an FPU-based side-channel. Instead, the FPU-based side-channel may be mitigated using a different fence that is appropriately configured and enforced at the reservation station or the FPU.

**Strict vs. Relaxed Enforcement.** Depending upon how prohibitive they are, we next classify fences into *strict* and *relaxed*. Strict fences are highly prohibitive and do not allow any instructions to pass through them until the fence retires, whereas relaxed fences allow certain types of instructions to pass through them. For example, an SFENCE that is enforced at the load/store queue and allows all instructions to pass except stores that have a greater sequence number than itself, is a *late-enforced* and relaxed fence. On the other hand, all x86 serializing instructions including LFENCE are *early-enforced* and strict. Customizing the micro-op stream with *early-enforced* and *strict* fences typically results in slower execution when compared to customization with *late-enforced* and *relaxed* fences. However, with carefully enforced constraints, the *late-enforced* and *relaxed* fences could offer similar, if not better security guarantees.

**Early vs. Late Commit.** A fence typically remains effective until it gets committed or squashed. Based on Intel’s manual [44], a serializing instruction is only allowed to be committed if there is no preceding outstanding store that is waiting to be written back. While this behavior might be necessary for device synchronization or memory ordering enforcement, for the purpose of securing speculative execution against Spectre attacks, there is no need to wait for stores to be written back. This is because write buffers aren’t committed to the cache until the store reaches retirement, and therefore the fact that a store is waiting for an outstanding writeback request to complete is enough evidence that it did not occur along a mis-speculated path. Allowing a fence to commit early without waiting for preceding outstanding stores to write back can considerably improve performance because as soon as a fence gets committed, a stream of instructions can advance further in the pipeline. Therefore, in this work, we propose and study the effects of a late-commit version of each fence that does not wait for stores to be written back. However, we note that these versions should only be limited to the security use case we describe and should not be used for synchronization.

**Newly Proposed Fences.** Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of different existing and newly proposed fences. Although the existing set of fences defend against all variants, they incur prohibitively high costs on performance, due to their strict enforcement constraints. To better understand the potential for fences beyond those that already exist, we propose and evaluate three new types of fences. In an attack scenario, we typically insert one of these fences between a branch instruction and a load instruction that potentially leaks sensitive information via a cache side-channel. The proposed fences more effectively and efficiently mitigate the high impact variant-1 attacks, by preventing information leaks along mis-speculated paths through cache-based side channels. We
describe each of them in greater detail below.

The LSQ-LFENCE and the LSQ-MFENCE are relaxed fences enforced at the load/store queue. While LSQ-LFENCE fence is in effect, it does not allow any subsequent load instruction to be issued out of the load/store queue, thereby preventing the cache state from being changed by load instructions on misspeculated paths. Thus, the LSQ-LFENCE mitigates the Spectre variant-1 attack. On the other hand, the more restrictive LSQ-MFENCE does not allow any subsequent memory instruction (both loads and stores) to be issued out of the load/store queue, until the fence commits. In addition to mitigating the variant-1 attack that the LSQ-LFENCE protects against, the LSQ-MFENCE mitigates the variant-1.1 and variant-1.2 attacks that exploit store-to-load forwarding between speculative loads and stores.

The CFENCE is a relaxed fence and is enforced at the cache controller level using the following set of rules. First, like any other fence, it allows all preceding instructions to proceed. Second, since store instructions do not commit the contents of the write buffer until the instruction retires, they are unaffected by the CFENCE. Finally, it labels any subsequent load as a non-modifying load and allows it to pass through the fence, but the load is restricted from modifying the cache state. In particular, a non-modifying load that results in a cache hit is allowed to read the contents of the cache, but is restricted from changing the LRU and other metadata bits. On the other hand, a non-modifying load that results in a cache miss is marked as uncacheable, allowing the memory read request to complete without altering the cache state. In this way, we avoid updating the cache state upon encountering a speculative load and don’t leave any observable cache footprints along misspeculated paths, thereby mitigating the variant Spectre variant-1 attack.

In addition, due to locality of references, the miss rate of reasonable program is typically very low, and therefore, using CFENCE results in considerably lower performance overhead than other types of fences.

Note that this can be applied recursively at each cache level. For example, an L2 hit (L1 miss) will bypass the L1 cache and not initiate a fill, then read from the L2 cache without altering the LRU bits.

5.1.3. Fence Frequency Optimization

The most naïve yet secure way to insert fences is to liberally instrument every instruction of a vulnerable type (e.g., load instructions in the case of cache side-channels) in the program and add the fence micro-op to all of them. In fact not every instance of a vulnerable instruction type is necessarily vulnerable; for example, all the loads in the program aren’t vulnerable to speculative attacks via cache side-channels. Therefore, we can reduce the number of fences inserted. However, since failing to insert fences, even in one scenario, would enable a Spectre attacker to read the whole victim’s memory space, it is of crucial importance that fence frequency optimizations be conducted meticulously. In the following, we introduce two secure optimizations for reducing the number of fences.

Basic Block-Level Fence Insertion. The source of the Spectre attack is dynamic control speculation, which implies that the speculation begins with a branch prediction and the processor starts speculatively executing along the predicted path. To fully mitigate this attack, we want a fence between each branch and subsequent loads; but if one branch is followed by four loads, we only need one fence to protect all four. Thus, in this optimization, we propose the insertion of fences for only vulnerable/tainted loads that operate on untrusted data, but the load is restricted from modifying the cache state. In all known instances of the attacks, the attacker performs some operations (mostly memory read) based on untrusted data that leads to the information leak. For example, in Spectre variant-1 the attacker provides an untrusted out-of-bound index to an array. In this work, we assume any information that comes from the user address space, input devices, and DMA’d pages as untrusted. In this optimization, we propose the insertion of fences for only vulnerable/tainted loads that operate on untrusted data, by leveraging a novel decoder-level information flow tracking (DLIFT) strategy described in the following section.

5.2. Decoder-Level Information Flow Tracking (DLIFT)

As its name indicates, the distinguishing feature that makes DLIFT unique from typical hardware taint tracking systems is that DLIFT can provide the taint information at the decoder stage of the pipeline rather than at commit stage. This is a critical distinction, though, for two reasons. First, obviously, our solution is decoder-based. Second, and perhaps more important, execute- or commit-based taint tracking comes too late in the pipeline for any speculation-based attack, and is of little use.

However, commit is still the only stage where taint information is guaranteed to be correct, so the design of a decode-
based taint tracker is challenging. In particular, since the front-end of the pipeline typically runs far ahead in execution than the rest of the pipeline, reading actual taints from register files at the decode stage will read inaccurate values. Therefore, in the proposed DLIFT framework, we separate the taint information into four taint structures – (a) a decoder-level taint map that tracks and maintains the taint information for architectural registers, (b) the physical register file augmented with taint information that maintains dynamically computed taint information at execute, (c) the TLB and page tables augmented with a taint bitmap to track cache block-level taint information, and (d) a commit-level taint map that maintains verified architectural register taint information. While the latter three structures are typical of any standard DIFT implementation [67], the former structure is a new addition proposed by this work. Instruction translation thus depends on some speculative taint tracking that might not be exact, potentially leaving vulnerable instructions unfenced (i.e., translating to non-secure micro-ops). For this reason, DLIFT relies on a mistaint recovery mechanism that, upon detecting a mistaint at the execution stage, redirects and restarts the execution from the incorrectly tainted instruction.

Figure 4 shows the integration of DLIFT with a CSD-enabled pipeline. The DLIFT engine maintains a taint map that stores a speculative taint bit for each architectural register. For each incoming instruction (1), the DLIFT engine evaluates the taint of destination register(s), based on the speculative taint bits of the source registers. Taint evaluation follows the standard DIFT procedure [67]. If a source register is marked as tainted in the speculative taint map, DLIFT propagates this taint to the destination register and further triggers context-sensitive translation (2) of the instruction (e.g., with speculative fence insertion), depending upon the configured levels of performance and security.

Tracking taints at the decoder level is not always straightforward. First, during speculative execution, the DLIFT engine continues to propagate taints along the misspeculated path, potentially leaving the taint map in an inconsistent state upon recovery from a branch misprediction. To this end, the DLIFT engine rolls back the state of the taint map to its commit-level counterpart, as part of the branch misprediction recovery. Second, the effective addresses of load instructions is usually not known at the decoder stage, due to which the DLIFT engine cannot accurately compute and propagate taint information. A conservative approach that marks all loads with unknown effective addresses as tainted could severely degrade performance since overtainting typically results in a high frequency of fence insertion. Therefore, we take a more optimistic approach by assuming loads with unknown effective addresses as untainted, and further rely on a mistaint detection mechanism at the execute stage to validate the predicted taints against the dynamically evaluated taints (3 and 4). In the event a mistaint is detected, we update the speculative taint map, flush the pipeline, and restart the translation and execution of the mistainted instruction. Note that we only perform mistaint recovery for the undertainting scenario, since it could potentially leave vulnerable instructions unfenced.

Furthermore, the DLIFT engine is capable of identifying instruction sequences and execution patterns such as a tainted load followed by a branch, allowing for the seamless detection of different Spectre gadget variants. In this way, although speculative, the DLIFT engine has the potential for fast recovery from misprediction, and further allows the microcode customization framework to perform a more targeted and surgical insertion of fences for particular vulnerable targets.

5.3. Mitigations for Control-flow Mistraining

Two Spectre variants (v2 and v5) rely on the mistraining of the branch predictor and the return stack buffer to influence the victim’s branch outcome across different protection domains. To mitigate these attacks, we examine several hardening mechanisms. In the simplest case, where we are protecting kernel branches from getting influenced, we can instrument syscall instructions to enforce branch predictor state isolation. If we want to protect a wider range of domain crossings, we could rely on a simple hardware mechanism that identifies control transfer to a domain with a higher privilege and then sets a flag. The first control flow instruction that decodes after that flag is set would then trigger an alternate decoding and reset the flag. The alternate decoding would insert a fence (to protect against this branch being mispredicted), then execute micro-ops that enforce branch predictor state isolation, and subsequently resume the original control flow.

This solution, then, is flexible enough that any region of code could be protected in this way by configuring model specific range registers (MSRRs) to indicate a protected region that would always reset the branch predictor upon entry; this, then, even prevents mistraining of sensitive code of different threads within the same process.

The easiest and the most heavyweight way to isolate the BP state is to clear all the states by a series of return/branch micro-ops. However, such a hard reset of the BP can be more quickly and efficiently performed using a special micro-op that clears some or all state of the branch predictor, thereby enabling custom solutions to reset different structures within the prediction unit, if such a micro-op is available. In this work, we assume a special micro-op to clear the branch target buffer (BTB) and the return stack buffer (RSB), the primary targets of the Spectre attack.

It should be noted that while resetting the BTB and the RSB will induce more mispredictions (something the attacker wants), it does the attacker no good with respect to these Spectre variants because the attacker can no longer control the target of the control flow mispeculation.

6. Methodology

This section details the experimental methodology for the performance and security evaluation of the context-sensitive fencing framework.
Table 4: Architecture Detail for the Baseline x86 Core

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline Processor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Fetch width</th>
<th>Issue width</th>
<th>INT/PP Regfile</th>
<th>LQ/SQ size</th>
<th>Branch Predictor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 GHz</td>
<td>4 fused uops</td>
<td>6 unfused uops</td>
<td>160/144 re</td>
<td>64/56 entries</td>
<td>LTAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D cache</td>
<td>ROB size</td>
<td>IQ</td>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32 KB, 8 way</td>
<td>168 entries</td>
<td>54 entries</td>
<td>Int ALU(6), Multi(1),</td>
<td>FP, ALU/Multi(2), SIMD(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Benchmarks Description

Our baseline processor is modeled after the Intel Sandybridge microarchitecture [1]. Table 4 shows the architectural configuration of our baseline processor in more detail. Note that we evaluate against three different branch predictor configurations (with different BTB and RAS) sizes to measure the performance impact of our micro-op flows that perform branch predictor state isolation across protection domains to defend against variant-2. We model this architecture using the gem5 [9] architectural simulator which already features x86 micro-op translation. Furthermore, gem5 already features a Spectre test infrastructure and a visualization tool that allow us to validate our claims regarding the security guarantees of context-sensitive fencing [56].

One of the primary goals of this work is to protect kernel memory from being leaked along misspeculated paths. Therefore, we use the full system simulation mode of gem5 which allows us to boot an Ubuntu 18.04 distribution of Linux with a kernel version of 4.8.13. Furthermore, in order to provide realistic estimates regarding attack coverage and performance impact of our proposed techniques, we select a good mix of benchmarks that spend different amounts of execution time in kernel mode, touch different aspects of the operating system, and perform different number of system calls during execution, as illustrated in Table 5. To this end, we include four benchmarks, bzip2, gcc, sjeng, omnet, from the SPEC CPU2006 suite [39] that exhibit varying degrees of instruction-level parallelism. Furthermore, use three commonly used Unix tools that target different functionalities of the kernel and use different device drivers — ping that sends and receives ICMP packets, (ps aux) that queries process information, and (ls /*/** that queries the filesystem in order to list multi-level directory information. In addition, we also add a memory-intensive program llsu that allocates a large amount of memory for a linked list and traverses the list making random memory accesses [85].

7. Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate both security and performance impacts of the proposed strategy, starting first with security assessment and following that with performance evaluation.

7.1. Security Discussion

The proposed defense strategy can mitigate five variants of the Spectre attacks. We discuss these in detail below.

Variants 1, 1.1, and 1.2. The goal of these variants is to leak memory contents of a victim along a misspeculated path by bypassing a bounds check and/or further stitch together such Spectre gadgets via store-to-load forwarding. All variants exploit a data cache-based side channel to leak information. Context-Sensitive Fencing mitigates these variants primarily by preventing information from being leaked along misspeculated paths via fences that are surgically inserted into the instruction stream and strategically placed between the conditional branch that performs the bounds check and the first load in the Spectre gadget. This work proposes three new fences – LSQ-LFENCE, LSQ-MFENCE, and CFENCE that each defend against the variant-1 attack by disallowing loads along misspeculated paths to modify the data cache state. LSQ-MFENCE additionally protects against the variants 1.1 and 1.2 by preventing both speculative loads and stores from being issued out of the load/store queue, effectively avoiding store-to-load forwarding between speculative loads and stores.

The surgical insertion of these fences is facilitated by the decoder-level information flow tracker (DLIFT) that can detect instruction sequences that could serve as Spectre gadgets, as described in Section 5.2. While the DLIFT itself performs speculative tracking of taint information, it has the ability to detect mistraining and recover within three stages of the pipeline. We further experimentally show later in this section that the speculative nature of the DLIFT engine may sometimes result in overtainting (where trusted operands/instructions get marked as tainted), but never results in an undetected and unrecovered undertainting (where untrusted operands/instructions remain untainted).

Variants 2 and 5. These variants reverse-engineer and mistrain the branch predictor and the return address stack to influence the branch outcomes of a victim, which in our case is the Linux kernel. In addition to the surgical fence injection and speculative taint tracking, context-sensitive fencing further employs mistraining mitigations that circumvent such attempts. More specifically, we intercept all protection domain crossings via syscalls and int 0x80 instructions and perform a full reset of the branch target buffer (BTB) and the return stack buffer (RSB), clearing all previous state. This prevents user code from influencing branch outcomes of the kernel code. We record no instance of BTB collision between user and kernel branches, and we ensure that we always start with a clean BTB and RSB upon entering kernel mode.

To show that our different fences and frequency optimizations close Spectre attacks, we use a proof of concept Spectre implementation and visualization tool [56]. The attacks fail
in every case when we use context-sensitive fencing to insert fences, despite our performance optimizations.

7.2. Performance

Figure 5 measures the performance impact of three different fences – (a) the standard x86 LFENCE, (b) the LSQ-MFENCE, and (c) the CFENCE, all enforced with the standard late commit, pessimistically inserted for every kernel load in the program. Clearly, from the figure, the CFENCE incurs the lowest performance overhead, since it is less restrictive than the other two and is enforced at a much later pipeline stage. We further study the effect of late and early commit policies for the CFENCE, as shown in Figure 6. The early commit version of the CFENCE consistently performs better than the late commit version, saving about 4% in overall execution time on average.

Overall, the CFENCE drastically reduces the incurred performance overhead due to fencing by 2.3X, bringing down the execution time overhead from 48% to 21%. Furthermore, this performance improvement is consistent across all the benchmarks; the only exception being llu, which performs random memory accesses due to the linked list traversal and suffers from a very high cache miss rate.

In Figure 7, we study the effect of the CFENCE on cache miss rate. Recall that when a load passes a CFENCE, it gets marked as non-modifying, and as a result, if it ends up being a miss in the cache, it is deemed uncacheable and therefore, the fetched cache block isn’t brought into cache. If the miss rate of a program is already high, as in the case of llu, the presence of a CFENCE in the instruction stream could potentially result in under-utilization of the cache since the missed blocks aren’t being filled back into the cache while the CFENCE is being enforced. For programs that have unusually low hit rates, we suggest using the standard LFENCE instead of the CFENCE. However, in those cases it should be noted that the overhead of the mitigation is low regardless of the fence used.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the number of non-modifying loads in the dynamic instruction stream do not necessarily have a negative impact on performance, while a CFENCE is being enforced. For example, while the ping program has the most non-modifying loads, it does not suffer much in terms of overall performance, because the working set fits well into the cache and most of the non-modifying accesses end up being hits. In general, we gain more from employing the CFENCE instead of standard serializing fences when the cache hit rate is low.

Figure 8 shows the performance of our proposed fence frequency optimization techniques. In the first optimization, we inject the CFENCE only for tainted loads and branches, as indicated by the DLIFT engine. This reduces the performance overhead of the defense from 21% to 11% on average. We further optimize the number of fences inserted by performing basic block-level fence insertion, where we only instrument the first instance of a vulnerable load in each basic block. This results in an additional 4% improvement in performance. Overall, compared to the state-of-the-art fence injection scheme that pessimistically injects an LFENCE for all kernel loads, our DLIFT-Based CFENCE injection reduces the performance overhead from 48% to just 7.7% on average.
We next study the accuracy and coverage of our DLIFT implementation. Figure 9 examines overtainting scenarios, where the DLIFT engine conservatively marks instructions as tainted when they’re actually not. The results are normalized to the total number of dynamic load instructions executed. Further, we examine two scenarios – the bars to the left represent DLIFT-based fencing without the basic-block level fence insertion, and the bars to the right includes the basic-block level fence insertion optimization. In most cases, the percentage of overtainted loads remains low in both scenarios.

Figure 10 examines undertainting scenarios, where the DLIFT engine optimistically forgoes instrumenting certain instructions that are actually vulnerable, but recovers from such scenarios later in the pipeline. We observe that the percentage of undertainted loads is low and consistently below 10%, with the outliers being the kernel-heavy applications, ping and ps, which have the highest number of tainted instructions (instructions with at least one tainted source register) as shown in Figure 11.

To evaluate the effect of our mistraining mitigations, we measure the impact of a full micro-op based BTB and RSB reset at every protection domain crossing. We do this experiment on three separate branch predictor configurations: (a) a small predictor with 256 BTB and 8 RAS entries, (b) a medium predictor with 512 BTB and 16 RAS entries, and (c) a large predictor with 1024 BTB and 32 RAS entries. We measure an average performance degradation of 2.7% on our small predictor, 6.6% on our medium predictor, and 15.2% on our large predictor. Naturally, the overhead is almost completely due to the loss of prediction accuracy, rather than the cost of micro-op expansion.

In summary, the proposed defense strategy introduces a flexible microcode customization framework that perform the surgical insertion of newly introduced speculation fences, that mitigate five variants of the Spectre class of attacks, reducing the fencing overhead of state-of-the-art fence-based Spectre mitigations by a factor of 6.
References


