Language Security

Or: bringing a knife to a gun fight
One-Slide Summary

• A language’s design principles and features have a strong influence on the security of programs written in that language.
• C’s legacy of null-terminated, stack-allocated and non-sized buffers leads directly to one of the most common sorts of security vulnerabilities: the buffer overrun.
• What can be done?
Today: Hacking For Dummies?
Lecture Outline

• Currently: beyond compilers
  - Looking at other issues in programming language design and tools

• C
  - Arrays
  - Exploiting buffer overruns
  - Detecting buffer overruns
Duck-billed Platitudes

- Language design has profound influence on
  - Safety
  - Efficiency
  - Security
C Design Principles

• Small language
• Maximum efficiency
• Safety less important

• Designed for the world in 1972
  - Weak machines
  - Trusted networks
  - *Tell me: how did those two factors influence C?*
Arrays in C

char buffer[100];

Declares and allocates an array of 100 chars

100 * sizeof(char)
C Array Operations

char buf1[100], buf2[100];

Write:
   buf1[0] = ‘a’;

Read:
   return buf2[0];
What’s Wrong with this Picture?

/* strcpy buf1 into buf2 */
int i;
for (i = 0; buf1[i] != '\0'; i++) {
    buf2[i] = buf1[i];
}
buf2[i] = '\0';
Indexing Out of Bounds

The following are all legal C (no parse errors, no type errors, etc.) and may generate no immediate run-time errors

```c
char buffer[100];
buffer[-1] = 'a';
buffer[100] = 'a';
buffer[100000] = 'a';
```
Why Ask Why?

• Why does C allow out of bounds array references?
  - Proving at compile-time that all array references are in bounds is very difficult (\textit{why}?)
  - Checking at run-time that all array references are in bounds is expensive (\textit{why? who does this}?)

#11
Code Generation for Arrays

• The C code:

```c
buf1[i] = 1;    /* buf1 has type int[] */
```

• The assembly code:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular C</th>
<th>C with bounds checks</th>
<th>Costly!</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>r1 = &amp;buf1;</td>
<td>r1 = &amp;buf1;</td>
<td>Finding the array limits is non-trivial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r2 = load i;</td>
<td>r2 = load i;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r3 = r2 * 4;</td>
<td>r3 = r2 * 4;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if r3 &lt; 0 then error;</td>
<td>if r3 &lt; 0 then error;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r5 = load limit of buf1;</td>
<td>r5 = load limit of buf1;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>if r3 &gt;= r5 then error;</td>
<td>if r3 &gt;= r5 then error;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r4 = r1 + r3</td>
<td>r4 = r1 + r3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>store r4, 1</td>
<td>store r4, 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C vs. Java

• Typical work for a C array reference
  - Offset calculation
  - Memory operation (load or store)

• Typical work for a Java array reference
  - Offset calculation
  - Memory operation (load or store)
  - Array bounds check
  - Type compatibility check (for stores) (why?)
Buffer Overruns

• A **buffer overrun** writes past the end of an array

• **Buffer** usually refers to a C array of char
  - But can be any array

• So who’s afraid of a buffer overrun?
  - Cause a core dump
  - Can damage data structures
  - What else?
Stack Smashing

Buffer overruns can alter the control flow of your program!

char buffer[100]; /* stack-allocated array */
void foo(char in[]) {
    char buffer[100];
    int i = 0;
    for(i = 0; in[i] != '\0'; i++)
        buffer[i] = in[i];
    buffer[i] = '\0';
}
An Interesting Idea

char in[104] = { 0,...,0, magic 4 chars }

foo(in);  (**)

foo entry

0 1 2 99 return address

100 *sizeof(char)

foo exit

0 1 2 99 return address

100 *sizeof(char)

magic 4 chars
Discussion

• So we can make foo jump wherever we like!
• How is this possible?

• Unanticipated interaction of two features:
  - Unchecked array operations
  - Stack-allocated arrays
    • Knowledge of frame layout allows prediction of where array and return address are stored
  - Note the “magic cast” from char to an address
The Rest of the Story

• Say that foo is part of a network server and the in originates in a received message
  - Some remote user can make foo jump anywhere!

• But where is a “useful” place to jump?
  - Idea: Jump to some code that gives you control of the host system (e.g. code that spawns a shell)

• But where to put such code?
  - Idea: Put the code in the same buffer and jump there!
Useful Jumps

• Where to jump?

• We want to take control of the program
• How about to a system call?
The Plan

- Force a jump to the following code:
  - In C: `exec("/bin/sh");`
  - In x86 assembly:
    ```
    movl $LC0, (%esp)
    call _exec
    LC0: .ascii "/bin/sh\0"
    ```
  - In machine code: `0x20, 0x42, 0x00, ...`
The Plan

char in[104] = { 104 magic chars }

foo(in);

• The last 4 bytes in “in” must equal the start of buffer
• That position might depend on many factors!
Guess the Location of the Injected Code

• Trial and error: gives you a ballpark
• Then pad the injected code with NOP
  - e.g. add r0, r1, 0x2020
    • stores result in r0 which is hardwired to 0 anyway
    • Encoded as 0x20202020

\texttt{foo exit}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{cccccc}
0 & 1 & 2 & ... & 99 & return address \\
\hline
0x20, ..., 0x20, & 0x20, & 0x42, & 0x00, & ... & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

• Works even with an approximate address of buffer!
More Problems

- We do not know exactly where the return address is
  - Depends on how the compiler chose to allocate variables in the stack frame
- Solution: pad the buffer at the end with many copies of the “magic return address X”
Even More Problems

• The most common way to copy the bad code in a stack buffer is using string functions: strcpy, strcat, etc.

• This means that buf cannot contain 0x00 bytes
  - Why?

• Solution:
  - Rewrite the injected code carefully
  - Instead of “addiu r4,r0,0x0015” (code 0x20400015)
  - Use “addiu r4,r0,0x1126; subiu r4,r4,0x1111”
• Name the company that manufactures Barbie (a $1.9 billion dollar a year industry in 2005 with two dolls being bought every second).
• This is a three-part deductive argument with an unstated assumption which must be true for the premises to lead to the conclusion. Examples include: "There is no law against composing music when one has no ideas whatsoever. The music of Wagner, therefore, is perfectly legal." or advertisements in which cars are draped with beautiful people.
Q: Events (597 / 842)

- Identify the speaker: "This is a court of law, young man, not a court of justice." and "I have no respect for the passion of equality, which seems to me merely idealizing envy."
These 1912 ring-shaped hard candies traditionally came in five flavors and were packaged in "rolls" of fifteen pieces.
Real-World Languages

- This tonal Indo-Aryan language boasts over 130 million speakers, mostly in north western India and eastern Pakistan. Its English name comes from the Persian “five waters” (panj ab), a reference to the Indus river. It has a canonical subject-object-verb word ordering and uses postpositions. Nouns feature two genders, two numbers, and five cases.
  - Example: ਲੋਰ ਪਾਕਤਾਨ ਪਞਖਾਬਾਦ ਦਾ ਦਾਰਾਲਾਖੋਂ ਰਕਾਬਾ
  - Example: لپور پاکستان پنجاب دا دارالحكومت
The State of C Programming

• **Buffer overruns** are common
  - Programmers must do their own bounds checking
  - Easy to forget or be off-by-one or more
  - Program still appears to work correctly

• In C with respect to buffer overruns
  - Easy to do the wrong thing
  - Hard to do the right thing
The State of Hacking

• Buffer overruns are an attack of choice
  - 40-50% of new vulnerabilities are buffer overruns
  - Many recent attacks of this flavor: Code Red, Nimda, MS-SQL server, yada yada
  - “Buffer overflows have been the most common form of security vulnerability for the past ten years ...” [OGI DARPA 2000]
  - From 2007 on, XSS and SQL-CIV are more popular, and buffer overruns are now #2

• Highly automated toolkits are available to exploit known buffer overruns
  - Look up “script kiddie”
The Sad Reality

• Even well-known buffer overruns are still widely exploited
  - Hard to get people to upgrade millions of vulnerable machines

• We assume that there are many more unknown buffer overrun vulnerabilities
  - At least unknown to the white hats
Static Analysis to Detect Buffer Overruns

- Detecting buffer overruns *before* distributing code would be better

- Idea: Build a tool similar to a type checker to detect buffer overruns

- This is a popular research area; we’ll present one idea at random [Wagner, Aiken, ...]
  - You’ll see more in later lectures
Focus on Strings

- Most important buffer overrun exploits are through **string** buffers
  - Reading an untrusted string from the network, keyboard, etc.

- Focus the tool only on arrays of characters
Idea 1: Strings as an Abstract Data Type

• A problem: Pointer operations and array dereferences are very difficult to analyze statically
  - Where does *ptr point?
  - What does buf[j] refer to?

• Idea: Model effect of string library functions directly
  - Hard code effect of strcpy, strcat, etc.
Idea 2: The Abstraction

- Model buffers as pairs of integer ranges
  - *Alloc*  min allocated size of the buffer in bytes
  - *Used*   max number of bytes actually in use

- Use integer ranges
  - \([x, y] = \{ x, x+1, ..., y-1, y \}\)
  - Alloc and used cannot be computed exactly
The Strategy

• For each program expression, write **constraints** capturing the **alloc** and **used** of its string subexpressions

• Solve the constraints for the entire program

• Check for each string variable $s$

  \[ \text{used}(s) \leq \text{alloc}(s) \]
The Constraints

char s[n];

n = alloc(s)

strcpy(dst, src)

used(src) ≤ used(dst)

p = strdup(s)

used(s) ≤ used(p) &
alloc(s) ≤ alloc(p)

p[n] = ‘\0’

min(used(p), n+1)) ≤ used(p)
Constraint Solving

• Solving the constraints is akin to solving dataflow equations
  - Remember liveness? Constant propagation?

• Build a graph
  - Nodes are `len(s), alloc(s)`
  - Edges are constraints `len(s) ≤ len(t)`

• Propagate information forward through the graph
  - Special handling of loops in the graph
Results

• This technique found new buffer overruns in *sendmail*
  - Which is like shooting fish in a barrel ...
• Found new exploitable overruns in Linux *nettools* package

• Both widely used
• Previously hand-audited packages
Limitations

• Tool produces many **false positives** (why?)
  - 1 out of 10 warnings is a real bug

• Tool has false negatives (why?)
  - Unsound: may miss some overruns

• But still productive to use
Summary

• Programming language knowledge is useful beyond interpreters

• Useful for programmers
  - Understand what you are doing!

• Handy for tools other than compilers
  - Big research direction
Homework

- Monday May 5: PA5, PA7