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Purely Rational Secret Sharing

Silvio Micalli and abhi shelat.
Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC) 2009.

Rational secret sharing is a fundamental primitive at the intersection of cryptography and game theory. In essence, a dealer wishes to engineer a communication game that, when rationally played, guarantees that each of the players learns the dealer's secret.   Yet, all solutions so far were {\em quite inefficient} and relied on the players' {\em beliefs} and not just on their rationality.
After providing a more complete definition of this problem, we exhibit a very efficient and  purely rational solution to it.  Our solution works in the verifiable trusted third party model.

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