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Office of the Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary

U.S. Department of Defense
Joint Forces Command
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

January 10, 2005
A. INTRODUCTION

It is widely recognized that regional instability in governmental and societal institutions in failing and failed states will create increasingly important national security and foreign policy issues, especially as globalization expands national perspectives and policies. In addition to the intra-state problems, these environments can provide a haven for terrorist operations that transcend national boundaries. Efforts both to prevent institutional instabilities from leading to conflict and to successfully address those post-conflict environments that inevitably arise are anticipated to influence our national security requirements and capabilities, and contribute to many of the most critical foreign policy issues facing the United States in the 21st century.

Even before 9/11, a number of blue ribbon commissions called for transformation of our national security apparatus, including our political, diplomatic, and military institutions, to meet the challenges of rising asymmetric threats in the era of globalization. As a complementary background for the conclusions of these commissions, in its December 2000 report, *Global Trends - 2015*, the National Intelligence Council identified demographics, natural resources and environment, science and technology, globalization, national and international governance, future conflict, and the role of the U.S. as seven key drivers or trends that would shape the world of 2015. The *Road Map for National Security - Imperative for Change*, published in January 2001 by the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, anticipated the need for, and the constituent parts of, a new department of homeland security. It also called for transformation of the armed forces and the Pentagon, an altered structure for the State Department, and a doubling of science and technology R&D by 2010. In the same month, the National Defense University concluded, in *Challenges of the Global Century - Report of the Project on Globalization and National Security*, “...successful strategies and policies in the global era require much closer coordination among the
economic, security, law enforcement, environmental, and S&T policy communities in Washington... The ability to shape globalization rather than just react to it requires adequate resources and a better balance between hard and soft security... More effective use of nonmilitary shaping and crisis prevention instruments could reduce demands on U.S. and allied armed forces for peace operations.”

Mindful of these strategic studies and US engagement in real-world stability operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Sub-Committee on National Security Research and Development commissioned an Inter-Agency Working Group (IWG) on Regional Stability and Nation Building charged with examining research and development activities required to support physical, social, and administrative systems to enhance political and social stability in regions of concern around the world. The IWG is co-chaired by the Department of Defense (Dr. Barbara Sotirin) and the Department of State (Dr. George Atkinson).

In commissioning this initiative, the NSTC has recognized that regional stability and capacity building operations before and after conventional armed conflict are likely to require distinct R&D investments across a wide range disciplines to ensure mission success. Broadening our reliance on the hard sciences and technological solutions, capabilities derived from research in social, behavioral and economic sciences, biology, computer and information sciences, educational tools, engineering, environmental and geosciences, math and physical sciences may all be applicable. Accordingly, the IWG has planned a series of workshops to examine requirements, formulate prioritized R&D needs, determine R&D gaps, identify programs for early funding consideration, and develop an integrated National R&D Strategy for Regional Stability for delivery to the NSTC Subcommittee on National Security R&D by September 2005.

The first workshop, Interagency Requirements for Regional Stability/Capacity Building Research and Development (R&D), was held in Washington, D.C. on December
3, 2004. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Office of the Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State (STAS) hosted the workshop. The conference was co-sponsored by the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in DOD, and the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the US Department of State (DOS). The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Intelligence Council, and USACE within the Department of Defense provided workshop funding.

The purpose of the first workshop was to discuss a framework and vision for the initiative and to begin identifying, integrating, and prioritizing interagency requirements appropriate for R&D investment to more effectively support regional stability and capacity building operations. Workshop participants were senior leaders from the U.S. Government (USG), academe, and private organizations working in areas of policy, acquisition, requirements generation, and R&D. Plenary panel members were Flag Officers and Ambassadors in rank, or their equivalent, and represented the Department of Defense, Department of State, and nationally recognized research corporations. A major outcome of the workshop was the establishment of an expert working group knowledgeable of the major discussion components, who will undertake the responsibilities as required in responding to the mandate set out by the NSTC.

A list of the workshop participants and affiliations is provided in Appendix A. The workshop agenda is shown in Appendix B.

The workshop began with a plenary session in which the speakers provided a framework for many of the discussions throughout the conference. Subsequently, to consider specific issues, the workshop broke into five focus groups derived from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Association of the United States
Army (AUSA) post-conflict reconstruction framework\(^1\). The five focus areas were: Security; Justice and Reconciliation; Social and Economic Development; Governance and Participation; and Planning and Intelligence.

The focus groups were comprised of a government rapporteur, a facilitator, and experts from inside and outside the government. The rapporteur led each group through an open, self-generated dialogue. Topical references and matrixes, referred to as “strawmen” assisted the groups, but participants were encouraged to take the discussion in any direction that seemed appropriate, particularly since not all of the areas have had equal attention in the past. As a result, the challenges posed to the groups generated different formats for their conclusions. At the end of the breakout sessions, the members returned to the plenary session where the rapporteurs presented the consensus observations and requirements.

Based on the workshop ground rules, these proceedings highlight, without attribution, the plenary session discussions and summarize the conclusions and recommendations of the five focus groups. The proceedings were edited through a coordinated effort, engaging the rapporteurs, facilitators, and reporters. They provide the foundation for supplemental workshops to complete the integration and prioritization of the R&D requirements identified by this workshop, to identify R&D gaps, and to determine potential R&D programs to fulfill the needs.

**B. PLENARY SESSION—SETTING THE STAGE**

Reconstruction and stabilization is not a passing phenomenon. It has become a mainstream component of our foreign policy and our security strategy. The time has come to focus on reconstruction and stabilization capabilities and develop new tools to aid in this endeavor. This focus should look at conflict management before, during, and after conflict at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

History has shown that most stabilization and reconstruction efforts have taken commitments of five to

ten years to complete, however, we have also learned that 50% of those countries or regions relapse into conflict within five years. Creating some form of unstable peace is not the desired outcome, hence a better understanding of the near-term and long-term impact of our stabilization activities is required. To address challenges of post-conflict societies, many communities and organizations -- political, intelligence, diplomatic, military, and non-governmental -- must be engaged and key questions must be addressed early in the policy process and planning cycles.

Stability operations can be addressed in four phases. Note that they do not necessarily have to be tackled sequentially, but can be undertaken in parallel. Methods and tools for stability operations are not well developed and we need to address how R&D can support capacity building to help countries move along the process of transition in a manner that is effective and sustainable

- **Phase One:** **Basic Stabilization.** Basic Stabilization deals with the joint establishment and implementation of the rule of law, physical security, food security, and humanitarian assistance. In this phase a “window of necessity” occurs during which you have to demonstrate results in order to win hearts and minds. The more you do upfront, the wider the window becomes, and conversely, the less you do, the more the window closes.

- **Phase Two:** **Confronting Core Causes of Conflict.** The core causes of conflict must be identified, assessed and confronted in partnership with local entities having the trust of the community. Alternatives must be developed to the structures that are at the root of the conflict such as state-dominated and nonviable economies, exploitation of natural resources, and political systems based upon cronyism and patronage must be replaced to create viable economic and political systems. This process is inherently destabilizing in nature, therefore safety nets need to be established.

- **Phase Three:** **Infrastructure for a Market Democracy.** The supply-side of a market economy must be established for a stable democracy to be created. This includes the economic, physical and governmental infrastructures. For example, the rule of law is more than writing new legal code. In societies where order had previously been
imposed from the top, we now want them to function with just laws, principled courts, honest and accessible elections and representation, and to promote openness, freedom, equal opportunity and participation. This is a radical transformation requiring long-term investment, and can be thought of as the supply-side for democracy.

- **Phase Four: Development of a Civil Society and Accountability in a Society.** This phase creates the demand-side for democracy. A system of checks and balances on power is established. For instance, the events occurring today in the Ukraine where the people are voicing their concerns and taking ownership of the process illustrate the impact of investments made in civil society ten to twelve years ago.

Regional security is a central and critical element of US foreign policy and a national security issue. Unstable and failing states have a direct impact on the US. As was seen in Afghanistan, poor governance in a state halfway around the world can create an environment in which a terrorist organization can take hold. We need to use our resources to help build successful, prosperous, and stable societies.

### C. SECURITY

Addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions. Security concerns securing the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence and the restoration of territorial integrity. ¹

#### a. Observations/ Issues

The job of the security forces is to protect military and civilian personnel, the indigenous population, and infrastructure (including systems such as transportation, utilities, and banking), all while not making enemies. It was noted that in many cases, security is the easiest task, while coordinating different interagency cultures is the challenge. Most important in this
The age of globalization is the ability to share information and technology with multi-national partners while maintaining our own classification procedures.

The role of research and development is important and can be used to improve current operations. One approach is to break down specific tasks that typically are performed by people and determine which can be carried out with technology. Technological solutions can allow the military to focus on more complex issues so that a larger scope of protection is offered. Examples include UAVs for surveillance and robots to open suspicious packages.

The group decided to approach the topic by looking at five aspects of operational requirements: anticipatory understanding, detection, pre-emption, protection, and consequence management. The requirements were general in nature and experts can provide specificity at a later date.

b. Requirements

1. *Anticipatory Understanding.* Currently the U.S. adopts an “effects-based approach.” We need improved understanding of potential adversary’s capabilities and tactics. This includes expanded capabilities in modeling and simulation, including collaborative planning spaces with other nations; improved multi-national information sharing, particularly with regards to databases; and a common “language” to be used by all Allies.

2. *Detection.* We need to increase capabilities to understand the local environment. Individuals are a necessary component of this aspect as they are used as sensors and to interpret situations. Especially critical are improving human intelligence sources and capabilities for tagging of our own personnel for identification and recovery in the event of their being victimized.

3. *Pre-emption.* The U.S. military’s greatest capability in this realm is its ability to discredit perceived threats and neutralize an adversary’s operations. We need to expand precision in effects-based operations, such as the ability to affect an adversary’s economy without other consequences; increase capabilities to neutralize an adversary’s operations; and improve capabilities to rapidly destroy an adversary’s ammunition.

4. *Protection.* Besides advanced weaponry and state-of-the-art capabilities, our current strengths lie with individuals possessing specialized country or regional knowledge, such as Foreign Area Officers. Through their network of contacts and understanding of the society, they have access to valuable information that can be utilized for the early detection of threats. We also
need to reduce infrastructure vulnerabilities by changing their footprint, complexity or other attributes, e.g., wireless communication systems and distributed power systems in place of centralized electricity producing facilities.

5. **Consequence Management.** Immediately after a combat operation, we must begin rapid reconstruction and communicate often with local residents. We need tools to better coordinate activities between the conflict and reconstruction stages, so that vital facilities, infrastructure, or services are not destroyed; and to improve cultural acceptance by accelerating the reestablishment of services. Also needed is a “reconstruction survey” to determine what labs, groups, and other organizations are doing to aid in reconstruction and pinpoint gaps to be further addressed.

### D. JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

*Addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system and for dealing with past abuses; in particular, creation of effective law enforcement, an open judicial system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict.*

#### a. Observations/Issues

The second panel addressed the importance of justice and reconciliation needs on stability. In helping a country develop rule of law it should be kept in mind that the legal context will vary from case to case. It is not for us to decide what system is appropriate, but to give the state viable choices.

Justice and reconciliation is a subset of a larger operation. As such, planning needs to be conducted both between U.S. Government (USG) agencies as well as with other international actors. To more effectively plan we need a better understanding of the capabilities and weaknesses of our international partners and ourselves. To facilitate reconciliation efforts a common situational awareness is needed pre, during, and post crisis.
b. Requirements

1. *Planning Framework and Tools.* We need a standard, rigorous planning process with clearly articulated intended outcomes. The process should include: a standard analytic framework to assess needs and evaluate programs; and scenario based planning and exercise tools supported by modeling and simulation. Planning, assessment, and evaluation tools must be made available and interoperable to all USG agencies and, as required, members of the international community.

2. *Institution Foundation Tools.* We need the tools necessary to establish the institutional pillars of the justice system – laws, an independent judiciary, minimal corruption, and effective, fair selection of those who run the system.

3. *Forensics.* We need tools and methods to build the forensic capacity and infrastructure required to select, train, build and guide an effective, self-sustaining law enforcement structure. Also required are the organizational, methodological and staffing skills to insure a transparent, effective and humane penal system.

4. *Judiciary and Law Enforcement.* We need the planning, evaluation, investigation, information and communication capabilities to underpin the judiciary and support law enforcement including the collection and preservation of public/private documents; IT applications to provide access to law, codes, regulations; automated translation; and on-demand access to unclassified imagery in usable formats for investigation and verification (e.g., war crimes).

5. *Public Understanding.* We need methods to evaluate public understanding and to provide objective evaluation of the legal and public measures necessary to overcome distrust and animosity built on past grievances.

E. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELL BEING

Addresses fundamental social and economic needs; in particular provision of emergency relief, restoration of essential services to the population, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of an inclusive, sustainable development program. As the situation stabilizes, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development.\(^1\)
a. Observations/Issues

The group initially defined terms and timeframes for focus. Specific requirements were determined for both the pre-conflict and immediately post-conflict environments. The types of tools and data needed to improve our capacity in the pre-conflict or pre-intervention stage and how to predict that a state will fail were discussed. To be able to understand the circumstances and anticipate the potential fate of a country, additional information about the language, culture, and internal politics is needed. We need to close the warning-to-response gap, and our response should be tailored to the particular conditions in that state. The post-conflict stage was looked at in terms of a window of opportunity in which to effect stabilization. The time immediately during and immediately following conflict is critical.

b. Requirements

Pre-conflict

1. Strategic Environment. We need a better understanding of the strategic operating environment (globally, regionally and locally) to enhance in all aspects of stabilization efforts. We need to determine who the spoilers to stabilization are, and which groups will win and which will lose if a conflict or change in status quo occurs. We need a comprehensive understanding of the culture and social dynamics of the area involved.

2. Information Systems. We need a broad-based, coherent, distributed data collection and dissemination system. To date, we have very limited data in pre-conflict situations and imperfect access to natural allies in the process, such as NATO and the EU. Instead, there is often an over-reliance on the expertise of people within the region. Improvement is needed in getting the best and most timely information to the decision and policy makers.

3. Planning Tools. We need the ability to predict and prepare for intervention in a failed or failing state. Simulations, models, experimentation, and exercising capabilities are not adequate to
meet this need effectively, but in the future could play a major role. Military success in using these tools should serve as a model for civilian efforts.

4. **Assessment.** We need a capability to determine the appropriate depth and level of engagement. This includes an understanding of scalability, the investment necessary to prevent failing states from going into conflict, and metrics surrounding this process.

**Post-conflict**

5. **Common Operating Picture.** We need the ability to formulate a common picture of the environment we are working in. Details on the local economy, security, and short-term human capital needs are critical. Speaking the local language alone is not adequate unless it is coupled with an understanding of culture as well.

6. **Assessment and Evaluation Tools.** Capabilities are needed to determine and manage immediate needs. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is currently using rapid assessment tools during disasters. Similar tools could be used to draw in information and data in the initial days following conflict.

7. **Local Populace.** The local populace needs to have trust and confidence in our people on the ground. This is done through job creation and local contracting. Jobs create security. If the youth are employed they will be less likely to contribute to instability. The impact of the Commander’s Emergency Relief (CER) program should be examined.

8. **Strategic Communications.** Strategic communications are the lynchpins to improving stability management efforts. This is not just a matter of the U.S. government explaining what we are doing overseas. R&D efforts should focus on how to do an effective strategic communications plan so that the local government can understand that there is a plan behind our actions. Tools within the broad strategic plan should be integrated and expectations managed.

**F. GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION**

Addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes; in particular, establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public sector management and administration,
and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of government and its policies.  

a. Observations/Issues

The governance and participation panel sought to determine what capabilities the U.S. and international communities have or should develop to assist in the transition of states that have failed or are in conflict to states that have achieved baseline stability. The discussion quickly turned away from the international community and focused primarily on U.S. capabilities, with Iraq as the leading example. Many of the following recommendations and observations have relevance within the U.S. nation-building infrastructure as well as among the various international organizations and coalitions capable of entering into such efforts. The requirements were derived mainly from the lessons we are learning in Iraq, but also from other interventions such as in Somalia and Haiti.

The main theme of the requirements is social reorganization in the power vacuum that follows conflict. The focus of these requirements is on tools to influence social reorganization effectively. Although the primary issue of influence in a power vacuum was well established, additional ideas were developed that can be used in developing appropriate strategies and resources. Intervention is not the first stage in a conflict. Understanding the dynamics of the situation leading up to failure or conflict can aid in resolution prior to failure or conflict or help to ensure success in intervention after failure.

Leadership, resources, and the means to effectively invest leadership and resources are essential in building stabilization. There is an automatic conflict between the stability represented by the old governance structures and creating new, more effective governance structures. In the vulnerable period after a breakdown, communities will naturally reorganize in one direction or another. Jumping at the opportunity is essential to maintaining stability. Specialized human intelligence resources need to be established and sustained regardless of the threat of the day. Working backwards from
what the endgame should be can lead to better-defined efforts to achieve the goal. Political experts do not have adequate dialogue with the systems experts; it is hard to do but needed.

The most significant questions from this panel dealt with the transition of power from a foreign or temporary authority to a self-sustaining government. We should have the participation of the community as we guide it in its efforts to re-organize and make it more inclusive. Engaging all the people is critical to understanding the environment. Speak to the hearts and minds of the people. Know how they respond. What do they hold sacred? Legitimacy is relevant to the civil/social dynamic. The questions of community participation were too broad and complex to be defined within the constraints of this forum.

b. Requirements

1. **Public Order.** We need improved understanding of cultural and psychological instruments of influence and authority. Enhanced capabilities to direct and assert efforts to insure public order and safety include establishment of indigenous organizations with responsibility and in general having methods and measures necessary to deal with insurgencies, and conflicting societal elements.

2. **Failure Mechanisms and Metrics.** We need to identify determinants of pre-conflict and post-conflict failed states. The pre-entry metrics that need to be considered in a conflict or failed state. These factors can provide the basis for plans, programs and implementation capabilities to form the critical institutional pillars – executive, legislative, judicial and administrative – required to accelerate general reconstruction efforts.

3. **Mass Communication.** Mass communication is very powerful – power brokers can influence hearts and minds by managing the information that people receive. We need more effective mass communication techniques and tools to further broad-based inclusion of all elements of civil society to become involved and participate. Opening up free media is essential. Better polling techniques are needed to determine the effects of both inbound and outbound communications. Also needed are instantaneous translation devices.

4. **Power Structures.** Natural re-organization of a society is inevitable after a conflict situation. We need tools to determine the power brokers, how to work with them and how to identify the spoilers. The key power broker will be the one who understands and can shape the dynamics of the situation. Predictive analysis must be carefully
executed or efforts will fail. Selection and discernment measures are needed to insure that the people, organizations, and groups we are dealing with are the proper and most effective for the purpose.

5. Evaluation Tools and Metrics. We need to identify the expected outcome of civilian and military activities on governance and participatory issues and to develop metrics to prioritize and evaluate the effectiveness and implications of our efforts that are beyond simple polling. Agreed upon metrics between policymakers and policy executers are integral to gauging success on the ground.

6. Interagency Relationships. We need an improved understanding of multi-agency command and control relationships, especially between civilian and military organizations. Methods to design effective, flatter organizational structures are needed.

7. Establishing Governance. We need better electoral processes and the criteria for establishing legitimate indigenous leadership. We need to understand how you get good governance in the time leading up to elections; and how to transition from stability building to long-term sustainment governed by indigenous leadership.

G. INTELLIGENCE AND PLANNING

Addresses the need for training and education to develop a clear strategic plan of action, in particular, methodologies for continuous monitoring, intelligence support to planning and operations, new modeling and simulation tools and experimentation that accurately portray the full range of post-conflict reconstruction challenges, development of training programs and courses, and enhancement of training for indigenous personnel in critical areas.

a. Observations / Issues

An important issue for the U.S. is being able to collect intelligence in a region or country before a problem arises, or at least before a problem becomes acute. Put simply, the goal is to understand countries or regions in real-time, in pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict situations. Critical enablers include the ability to plan for and execute interagency operations over long time scales; new capabilities and practices for the collection, sharing, and analysis of intelligence data; and greater focus on education and training of key intelligence and information personnel.
The U.S. lacks a structure, a process, and the ability to plan for integrating all instruments of national power. This limits the government’s responsiveness when interagency cooperation is needed, as seen, for example, in the need to refine and clarify interagency Command and Control and Communications during transitional operations.

The information and intelligence needed for stability operations will be obtained from multiple sources, including open source intelligence and intelligence from international organizations, and will of necessity be shared with coalition partners. The U.S. currently lacks policies that will enable and facilitate sharing national security classified information, and common standards for improved interoperability. Though the group noted that currently policy is not always informed by intelligence analysis, it is important to establish information resources pre-crises to gather intelligence, leveraging the existence, for example, of country teams from outside organizations or USG civilian personnel who may already be in place within a region.

An important component of interagency cooperation supporting regional stability is the education and training of key intelligence and information personnel. The current status is characterized by inadequate (or a lack thereof) interagency training and education programs, no resourcing or rewards programs in the civilian agencies for interagency education, and no interagency dictionary, vernacular, common language, and concepts of operation.

b. Requirements

1. Planning. The USG needs processes and capabilities for planning and decision-making at the interagency level. Achieving this will require an enterprise model for planning and execution of reconstruction and stabilization, and a focused program of interagency exercises. Over time, this will enhance the ability to better understand the root causes of potential conflicts and thus bring greater focus on preventive and long-term measures. Achieving this level of integration may require an executive order mandating, directing, and/or controlling interagency cooperation.
2. **Intelligence.** A key goal is the ability to understand societies within their local, regional, and global context in real time, using a system-of-systems analysis framework. The principal analysis elements include power relationships at all levels, societal dynamics, a region’s cultural and religious values, economics, languages, and various means to influence the inter-relationships and dynamics. The USG needs to define, develop, and implement a government- and coalition partner-wide information sharing enterprise, and a community-wide common language for this enterprise, to ensure effective transfer of knowledge to host nations during all phases of stability operations. Another critical need concerns a central repository for intelligence data. This repository would also include non-governmental intelligence sources and could be utilized for prevention, mitigation, and nodal analysis. Data could be gathered from sources such as humanitarian repositories, countries of concern databases, government planning organizations such as DOD Joint Forces Command or DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and databases and search engines from the academic and research organizations such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Peace-Keeper and Stability Operations Institute at the Army War College and the National Defense University. Tools for data sorting and data mining need to be enhanced.

3. **Education and Training.** The principal goal is to design and develop a doctrine for interagency coordination and planning, and then train people to exercise the doctrine. Potentially, a forcing mechanism or legislation is required; one suggestion being to resource and implement “Goldwater/Nichols” type reforms for the interagency community. A supporting enabler is a broad-based exchange of personnel to break down cultural stereotypes.

**H. GENERAL THEMES/REQUIREMENTS**

Several themes were common to more than one of the five groups. These highlight the key capabilities required for improved success in pre- and post-conflict stability efforts. These requirements center on tools and capabilities required to respond more effectively to stability/capacity building operations.
Cross-cutting Requirements

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<th>Security</th>
<th>Justice &amp; Reconciliation</th>
<th>Economic &amp; Social Development</th>
<th>Governance &amp; Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Collaboration</td>
<td>We need seamless interagency and multi-leveled collaboration systems that enhance the ability of multiple agencies of the USG and, as required, its international partners to attain a collective understanding of the region and its capabilities, and to develop and execute plans. This capability will require a common understanding, “language” and new modeling and simulation tools.</td>
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<td>2. Information Collection, Sharing, Analysis</td>
<td>We need improved capabilities for the collection, distribution, retrieval and analysis of information critical for pre-conflict planning. These will promote understanding of the local language, values and culture, social and political structure, and economic and security situations. This information will come from many agencies and organizations, and various collection and reporting systems. It must be effectively analyzed and disseminated and assembled into commonly available pictures to allow a shared situational awareness within and between agencies of government.</td>
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<td>3. Capabilities for Influencing Environment</td>
<td>We need enhanced capabilities to insure public order and safety, and for dealing with insurgencies and conflicting societal elements. New analysis frameworks are needed for understanding the power relationships at all levels, societal dynamics, a region’s cultural and religious values, economics, languages, and effective means to influence the inter-relationships and dynamics.</td>
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<td>4. Planning, Evaluation</td>
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<td>5. Communication</td>
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resource management, and effective decisions. Tools such as modeling, simulation, scenarios, as well as other newly developing management evaluation systems and decision aids are relevant to these needs.

5. **Communication:** We need tools, approaches, and systems which allow the various players to reach common understanding necessary to plan, act, and interact with local populations. This also includes mass communication capabilities that help promote public trust, and strategic communications. There must be effective plans and mechanisms available to reach outside the U.S. stability forces (civilian and military) to inform and influence coalition partners, relevant regional and international audiences, and target populations.

### Requirements focused on a Single Area

6. **Infrastructure protection:** New capabilities are required to enhance the security of a region’s infrastructure by reducing the vulnerability of the systems, by making the systems less exposed, or more readily maintained and repaired.

7. **Justice:** Broad-based assistance must be provided, including the tools necessary to establish the institutional pillars of the justice system, e.g., laws, an independent judiciary, minimal corruption, and effective, fair selection of those to run the system.

8. **Governance:** For a country to transition to sustainable peace, the people and institutions put in place must have legitimacy with the local population. Selection and discernment measures are needed to insure that the people, organizations, and groups we are dealing with are the proper and most effective for the purpose. Better electoral processes must be fostered; the processes and criteria for establishing legitimate indigenous leadership created; and an understanding developed of how to transition from stability operations to long-term sustainment governed by indigenous leadership.

### I. NEXT STEPS

The next workshop, *Identifying Interagency Capability Gaps in Regional Stability Operations/Capacity Building*, is planned for February 23, 2005, in Washington, D.C. The objective of this second workshop will be to review current capabilities and to identify initial capability gaps of government and non-government organizations.
appropriate for R&D investment and to address regional stability operations and capacity building relevant to the requirements and needs documented above.

It is difficult to identify requirements that cross so many agencies and organizations and involve such a broad set of topics. This first workshop has begun the development of critical relationships across agencies, communities, and disciplines to achieve a comprehensive understanding of existing capabilities and to coordinate efforts to address capability gaps. The NSTC IWG on Regional Stability and Nation Building will convene experts to examine these requirements and programs in greater detail at subsequent workshops and to make recommendations, as appropriate, with the objective of preparing a national R&D strategy for regional stability by September 2005, for consideration in the FY 2007 budget cycle.
APPENDIX A
## List of Participants

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Institution</th>
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<tr>
<td>COL John F. Agogilia</td>
<td>Director, U.S. Army Peach Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (USAPKSOI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Allen</td>
<td>Program Director and Senior Technical Advisor to Dr. Robert Popp, SRS Technologies</td>
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The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research & Engineering
Col. Harold Shamblin, Director, Futures Directorate, U.S. Special Operations Command
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COL Guy White, National Defense University

Todd Wilson, Director, Transitional Security

Brenda D. Wyler, Asst Director for Warfighting Support, R&D, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
APPENDIX B
OBJECTIVE: To identify, integrate and prioritize interagency requirements appropriate for research and development investment to more effectively execute regional stability and capacity building operations.

8:00 am  Coffee and Registration

8:30  Welcome/ Opening Remarks  
Dr. Barbara Sotirin, Deputy Director Research & Development, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Mr. David Ozolek, Executive Director for Joint Experimentation, Joint Forces Command

Dr. George H. Atkinson, Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary

9:00  Setting the Stage

The Honorable Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs

9:10  Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State
Addressing the Challenge: Regional security and stability pre- and post-conflict in 21st century foreign affairs

Moderator: MG James A. Cheatham, Director, Military Programs, HQ U. S. Army Corps of Engineers

Dr. John Hamre, President and CEO, Center for Strategic and International Studies; co-chair, Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Ambassador James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND

Major General William Nash (ret.), Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations

10:40

Explanation of Breakout Sessions

Dr. Barbara Sotirin

10:45

Break

11:00

Breakout Sessions: The purpose of the breakout sessions is to identify and prioritize US capabilities needed in each of the five main areas:

Group 1 – Security (Ball Room B)
Rapporteur: David Ozolek, Department of Defense

Addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions. Security concerns securing the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence and the restoration of territorial integrity.

Group 2 – Justice and Reconciliation (John Paul Jones Room)
Rapporteur: Theodore Cooperstein, Department of Justice

Addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system and for dealing with past abuses; in particular, creation of effective law enforcement, an open judicial system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict.

Group 3 – Economic and Social Development (Iwo Jima Room)
Rapporteur: Susan Reichle, Department of State

Addresses fundamental social and economic needs; in particular provision of emergency relief, restoration of essential services to the population, laying the
foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of an inclusive, sustainable development program. As the situation stabilizes, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development.

**Group 4 – Governance and Participation (Washington Room)**
Rapporteur: Richard T. Miller, Department of State

Addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes; in particular, establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public sector management and administration, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of government and its policies.

**Group 5 – Planning and Intelligence (Ball Room A)**
Rapporteur: Dr. William A. Anderson, National Intelligence Council

Addresses the need for training and education to develop a clear strategic plan of action, in particular, methodologies for continuous monitoring, intelligence support to planning and operations, new modeling and simulation tools and experimentation that accurately portray the full range of post-conflict reconstruction challenges, development of training programs and courses, and enhancement of training for indigenous personnel in critical areas.

12:30 pm  
**Working Lunch – Break out sessions continue**

2:00  
**Topic Area Reports:** Each break-out group presents 5-10 observations and recommendations, answers questions from larger group. Re-adjourn to main dining room.

3:15  
**Discussant and Perspectives:**

The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research & Engineering

Ambassador James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND

Major General William Nash (ret.), Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations

3:45  
**Wrap up:** Discussion and Next Step
Dr. Barbara Sotirin and Dr. George H. Atkinson

4:00  
**Adjournment**