Purely Rational Secret Sharing
Silvio Micalli and abhi shelat.
Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC) 2009.
Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC) 2009.
Rational secret sharing is a fundamental primitive at the intersection of cryptography and game theory. In essence, a dealer wishes to engineer a communication game that, when rationally played, guarantees that each of the players learns the dealer's secret. Yet, all solutions so far were {\em quite inefficient} and relied on the players' {\em beliefs} and not just on their rationality.
After providing a more complete definition of this problem, we exhibit a very efficient and purely rational solution to it. Our solution works in the verifiable trusted third party model.
After providing a more complete definition of this problem, we exhibit a very efficient and purely rational solution to it. Our solution works in the verifiable trusted third party model.
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