We’ll be discussing two papers: On the Borel and von Neumann Poker Models and Best Response to Tight and Loose Opponents in the Borel and von Neumann Poker Models with further emphasis on the former. You can find links to them below:



EDIT 2/11/11: In case anyone is getting confused by the missing figures in the second article, I have posted recreations of what I believe the author was trying to show.  (Figure 2, Figure 4).  The remaining figures are essentially the betting trees from the first article.

Like with the AKQ lecture, we’ll also give you some time to play the games to see what they’re like.  We’ll use the following site to help generate random numbers:


Additional papers related to the topic are given below that go into the math and derivations a bit more heavily.  These won’t be discussed but are provided in case you are interested.

http://www.archive.org/details/theoryofgamesand030098mbp (Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, focus on section 19)

http://www.math.ucla.edu/~tom/papers/poker2.pdf (Uniform(0,1) Two-Person Poker Models)

http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.dmj/1077468915 (A Continuous Poker Game)