The Computational Complexity of Program Obfuscation

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Abstract

Recent developments in cryptography have given rise to a variety of tools that allow for secure communication and computation of data. In this work we focus on studying one such task called program obfuscation which, roughly speaking, hides any information within a program’s code without affecting its functionality. In particular, we will study the complexity of the main variant of obfuscation called indistinguishability obfuscation (IO), which is itself versatile enough to enable a wide variety of new applications in cryptography, and our main objective is determine a lower bound on the assumptions required for realizing an IO scheme.

The reason behind pursuing this objective of proving such lower bounds for IO (and in general for any other cryptographic primitive) is to understand the complexity of said primitive and to investigate whether it is possible to use well-studied assumptions to base this primitive on. In order to prove these kinds of lower bounds for IO, we need to show that certain assumptions and/or objects are insufficient to achieve it. Such classes of impossibility results are proven under the “black-box framework” introduced by Impagliazzo and Rudich in 1989 and later formalized by Reingold, Trevisan, and Vadhan in 2004. However, due to the nature of current IO constructions, the existing techniques for proving impossibility results are not conducive to ruling out the type of “complex” assumptions on which IO stands.

The goal of this thesis is to first develop new techniques and propose extensions to the aforementioned classical black-box framework, allowing us to rule out some natural primitives from being able to construct IO. This then allows us to explore and prove lower bounds on the complexity of obfuscation by showing that certain assumptions and/or primitives, under this newly developed paradigm, are insufficient for the construction of secure IO schemes. In particular, we rule out constructions of IO from both various traditional long-established primitives and some of the more recent advanced objects. Furthermore, while this new extended framework facilitates a more comprehensive study of lower bounds for recent sophisticated primitives that are currently realized from more specialized cryptographic objects, it is of independent interest and opens up the opportunity to revisit and improve upon even the existing well-known impossibility results.
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# Contents

List of Figures vi

1 Introduction 1
   1.1 Motivation 2
   1.2 Contributions 4
      1.2.1 Impossibility of VBB Obfuscation in Idealized Models 4
      1.2.2 Extending the Black-box Framework 5
      1.2.3 Separating IO from other Assumptions 5
   1.3 Related Work 6
   1.4 Organization 8

2 Preliminaries 10
   2.1 Notation 10
   2.2 Measure-Theoretic Lemmas 11
   2.3 Generic/Idealized Models 11
   2.4 Basic Primitives 13
   2.5 Obfuscation 13
   2.6 Encryption Primitives 15
      2.6.1 Witness Encryption 16
      2.6.2 Predicate Encryption 17
      2.6.3 Homomorphic Encryption 19
      2.6.4 Functional Encryption 21
      2.6.5 Universal Variants of Primitives 23

I Black-box Separations for Indistinguishability Obfuscation 25

3 The Black-box Framework 26
   3.1 Black-box Constructions 26
      3.1.1 Variants on Black-box Constructions 27
      3.1.2 Black-box Constructions in Idealized Models 28

4 Impossibility of VBB Obfuscation in Idealized Models 31
   4.1 Introduction 31
   4.2 Our Results 32
   4.3 Technical Overview 33
      4.3.1 Generic Group Model: Proving Theorem 4.2.1 34
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>Low-Degree Graded Encoding Model: Proving Theorem 4.2.2</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.3</td>
<td>Random Trapdoor Permutation Model: Proving Theorem 4.2.3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Impossibility of VBB Obfuscation in Generic Algebraic Models</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1</td>
<td>Preliminaries</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2</td>
<td>Solving Linear Equations over Abelian Groups</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.3</td>
<td>Generic Group Model</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.4</td>
<td>Degree-O(1) Graded Encoding Model</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Impossibility of VBB Obfuscation in the random TDP Model</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.1</td>
<td>The Construction</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.2</td>
<td>Completeness and Soundness</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.3</td>
<td>Extension to hierarchical random TDP</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Separating IO from Standard Assumptions</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.1</td>
<td>Technical Overview: Separating IO from the Random-Oracle</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2</td>
<td>Technical Overview: Hardness of Semi-Black-Box Constructions of IO</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.3</td>
<td>Technical Overview: Separating IO from TDP and Constant-Degree GEM</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Separating IO from Random Oracle Based Primitives</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Hardness of Semi-Black-Box Constructions of IO</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Separating IO from TDP and Constant-Degree GEM</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Monolithic Separations for Indistinguishability Obfuscation</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Extending the Black-box Framework</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Our Results</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>A Concrete Definition for Case of WE</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.1</td>
<td>A Transitivity Lemma for Deriving More Separations</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>An Abstract Extension of the Black-Box Model</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>An Abstract Model for Extended Primitives and Constructions</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Monolithic Constructions</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Monolithic Separation of IO from All-or-Nothing Encryption Primitives</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.1</td>
<td>Known Recipe for Proving Lower-bounds for IO</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.2</td>
<td>Warm-Up: The Basic Case of Witness Encryption</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.3</td>
<td>Separating IO from Instance-Hiding WE</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.4</td>
<td>Separating IO from Homomorphic WE</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.5</td>
<td>Primitives Implied by Our Variants of WE</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Approach for Proving Lower Bounds on IO</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1</td>
<td>General Approach</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Separating IO from Instance Revealing Witness Encryption</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1</td>
<td>Overview of Proof Techniques</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.2</td>
<td>The Ideal Model</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.3</td>
<td>Witness Encryption exists relative to Θ</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3.4 Compiling out \( \Theta \) from IO ........................................... 106
7.3.5 The new obfuscator \( \hat{\text{IO}}^R \) in the random oracle model .......... 107
7.4 Separating IO from Instance Hiding Witness Encryption .................. 111
  7.4.1 Overview of Proof Techniques ........................................ 113
  7.4.2 The Ideal Model ..................................................... 114
  7.4.3 (Instance-hiding) Witness Encryption exists relative to \( \Theta \) ....... 114
  7.4.4 Compiling out \( \Theta \) from IO ........................................ 118
7.5 Separating IO from Homomorphic Witness Encryption ....................... 126
  7.5.1 Overview of Proof Techniques ........................................ 128
  7.5.2 The Ideal Model ..................................................... 129
  7.5.3 Homomorphic Witness Encryption exists relative to \( \Psi \) .......... 130
  7.5.4 Compiling out \( \Psi \) from IO ........................................ 135
7.6 Primitives Implied by Our Variants of Witness Encryption .................. 145
  7.6.1 Extended Predicate Encryption ...................................... 145
  7.6.2 Extended Spooky Encryption ........................................ 148
  7.6.3 Extended Attribute Based FHE ...................................... 149

8 Monolithic Separation of IO from Functional Encryption ........................ 152
  8.1 Introduction ............................................................ 152
  8.2 Our Results ............................................................. 153
  8.3 Technical Overview ................................................... 154
    8.3.1 The Details of the Proof of Separation ............................ 155
  8.4 Monolithic Separation of IO from Short-Output FE ......................... 158
    8.4.1 The Ideal Model ................................................... 158
    8.4.2 Extended Functional Encryption Exists Relative to \( \Gamma \) ........ 158
    8.4.3 Customized FWE in the \( \Gamma \) Ideal Model ......................... 163
    8.4.4 From CFWE to Functional Encryption ............................. 167
    8.4.5 Compiling out \( \Gamma \) from IO .................................... 168
  8.5 Extended Long-Output FE Implies Obfuscation ............................. 178
  8.6 Fully Black-Box Separation of IO from Functional Encryption ............. 180
    8.6.1 Single-Key (Non-Extended) Functional Encryption exists relative to \( \bar{\Gamma} \) 181
    8.6.2 Compiling out \( \bar{\Gamma} \) from IO ................................ 181

9 Conclusion ........................................................................... 183

Bibliography ........................................................................... 184
List of Figures

1.1 Summary of results ................................................................. 7
2.1 The IND_{PE} experiment used in defining the security for predicate encryption schemes .................................................. 18
2.2 The IND_{ABE} experiment used in defining the security for attribute-based encryption schemes ............................................. 19
2.3 The IND_{FE} experiment used in defining the security for functional encryption schemes ....................................................... 22
7.1 Summary of our witness encryption separation results. ............... 89
7.2 The 2-instance Exp_{A} Experiment ............................................ 118
8.1 The single-instance Exp_{A} Experiment ........................................ 166
8.2 The output-constrained circuit g_{i} defined for the underlying compact FE scheme.179
Chapter 1

Introduction

Program obfuscation is the task of hiding any information embedded within any given program without affecting the functionality of the program. Obfuscation was first introduced by Hada in [Had00] and later formalized and studied in detail by Barak, Goldreich, Impagliazzo, Rudich, Sahai, Vadhan, and Yang in [BGI+01]. The strongest notion of obfuscation, called virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation, has the property that an attacker with access to the obfuscated program learns no more information about the program than if it had just “black-box” access to this program - that is knowing only the input-output behaviour of the program. While this seems to be the ideal notion of security required by an obfuscation mechanism, it was shown in [BGI+01, GK05] that it is impossible to achieve in general. However, this does not preclude that certain restricted classes of functions can be obfuscated under this notion. Indeed, a series of works have demonstrated the possibility of VBB obfuscation for specific families of functions, including point functions [CMR98, LPS04, Wee05, CD08, BC10], re-encryption functions [HRsV07], membership-checking in constant-dimension hyperplanes [CRV10], and conjunctions [BR13].

In order to circumvent this impossibility result on VBB obfuscation, [BGI+01] defined an alternative weaker notion of obfuscation called indistinguishability obfuscation (IO). Informally, the security of IO states that an attacker cannot distinguish between obfuscations of two functionally-equivalent circuits of the same size. At first glance, the security guarantee might seem too weak to enable its use in practice as there is no explicit assurance that information will remain hidden after obfuscation. Nevertheless, such a security notion was deemed to be equivalent to what [GR07] referred to as “best-possible” obfuscation where the obfuscated circuit leaks as much information as any other circuit of the same size and input-output behaviour.

It was not until the seminal work of Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai, and Waters [GGH+13b] that interest in IO was reinvigorated as the authors in that work provided the first candidate construction of an IO scheme from multi-linear map assumptions [GGH13a, CLT13, GGH15], which were believed to be, at the time, hard to break. This started a series of works exploring the different possible applications of IO, some of which were not even known to be feasibly realizable from previous tools. Such applications include functional encryption [GGH+13b, Wat15], witness encryption [GGSW13], public-
key and deniable encryption [SW14], multi-party computation [GGHR14, GP15, CGP15], oblivious transfer [SW14], verifiable searchable encryption [CYG+15], identity-based fully homomorphic encryption [CM14], and many more.

Following the initial candidate construction of IO [GGH+13b], a long line of work [AGIS14, MSW14, PST14, AB15, Zim15, BMSZ15, GMM+16, Lin16, LV16, Lin17] focused on building new and improved IO constructions that either use more robust assumptions or possess security properties that are proven to exists in some idealized model. Furthermore, all these constructions use multi-linear maps as their building block in some way or another. However, several attacks [CHL+15, HJ16, CGH+15, CLLT16, MSZ16] against multi-linear maps proved that these assumptions were not as sturdy as initially believed to be, and this created an uncertainty towards the security of the IO constructions that are based on these broken assumptions.

As a result of the above problem, it has become increasingly desirable to find more standard, time-tested assumptions (e.g. Discrete Log, Decisional Diffie-Hellman, etc.) on which the security of IO constructions can be based on, instead of the more exotic assumptions that are not well-understood. So far, the only known alternative constructions of IO go through what is known as “functional” encryption [AJ15, BV15], which can roughly be described as an encryption scheme with expressive access control mechanisms. However, all known functional encryption schemes that are strong enough to give IO are also based on multilinear maps. This leads us to the motivation of this work as we strive to investigate the reasoning behind why IO constructions gravitate towards using such strong assumptions.

1.1 Motivation

An important line of work in theoretical cryptography is the study of the hardness of the underlying assumptions on which computationally secure cryptographic tasks are built upon. By analyzing the “complexity” of computational assumptions, one can determine their relative strength and the resulting implications between them. More importantly, this allows us to argue whether certain “simpler” primitives and/or assumptions can be used to construct more sophisticated tools that have more useful, impactful applications. For example, it is well known that trapdoor permutations, a standard well-studied cryptographic tool, are sufficient to be used as low-level building blocks for constructing public-key encryption schemes [Sah99, DDN00]. On the other hand, it was proven that the existence of just one-way functions, which while is a more desirable assumption, is simply not enough to build public-key encryption schemes (in a black-box way) [IR89]. The latter result is said to be a lower bound on the complexity of public-key encryption since we require an assumption that is at least stronger than just the existence of one-way functions in order to construct such a scheme, and the ultimate goal is to find the best (i.e. weakest assumption) to realize any scheme.

The main goal of this thesis is to extend the above line of work on lower bounds but for the case of indistinguishability obfuscation. More specifically, we would like to make progress towards answering the following question:
What assumptions could be used for realizing indistinguishability obfuscation?

As is the case for any other primitive, an important motivation behind determining the lower bounds of IO, which is our main focus in this work, is that it helps in finding weaker well-studied assumptions on which to base IO. This is more so the case for IO as it is a relative newcomer to the scene and researchers that study it are yet to be completely familiar with the complexity of such an object. Another motivation is that it guides research for building standard IO schemes and allows one to avoid using assumptions and/or tools that were proven to be insufficient on their own for achieving IO, instead focusing on alternative stronger, yet still robust, assumptions.

In order to even start looking at what assumptions or primitives are sufficient (or not) for building secure IO constructions, one needs to first define the framework under which such constructions exist. More generally, we need to ask what it means to have a secure construction of some primitive \( Q \) from another primitive \( P \). In particular, one cannot hope to rule out all constructions of \( Q \) from \( P \) especially considering that one can (perhaps injudiciously) assumes that \( Q \) exists unconditionally. Therefore, in order to capture a meaningful construction of one primitive from another, [IR89, RTV04] proposed a taxonomy that classifies any given such construction as one of several types. Of particular interest are fully black-box constructions, which (1) allow the construction of primitive \( Q \) to only use primitive \( P \) in a “black-box” way (i.e. knowing only the input-output behaviour of \( P \) and without knowledge of the actual implementation of \( P \)) and (2) allow the security of \( Q \) to be based on the security of \( P \). Most constructions in cryptography are black-box constructions and they are often desirable as they lead to more practical implementations. As such, ruling out such constructions of a primitive \( Q \) from another primitive \( P \) (which we call a black-box separation of \( Q \) from \( P \)) would prove that a large class of natural constructions of \( Q \) from \( P \) are indeed impossible.

On the other hand, one major drawback of ruling out just fully black-box constructions \( Q \) from \( P \) is that it does not necessarily mean that there are other non-black-box techniques that allow \( Q \) to be constructed from \( P \). Consider for example a possible construction of some primitive \( Q \) from another primitive \( P \) where \( Q \) may need to feed the code of \( P \) back to \( P \) itself. Such a construction would not violate any black-box impossibility result that says \( Q \) cannot be based on \( P \) in a black-box way. In fact, it might very well be that such a candidate construction would circumvent this impossibility result.

The case with currently known IO constructions from functional encryption is that they all make non-black-box use of the underlying primitive. Consequently, in order to rule out any constructions of IO from any primitive \( P \) that has a similar flavor to functional encryption, it would not be very useful to consider ruling out only black-box constructions of IO from \( P \) since any such potential construction would most likely use \( P \) in a non-black-box way. These potential constructions do not fall under the classical framework of [RTV04] so we cannot rule them out using standard black-box separation techniques. As a result, this motivates us to extend the framework of [RTV04] to capture IO constructions of this form (and perhaps even other primitives of similar nature) in order to begin proving our impossibility results.
1.2 Contributions

In light of the motivation behind this thesis, we will highlight the three main contributions of this work.

1.2.1 Impossibility of VBB Obfuscation in Idealized Models

Given that the central focus of this work is to provide lower bounds on indistinguishability obfuscation, it is natural to ask whether we can also provide similar lower bounds for virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation in idealized models where algorithms have access to oracles that are provably secure. While the impossibility of VBB for general circuits in the plain model (where no oracle exists) has already been established, we extend this negative result by proving that VBB is impossible to achieve even in certain more powerful/expressive idealized models. We also note that despite the impossibility of general plain-model, a construction for VBB obfuscation in some idealized model could still be used as a practical heuristic obfuscation mechanism once instantiated with a strong hash function (such as SHA-3). This would be in analogy with the way random oracle-based constructions of other primitives are widely used in practice despite the impossibility results of [CGH04].

We will use the work of Canetti, Kalai, and Paneth [CKP15] as our starting point for this part. It was shown there that a VBB obfuscator that has access to a random oracle \( I \) (an ideal random function) can be transformed in to an approximately correct VBB obfuscator in the plain model where no oracle \( I \) exists. However, assuming trapdoor permutations (which is a reasonable and well-believed assumption), the work of [BP13] have shown that even approximately correct VBB obfuscation does not exist in the plain model. Together with [CKP15], this rules out VBB obfuscation in the random oracle model.

Using the same reasoning for different idealized oracles which we list below, we show how to remove or “compile out” these oracles from the VBB obfuscator and get an approximately correct obfuscator in the plain model thus allowing us to argue the impossibility of such an obfuscation in these ideal models. The ideal models that we consider are the following (see Section 2.3 for formal definitions):

- Random Trapdoor Permutation Model
- Generic Group Model (over any abelian group)
- Generic \( O(1) \)-degree Graded Encoding Model (over any finite ring)

This complements the results of [BR14, BGK+14] where they show that general VBB obfuscation is indeed possible in the idealized graded encoding model of some polynomial degree. This contribution is discussed in Chapter 4 and appears in [MMN16a]. We also mention the concurrent work of [PS16], which prove that VBB obfuscation is impossible in the idealized constant-degree GEM over finite fields. Part of our work extends that result by also proving VBB obfuscation under idealized constant-degree GEM over finite rings.
1.2.2 Extending the Black-box Framework

The existing well-established framework of [IR89,RTV04] used for separating primitives from each other does not capture more sophisticated primitives whose constructions are naturally defined in a way that permit some measure of “non-black-box” use of their underlying components (e.g. using the code or implementation of the underlying object). In order to even start working on separating IO from more powerful primitives, this framework needs to be extended in a way that reflects such constructions.

In more detail, let us first consider what it means to have a construction of a primitive in the traditional black-box framework. Informally, we say that we have a fully black-box construction of a primitive \( Q \) from another primitive \( P \) if we can construct an algorithm \( Q \) that correctly implements \( Q \) using only the input-output behavior of any implementation \( P \) of \( P \), and if \( P \) is secure then we can show that \( Q \) is secure as well.

In this work, we would like to consider constructions of primitives that do not fall under the aforementioned types of constructions. For example, a known construction of IO is based on a strong form of an encryption mechanism called functional encryption (FE) and uses the subroutines of FE in a non-black-box way. In particular, one of the subroutines of FE is a key generation algorithm and the construction of IO needs to supply the code of FE to the key generation algorithm. This is currently not captured by the black-box framework of [IR89,RTV04] since the correctness condition requires that \( Q \) must use \( P \) in a black-box way.

However, we observed that for these types of non-black-box use of \( P \), \( Q \) needs only to “plant” oracle gates (i.e. subroutine calls) to \( P \) when calling \( P \) subroutines. Thus, our first line of thought is to extend this definition so that the construction allows \( Q \) to use \( P \) in a black-box way, where \( P \) allows \( Q \) to call \( P \) with circuits/Turing machines that have oracle gates to \( P \). This almost gives us what we want, but we still need to consider various subtle issues regarding what constitutes as a valid extension of some primitive \( P \). More specifically, we require a definition for extended primitives (i.e. \( P \)) that (1) covers all the known positive constructions of this form and (2) allows us to apply our separation techniques to rule out such extended primitives from constructing IO (or other similar primitives). We note here that this definition generalizes previous models that were developed in [BKSY11,AS15] where \( P \) accepts only circuits with one-way function gates.

In Chapter 6 we present and define an extended black-box framework, called the monolithic framework, which allows us to model constructions that make use of a large and natural class of commonly-used non-black-box techniques in order to later prove that such techniques are not helpful for building IO from other strong primitives. This contribution appears in [GMM17a].

1.2.3 Separating IO from other Assumptions

As the main goal this work, we prove black-box separation results for IO from standard assumptions and, by leveraging the newly developed monolithic framework, from even more powerful primitives as well. The standard primitives that we rule out include one-way func-
tions, trapdoor permutations, and hash functions. Furthermore, we show that assumptions based on generic groups and generic encoding models (e.g. discrete log and “low-degree” multi-linear assumptions) are not sufficient for building IO under the black-box framework. We also examine more sophisticated primitives such as predicate encryption [BSW11], fully homomorphic encryption [RAD78,Gen09], and witness encryption [GGSW13] and prove that such versatile tools are unable to build secure IO schemes using techniques captured by the monolithic framework.

In order to prove these separation results, we will leverage the result of [BBF16], where they show that statistically-secure approximate IO (that is correct on only some inputs) does not exist under reasonable complexity assumptions. Thus, by adopting the same approach that was used for compiling out idealized oracles in VBB obfuscators, we apply the technique here for any primitive \( \mathcal{P} \) that we would like to separate IO from. In particular, we start with an idealized oracle \( \mathcal{I} \) that securely instantiates \( \mathcal{P} \) then we compile out \( \mathcal{I} \) to get an approximately correct IO scheme for which we know there is an attack against by [BBF16].

This contribution is discussed in Chapters 5, 7, and 8, and it appears in [MMN+16b, GMM17a, GMM17b]. Figure 1.1 shows the known relationships surrounding IO and indicates our separation results. Note that the non-black-box constructions that we rule out (e.g. IO from fully homomorphic encryption) will be cast as monolithic constructions under our new framework.

1.3 Related Work

In this section we discuss the relevant related work regarding negative results on virtual black box obfuscation and indistinguishability obfuscation. We also provide an overview of previous results that prove non-black-box separations in various other areas in cryptography.

Negative Results for Obfuscation While the previous work of [BGI+01, GK05] have shown that general VBB obfuscation is impossible, this still left open the question of whether such a strong form of obfuscation can perhaps exist in an idealized world where powerful black-box algorithms (oracles) aid the obfuscation in ensuring the security of the scheme. The work of [BR14,BGK+14] prove that VBB obfuscation for general functions does indeed exist in what is known as the idealized poly-degree graded encoding model (GEM) where the obfuscation algorithm has access to an oracle that represents a multilinear map while capturing all the necessary properties required for security. This raises the question of whether other (perhaps weaker) idealized models are capable of allowing VBB obfuscation to exist. In [CKP15], it was shown that for the case that the idealized model is the random oracle model, VBB obfuscation for general circuits is impossible. Furthermore, in the concurrent work of [PS16], they prove that VBB obfuscation is impossible in the idealized poly-degree GEM over finite fields.

Turning to the known negative results for IO, the first such result was shown by [GR07] where they proved that \textit{statistically-secure}\footnote{While standard computational security of IO holds only against computationally bounded adversaries,} IO is impossible under reasonable complexity
Figure 1.1: Relations between the assumptions surrounding indistinguishability obfuscation. Solid lines indicate black-box constructions while dashed lines indicate non-black-box constructions. The bold lines with $\times$ on top indicate our contributions that prove the impossibility of basing IO on any of these underlying objects.
assumptions. More recently, [BBF16] extended the previous result by showing that even approximately correct statistically-secure IO is impossible (where approximate correctness implies that the obfuscated circuit may return an incorrect answer on some inputs). On a different but related note, the work of [AS15] provided the first limitation of IO by proving that there exists no black-box construction of collision-resistant hash functions from an IO scheme that obfuscates circuits calling one-way functions.

Non-Black-Box Separations We mention here some of the previous work that prove the non-existence of non-black-box constructions from other primitives. These kinds of proofs are often extremely tied to the primitive whose construction is refuted and are thus somewhat difficult to generalize, but the consequences of the impossibility result are quite profound as they show that even non-black-box constructions of the primitive is impossible. For example, the work of [PTV11] showed that one can rule out a variety of non-black-box constructions of standard primitives (e.g. one-way permutations, collision-resistant hash functions) from one-way functions (under reasonable assumptions) as long as the security proof is black-box. Furthermore, [GW11] show that succinct non-interactive argument systems cannot be based on many standard assumptions in a non-black-box way.

There also exists a few works in the literature that attempt to capture some non-black-box techniques within the black-box framework in order to rule out these constructions using standard techniques. We already mentioned that Asharov and Segev [AS15] have done exactly that by interpreting non-black-box constructions of hash functions from IO and one-way functions as black-box constructions of hash functions from IO that obfuscate circuits calling one-way functions. Similarly, the work of [BKSY11] interpreted non-black-box constructions of key-agreement protocols from zero-knowledge proofs and one-way functions as black-box constructions of key-agreement protocols from zero-knowledge proofs for statements that call one-way functions and then ruled out such constructions. We note that, while these works partially extended the notion of black-box constructions for the sake of ruling out a specific primitive from a special class of primitives (those that, for example, take oracle circuits as input), we aim to generalize the black-box framework and establish theorems related to it so that it applies to any separations of the above form.

1.4 Organization

We start in Chapter 2 by presenting our notation that we will use in this work and list the definitions of the cryptographic primitives relevant to our results. We present our results in two parts: the first part discusses our black-box separations of IO while the second part is dedicated to our monolithic separations of IO from various advanced primitives. The first part of our results starts with Chapter 3 where we review the classical black-box framework statistically secure IO extends to computationally unbounded adversaries as well.

2This impossibility result is actually a proof for the non-existence of partially non-black-box constructions of hash functions from IO and one-way functions. Our work will generalize this notion in multiple directions.

3We discuss what it means to have a black-box security proof in Chapter 3.
due to [IR89, RTV04], and in Chapters 4 and 5 we present impossibility results for VBB obfuscation and IO from standard assumptions under the black-box framework. The second part of our results starts with Chapter 6 where we present our new monolithic framework. In Chapters 7 and 8 we will make use of this framework to prove even more separation results for IO constructions that are based on strong encryption primitives.
Chapter 2

Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

We let $\kappa$ be the security parameter which, roughly speaking, determines the level of security of an instantiated cryptographic construction. We denote $\{0,1\}^n$ the set of $n$-bit strings and, for any string $x$, we let $|x|$ be the bit-length of the string. We denote $\{0,1\}^*$ to be the set of all strings of arbitrary length. We use "||" to concatenate strings and we use ",” for attaching strings in a way that they could be retrieved. Namely, one can uniquely identify $x$ and $y$ from $(x,y)$. For example $(00||11) = (0011)$, but $(0,011) \neq (001,1)$. We denote a vector of dimension $n$ as bold-faced variables $v = (v_1,\ldots,v_n)$.

Given any parameter $n$, we say that a function $p(n) : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ is poly($n$) if it is some polynomial in $n$. We say that a function $\epsilon(.)$ is a negligible function if for any polynomial $p(.)$, $\epsilon(n) \leq 1/p(n)$ for sufficiently large $n$.

Models of Computation. For any Turing machine (or algorithm) $A$, we say that $A$ is uniform probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) or simply efficient if there exists a polynomial function $p(.) : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ such that the running time of $A$ on any input $x$ is at most $p(|x|)$ (otherwise, we say it is inefficient). One can also consider the case that $A$ is a non-uniform PPT Turing machine where, in addition to its input $x$, $A$ would also accept an advice string $z_{|x|} \in \{0,1\}^{\text{poly}(|x|)}$ that depends on the length of the input. We call an algorithm $A^{(.)}$ an efficient oracle (or oracle-aided) algorithm if it is efficient and is able to issue queries to some oracle $O$.

Definition 2.1.1 (Universal Circuit Evaluator). For any family of circuits $C$ with input size $n$, let $U(.,.)$ be a PPT oracle Turing machine that accepts as input a circuit $C \in C$ and an input $x \in \{0,1\}^n$. We call $U$ a universal circuit evaluator if, for any $(C,x)$, $U(C,x) = C(x)$.

Probability Distributions. For random variables $X,Y$, by $X \equiv Y$ we denote the fact that $X$ and $Y$ are distributed identically. When writing the probabilities, by putting an algorithm $A$ in the subscript of the probability (e.g., $\Pr_{A[\cdot]}$) we mean the probability is over $A$’s randomness. For any given probability distribution $D$, we denote $x \leftarrow D$ as sampling
from this distribution and obtaining a sample \( x \) from the support of \( D \). We denote \( \Delta(X, Y) \) to be the statistical distance between the two random variables. We say that \( X \) and \( Y \) are statistically indistinguishable \( \Delta(X, Y) \leq \text{negl}(\kappa) \).

### 2.2 Measure-Theoretic Lemmas

By a probability space we mean a measure space with total measure equal to one, and by \( \Pr[E] \) we denote the measure of the measurable set \( E \). For a sequence of measurable sets \( \mathcal{E} = (E_1, E_2, \ldots) \) defined over some measure space, the limit supremum of \( \mathcal{E} \) is defined as \( \limsup(\mathcal{E}) = \bigcap_{n=1}^{\infty} \bigcup_{m=n}^{\infty} E_m \). It can be shown that \( \limsup(\mathcal{E}) \) is measurable if \( E_i \) is so for all \( i \).

**Lemma 2.2.1** (Borel–Cantelli [Bor09, Can17]). Let \( \mathcal{E} = (E_1, E_2, \ldots) \) be a sequence of measurable sets over some probability space, and \( \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \Pr[E_i] < \infty \). Then \( \limsup(\mathcal{E}) \) has measure zero.

The following lemma follows from Exercise 2 of Section 7.3 of [GS01]. For completeness we give a proof using continuity of probability.

**Lemma 2.2.2.** If \( \mathcal{E} = (E_1, E_2, \ldots) \) is a sequence of measurable sets over some probability space, and \( \Pr[E_i] \geq \delta \) for all \( i \in \mathbb{N} \), then \( \Pr[\limsup(\mathcal{E})] \geq \delta \).

**Proof.** We use the following well-known lemma whose proof could be found in [Ale03] Proposition 37, Part (iii).

**Lemma 2.2.3** (Continuity of Probability). Let \( B_1 \supseteq B_2 \supseteq \ldots \) be a sequence of measurable sets over some measure space, and \( \Pr[B_1] < \infty \). Then \( \Pr[\bigcap_{n=1}^{\infty} B_n] = \lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[B_n] \).

Now let \( B_n = \bigcup_{m=n}^{\infty} E_m \), and so \( \limsup(\mathcal{E}) = \bigcap_{n=1}^{\infty} B_n \). Since the measure space is a probability space, thus we have \( \Pr[B_1] \leq 1 \), and we can apply the above lemma to conclude that

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[B_n] = \Pr[\bigcap_{n=1}^{\infty} B_n] = \Pr[\limsup(\mathcal{E})].
\]

Finally, because \( \Pr[B_n] \geq \Pr[E_i] \geq \delta \) for every \( n \), we get \( \delta \leq \lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[B_n] = \Pr[\limsup(\mathcal{E})] \).

### 2.3 Generic/Idealized Models

An idealized model \( \mathcal{I} \) is a randomized oracle; examples relevant to our work include the random oracle, random trapdoor permutation oracle, generic group model, and the graded encoding model, all of which we define more formally below. A sample \( I \leftarrow \mathcal{I} \) of the oracle’s distribution can (usually) be represented as a sequence \((I_1, I_2, \ldots)\) where \( I_\kappa \) is the part of \( I \) that is defined for security parameter \( \kappa \). The distribution over the infinite object
could naturally be defined through finite distributions $D_i$ over the finite space of $I_i$. Caratheodory’s extension theorem shows that such finite probability distributions could always be extended consistently to a measure space over the full infinite space of $I_i$ (see Theorem 4.6 of [Hol15] for a proof).

**Definition 2.3.1** (Random Oracle Model). In the random oracle model, all parties have access to a randomized oracle $f$ such that for each input $x$, the answer $f(x)$ is uniformly (and independently of the rest of the oracle) distributed over $\{0,1\}^{|x|}$.

**Definition 2.3.2** (Random Trapdoor Permutation). For any security parameter $\kappa$, a random trapdoor permutation (TDP) oracle $T_\kappa$ consists of three subroutines $(G,F,F^{-1})$ as follows:

- $G(\cdot)$ is a random permutation over $\{0,1\}^\kappa$ mapping trapdoors $sk$ to a public indexes $pk$.
- $F[pk](x)$: For any fixed public index $pk$, $F[pk](\cdot)$ is a random permutation over $\{0,1\}^\kappa$.
- $F^{-1}[sk](y)$: For any fixed trapdoor $sk$ such that $G(sk) = pk$, $F^{-1}[sk](\cdot)$ is the inverse permutation of $F[pk](\cdot)$, namely $F^{-1}[sk](F[pk](x)) = x$.

**Definition 2.3.3** (Generic Group Model (GGM) [Sho97]). Let $(G,\circ)$ be any group of size $N$ and let $S$ be any set of size at least $N$. The generic group oracle $I[G \mapsto S]$ (or simply $I$) is as follows. At first an injective random function $\sigma: G \mapsto S$ is chosen, and two type of queries are answered as follows.

- **Labeling Queries.** Given $g \in G$ oracle returns $\sigma(g)$.
- **Addition Queries.** Given $y_1,y_2$, if there exists $x_1,x_2$ such that $\sigma(x_1) = y_1$ and $\sigma(x_2) = y_2$, it returns $\sigma(x_1 \odot x_2)$. Otherwise it returns $\bot$.

**Definition 2.3.4** (Degree-$d$ Ideal Graded Encoding Model (GEM)). The oracle $M^d_R$ = (enc,zero) is stateful and is parameterized by a ring $R$ and a degree $d$ and works in two phases. For each $l$ the oracle enc($\cdot$,l) is a random injective function from the ring $R$ to the set of labels $S$.

1. Initialization phase: In this phase the oracle answers enc($v,l$) queries and for each query it stores $(v,l,h)$ in a list $L_O$.

2. Zero testing phase: Suppose $p(\cdot)$ is a polynomial whose coefficients are explicitly represented in $R$ and its monomials are represented with labels $h_1,\ldots,h_m$ obtained through enc($\cdot$,\cdot) oracle in phase 1. Given any such query $p(\cdot)$ the oracle answers as follows:

   (a) If any $h_i$ is not in $L_O$ (i.e., it is not obtained in phase 1) return \textbf{false}.
   (b) If the degree of $p(\cdot)$ is more than $d$ then return \textbf{false}.
   (c) Let $(v_i,l_i,h_i) \in L_O$. If $p(v_1,\ldots,v_m) = 0$ return \textbf{true}, otherwise \textbf{false}.
Definition 2.3.5 (Generic Algorithms). Let $A^I$ be an algorithm (or a set of interactive algorithms $A = \{A_1, A_2, \ldots\}$) where $I$ is the generic group oracle or the graded encoding oracle. We call $A^I$ a generic algorithm in the generic group model (resp. graded encoding model) model if it never asks any addition (resp. zero-testing) query that is answered as $\perp$. Namely, only queries are asked for which the labels are previously obtained.

In this work we only use sparse encodings in which $|S|/|G| = \kappa^{\omega(1)}$ (for the generic group model) or $|S|/|R| = \kappa^{\omega(1)}$ (for the graded encoding model) where $\kappa$ is the security parameter. Therefore, the execution of poly-time algorithms in this model will be statistically close to being generic.

2.4 Basic Primitives

In this section we list the definitions of various common and basic cryptographic primitives and assumptions which we will use or refer to throughout this work.

Definition 2.4.1 (One-way Function (OWF)). Let $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ be a function. We call $f$ a one-way function if the following conditions are satisfied:

- **Completeness**: For any input $x$, the running time of $f(x)$ is at most $\text{poly}(|x|)$.

- **One-way**: For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}$ such that for any security parameter $\kappa$:

\[
\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*} [A(f(x)) \in f^{-1}(f(x))] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)
\]

Definition 2.4.2 (Collision-resistant Hash Functions (CRHF)). Let $h = \{h_i : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m\}_{i \in I}$ be a family of functions where $m < n$ and $I$ is efficiently sampleable. We call $h$ a collision-resistant hash function (family) if the following conditions are satisfied:

- **Completeness**: The running time of $h_i(x)$ for any $i$ and $x$ is at most $\text{poly}(|x|)$.

- **Collision-resistant**: For any (even non-uniform) PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}$ such that for any security parameter $\kappa$:

\[
\Pr_{i \leftarrow I, (x, x') \leftarrow A(1^\kappa, i) : x' \neq x \land h_i(x) = h_i(x')} \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)
\]

2.5 Obfuscation

Below we give a direct formal definition for approximately correct virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation in idealized models. The (standard) definition of VBB is equivalent to 0-approximate VBB in the plain model where no oracle is accessed.
Definition 2.5.1 (Virtual Black-box Obfuscation in Idealized Models). For security parameter \( \kappa \in \mathbb{N} \) and function \( \epsilon : \mathbb{N} \to [0, 1] \), an \( \epsilon \)-approximate virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation scheme in an idealized model \( \mathcal{I} \) consists of two oracle PPT algorithms \( \text{Obf} = (\text{vO}, \text{Ev}) \) defined as follows:

- Obfuscator \( \text{vO} \) is a PPT that takes as inputs a circuit \( C \) and a security parameter \( 1^\kappa \) and outputs a “circuit” \( B \).
- Evaluator \( \text{Ev} \) takes as input \((B, x)\) and outputs \( y \).

The completeness and security conditions assert that:

- **Correctness**: For any circuit \( C \) of size \( n \) and input size \( m \):
  \[
  \Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m} [\text{Ev}^\mathcal{I}(B, x) \neq C(x)] \leq \epsilon(\kappa)
  \]
  where \( B \leftarrow \text{vO}^\mathcal{I}(1^\kappa, C) \), and the probability is over the choice of input \( x \), the oracle \( \mathcal{I} \), and the internal randomness of \( \text{vO} \). If \( \epsilon = 0 \), then it is a perfectly correct obfuscator.

- **Virtual Black-box Security**: For every PPT adversary \( A \), there exists a PPT simulator \( \text{Sim} \) and a negligible function \( \mu \) such that for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) and circuits \( C \in \{0, 1\}^n \):
  \[
  |\Pr_{iO}[A^\mathcal{I}(\text{iO}(1^\kappa, C)) = 1] - \Pr_{\text{iO}}[\text{Sim}^C(1^\kappa, 1^{1\lvert C\rvert}) = 1]| \leq \mu(\kappa)
  \]
  where the probability is over \( \mathcal{I} \) and the randomness of \( A, \text{Sim} \), and \( \text{vO} \).

Definition 2.5.2 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation (IO) [BGI+01]). An indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) scheme consists of two subroutines:

- Obfuscator \( \text{iO} \) is a PPT that takes as inputs a circuit \( C \) and a security parameter \( 1^\kappa \) and outputs a “circuit” \( B \).
- Evaluator \( \text{Ev} \) takes as input \((B, x)\) and outputs \( y \).

The completeness and security conditions assert that:

- **Completeness**: For every \( C \), with probability 1 over the randomness of \( \text{iO} \), we get \( B \leftarrow \text{iO}(1^\kappa, C) \) such that: For all \( x \) it holds that \( \text{Ev}(B, x) = C(x) \).

- **Security**: For every poly-sized distinguisher \( D \) there exists a negligible function \( \mu(\cdot) \) such that for every two circuits \( C_0, C_1 \) that are of the same size and compute the same function, we have:
  \[
  |\Pr_{iO}[D(\text{iO}(1^\kappa, C_0)) = 1] - \Pr_{iO}[D(\text{iO}(1^\kappa, C_1)) = 1]| \leq \mu(\kappa)
  \]

Definition 2.5.3 (Approximate IO). For function \( 0 < \epsilon(n) \leq 1 \), an \( \epsilon \)-approximate IO scheme is defined similarly to an IO scheme with a relaxed completeness condition:
• $\epsilon$-approximate completeness. For every $C$ and $n$ we have:

$$\Pr_{x,iO}[\text{Ev}(B, x) = C(x) | B = \text{iO}(1^\kappa, C)] \geq 1 - \epsilon(\kappa)$$

**Definition 2.5.4** (Approximate Statistical Correlation IO [BBF16]). A PPT IO scheme $(\text{iO}, \text{Ev})$ is an $(\epsilon, \delta)$-approximate statistical correlation IO (CIO for short) if:

- **Approximate correctness**: $\Pr[\text{Ev}(B, x) \neq C(x)] \leq \epsilon(|C|)$ where $B = \text{iO}(1^\kappa, C)$ and the probability is over the randomness of the obfuscator and the input $x$.
- **Statistical correlation**: For every pair of circuits $C_1 \equiv C_2$ of the same size $n$, the statistical distance between $\text{iO}(1^\kappa, C_1)$ and $\text{iO}(1^\kappa, C_2)$ (both defined over the randomness of $\text{iO}$) is at most $\delta(n)$.

A computational variant of Definition 2.5.4 can be defined analogously:

**Definition 2.5.5** (Approximate Computational Correlation IO). A PPT IO scheme $(\text{iO}, \text{Ev})$ is an $(\epsilon, \delta)$-approximate computational CIO if it satisfies the same correctness condition as approximate statistical CIO and:

- **Computational correlation**: For every poly-time adversary $A$ and for every pair of circuits $C_1 \equiv C_2$ of equal size $n$, it holds that $\Pr[A(\text{iO}(1^\kappa, C_1))] = 1 - \Pr[A(\text{iO}(1^\kappa, C_2))] \leq \delta(n)$.

**The Evaluation Algorithm.** All of the definitions of the obfuscation scheme above have a subroutine for evaluating the obfuscated code. The reason for defining the evaluation as a subroutine of its own is that when we want to construct IO in oracle/idealized models, we allow the obfuscated circuit to call the oracle as well. Having an evaluator subroutine to run the obfuscated code allows to have such oracle calls in the framework of black-box constructions of [RTV04] where each primitive $Q$ is simply a class of acceptable functions that we (hope to) efficiently implement given oracle access to functions that implement another primitive $P$.

However, for simplicity and whenever it is unambiguous, we can consider the Ev algorithm as running the obfuscated code $B$ on input $x$ and we can then simply write $\text{iO}(C)(x)$ as being an equivalent notation to $\text{Ev}(\text{iO}(C), x)$.

**2.6 Encryption Primitives**

In this section we present the definitions for the different encryption primitives that we will deal in this work. We will frequently refer to them during our main results whenever it is necessary and relevant to the current section.
2.6.1 Witness Encryption

Definition 2.6.1 (Witness Encryption (WE) indexed by verifier $V$ [GGSW13]). Let $L$ be an NP language with a corresponding efficient relation verifier $V$ (that takes instance $a$ and witness $w$ and either accepts or rejects). A witness encryption scheme for relation defined by $V$ consists of two PPT algorithms $(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V)$ defined as follows:

- $\text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m)$ : given an instance $a \in \{0,1\}^*$ and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and security parameter $\kappa$ (and randomness as needed) it outputs $c \in \{0,1\}^*$.
- $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ : given ciphertext $c$ and “witness” string $w$, it either outputs a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$ or $\bot$.

We also need the following completeness and security properties:

- **Completeness:** For any security parameter $\kappa$, any $(a, w)$ such that $V(a, w) = 1$, and any $m$ it holds that
  \[
  \Pr_{\text{Enc, Dec}_V}[\text{Dec}_V(w, \text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m)) = m] = 1
  \]

- **Security:** For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\mu(.)$ such that for all $a \notin L_V$ (i.e., that there is no $w$ for which $V(a, w) = 1$) and any $m_0 \neq m_1$ of the same length $|m_0| = |m_1|$ the following holds:
  \[
  |\Pr[A(\text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m_0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(\text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m_1)) = 1]| \leq \mu(\kappa)
  \]

When we talk about the witness encryption as a primitive (not an indexed family) we refer to the special case of the ‘complete’ verifier $V$ which is a universal circuit algorithm and $V(w, a) = 1$ if $a(w) = 1$ where $a$ is a circuit evaluated on witness $w$.

We also define variants of witness encryption, which are both a strengthening of the Definition 2.6.1, one of them strengthens WE’s functionality and the other one strengthens its security. Therefore these variants of WE are incompatible in their capabilities and, hence, a witness encryption scheme may possess either one or the other extra feature (but not both).

Definition 2.6.2 (Instance-revealing Witness Encryption (IRWE)). A witness encryption scheme is said to be instance-revealing if it satisfies the properties of Definition 2.6.1 and, in addition, includes the following subroutine.

- **Instance-Revealing Functionality:** $\text{Rev}(c)$ given ciphertext $c$ outputs $a \in \{0,1\}^* \cup \{\bot\}$, and for every $a, m, \kappa$:
  \[
  \Pr_{\text{Enc, Dec}_V}[\text{Rev}(\text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m)) = a] = 1.
  \]

Definition 2.6.3 (Instance-hiding Witness Encryption (IHWE)). A witness encryption scheme is said to be instance-hiding if it satisfies the properties of Definition 2.6.1 except that the security property is replaced with the following (stronger) security guarantee:
• **Instance-Hiding Security:** For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\mu(.)$ such that for all $a_0, a_1 \notin V$ for which $|a_0| = |a_1|$ and $m_0, m_1$ for which $|m_0| = |m_1|$, the following holds:

$$|\Pr[A(\text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a_0, m_0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(\text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a_1, m_1)) = 1]| \leq \mu(\kappa)$$

### 2.6.2 Predicate Encryption

**Definition 2.6.4** (Predicate Encryption (PE) [BSW11]). Let $P_{K,A} : K \times A \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an efficiently computable predicate defined over some key space $K$ (that contains a special empty key $\epsilon$) and attribute space $A$ and $P$ is an efficient Turing machine computing the relation $P_{K,A}$. A predicate encryption scheme for a class of predicates $P_{K,A}$ consists of four PPT algorithms (Setup, KGen, Enc, DecP) defined as follows:

- **Setup($1^\kappa$):** given the security parameter, it outputs a master public key $\text{MPK}$ and a master secret key $\text{MSK}$.
- **KGen($\text{MSK}, k$):** given $k \in K$ and the master secret key $\text{MSK} \in \{0, 1\}^n$, outputs the decryption key $sk_k$. If $k = \epsilon$, it outputs $\epsilon$.
- **Enc($\text{MPK}, (m, a)$):** given the master public key $\text{MPK}$, attribute $a \in A$, and message $m$, outputs ciphertext $c$.
- **DecP($sk_k, c$):** given a secret key for $k \in K$ and a ciphertext $c$, outputs a string $m$ (or $\bot$).

The following completeness and security properties must be satisfied:

- **Completeness:** For any security parameter $\kappa$, key $k \in K$, attribute $a \in A$, the following holds:

$$\text{DecP}(sk_k, \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, (m, a))) = \begin{cases} \langle |a|, |m| \rangle & \text{if } k = \epsilon \\ m & \text{if } k \neq \epsilon \text{ and } P(k, a) = 1 \\ \bot & \text{Otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where $sk_k \leftarrow \text{KGen}(\text{MSK}, k)$ and $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$.

- **Security:** For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that the following holds:

$$\Pr[\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{PE}}(1^\kappa) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\kappa)$$

where $\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{PE}}$ is shown in Figure 2.1, and for each key query $k$ that $A$ sends to the KGen oracle, it must hold that $P(k, a_0) = P(k, a_1) = 0$. 

17
Experiment $\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{PE}}(1^\kappa)$:
1. $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$
2. $(x_0, x_1) \leftarrow A^{\text{KGen}(\text{MSK}, \cdot)}(\text{MPK})$ where $x_b = (a_b, m_b)$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, $|a_0| = |a_1|$ and $|m_0| = |m_1|$ and for each prior query $k$ we require that $P(k, a_0) = P(k, a_1) = 0$
3. $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$
4. $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, x_b)$
5. $b' \leftarrow A^{\text{KGen}(\text{MSK}, \cdot)}(\text{MPK}, c)$ where for each query $k$ we require that $P(k, a_0) = P(k, a_1) = 0$
6. Output 1 if $b = b'$ and 0 otherwise.

Figure 2.1: The $\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{PE}}$ experiment used in defining the security for predicate encryption schemes

When $P$ is clear from the context, we might simply write $\text{Dec}$ instead of $\text{Dec}_P$.

We also present the definition of attribute-based encryption, which is a special case of predicate encryption where the attribute of the encrypted message could be potentially extracted efficiently from the ciphertext $^1$.

**Definition 2.6.5 (Attribute-based Encryption (ABE)).** An attribute-based encryption scheme is a predicate encryption scheme for a class of predicates $P_{K, A}$ (defined through efficient test $P(k, a) \in \{0, 1\}$) satisfying the properties of Definition 2.6.4 except that the completeness and security conditions are replaced with the following:

- **Completeness:** For any security parameter $\kappa$, key $k \in K$, attribute $a \in A$, and message $m \in M$, the following holds:

  $$ \text{Dec}_P(sk_k, \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, (m, a))) = \begin{cases} (a, |m|) & \text{if } k = \epsilon \\ m & \text{if } k \neq \epsilon \text{ and } P(k, a) = 1 \\ \bot & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} $$

  where $sk_k \leftarrow \text{KGen}(\text{MSK}, k)$ and $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$.

- **Security:** For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that the following holds:

  $$ \Pr[\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{ABE}}(1^\kappa) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\kappa) $$

  where $\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{ABE}}$ is shown in Figure 2.2, and for each key query $k$ that $A$ sends to the KGen oracle, it must hold that $P(k, a) = 0$.

$^1$The work of [BSW11] refers to this sub-class as predicate encryption with public index
Experiment $\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{ABE}}(\lambda)$:
1. $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda)$
2. $(x_0, x_1) \leftarrow A^{\text{KGen}(\text{MSK})}(\text{MPK})$ where $x_b = (a, m_b)$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, $|m_0| = |m_1|$ and for each prior query $k$ we require that $P(k, a) = 0$
3. $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$
4. $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, x_b)$
5. $b' \leftarrow A^{\text{KGen}(\text{MSK})}(\text{MPK}, c)$ where for each query $k$ we require that $P(k, a) = 0$
6. Output 1 if $b = b'$ and 0 otherwise.

Figure 2.2: The $\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{ABE}}$ experiment used in defining the security for attribute-based encryption schemes

2.6.3 Homomorphic Encryption

Definition 2.6.6 (Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)). Let $F$ be a PPT algorithm that accepts as input string $f$ and messages $m_1, \ldots, m_t$ and outputs a string $m'$. For any security parameter $\kappa$, a homomorphic scheme $\text{HE}$ for $F$ is composed of four PPT algorithms $(\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Eval}_F)$ defined as follows:

- $\text{Setup}(\lambda)$: given the security parameter $\lambda$, outputs the master public key $\text{MPK}$ and the master secret key $\text{MSK}$.
- $\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, m)$: given $\text{MPK}$ and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}$, outputs an encryption $c$.
- $\text{Eval}_F(\text{MPK}, f, c_1, \ldots, c_t)$: given master public key $\text{MPK}$, string $f$, and a sequence of ciphertexts $c_1 = \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, m_1), \ldots, c_t = \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, m_t)$, outputs another ciphertext $c_f$.
- $\text{Dec}(\text{MSK}, c)$: given $\text{MSK}$ and ciphertext $c$, outputs a bit $m \in \{0, 1\}$.

A HE scheme is said to be fully homomorphic if the class of circuits supported for evaluation consists of all polynomially-sized circuits (i.e. $\mathbb{P}/\text{poly}$). Furthermore, an FHE scheme must satisfy the following properties:

- **Completeness**: For any security parameter $\kappa$, string $f$ and messages $m_1, \ldots, m_t \in \{0, 1\}$, it holds that:
  \[ \Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{MSK}, \text{Eval}_F(\text{MPK}, f, c_1, \ldots, c_t)) = F(f, m_1, \ldots, m_t)] = 1 \]
  where $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda)$ and $c_i = \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, m_i)$ for $i \in [t]$.

- **Compactness**: There exists a fixed polynomial $p(.)$ such that, for every string $f$, the size of the evaluated ciphertexts $|\text{Eval}_F(\text{MPK}, f, c_1, \ldots, c_t)|$ is at most $p(\kappa)$ where, for all $i \in [t]$, $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, m_i)$ for some $m_i \in \{0, 1\}$.
Security: For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\mu(.)$ such that the following holds:

$$|\Pr[A(\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 1)) = 1]| \leq \mu(\kappa)$$

where $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$ and the probability is over the randomness of $A$ and $\text{Enc}$.

We also provide two stronger variants of FHE where one may evaluate on multiple encryptions that were generated from different public keys but can only decrypt the newly evaluated ciphertext if one has access to some subset of the corresponding secret keys.

Definition 2.6.7 (Multi-key FHE (MFHE) [LTV12, MW16]). A multi-key FHE scheme is an FHE scheme where the evaluation sub-routine is replaced with the following:

- $\text{Eval}(\overrightarrow{\text{MPK}}, f, c_1, ..., c_t)$: given a sequence of $L$ distinct and independently generated keys $\overrightarrow{\text{MPK}} = (\text{MPK}_1, ..., \text{MPK}_L)$, a circuit $f \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and a sequence of ciphertexts $(c_1, ..., c_t)$ where for all $i \in [t]$ there exists some $j \in [L]$ such that $c_i = \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}_j, m_i)$, outputs another ciphertext $c_f$.

Furthermore, the following properties must be satisfied:

- Completeness: For any security parameter $\kappa$, messages $m_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and function $f$, it holds that:

$$\Pr[\text{Dec}(\overrightarrow{\text{MSK}}, \text{Eval}(\overrightarrow{\text{MPK}}, f, c_1, ..., c_t)) = f(m_1, ..., m_t)] = 1$$

where $\overrightarrow{\text{MSK}} = (\text{MSK}_1, ..., \text{MSK}_L)$, $\overrightarrow{\text{MPK}} = (\text{MPK}_1, ..., \text{MPK}_L)$, and for all $j \in [L]$ we have $(\text{MSK}_j, \text{MPK}_j) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$ and for all $i \in [t]$ there exists $j \in [L]$ such that $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}_j, m_i)$.

- Compactness: There exists a fixed polynomial $p(., .)$ such that the size of the evaluated ciphertexts $\text{Eval}(\overrightarrow{\text{MPK}}, f, c_1, ..., c_t)$ is at most $p(\kappa, L)$ for any $f \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

- Security: For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\mu(.)$ such that the following holds:

$$|\Pr[A(\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 1)) = 1]| \leq \mu(\kappa)$$

where $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$ and the probability is over the randomness of $A$ and $\text{Enc}$.

Definition 2.6.8 (Spooky Encryption [DHRW16]). Let $F$ be a PPT algorithm that accepts as input a string $f$ and messages $m_1, ..., m_t$ and outputs a sequence of messages $m'_1, ..., m'_t$. A $F$-spooky encryption scheme is an HE scheme for (possibly randomized) $F$ where evaluation is replaced with the following:
• $\text{Eval}_F(f, (\text{MPK}_1, c_1), ..., (\text{MPK}_t, c_t))$: given a sequence of pairs of public key-ciphertext pairs $(\text{MPK}_i, c_i)$, would output a sequence of ciphertexts $(c'_1, ..., c'_t)$.

Furthermore, the following properties must be satisfied:

• Completeness: For any security parameter $\kappa$, string $f$ and messages $(m_1, ..., m_t)$ where $m_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ for all $i \in [t]$, it holds that:

\[
\{(\text{Dec}(\text{MSK}_1, c'_1), ..., \text{Dec}(\text{MSK}_t, c'_t))\}_\kappa \approx_c \{F(f, m_1, ..., m_t)\}_\kappa
\]

where for all $i \in [t], (\text{MSK}_i, \text{MPK}_i) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa), c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}_i, m_i)$, and the evaluated ciphertexts are given as $c'_i \leftarrow \text{Eval}_F(f, (\text{MPK}_1, c_1), ..., (\text{MPK}_t, c_t))$.

• Security: For any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\mu(.)$ such that the following holds:

\[
|\Pr[A(\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 1)) = 1]| \leq \mu(\kappa)
\]

where $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$ and the probability is over the randomness of $A$ and $\text{Enc}$.

In [DHRW16], a special case of spooky encryption called additive function sharing (AFS) spooky encryption was defined, which is essentially $F$-spooky encryption where $F$ accepts and executes a circuit $f_h$ that outputs a random $n$-out-of-$n$ additive secret share of $h(m_1, ..., m_t)$. Note that $F$-spooky encryption supporting the class of all polynomially-sized circuits is a generalization of multi-key FHE [LTV12, MW16]. In particular, if we allowed repetition of public keys in the evaluation algorithm of the MFHE scheme, then we can define the evaluation algorithm of MFHE to simply use the evaluation of the spooky encryption scheme and output $c_f = (c'_1, ..., c'_t)$.

### 2.6.4 Functional Encryption

We will mainly be concerned with single-key functional encryption schemes which we define below so in the rest of this work whenever we refer to functional encryption, it is of the single-key type. We define a single-key functional encryption for function family $F = \{F_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ (represented as a circuit family) as follows:

**Definition 2.6.9** (Single-Key Functional Encryption [BV15]). A single-key functional encryption (FE) for function family $F$ consists of three PPT algorithms (Setup, Enc, Dec) defined as follows:

• **Setup(1^\kappa)**: Given as input the security parameter $1^\kappa$, it outputs a master public key and master secret key pair $(\text{MPK}, \text{MSK})$.

• **KGen(\text{MSK}, f)**: Given master secret key $\text{MSK}$ and function $f \in F$, outputs a decryption key $\text{SK}_f$.

• **Enc(\text{MPK}, x)**: Given the master public key $\text{MPK}$ and message $x$, outputs ciphertext $c \in \{0, 1\}^p$. 

21
• Dec(SK_f, c): Given a secret key SK_f and a ciphertext c ∈ \{0, 1\}^m, outputs a string y ∈ \{0, 1\}^s.

The following completeness and security properties must be satisfied:

• **Completeness:** For any security parameter \(\kappa\), any \(f \in F\) with domain \(\{0, 1\}^n\) and message \(x \in \{0, 1\}^n\), the following holds:

\[
\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_f, \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, x)) = f(x)
\]

where (\text{MPK}, \text{MSK}) ← \text{Setup}(1^{\kappa}) and \text{SK}_f ← \text{KGen}(\text{MSK}, f)

• **Security:** For any PPT adversary \(A\), there exists a negligible function \(\text{negl}(\cdot)\) such that:

\[
\Pr[\text{IND}_A^{\text{1FE}}(1^{\kappa}) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\kappa),
\]

where \(\text{IND}_A^{\text{1FE}}\) is the following experiment.

**Experiment** \(\text{IND}_A^{\text{1FE}}(1^{\kappa})\):

1. (\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) ← \text{Setup}(1^{\kappa})
2. \((f, x_0, x_1) ← A(\text{MPK})\) where \(|x_0| = |x_1|\) and \(f(x_0) = f(x_1)\)
3. \(b \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}, c ← \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, x_b), \text{SK}_f ← \text{KGen}(\text{MSK}, f)\)
4. \(b' ← A(\text{MPK}, \text{SK}_f, c)\)
5. Output 1 if \(b = b'\) and 0 otherwise.

Figure 2.3: The \(\text{IND}_A^{\text{1FE}}\) experiment used in defining the security for functional encryption schemes

• **Efficiency:** We define two notions of efficiency for single-key FE supporting the function family \(F\):

  - **Compactness:** An FE scheme is said to be compact if the size of the encryption circuit is bounded by some fixed polynomial \(\text{poly}(n, \kappa)\) where \(n\) is the size of the message, independent of the function \(f\) chosen by the adversary.\(^2\)

  - **Function Output Length:** An FE scheme is said to be \(t\)-bit-output if \(\text{outlen}(f) ≤ t(n, \kappa)\) for any \(f \in F\), where \(\text{outlen}(f)\) denotes the output length of \(f\). Given ciphertext length \(p(n, \kappa)\), we say an FE scheme is long-output if it is \((p + i)\)-bit-output for some \(i ≥ 1\) and short-output if it is only \((p - \omega(n + \kappa))\)-bit-output where \(n\) is the size of the message.

**Definition 2.6.10** (Functional Witness Encryption (FWE) [BCP14]). Let \(V\) be a PPT algorithm that takes as input an instance-message pair \(x = (a, m)\) and witness \(w\) then outputs a bit. Furthermore, let \(F\) be a PPT Turing machine that accepts as input a witness \(w\) and a message \(m\) then outputs a string \(y ∈ \{0, 1\}^4\). For any given security parameter \(\kappa\), a functional witness encryption scheme indexed with \(V\) and \(F\) consists of two PPT algorithms \(P = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V,F)\) defined as follows:

\(^2\)A couple of other weaker notions of compactness for FE have also been considered in the literature. However, all these notions are known to be “monolithically” equivalent to compact single-key FE. Therefore, we restrict our discussion just to compact single-key FE.
• Enc(1\(\kappa\), a, m) : given an instance a \(\in\{0, 1\}\)*, message m \(\in\{0, 1\}\)*, and security parameter \(\kappa\), outputs c \(\in\{0, 1\}\)*.
• Dec\(V, F\)(w, c) : given ciphertext c and “witness” string w \(\in\{0, 1\}\)*, outputs a message m’ \(\in\{0, 1\}\)*.

A functional witness encryption scheme satisfies the following completeness and security properties:

• Correctness: For any security parameter \(\kappa\), any m \(\in\{0, 1\}\)*, and any \((w, (a, m))\) such that \(V^P(w, a) = 1\), it holds that

\[
\Pr_{\operatorname{Enc,Dec}}[\operatorname{Dec}_{\operatorname{V,F}}(w, \operatorname{Enc}(1\kappa, a, m)) = F^P(w, m)] = 1
\]

• Extractability: For any PPT adversary A and polynomial \(p_1(.)\), there exists a PPT extractor E and a polynomial \(p_2(.)\) such that for any security parameter \(\kappa\), any a for which \(V^P(w, a) = 1\) for some w, and any \(m_0, m_1\) where \(|m_0| = |m_1|\), if:

\[
\Pr\left[A(1\kappa, c) = b \mid b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, c \leftarrow \operatorname{Enc}(1\kappa, a, m_b)\right] \geq \frac{1}{2} + p_1(\kappa)
\]

Then:

\[
\Pr\left[E(A(1\kappa, a, m_0, m_1)) = w : V^P(w, a) = 1 \land F^P(w, m_0) \neq F^P(w, m_1)\right] \geq p_2(\kappa)
\]

2.6.5 Universal Variants of Primitives

In all the primitives that we have defined in this section, there exists an efficiently computable function \(R\) that is part of the definition of this (family of) primitives. However, in this work, whenever we reference such a primitive, we will use a standard universal circuit evaluator function \(R_U\) (see Definition 2.1.1) that captures the most ‘complete’ version of such a primitive and allows us to obtain the primitive in terms of any other relation. More specifically, the universal function is defined as follows for each relevant primitive:

• Witness Encryption: The function (which is a relation here) \(R_U\) with corresponding verifier \(V\) is defined so that for any input pair \((w, a)\), \(V(w, a) = a(w)\). Thus, this relation gives rise to the language \(L_V = \{a \mid \exists w: a(w) = 1\}\), which is essentially the language of circuit satisfiability.

• Predicate and Attribute-based Encryption: The universal predicate class \(P_{K, A}\) with corresponding \(P\) is defined so that for any \(k \in K\) and \(a \in A\), \(P(k, a) = k(a)\). Thus, this relation gives rise to the language \(L_P = \{k \mid \exists a: k(a) = 1\}\).

• (Multi-key) FHE and Spooky Encryption: The algorithm \(F\) representing the scheme is defined so that for any input sequence \((f, m_1, ..., m_i)\), \(F(f, m_1, ..., m_i) = f(m_1, ..., m_i)\).

Given a primitive defined with universal relation \(R_U\) with associated verifier \(V\), we can construct the same primitive for any other arbitrary efficiently computable relation \(R'\) with
associated verifier $\mathcal{V}'$. This is achieved by defining an instance $a$ to be verified by $\mathcal{V}$ as a circuit $a := \mathcal{V}'(., a')$ where $a'$ is an instance to be verified by $\mathcal{V}'$. In that case, we have that, for any $(w, a')$, $\mathcal{V}'(w, a') = 1$ if and only if $\mathcal{V}(w, a) = 1$ since $\mathcal{V}(w, a) = a(w) = \mathcal{V}'(w, a')$.

We can also define a symmetric variant of the universal relation. For example, for PE or ABE, we can let $P(k, a) = a(k)$ instead\(^3\). In either case, we will explicitly mention which input is to act as the circuit when we make use of these relations.

\(^3\)In fact, these symmetric notions have been previously defined in the literature in the context of predicate encryption as key policy [GPSW06] and ciphertext policy [BSW07].
Part I

Black-box Separations for Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Chapter 3

The Black-box Framework

In this section, we present a background on the standard techniques used to prove black-box separation results. We first start by defining the various notions of black-box constructions then present how these constructions work in idealized models where access to randomized oracles is provided to all algorithms.

3.1 Black-box Constructions

Cryptographic primitives or objects, such as one-way functions and private-key encryption schemes, are traditionally defined as satisfying a correctness condition and a security condition. As such, any given construction of a primitive $Q$ from another primitive $P$ should satisfy both conditions in order to be a valid instantiation of $Q$. We refer to any construction of $Q$ from $P$ as being black-box if such a construction makes use of the input-output behaviour of $P$ and not the actual implementation.

Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] were the first to formally study the power of black-box constructions that relativize to any oracle. Their notion was further explored in detail by Reingold, Trevisan, and Vadhan [RTV04]. The work of Baecher, Brzuska, and Fischlin [BBF13] further studied the black-box framework and presented variants of the definition of black-box constructions. We first start by recalling the definition of cryptographic primitives, and then will go over the standard notion of (fully) black-box constructions.

**Definition 3.1.1** (Cryptographic Primitives [RTV04]). A primitive $\mathcal{P} = (\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{R})$ is defined as set of functions $\mathcal{F}$ and a relation $\mathcal{R}$ between functions. A (possibly inefficient) function $F : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ is a correct implementation of $\mathcal{P}$ if $F \in \mathcal{F}$, and a (possibly inefficient) adversary $A$ breaks an implementation $F \in \mathcal{F}$ if $(A,F) \in \mathcal{R}$.

**Definition 3.1.2** (Black-box Constructions [RTV04]). A black-box construction of a primitive $Q$ from a primitive $\mathcal{P}$ consists of two PPT algorithms $(Q,S)$ defined as follows:

1. **Implementation**: For any oracle $P$ that implements $\mathcal{P}$, $Q^P$ implements $Q$. 
2. **Security reduction**: for any oracle $P$ implementing $\mathcal{P}$ and for any (computationally unbounded) oracle adversary $A$ breaking the security of $Q^P$, it holds that $S^{P,A}$ breaks the security of $P$.

By considering the role of the security parameter we can distinguish between attacks that succeed over an “infinite” vs. “all but finitely many” security parameters. Therefore, we will work with a more refined definition of cryptographic primitives (and constructions) where the parties also receive a security parameter $\kappa$ as input. Thus, any function $P$ implementing a primitive $\mathcal{P}$ will take as input a “security parameter” $\kappa$ and, according to the standard definition of security in cryptography, any adversary $A$ who successfully breaks $P$ would have to “win” over an infinite number of security parameters for a “noticeable” advantage (e.g. only winning over security parameters that are, say, powers of two will suffice to call it a successful attack).

**Primitives with stronger hardness.** The above definition is for polynomially secure primitives. When the used primitive $\mathcal{P}$ is $s$-secure for a more quantitative bound $s(n) \gg \text{poly}(n)$, the security reduction $S$ could potentially run in longer running time as well so long as it holds that: when $P, A$ are polynomial time, the total running time of the composed algorithm $S^{P,A}$ is also small enough to be considered a legitimate attack against the implementation $P$ of $\mathcal{P}$.

**Black-box Separations.** In order to rule out black-box constructions we can use one of many various techniques that were developed in [IR89, GMR01, HR04], each of which have their advantages and difficulties when ruling out certain classes of constructions. In most cases, one can easily see that in order to rule out a black-box construction of a primitive $\mathcal{Q}$ from another primitive $\mathcal{P}$, it suffices to show that, for any candidate construction $Q$ of $\mathcal{Q}$, there exists an oracle $O$ such that $Q^O$ can be broken by some poly-query adversary $A^O$ but any construction $P$ of $\mathcal{P}$ is secure against any adversary that tries to break it.

### 3.1.1 Variants on Black-box Constructions

In the following more relaxed form of constructions, the security reduction can depend arbitrarily on the adversary but it still treats the implementation of the used primitive in a black-box way.

**Definition 3.1.3** (Semi-black-box constructions [RTV04]). A *semi-black-box* construction of a primitive $\mathcal{Q}$ from a primitive $\mathcal{P}$ is defined similarly to the fully black-box Definition of 3.1.2 with the following difference in the security reduction:

- For any oracle $P$ implementing $\mathcal{P}$ and any efficient oracle-aided adversary $A^P$ who breaks the security of $Q^P$, it holds that $S^{P}(A)$ breaks the security of $P$. Note that since $A$’s description is efficient it could indeed be given to $S$ in a non-black-box way.
Efficiency of adversary. We used the term efficient in an unspecified way so that it could be applied to complexity classes beyond polynomial time. For example, using a quasi-polynomially secure primitive $P$ to construct a polynomially secure primitive $Q$ would require a security primitive that is more relaxed and could lead to a quasi-polynomial (as opposed to polynomial) time attack against $P$ using any polynomial-time attacker against $Q_P$.

3.1.2 Black-box Constructions in Idealized Models

Definition 3.1.4 (Oracle-fixed constructions in idealized models). We say a primitive $P$ exists relative to the randomized oracle (or idealized model) $I$ if there is an oracle-aided algorithm $P$ such that:

1. Completeness: For every instantiation $I \leftarrow I$, it holds that $P_I$ implements $P$ correctly.

2. Security: Let $A$ be an oracle-aided adversary $A^I$ where the complexity of $A$ is bounded by the specified complexity of the attacks for primitive $P$. For example if $P$ is polynomially secure (resp., quasi-polynomially secure), then $A$ runs in polynomial time (resp., quasi-polynomial time). For every such oracle-aided $A$, with measure one over the sampling of the idealized oracle $I \leftarrow I$, it holds that $A$ does not break the security of $P_I$.

We call $P$ a black-box construction of $P$ relative to $I$ if the security property holds also in a “black-box” way defined as follows:

- Black-box security: Let $A$ be an oracle-aided adversary $A^I$ where the query complexity of $A$ is bounded by the specified complexity of the attacks for primitive $P$. For example if $P$ is polynomially secure (resp., quasi-polynomially secure), then $A$ only asks a polynomial (resp., quasi-polynomial) number of queries. For every such oracle-aided $A$, with measure one over the sampling of the idealized oracle $I \leftarrow I$, it holds that $A$ does not break the security of $P_I$.

In the definition above, we only require the scheme to be secure after the adversary is fixed. This is along the line of the way the random oracle model is used in cryptography [BR93], and lets us easily derive certain primitives in idealized models. For example it is easy to see that a random trapdoor permutation, with measure one, is a secure TDP against any fixed adversary of polynomial query complexity. Therefore, TDPs exist in the idealized model of random TDP in a black-box way. In fact stronger results are proved in the literature for other primitives. Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] and Gennaro and Trevisan [GT00] showed that one-way functions exist relative to the idealized model of random oracle, even if we sample the oracle first and then go over enumerating possible attacks. Chung et al. [CLMP13] proved a similar result for collision resistant hash functions.

Remark 3.1.5. Definition 3.1.4 is different from saying that $P$ exists in a relativized world $I \leftarrow I$ with measure one (where we have to fix the oracle first then enumerate over all
attackers instead of fixing the attacker first). If the security condition was defined with respect to efficient attackers, then we could use the Borel–Cantelli lemma (see Lemma 2.2.1) then do a union bound over all such attackers, but the number of bounded-query attacking algorithms is not countable. Working with Definition 3.1.4 allows us to still use idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ for the purpose of proving black-box separations (where we want to say $\mathcal{P}$ is not enough to obtain another primitive $\mathcal{Q}$).

Definition 3.1.4 is called “oracle-fixed” in contrast to another “oracle-mixed” definition (stated below) in which the same security condition holds (with measure one) over the randomness of the $\mathcal{I}$ and $A$ at the same time.

**Definition 3.1.6** (Oracle-mixed constructions in idealized models). We say a primitive $\mathcal{P}$ has an oracle-mixed black-box construction in idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ if there is an oracle-aided algorithm $P$ such that:

- **Oracle-mixed Completeness**: $P^I$ implements $\mathcal{P}$ correctly where the probabilities are also over $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$. For the important case of perfect completeness, this definition is the same as oracle-fixed completeness.

- **Oracle-mixed Black-box Security**: Let $A$ be an oracle-aided algorithm in idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ whose query complexity is bounded by the specified complexity of the attacks defined for primitive $\mathcal{P}$. We say that the oracle-mixed black-box security holds for $P^I$ if for any such $A$ there is a negligible $\mu(n)$ such that the advantage of $A$ breaking $P^I$ over the security parameter $n$ is at most $\mu(n)$ where this bound is also over the randomness of $\mathcal{I}$.

**Remark 3.1.7** (Oracle-fixed vs. Oracle-mixed Constructions). We called the constructions of Definition 3.1.4 “oracle-fixed” because many constructions in idealized models use an “oracle-mixed” security definition. In an oracle-mixed construction $P$ of a primitive $\mathcal{P}$ in an idealized model $\mathcal{I}$, the completeness is defined similarly to Definition 3.1.4, but when it comes to security, the advantage of $A$ in breaking the scheme is calculated also over the randomness of $\mathcal{I}$. Even though oracle-fixed constructions seem to enjoy a stronger security guarantee than oracle-mixed ones, it can be shown that the oracle-fixed security does not imply oracle-mixed security when the advantage of the attack is only $1/\text{poly}(n)$. For example consider a trivial primitive in the Boolean random oracle model $\mathcal{B}$ in which a trivial attacker $A$ succeeds in its attack over security parameter $n$ if $\mathcal{B}$ is equal to 0 over the first $\log(n)$ queries. Then the only oracle for which $A$ succeeds in its attack for an infinite sequence of security parameters is the constant zero oracle, which has a measure zero of being sampled. However, looking ahead, we will prove in Section 7.2 the fact that when the attacker achieves constant $\Omega(1)$ advantage over the trivial bound, an oracle-fixed black-box construction is also an oracle-mixed black-box construction.

\(^1\)For example, an oracle-mixed construction of an $\epsilon$-approximate IO only requires approximate correctness while the probability of approximate correctness is computed also over the probability of the input as well as the oracle.
We now present two lemmas stating that the existence of some primitive $P$ in an idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ and the existence of a fully- or semi-black-box construction of $Q$ from $P$ would imply that $Q$ also exists in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$.

**Lemma 3.1.8 (Composition lemma).** Suppose $Q$ is a fully-black-box construction of primitive $Q$ from primitive $P$, and suppose $P$ is an oracle-fixed construction for primitive $P$ relative to $\mathcal{I}$ (according to Definition 3.1.4). Then $Q^P$ is an oracle-fixed implementation of $Q$ relative to the same idealized model $\mathcal{I}$.

**Proof.** It is easy to see that $Q^P$ is an implementation of $Q$ relative to $\mathcal{I}$ (by completeness of the constructions $P$ and $Q$), and so the completeness holds. The proof of security follows. For sake of contradiction, let $A^I$ be any efficient query successful attacker against the implementation $Q^P$ (of $Q$) in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ which rules out its oracle-fixed black-box property. Namely, there is a non-zero measure fraction of $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ for which it holds that $A^I$ breaks the security of $Q^P_I$. For any such fixed $I$, the security reduction $SA^I_I$ (of the fully-black-box construction $Q$ of $P$) would break the security of $P^I$. By combining the algorithms $S$ and $A$ we get that the efficient query attacker $(SA)^I = B^I$ breaks the security of $P^I$ with non-zero measure over the sampled oracle $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$. But this contradicts the assumption that $P$ is securely realized in $\mathcal{I}$ in an oracle-fixed black-box way. Therefore $Q^P$ is also an oracle-fixed black-box construction of $Q$ relative to $\mathcal{I}$. \[\square\]

**Lemma 3.1.9 (Composition Lemma (semi-black-box constructions)).** Suppose $Q$ is a semi-black-box construction of primitive $Q$ from primitive $P$, and suppose $P$ is an oracle-fixed construction for primitive $P$ relative to $\mathcal{I}$ (according to Definition 3.1.4). Then $Q^P$ is an oracle-fixed implementation of $Q$ relative to the same idealized model $\mathcal{I}$.

**Proof.** Let $Q$ be the semi-black-box construction of $Q$ from $P$. Let $P$ be the implementation of $P$ relative to $\mathcal{I}$. Now, for sake of contradiction, let $A^I$ be any efficient successful attacker against the implementation of $Q^P$ in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$. That means by non-zero measure over the choice of $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ it holds that $A^I$ breaks the security of $Q^P_I$. For any such fixed $I$, the (semi-black-box) security reduction $S^I(A)$ would break the security of $P^I$. This means that the attacker $S(A) = B$ breaks the security of $P^I$ with non-zero measure over the sampled oracle $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$, which contradicts the assumption that $P$ is securely realized in $\mathcal{I}$. \[\square\]
Chapter 4

Impossibility of VBB Obfuscation in Idealized Models

4.1 Introduction

Virtual Black-Box (VBB) obfuscation (see Definition 2.5.1) is a strong form of obfuscation in which the obfuscated code does not reveal any secret bit about the obfuscated program unless that information could already be obtained through a black-box access to the program. It was shown in [BGI+01, GK05] that VBB obfuscation is not possible in general as there is a family of functions $F$ that could not be VBB obfuscated. Roughly speaking, $F$ would consist of circuits $C$ such that given any obfuscation $B = \nuO(C)$ of $C$, by running $B$ over $B$ itself as input one can obtain a secret $s$ about $C$ that could not be obtained through mere black-box interaction with $C$. This strong impossibility result, however, did not stop researchers from exploring the possibility of VBB obfuscation for special classes of functions, and positive results for special cases were presented (e.g., [Can97, CMR98, DS05, Wee05, AW07, HRsV07, CD08, BC10, CRV10]) based on believable computational assumptions.

The work of Lynn, Prabhakaran and Sahai [LPS04] showed the possibility of VBB obfuscation for certain class of functions in the random oracle model (ROM) (see Definition 2.3.1). The work of [LPS04] left open whether general purpose obfuscatory for all circuits could be obtained in the ROM or not. Note that when we allow the random oracle to be used during the obfuscation phase (and also let the obfuscated code to call the random oracle) the impossibility result of [BGI+01] no longer applies, because the proof of [BGI+01] requires the obfuscated algorithm to be a circuit in the plain model where no oracle is accessed. In fact, despite the impossibility of general VBB obfuscation in the plain model, a construction for VBB obfuscation in the ROM could be used as a practical heuristic obfuscation mechanism once instantiated with a strong hash function such as SHA3. This would be in analogy with the way ROM based constructions of other primitives are widely used in practice despite the impossibility results of [CGH04].

Canetti, Kalai, and Paneth [CKP15] proved the first impossibility result for VBB obfuscation in a natural idealized model by ruling out the existence of general purpose VBB
obfuscators in the random oracle model, assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations. Their work resolved the open question of [LPS04] negatively. At a technical level, [CKP15] showed how to compile any VBB obfuscator in the ROM into an approximate VBB obfuscator in the plain model which preserves the circuit’s functionality only for “most” of the inputs. This would rule out VBB obfuscation in plain model (assuming TDPs) since Bitansky and Paneth [BP13] had shown that no approximate VBB obfuscator for general circuits exist if trapdoor permutations exist.

Pass and shelat [PS16] further studied the possibility of VBB obfuscation in idealized algebraic models in which the positive results of [BGK+14,BR14] were proved. [PS16] showed that the existence of VBB obfuscation schemes in the graded encoding model (see Definition 2.3.4) highly depends on the degree of polynomials (allowed to be zero tested) in this model. In particular they showed that VBB obfuscation of general circuits is impossible in the graded encoding model of constant-degree polynomials. Their work nicely complemented the positive results of [BGK+14,BR14] that were proved in a similar (graded encoding) model but using super-constant (in fact polynomial in security parameter) polynomials.

We shall emphasize that proving limitations of VBB obfuscation or any other primitive in generic models of computation such as the generic group model of Shoup [Sho97] are strong lower-bounds (a la black-box separations [RTV04,IR89]) since such results show that for certain cryptographic tasks, as long as one uses certain algebraic structures (e.g., an abelian group) in a black-box way as the source of computational hardness, there will always be a generic attack that also treats the underlying algebraic structure in a black-box way and breaks the constructed scheme. The fact that the proposed attack is generic makes the lower-bound only stronger.

4.2 Our Results

In this chapter we extend the previous works [CKP15,PS16] on the impossibility of VBB obfuscation in idealized models of computation and generalize their results to more powerful idealized primitives. We first focus on the generic group model of Shoup [Sho97] (see Definitions 2.3.3 and 2.3.5) and rule out the existence of general VBB obfuscation in this model for any finite abelian group.

**Theorem 4.2.1** (Informal). **Assuming trapdoor permutations exist, there is no virtual black-box obfuscation for general circuits in the generic group model for any finite abelian group.**

The work of [PS16] implies a similar lower bound for the case of abelian groups of prime order. We build upon the techniques of [CKP15,PS16] and extend the result of [PS16] to arbitrary (even non-cyclic) finite abelian groups. See the next section for a detailed description of our techniques for proving this theorem and the next theorems described below.

We then apply our techniques designed to prove Theorem 4.2.1 to the setting of graded-encoding model studied in [PS16] and extend their results to arbitrary finite rings (rather
than fields) which remained open after their work. Our proof even handles non-commutative rings.

**Theorem 4.2.2** (Informal). Assuming trapdoor permutations exist, there is no virtual black-box obfuscation for general circuits in ideal degree-$O(1)$ graded encoding model for any finite ring.

Finally, we generalize the work of [CKP15] beyond random oracles by ruling out general VBB obfuscation in random trapdoor permutations (TDP) oracle model. Our result extends to an arbitrary number of levels of hierarchy of trapdoors, capturing idealized version of primitives such as hierarchical identity based encryption [HL02].

**Theorem 4.2.3** (Informal). Assuming trapdoor permutations exist, there is no virtual black-box obfuscation for general circuits in the random trapdoor permutation model, even if the oracle provides an unbounded hierarchy of trapdoors.

Note that the difference between the power of random oracles and random TDPs in cryptography is usually huge, as random oracle is an idealized primitive giving rise to (very efficient) symmetric key cryptography primitives, while TDPs could be used to construct many public-key objects. Our result indicates that when it comes to VBB obfuscation random TDPs are no more powerful than just random oracles.

**Connection to black-box complexity of IO.** Looking ahead, we note that the results of this work and those of [PS16] will be used to derive lower-bounds on the assumptions that can be used in a black-box way to construct IO. In particular, let $\mathcal{P}$ be a primitive implied by (i.e. exist relative to) random trapdoor permutations, generic abelian group model, or the degree-$O(1)$ graded encoding model; this includes powerful primitives such as exponentially secure TDPs or exponentially secure Diffie-Hellman-type assumptions. In Chapter 5 we show that basing IO on $\mathcal{P}$ in a black-box way is either impossible, or it is at least as hard as basing public-key cryptography on one-way functions (in a non-black-box way). Whether or not public-key encryption can be based on one-way functions has remained as one of the most fundamental open questions in cryptography.

### 4.3 Technical Overview

The high level structure of the proofs of our results follows the high level structure of [CKP15], so we start by recalling this approach. The idea is to convert the VBB obfuscator $\mathcal{V}_O$ in the idealized model to an approximate VBB obfuscation $\hat{\mathcal{V}}_O$ in the plain model which gives the correct answer $C(x)$ with high (say, 9/10) probability over the choice of random input $x$ and randomness of obfuscator. The final impossibility follows by applying the result of [BP13] which rules out approximate VBB in the plain model. Following [CKP15] our approximate VBB obfuscator $\hat{\mathcal{V}}_O$ in the plain model has the following high level structure.
1. **Obfuscation emulation.** Given a circuit $C$ emulate the execution of the obfuscator $vO^2$ in the idealized model over input $C$ to get circuit $B$ (running in the idealized model).\(^1\)

2. **Learning phase.** Emulate the execution of $B$ over $m$ random inputs for sufficiently large $m$. Output $B$ and the view $z$ of the $m$ executions above as the obfuscated code $\hat{B} = (B, z)$.

3. **Final execution.** Execute the obfuscated code $\hat{B} = (B, z)$ on new random points using some form of “lazy evaluation” of the oracle while only using the transcript $z$ of the learning phase (and not the transcript of obfuscator $vO$ which is kept private) as the partially fixed part of the oracle. The exact solution here depends on the idealized model $I$, but they all have the following form: if the answer to a new query could be “derived” from $z$ then use this answer, otherwise generate the answer from some simple distribution.

**VBB property.** As argued in [CKP15], the VBB property of $\hat{vO}$ follows from the VBB property of $vO$ and that the sequence of views $z$ could indeed be sampled by any PPT holding $B$ in the idealized model (by running $B$ on $m$ random inputs), and so it is simulatable (see Lemma 4.4.5).

**Approximate correctness.** The main challenge is to show the approximate correctness of the new obfuscation procedure in the plain model. The goal here is to show that if the learning phase is run for sufficiently large number of rounds, then its transcript $z$ has enough information for emulating the next (actual) execution consistently with but without knowing the view of $vO$. In the case that $I$ is a random oracle [CKP15] showed that it is sufficient to bound the probability of the “bad” event $E$ that the final execution of $\hat{B} = (B, z)$ on a random input $x$ asks any of the “private” queries of the obfuscator $vO$ which is not discovered during the learning phase. The work of [PS16] studies graded encoding oracle model where the obfuscated code can perform arbitrary zero-test queries for low degree polynomials $p(\cdot)$ defined over the generated labels $s_1, \ldots, s_k$. The oracle will return \text{true} if $p(s_1, \ldots, s_k) = 0$ (in which case $p(\cdot)$ is called a zero polynomial) and returns \text{false} otherwise. Due to the algebraic structure of the field here, it is no longer enough to learn the heavy queries of the obfuscated code who might now ask its oracle query $p(\cdot)$ from some “flat” distribution while its answer is correlated with previous answers.

### 4.3.1 Generic Group Model: Proving Theorem 4.2.1

To describe the high level ideas of the proof of our Theorem 4.2.1 it is instructive to start with the proof of [PS16] restricted to zero testing degree-1 polynomials and adapt it to the

\(^1\)The emulation here and in next steps would require the idealized model $I$ to have an efficient “lazy evaluation” procedure. For example lazy evaluation for random oracles chooses a random answer (different from previous ones) given any new query.
very close model of GGM for $\mathbb{Z}_p$ when $p$ is a prime, since as noted in [PS16] when it comes to zero-testing linear functions these two models are indeed very close.\footnote{More formally, using the rank argument of [PS16] it can be shown that for the purpose of obfuscation, the two models are equivalent up to arbitrary small $1/poly(n)$ completeness error.}

**Case of $\mathbb{Z}_p$ for prime $p$ [PS16].** When we go to the generic group model we can ask addition and labeling queries as well. It can be shown that we do not need to generate any labels when evaluating the obfuscated code since they can be emulated using addition queries. Then, by induction, all the returned labels $t_1, \ldots, t_\ell$ for addition queries are linear combinations of the labels $s_1, \ldots, s_k$ generated during obfuscation with integer coefficients\footnote{Even though the summation is technically defined over the group elements, for simplicity we use the addition operation over the labels as well.} and that is how we represent queries. Suppose we get an addition query $a + b$ and want to know the label of the group element determined by (the coefficients) $a + b = x$. Suppose for a moment that we know $s$ is the label for a vector of integers $c$, and suppose we also know that the difference $x - c$ evaluates to zero. In this case, similarly to [CKP15], we can confidently return the label $s$ as the answer to $a + b$. To use this idea, at any moment, let $W$ be the space of all (zero) vectors $\alpha - \beta$ such that we have previously discovered same labels for $\alpha$ and $\beta$. Now to answer $a + b = x$ we can go over all previously discovered labels ($c \mapsto s$) and return $s$ if $x - c \in \text{span}(W)$, and return a random label otherwise. The approximate correctness follows from the following two points.

- **The rank argument.** First note that if $x - c \in \text{span}(W)$ then the label for the vector $a + b = x$ is indeed $s$. So we only need worry about cases where $x - c \not\in \text{span}(W)$ but $x - c$ is still zero. The rank argument of [PS16] shows that this does not happen too often if we repeat the learning phase enough times. The main idea is that if this “bad” event happens, it increases the rank of $W$, but this rank can increase only $k$ times.

- **Gaussian elimination.** Finally note that the test $x - c \not\in \text{span}(W)$ can be implemented efficiently using Gaussian elimination when we work in $\mathbb{Z}_p$.

**Case of general cyclic groups.** We first describe how to extend the above to any cyclic (abelian) group $\mathbb{Z}_m$ (for possibly non-prime $m$) as follows.

- **Alternative notion for rank of $W$.** Unfortunately, when we move to the ring of $\mathbb{Z}_m$ for non-prime $m$ it is no longer a field and we cannot simply talk about the rank of $W$ (or equivalently the dimension of $\text{span}(W)$) anymore.\footnote{Note that this is even the case for $\mathbb{Z}_q$ when $q$ is a prime power, although finite fields have prime power sizes.} More specifically, similarly to [PS16], we need such (polynomial) bound to argue that during most of the learning phases the set $\text{span}(W)$ does not grow. To resolve this issue we introduce an alternative notion which here we call $\text{\textup{rank}}(W)$ that has the following three properties even when vectors $w \in W$ are in $\mathbb{Z}_m^k$ (1) If $a \in \text{span}(W)$ then $\text{\textup{rank}}(W) = \text{\textup{rank}}(W \cup \{a\})$, and
(2) if \(a \not\in \text{span}(W)\) then \(~\text{rank}(W) + 1 \leq ~\text{rank}(W \cup \{a\})\), and (3) \(1 \leq ~\text{rank}(W) \leq k \cdot \log |Z_m| = k \cdot \log m\). In particular in Lemma 4.4.27 we show that the quantity \(\text{rank}(W) := \log |\text{span}(W)|\) has these three properties. These properties together show that \(\text{span}(W)\) can only “jump up” \(k \cdot \log m\) (or fewer) times during the learning phase, and that property is enough to be able to apply the argument of [PS16] to show that sufficiently large number of learning phases will bound the error probability by arbitrary \(1/\text{poly}(n)\).

- **Solving system of linear equations over \(Z_m\).** Even though \(m\) is not necessarily prime, this can still be done using a generalized method for cyclic abelian groups [McC90].

**Beyond cyclic groups.** Here we show how to extend the above argument beyond cyclic groups to arbitrary abelian groups. First note that to solve the Gaussian elimination algorithm for \(Z_m\), we first interpret the integer vectors of \(W\) as vectors in \(Z_m^k\). This “mapping” was also crucially used for bounding \(~\text{rank}(W)\).

- **Mapping integers to general abelian \(G\).** When we move to a general abelian group \(G\) we again need to have a similar mapping to map \(W\) into a “finite” module. Note that we do not know how to solve these questions using integer vectors in \(W\) efficiently. In Lemma 4.4.4 we show that a generalized mapping \(\rho_G(\cdot): \mathbb{Z} \mapsto G\) (generalizing the mapping \(\rho_{Z_m}(x) = (x \mod m)\) for \(Z_m\)) exists for general abelian groups that has the same effect; namely, without loss of generality we can first convert integer vectors in \(W\) to vectors in \(G^k\) and then work with the new \(W\).

- **The alternative rank argument.** After applying the transformation above over \(W\) (to map it into a subset of \(G^k\)) we can again define and use the three rank-like properties of \(~\text{rank}(\cdot)\) (instead of \(~\text{rank}(W)\)) described above, but here for any finite abelian group \(G\). In particular we use \(~\text{rank}(W) := \log |\text{span}_Z(W)|\) where \(\text{span}_Z(\cdot)\) is the module spanned by \(W\) using integer coefficients. Note that even though \(G\) is not a ring, multiplying integers with \(x \in G\) is naturally defined (see Definition 4.4.3).

- **System of linear equations over finite abelian groups.** After the conversion step above, now we need to solve a system of linear equation \(xW = a\) where elements of \(W, a\) are from \(G\) but we are still looking for integer vector solutions \(x\). After all, there is no multiplication defined over elements from \(G\). See Section 4.4.2 where we give a reduction from this problem (for general finite abelian groups) to the case of \(G = Z_m\) which is solvable in polynomial time [McC90].

### 4.3.2 Low-Degree Graded Encoding Model: Proving Theorem 4.2.2

To prove Theorem 4.2.3 for general finite rings, we show how to use the ideas developed for the case of general abelian generic groups discussed above and apply them to the framework
of [PS16] for low-degree graded encoding model as specified in Theorem 4.2.2. Recall that here the goal is to detect the zero polynomials by checking their membership in the module \( \text{span}(W) \). Since here we deal with polynomials over a ring (or field) \( R \) the multiplication is indeed defined. Therefore, if we already know a set of zero polynomials \( W \) and want to judge whether \( a \) is also (the vector corresponding to) a zero polynomial, the more natural approach is to solve a system of linear equations \( xW = a \) over ring \( R \).

\textbf{Searching for integer solutions again.} Unfortunately we are not aware of a polynomial time algorithm to solve \( x \cdot W = a \) in general finite rings and as we mentioned above even special cases like \( R = \mathbb{Z}_m \) are nontrivial [McC90]. Our idea is to try to reduce the problem back to the abelian groups by somehow eliminating the ring multiplication. Along this line, when we try to solve \( x \cdot W = a \), we again restrict ourselves only to integer solutions. In other words, we do not multiply inside \( R \) anymore, yet we take advantage of the fact that the existence of integer solution to \( x \cdot W = a \) is still sufficient to conclude \( a \) is a zero vector. As we mentioned above, we indeed know how to find integer solutions to such system of linear equations in polynomial time (see Section 4.4.2).

Finally note that, we can again use our alternative rank notion of \( \tilde{\text{rank}}(W) \) to show that if we run the learning phase of the obfuscation (in plain model) \( m \) times the number of executions in which \( \text{span}_c(W) \) grows is at most poly\((n)\) (in case of degree-O(1) polynomials). This means that we can still apply the high level structure of the arguments of [PS16] for the case of finite rings without doing Gaussian elimination over rings.

### 4.3.3 Random Trapdoor Permutation Model: Proving Theorem 4.2.3.

Here we give the high-level intuition behind our result for the random TDP oracle model.

\textbf{Recalling the case of Random Oracles [CKP15].} Recall the high level structure of the proof of [CKP15] for the case of random oracles described above. As we mentioned, [CKP15] showed that to prove approximate correctness it is sufficient to bound the probability of the event \( E \) that the final execution of \( \hat{B} = (B, z) \) on a random input \( x \) asks any of the queries that is asked by emulated obfuscation \( vO \) of \( B \) (let \( Q_O \) denote this set) which is not discovered during the learning phase. So if we let \( Q_E, Q_B, Q_O \) denote the set of queries asked, respectively, in the final execution, learning, and obfuscation phases, the bad event would be \( Q_E \cap (Q_O \setminus Q_B) \neq \emptyset \). This probability could be bound by arbitrary small \( 1/\text{poly} \) by running the learning phase sufficiently many times. The intuition is that all the “heavy” queries which have a \( 1/\text{poly} \)-chance of being asked by \( \hat{B} = (B, z) \) (i.e., being in \( Q_E \)) on a random input \( x \) would be learned, and thus the remaining unlearned private queries (i.e., \( Q_O \setminus Q_B \)) would have a sufficiently small chance of being hit by the execution of \( \hat{B} = (B, z) \) on a random input \( x \).

\textbf{Warm-up: Random Permutation Oracle.} We start by first describing the proof for the simpler case of random permutation oracle. The transformation technique for the random
oracle model can be easily adapted to work in the random permutation model as follows. For starters, assume that the random permutation is only provided on one input length $k$; namely $R: \{0,1\}^k \mapsto \{0,1\}^k$. If $k = O(\log \kappa)$ where $\kappa$ is the security parameter, then it means that the whole oracle can be learned during the obfuscation and hardcoded in the obfuscated code, and so $R$ cannot provide any advantage over the plain model. On the other hand if $k = \omega(\log \kappa)$ it means that the range of $R$ is of super-polynomial size. As a result, the same exact procedure proposed in [CKP15] (that assumes $R$ is a random oracle and shows how to securely compile out $R$ from the construction) would also work if $R$ is a random permutation oracle. The reason is that the whole transformation process asks poly($\kappa$) number of queries to $R$ and, if the result of the transformation does not work when $R$ is a random permutation, then the whole transformation gives a poly($\kappa$) = $q$ query attack to distinguish between whether $R$ is a random permutation or a random function. Such an attack cannot “succeed” with more than negligible probability when the domain of $R$ has super-polynomial size $q^{\omega(1)}$ in the number of queries $q$.

**Random TDP Model.** Suppose $T = (G,F,F^{-1})$ is a random trapdoor permutation oracle in which $G$ is a random permutation for generating the public index, $F$ is the family of permutations evaluated using public index, and $F^{-1}$ is the inverse permutation computed using the secret key (see Definition 2.3.2 for formal definition and notation used). When the idealized oracle is $T = (G,F,F^{-1})$, we show that it is sufficient to apply the same learning procedure used in the random oracle case over the normalized version of the obfuscated algorithm $B$ to get a plain-model execution $\hat{B}(x)$ that is statistically close to an execution $B_T(x)$ that uses oracle $T$. This, however, requires careful analysis to prove that inconsistent queries specific to the TDP case occur with small probability.

Indeed, since the three algorithms (emulation, learning, and final execution) are correlated, there is a possibility that the execution of $B$ on the new random input might ask a new query that is not in $Q_O$, and yet still be inconsistent with some query in $Q_O \setminus Q_B$. For example, assume we have a query $q$ of the form $G(sk) = pk$ that was asked during the obfuscation emulation phase (and thus is in $Q_O$) but was missed in the learning phase (and thus is not in $Q_B$) and assume that a query of the form $F[pk](x) = y$ was asked during the learning phase (so it is in $Q_B$). Then, it is possible that during the evaluation of the circuit $B$, it may ask a query $q'$ of the form $F^{-1}[sk](y)$ and since this is a new query undetermined by previously learned queries, the plain-model circuit $\hat{B}$ will answer with some random answer $y'$. Note that in this case, $y'$ would be different from $y$ with very high probability, and thus even though $q \neq q'$, they are together inconsistent with respect to oracle $T$.

As we show in our case-by-case analysis of the learning heavy queries procedure for the case of trapdoor permutation (in Section 4.5.2), the only bad events that we need to consider (besides hitting unlearned $Q_O$ queries, which was already shown to be unlikely) will

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5In general, when the random permutation $R$ is available in all input lengths, we can use a mixture of the above arguments by generating all the oracle queries of length $c \log(\kappa)$ (for a sufficiently large constant $c$) during the obfuscation (in the plain model) and representing this randomness in the obfuscated circuit. This issue also exists in the trapdoor permutation and the generic group models and can be handled exactly the same way.
be those whose probability of occurring are negligible (we use the lemmas from [GKLM12] as leverage). Due to our normalization procedure, the rest of the cases will be reduced to the case of not learning heavy queries, and this event is already bounded.

### 4.4 Impossibility of VBB Obfuscation in Generic Algebraic Models

In this section we will formally state and prove our Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 for the generic group and graded encoding models, respectively. After going over the preliminaries related to this section and describing a useful algorithm for solving linear equations over abelian groups (which we will later use in our compilation procedure), we proceed with proving the VBB impossibility in the idealized generic group model and the graded encoding model.

#### 4.4.1 Preliminaries

We start by stating some basic group theoretic notation, facts, and definitions. By \( \mathbb{Z} \) we refer to the set of integers. By \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) we refer to the additive ring of integers modulo \( n \). When \( G \) is an abelian group, we use + to denote the operation in \( G \). A semigroup \((G, \odot)\) consists of any set \( G \) and an associative binary operation \( \odot \) over \( G \).

**Definition 4.4.1.** For semi-groups \((G_1, \odot_1), \ldots, (G_k, \odot_k)\), by the direct product semi-group \((G, \odot) = (G_1 \times \cdots \times G_k, \odot_1 \times \cdots \times \odot_k)\) we refer to the group in which for \( g = (g_1, \ldots, g_k) \in G, h = (h_1, \ldots, h_k) \in G \) we define \( g \odot h = (g_1 \odot_1 h_1, \ldots, g_k \odot_k h_k) \). If \( G_i \)'s are groups, their direct product is also a group.

The following is the fundamental theorem of finitely generated abelian groups restricted to the case of finite abelian groups.

**Theorem 4.4.2** (Characterization of Finite Abelian Groups). Any finite abelian group \( G \) is isomorphic to the direct product group \( \mathbb{Z}_{p_1^{a_1}} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_d^{a_d}} \) in which \( p_i \)'s are (not necessarily distinct) primes and \( \mathbb{Z}_{p_i^{a_i}} \) is the cyclic group mod \( p_i^{a_i} \).

**Definition 4.4.3** (Integer vs in-group multiplication for abelian groups). For integer \( a \in \mathbb{Z} \) and \( g \in G \) where \( G \) is any finite abelian group by \( a \cdot g \) we mean adding \( g \) by itself \(|a|\) times and negating it if \( a < 0 \). Now let \( g, h \in G \) both be from abelian group \( G \) and let \( G = \mathbb{Z}_{p_1^{a_1}} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_d^{a_d}} \) where \( p_i \)'s are primes. If not specified otherwise, by \( g \cdot h \) we mean the multiplication of \( g, h \) in \( G \) interpreted as the multiplicative semigroup that is the direct product of the multiplicative semigroups of \( \mathbb{Z}_{p_i^{a_i}} \)'s for \( i \in [d] \) (where the multiplications in \( \mathbb{Z}_{p_i^{a_i}} \) are mod \( p_i^{a_i} \)).

**Lemma 4.4.4** (Mapping integers to abelian groups). Let \( G = \mathbb{Z}_{p_1^{a_1}} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_d^{a_d}} \). Define \( \rho_G : \mathbb{Z} \mapsto G \) as \( \rho_G(a) = (a_1, \ldots, a_d) \in G \) where \( a_i = a \mod p_i^{a_i} \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_i^{a_i}} \). Also for \( a = (a_1, \ldots, a_k) \in \mathbb{Z}^k \) define \( \rho_G(a) = (\rho_G(a_1), \ldots, \rho_G(a_k)) \). Then for any \( a \in \mathbb{Z} \) and \( g \in G = \mathbb{Z}_{p_1^{a_1}} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_d^{a_d}} \).
it still holds that 
\[ a \cdot g = \rho_G(a) \cdot g \]
where the first multiplication is done according to Definition 4.4.3, and the second multiplication is done in \( G \). More generally, if 
\[ a = (a_1, \ldots, a_k) \in \mathbb{Z}^k \]
and 
\[ g = (g_1, \ldots, g_k) \in G, \]
then 
\[ \sum_{i \in [k]} a_i g_i = \langle a, g \rangle = \langle \rho_G(a), g \rangle. \]

The following lemma is used in [CKP15], and here we state it in an abstract form considering only the VBB security and ignoring the completeness.

**Lemma 4.4.5 (Preservation of VBB Security).** Let \( v_O \) be a PPT virtual black-box obfuscator in the \( \mathcal{I} \)-ideal model that satisfies VBB security, and let \( U \) be a PPT algorithm also in the \( \mathcal{I} \)-ideal model that given input \( B = v_O(I)(C) \) for some circuit \( C \in \{0, 1\}^n \), outputs circuit \( B' \), and suppose \( v_O \) is some plain-model PPT algorithm that given circuit \( C \), outputs \( \hat{B} \). If it holds that conditioned on any given \( C \), the statistical distance between \( B' \) and \( \hat{B} \) are negligible, then \( v_O \) satisfies the VBB security.

### 4.4.2 Solving Linear Equations over Abelian Groups

In this section we define an algebraic problem relevant to our compilation procedure and we describe a polynomial time algorithm for solving it.

**Definition 4.4.6.** [Integer Solutions to Linear Equations over Abelian Groups (iLEAG)] Let \( G \) be a finite abelian group. Suppose we are given \( G \) (e.g., by describing its decomposition factors according to Theorem 4.4.2) an \( n \times k \) matrix \( A \) with components from \( G \) and a vector \( b \in G^k \). We want to find an integer vector \( x \in \mathbb{Z}^n \) such that 
\[ xA = b. \]

**Remark 4.4.7 (Integer vs. Ring Solutions).** Suppose instead of searching for an integer vector solution \( x \in \mathbb{Z}^n \) we would ask to find \( x \in G^n \) and define multiplication in \( G \) according to Definition 4.4.3 and call this problem \( G \)-LEAG. Then any solution to iLEAG can be directly turned into a solution for \( G \)-LEAG by mapping any integer coordinate \( x_i \) of \( x \) into \( G \) by mapping \( \rho_G(x_i) \) of Lemma 4.4.4. The converse is true also for \( G = \mathbb{Z}_n \), since any \( g \in \mathbb{Z}_n \) is also in \( \mathbb{Z} \) and it holds that \( \rho_G(g) = g \in G \). However, the converse is not true in general for general abelian groups, since there could be members of \( G \) that are not in the range of \( \rho_G(\mathbb{Z}) \). For example let \( G = \mathbb{Z}_{p^2} \times \mathbb{Z}_p \) for prime \( p > 2 \) and let \( g = (2, 1) \). Note that there is no integer \( a \) such that \( a \mod p^2 = 2 \) but \( a \mod p = 1 \).

**Theorem 4.4.8.** There exists a polynomial time algorithm that can solve iLEAG.

**Cyclic vs General Abelian.** Note that if \( G = \mathbb{Z}_p \) for a prime \( p \) then iLEAG can be solved efficiently using Gaussian elimination. If the abelian group \( G \) is cyclic \( \mathbb{Z}_q \), it does not matter if we define the variables \( x \) in \( \mathbb{Z}^n \) or in \( \mathbb{Z}_q^n \). In this case, if \( q \) is prime, we can use the Gaussian elimination method to find \( x \). Interestingly, even if \( q \) is not a prime, there is still a way to solve systems of linear equations over \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) using a generalization of Gaussian elimination [McC90] which is the main tool we use to prove Theorem 4.4.8.

**Theorem 4.4.9 (McC90 Section 5.1).** Systems of linear equations over \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) for integer \( q \) can be solved in polynomial time. i.e., iLEAG is solvable in polynomial time for cyclic (abelian) \( G \).
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 4.4.8. We will do so by reducing iLEAG to
\( G = \mathbb{Z}_q \) (where \( q \) happens to be a prime power) and applying Theorem 4.4.9.

**Proof of Theorem 4.4.8 using Theorem 4.4.9.** We will change iLEAG in two steps by defin-
ing simplified versions of it and reducing it to these simplified forms.

**Definition 4.4.10** (Linear Equations over Arbitrary Prime Powers (LEAP)). Let \( \{ \mathbf{a}^j \mid j \in [m], \mathbf{a}^j \in \mathbb{Z}^n \} \) be a set of \( m \) vertical vectors in \( \mathbb{Z}^n \) and suppose we are given \( p_i^{\alpha_i} \) in which \( p_i \) is a prime (but it could be that \( p_i = p_j \)). We want to find an integer vector \( x \in \mathbb{Z}^n \) such that for all \( j \in [m] \) the inner product \( \langle x, \mathbf{a}^j \rangle \) is zero mod \( p_j^{\alpha_j} \).

**Claim 4.4.11.** Solving iLEAG can be reduced to solving LEAP in polynomial time.

**Proof.** Let \( A = [\mathbf{a}^1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}^k], \mathbf{b} = (b_1, \ldots, b_k) \) be a given instance of iLEAG over \( G \). Let \( G \) be isomorphic to \( \mathbb{Z}_{p_1^{\alpha_1}} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_d^{\alpha_d}} \). Then we can think of every column \( \mathbf{a}^i \) in \( A \) as an \( n \times d \) matrix \( C_i = [\mathbf{c}_1^i, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_d^i] \) for which \( \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a}^i \rangle = b_i \) is equivalent to having \( \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{c}_j^i \rangle = 0 \mod p_j^{\alpha_j} \) for every \( j \in [d] \). And so \( \mathbf{c}A = \mathbf{b} \) will be equivalent to \( \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{c}_j^i \rangle = 0 \mod p_j^{\alpha_j} \) for all \( i \in [k] \) and \( j \in [d] \). The latter is indeed a LEAP instance (with \( k \cdot d \) linear constraints over a total of \( d \) different moduli). \( \square \)

**Definition 4.4.12** (Linear Equations over Identical Prime Powers (LEIP)). This problem is a special case of LEAP in which all the moduli are over the same prime, but perhaps with different powers. Namely, if \( p_i^{\alpha_i} \) and \( p_j^{\alpha_j} \) is the modulus for the \( i \) inner product, we have \( p_i^{\alpha_i} = p_j^{\alpha_j} \) for all \( i, j \in [m] \).

**Claim 4.4.13.** Solving LEAP could be reduced to solving LEIP in polynomial time.

**Proof.** Let \( m \) be the number of linear constraints and \( p_i^{\alpha_i} \) be the modulus for that restriction. Partition \( [m] \) into sets \( S_1, \ldots, S_\ell \) such that \( i, j \) are in the same partition \( S_k \) if and only if \( p_i = p_j \). This partitioning defines \( \ell \) subproblems from the original LEAP instance that we simply denote by \( S_1, \ldots, S_\ell \). It is easy to see that any solution \( \mathbf{x} \) to the original LEAP instance also works for all of its subproblems. We prove the converse using the Chinese reminder theorem.

Let \( q_j = \max_{i \in S_j} p_i^{\alpha_i} \) be the largest modulus whose index is in \( S_j \). For every \( i \in S_j \) let \( r = q_j/p_i^{\alpha_i} \) and then multiply \( \mathbf{a}^i, b_i \), as well as the modulus restriction for them (i.e., \( p_i^{\alpha_i} \)) by \( r \). Note that this will not change the space of solutions, but will make all the modulus restrictions in \( S_j \) equal to \( q_j \).

Now let \( \mathbf{x}_j \) be the integer solution to LEIP instance \( S_j \) for \( j \in [\ell] \). Using the (algorithmic proof of the) Chinese reminder theorem we can use \( \mathbf{x}_j \)'s to find a single integer vector \( \mathbf{x} \) such that \( \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_j \mod q_j \) for all \( j \in [\ell] \) which means \( \mathbf{x} \) is an integer solution to the original LEAP instance. \( \square \)

Finally note that LEIP is a special case of solving linear equations over \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) for general integer \( q \) which can be solved in polynomial time according to Theorem 4.4.9. \( \square \)
Finally, we note that there is also a polynomial time algorithm for the arguably “more natural” problem $G$-LEAG (see Remark 4.4.7) in which we seek solutions for $xA = b$ inside ring $G$ where the multiplication in $G$ is defined according to Definition 4.4.3. Note that since the multiplication of Definition 4.4.3 generalizes the notion of ring $\mathbb{Z}_n$, the following theorem is a also a generalization of solving system of linear equations over $\mathbb{Z}_n$, as was the case for iLEAG, but here the generalization is in a different direction.

**Theorem 4.4.14.** $G$-LEAG can be solved in polynomial time for finite abelian groups.

**Proof.** As opposed to the case of iLEAG we show how to reduce $G$-LEAG directly to LEIP. Suppose we are given an $n \times k$ matrix $A$ and a $1 \times k$ vector $b$ with all elements in $G$, and we want to find $x$ such that $xA = b$. Let $G = \mathbb{Z}_{\alpha_1^{p_1}} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{\alpha_d^{p_d}}$. Therefore all elements of $A$, $b$ and even $x$ could be thought as $1 \times d$ vectors were the addition and multiplication in the $i$'th coordinate is done modulo $p_i^{\alpha_i}$. Now let $(A_i', b_i')$ be the LEIP instance that could be derived from $xA = b$ and for each element we substitute the corresponding $i$'th coordinate in its vector representation of $G$. It is easy to see that solving the $G$-LEAG instance is equivalent to solving all of the $d$ LEIP subproblems $(A_i', b_i')$ for $i \in [d]$ and simply using the solutions $x^i$ (whose components are modulo $p_i^{\alpha_i}$) to scale them up into a solution $x$ in $G$. \qed

### 4.4.3 Generic Group Model

We start by presenting some definitions and properties regarding the generic group model, which was formally defined in Definition 2.3.3.

**Remark 4.4.15** (Family of Groups). A more general definition allows generic oracle access to a family of groups $\{G_1, G_2, \ldots\}$ in which the oracle access to each group is provided separately when the index $i$ of $G_i$ is also specified as part of the query and the size of the group $G_i$ is known to the parties. Our negative result of Section 4.4.3 directly extends to this model as well. We use the above “single-group” definition for sake of simplicity.

**Remark 4.4.16** (Stateful vs Stateless Oracles and the Multi-Party Setting). Note that in Definition 2.3.3 we used a stateless oracle to define the generic group oracle, and we separated the generic nature of the oracle itself from how it is used by an algorithm $A^T$. In previous work (e.g., Shoup’s original definition [Sho97]) a stateful oracle is used such that it will answer addition queries only if the two labels have already been obtained before through a labeling query to the oracle.\(^6\)

Note that for “one party” settings in which $A^T$ is a single algorithm, $A^T$ “knows” the labels that it has already obtained from the oracle $I$, and so w.l.o.g. $A^T$ would never ask any addition queries unless it has previously obtained the labels itself. However, in the multi-party setting, a party might not know the set of labels obtained by other parties. A stateful oracle in this case might reveal some information about other parties’ oracle queries if the oracle does not answer a query $(y_1, y_2)$ (by returning ⊥) just because the labels $y_1, y_2$ were not previously obtained.

\(^6\)So the oracle might return ⊥ even if the two labels are in the range of $\sigma(G)$.
**Remark 4.4.17** (Equivalence of Two Models for Sparse Encodings). If the encoding of $G$ is sparse in the sense that $|S|/|G| = \kappa^{\omega(1)}$ where $\kappa$ is the security parameter, then the probability that any party could query a correct label before it being returned by oracle through a labeling (type 1) query is indeed negligible. So in this case any algorithm (or set of interactive algorithms) $A^I$ would have a behavior that is statistically close to a generic algorithm that would never ask a label in an addition query unless that label is previously obtained from the oracle. Therefore, if $|S|/|G| = \kappa^{\omega(1)}$, we can consider $A^I$ to be an arbitrary algorithm (or set of interactive algorithms) in the generic group model $I$. The execution of $A$ would be statistically close to a “generic execution” in which $A^I$ never asks any label before obtaining it.

In light of Remarks 4.4.16 and 4.4.17, for simplicity of the exposition we will always assume that the encoding is sparse $|S|/|G| = \kappa^{\omega(1)}$ and so all the generic group model algorithms are automatically (statistically close to being) generic.

**Theorem 4.4.18** (Theorem 4.2.1 Formalized). Let $G$ be any abelian group of size at most $2^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$. Let $vO$ be an obfuscator in the generic group model $I[G \mapsto S]$ where the obfuscation of any circuit followed by execution of the obfuscated code (jointly) form a generic algorithm. If $vO$ is an $\epsilon$-approximate VBB obfuscator in the generic group model $I[G \mapsto S]$ for poly-size circuits, then for any $\delta = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$ there exists an $(\epsilon + \delta)$-approximate VBB obfuscator $\hat{vO}$ for poly-size circuits in the plain model.

**Remark 4.4.19** (Size of $G$). Note that if a poly($\kappa$)-time algorithm accesses (the labels of the elements of) some group $G$, it implicitly means that $G$ is at most of $\exp(\kappa)$ size so that its elements could be names with poly($\kappa$) bit strings. We chose, however, to explicitly mention this size requirement $|G| \leq 2^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ since this upper bound plays a crucial role in our proof for general abelian groups compared to the special case of finite fields.

**Remark 4.4.20** (Sparse Encodings). If we assume a sparse encoding i.e., $|S|/|G| = \kappa^{\omega(1)}$ (as e.g., is the case in [PS16] and almost all prior work in generic group model) in Theorem 4.4.18 we no longer need to explicitly assume that the obfuscation followed by execution of obfuscated code are in generic form; see Remark 4.4.17.

Since [BP13] showed that (assuming TDPs) there is no $(1/2 - 1/\text{poly})$-approximate VBB obfuscator in the plain-model for general circuits, the following corollary is obtained by taking $\delta = \epsilon/2$.

**Corollary 4.4.21.** If TDPs exist, then there exists no $(1/2 - \epsilon)$-approximate VBB obfuscator $vO$ for general circuits in the generic group model for any $\epsilon = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$, any finite abelian group $G$ and any label set $S$ of sufficiently large size $|S|/|G| = \kappa^{\omega(1)}$. The result would hold for labeling sets $S$ of arbitrary size if the execution of the obfuscator $vO$ followed by the execution of the obfuscated circuit $vO(C)$ form a generic algorithm.

Now we formally prove Theorem 4.4.18. We will first describe the algorithm of the obfuscator in the plain model, and then will analyze its properties.
Notation and w.l.o.g. assumptions. Using Theorem 4.4.2 w.l.o.g. we assume that our abelian group \( G \) is isomorphic to the additive direct product group \( \mathbb{Z}_{p_1^{\alpha_1}} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_d^{\alpha_d}} \) where \( p_i \)'s are prime. Let \( e_i \in G \) be the vector that is 1 in the \( i \)'th coordinate and zero elsewhere. Note that \( \{ e_1, \ldots, e_d \} \) generates \( G \). We can always assume that the first \( d \) labels obtained by \( vO \) are the labels of \( e_1, \ldots, e_d \) and these labels are explicitly passed to the obfuscated circuit \( B = vO(C) \). Let \( k = \text{poly}(\kappa) \) be an upper bound on the running time of the obfuscator \( vO \) for input \( C \) which in turn upper bounds the number of labels obtained during the obfuscation (including the \( d \) labels for \( e_1, \ldots, e_d \)). We also assume w.l.o.g. that the obfuscated code never asks any type one (i.e., labeling) oracle queries since it can use the label for \( e_1, \ldots, e_d \) to obtain labels of any arbitrary \( g = a_1 e_1 + \cdots + a_d e_d \) using a polynomial number of addition (i.e., type two) oracle queries. For \( \sigma(g) = s, a \in \mathbb{Z} \), and \( t = \sigma(a \cdot g) \) we abuse the notation and denote \( a \cdot s = t \).

The Construction

Even though the output of the obfuscator is always an actual circuit, we find it easier to first describe how the obfuscator \( \hat{vO} \) generates some string \( \hat{B} \), and then we will describe how to use \( \hat{B} \) to execute the new obfuscated circuit in the plain model. For simplicity we use \( \hat{B} \) to denote the obfuscated circuit.

How to Obfuscate

The new obfuscator \( \hat{vO} \). The new obfuscator \( \hat{vO} \) uses lazy evaluation to simulate the labeling \( \sigma(\cdot) \) oracle. For this goal, it holds a set \( Q_\sigma \) of the generated labels. For any new labeling query \( g \in G \) if \( \sigma(g) = s \) is already generated it returns \( s \). Otherwise it chooses an unused label \( s \) from \( S \) uniformly at random and adds the mapping \( (g \mapsto s) \) to \( Q_\sigma \) and returns \( s \). For an addition query \( (s_1, s_2) \) it first finds \( g_1, g_2 \) such that \( \sigma(g_1) = s_1 \) and \( \sigma(g_2) = s_2 \) (which exist since the algorithm that calls the oracle is in generic form) and gets \( g = g_1 + g_2 \). Now \( vO \) proceeds as if \( g \) is asked as a labeling query and returns the answer. The exact steps of \( vO \) are as follows.

1. Emulating obfuscation. \( \hat{vO} \) emulates \( vO^I(C) \) to get circuit \( B \). Note that the type-two queries to \( I[G \mapsto S] \) could be avoided all together and be answered using labeling queries since all the generated labels are known during the obfuscation phase.

2. Learning phase 1 (heavy queries): Set \( Q_B = \emptyset \). For \( i \in [d] \) let \( t_i = \sigma(e_i) \) be the label of \( e_i \in G \) which is explicitly passed to \( B \) by the obfuscator \( vO(C) \) and \( T = (t_1, \ldots, t_d) \) at the beginning where \( T \) will (eventually) represent the discovered labels of the obfuscation. The length of the sequence \( T \) would increase during the steps below but will never exceed \( k \). Choose \( m \) at random from \( \ell = \lceil 3 \cdot k \cdot \log(|G|)/\delta \rceil \). For \( i = 1, \ldots, m \) do the following:

   - Choose \( x_i \) as a random input for \( B \). Emulate the execution of \( B \) on \( x_i \) using the (growing) set \( Q_\sigma \) of partial labeling for the lazy evaluation of labels. Note that
as we said above, w.l.o.g. $B$ only asks addition (i.e., type two) oracle queries. Suppose $B$ (executed on $x_i$) needs to answer an addition query $(s_1, s_2)$. If either of the labels $u = s_1$ or $u = s_2$ is not already obtained during the learning phase 1 (which means it was obtained during the initial obfuscation phase) append $u$ to the sequence $T$ of discovered labels by $T := (T, u)$. Using induction, it can be shown that for any addition query asked during learning phase 1, at the time of being asked, we would know that the answer to this query will be of the form $\sum_{i\in[k]} a_i \cdot t_i$ for integers $a_i$. Before seeing why this is the case, let $a_i = (a_{i,1}, \ldots, a_{i,k})$ be the vector of integer coefficients (of the labels $t_1, t_2, \ldots$) for the answer $s$ that is returned to the $i$'th query of learning phase 1. We add $(a_i \rightarrow s)$ to $Q_B$ for the returned label. To see why such vectors exist, let $(s_1, s_2)$ be an addition query asked during this phase, and let $s \in \{s_1, s_2\}$. If the label $s$ is obtained previously during learning phase 1, then the linear form $s = \sum_{i\in[k]} a_i \cdot t_i$ is already stored in $Q_B$. On the other hand, if $s$ is a new label discovered during an addition (i.e., type two) oracle query which just made $T = (t_1, \ldots, t_{j-1}, t_j = s)$ have length $j$, then $s = a_j \cdot t_j$ for $a_j = 1$. Finally, if the linear forms for both of $(s_1, s_2)$ in an addition oracle query are known, the linear form for the answer $s$ to this query would be the summation of these vectors.\footnote{Note that although the sequence $T$ grows as we proceed in learning phase 1, we already now that this sequence will not have length more than $d$ since all of these labels that are discovered while executing the obfuscated code has to be generated by the obfuscator, due to the assumption that the sequential execution of the obfuscator followed by the obfuscated code is in generic form. Therefore we can always consider $a_i$ to be of dimension $k$.}

3. Learning phase 2 (zero vectors): This step does not involve executing $B$ anymore and only generates a set $W = W(Q_B) \subseteq C^k$ of polynomial size. At the beginning of this learning phase let $W = \emptyset$. Then for all $(a_1 \rightarrow s_1) \in Q_B$ and $(a_2 \rightarrow s_2) \in Q_B$, if $s_1 = s_2$, let $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{a}_1 - \mathbf{a}_2$, and add $\rho_G(\mathbf{a})$ to $W$ where $\rho_G(\mathbf{a})$ is defined in Lemma 4.4.4.

4. The output of the obfuscation algorithm will be $\hat{B} = (B, Q_B, W, T, r)$ where $T$ is the current sequence of discovered labels $(t_1, t_2, \ldots)$ as described in Lemma 4.4.4, and $r$ is a sufficiently large sequence of random bits that will be used as needed when we run the obfuscated code $\hat{B} = (B, Q_B, W, T, r)$ in the plain model.\footnote{Note that even though $W(Q_B)$ could always be derived from $Q_B$, and even $T$ could be derived from an ordered variant of $Q_B$ (in which the order in which $Q_B$ has grown is preserved) we still choose to explicitly represent these elements in the obfuscated $\hat{B}$ to ease the description of the execution of $\hat{B}$.}

How to Execute

In this section we describe how to execute $\hat{B}$ on an input $x$ using $(B, Q_B, W, T, r)$.\footnote{Note that we do not have access to the set $Q_\sigma$ that was used for consistent lazy evaluation of $\sigma(\cdot)$.}

Executing $\hat{B}$. The execution of $\hat{B} = (B, Q_B, W, T, r)$ on $x$ will be done identically to to the “next” execution during the learning phase 1 of the obfuscation (as if $x$ is the $(m+1)$'st
execution of this learning phase) and even the sets $Q_B, W = W(Q_B)$ will grow as the execution proceeds, with the only difference described as follows.\footnote{We even allow new labels $t_i$ to be discovered during this execution to be appended to $T$, even though that would indirectly lead to an abort!} Suppose we want to answer an addition (i.e., type two) oracle query $(s_1, s_2)$ where for $b = \{1, 2\}$ we inductively know that $s_b = \sum_{i \in [k]} a_{b,i} \cdot t_i$. For $b = \{1, 2\}$ let $a_b = (a_{b,1}, \ldots, a_{b,k})$ and let $a = a_1 + a_2$.

- Do the following for all $(b \rightarrow s) \in Q_B$. Let $c = a - b$ and let $\overline{c} = \rho_G(c) \in G^k$ as defined in Lemma 4.4.4. Let $A$ be a matrix whose rows consists of all vectors in $W$. Run the polynomial time algorithm presented in Section 4.4.2 (for $G = \mathbb{Z}_n$) to see if there is any integer solution $v$ for $vA = \overline{c}$ as an instance of the iLEAG problem defined in Definition 4.4.6. If an integer solution $v$ exists, then return $s$ as the result (recall $(b \rightarrow s) \in Q_B$), break the loop, and continue the execution of $\widehat{B}$. If the loop ended and no such $(b \rightarrow s) \in Q_B$ was found, choose a random label $s$ not in $Q_B$ as the answer, add $(a \rightarrow s)$ to $Q_B$ and continue.

**Completeness and Soundness**

In this section we prove the completeness and soundness of the construction of Section 4.4.3.

**Size of $S$.** In the analysis below, we will assume w.l.o.g. that the set of labels $S$ has superpolynomial size $|S| = \kappa^{\omega(1)}$. This would immediately hold if the labeling of $G$ is sparse, since it would mean even $|S|/|G| \geq \kappa^{\omega(1)}$. Even if the labeling is not sparse, we will show that w.l.o.g. we can assume that $G$ itself has super-polynomial size (which means that $S$ will be so too). That is because otherwise all the labels in $G$ can be obtained by the obfuscator, the obfuscated code, and the adversary and we will be back to the plain model. More formally, for this case Theorem 4.4.18 could be proved through a trivial construction in which the new obfuscator simply generates all the labels of $G$ and plants all of them in the obfuscated code and they will be used by the obfuscated algorithm. More precisely, when the size of $G$ (as a function of security parameter $\kappa$) is neither of polynomial size $|G| = \kappa^{O(1)}$ nor super-polynomial size $|G| = \kappa^{\omega(1)}$ we can still choose a sufficiently large polynomial $\gamma(\kappa)$ and generate all labels of $G$ when $|G| < \gamma(\kappa)$, and otherwise use the obfuscation of Section 4.4.3.

**Completeness: approximate functionality.** Here we prove the the following claim.

**Claim 4.4.22.** Let $\widehat{B} = (B, Q_B, W, T, r)$ be the output of the obfuscator $\widehat{\mathcal{O}}$ given input circuit $C$ with input length $\alpha$. If we run $\widehat{B}$ over a random input according to the algorithm described in Section 4.4.3, then it holds that

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\alpha, B \leftarrow \widehat{\mathcal{O}}(C)} \left[ \widehat{B}(x) \neq C(x) \right] \leq \Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\alpha, B \leftarrow \mathcal{O}[G \mapsto S](C)} \left[ B^T[G \mapsto S](x) \neq C(x) \right] + \delta$$

over the randomness of $\mathcal{I}[G \mapsto S]$, random choice of $x$ and the randomness of the obfuscators.
Proof. As a mental experiment, suppose we let the learning phase 1 always runs for exactly \( \ell + 1 = 1 + \lceil 3 \cdot k \cdot \log(|G|)/\delta \rceil \) rounds but only derive the components \((Q_B, W(Q_B), T)\) based on the first \( m \) executions. Now, let \( x_i \) be the random input used in the \( i \)'th execution and \( y_i \) be the output of the \( i \)'th emulation execution the learning phase 1. Since all the executions of the learning phase 1 are perfect simulations, for every \( i \in [\ell] \), in particular \( i = m \), it holds that

\[
\Pr[B^{x \rightarrow s}_{G \rightarrow s}(x) \neq C(x)] = \Pr[y_i \neq C(x)]
\]

where probability is over the choice of inputs \( x, x_i \) as well as all other randomness in the system. Thus, to prove claim 4.4.22 it will suffice to prove that

\[
|\Pr[y_i \neq C(x)] - \Pr[\hat{B}(x_i) \neq C(x)]| < \delta.
\]

We will indeed do so by bounding the statistical distance between the execution of \( \hat{B} \) vs the \( m + 1 \)'st execution of the learning phase 1 over the same input \( x_i \). Here we will rely on the fact that \( m \) is chosen at random from \([\ell]\).

Claim 4.4.23. For random \([\ell]\) the statistical distance between the \( m + 1 \)'st execution of the learning phase 1 (which we call \( B' \)) and the execution of \( \hat{B} \) over the same input \( x_i \) is \( \leq 2\delta/3 + \text{negl}(\kappa) \).

To prove the above claim we will define three types of bad events over a joint execution of \( B' = B_{m+1} \) and \( \hat{B} \) when they are done concurrently and using the same random tapes (and even the input \( x_i \)). We will then show that (1) as long as these bad events do not happen the two executions proceed identically, and (2) the total probability of these bad events is at most \( 2\delta/3 + \text{negl}(\kappa) \). In the following we suppose that the executions of \( B' \) and \( \hat{B} \) (over the same random input) have proceeded identically so far. Suppose we want to answer an addition (i.e., type two) oracle query \((s_1, s_2)\) where for \( b = \{1, 2\} \) we inductively know that \( s_b = \sum_{i \in [k]} a_{b,i} \cdot t_i \). Several things could happen:

- If the execution of \( \hat{B} \) finds \((b \rightarrow s) \in Q_B\) such that when we take \( \mathbf{c} = \mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b} \) and let \( \overline{\mathbf{c}} = \rho_G(\mathbf{c}) \in G^k \) and let \( A \) be a matrix whose rows are vectors in (the current) \( W \), there is an integer solution \( \mathbf{v} \) to the iLEAG instance \( \mathbf{v} A = \overline{\mathbf{c}} \). If this happens the execution of \( \hat{B} \) will use \( s \) as the answer. We claim that this is the “correct” answer as \( B' \) would also use the same answer. This is because by the definition of \( W \) and Lemma 4.4.4 for all \( \mathbf{w} \in W \) it holds that \( \mathbf{w} = (w_1, \ldots, w_k) \) is a “zero vector in \( G^k \) in the sense that summing the (currently discovered labels in) \( T \) with coefficients \( w_1, \ldots, w_k \) (and multiplication defined according to Definition 4.4.3) will be zero. As a result, \( \mathbf{v} A = \overline{\mathbf{c}} \) which is a linear combination of vectors in \( W \) with integer coefficients will also be a zero vector. Finally, by another application of Lemma 4.4.4 it holds that \((c_1, \ldots, c_k) = \mathbf{c} = \mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b} \) is a “zero vector in \( \mathbb{Z}^k \)” in the sense that summing the (currently discovered labels in) \( T \) with integer coefficients \( c_1, \ldots, c_k \) (and multiplication defined according to Definition 4.4.3) will also be zero. Therefore the answer to the query defined by vector \( \mathbf{a} \) is equal to the answer defined by vector \( \mathbf{b} \) which is \( s \).
• If the above does not happen (and no such \((b \rightarrow s) \in Q_B\) is found) then either of the following happens. Suppose the answer returned for \((s_1, s_2)\) in execution of \(B'\) is \(s'\):

- **Bad event** \(E_1\): \(s'\) is equal to one of the labels in \(Q_B\). Note that in this case the executions will diverge because \(\hat{B}\) will choose a random label.

- **Bad event** \(E_2\): \(s'\) is equal to one of the labels discovered in the emulation of \(vO^T(C)\) (but not present in the current \(Q_B\)).

- **Bad event** \(E_3\): \(s'\) is a new label, but the label chosen by \(\hat{B}\) is one of the labels used in the emulation of \(vO^T(C)\). Note that in this case the execution of \(\hat{B}\) will not use any previously used labels in \(Q_B\).

It is easy to see that as long as none of the events \(E_1, E_2, E_3\) happen, the execution of \(B'\) and \(\hat{B}\) proceeds statistically the same. Therefore, to prove Claim 4.4.23 and so Claim 4.4.22 it is sufficient to bound the probability of the events \(E_1, E_2, E_3\) as we do below.

**Claim 4.4.24.** \(\Pr[E_3] < \text{negl}(\kappa)\).

**Proof.** This is because (as we described at the beginning of this subsection above) the size of \(S\) is \(\kappa^{\omega(1)}\) but the number of labels discovered in the obfuscation phase is at most \(k = \text{poly}(\kappa)\). Therefore the probability that a random label from \(S\) after excluding labels in \(Q_B\) (which is also of polynomial size) hits one of at most \(k\) possible labels is \(\leq k/(|S| - |Q_B|) = \text{negl}(\kappa)\). Therefore, the probability that \(E_3\) happens for any of the oracle queries in the execution of \(\hat{B}\) is also \(\text{negl}(\kappa)\). \(\square\)

**Claim 4.4.25.** \(\Pr[E_2] < \delta/(3 \log |G|) < \delta/3\).

**Proof.** We will prove this claim using the randomness of \(m \in [\ell]\). Note that every time that a label \(u\) is discovered in learning phase 1, this label \(u\) cannot be discovered “again”, since it will be in \(Q_B\) from now on. Therefore, the number of possible indexes of \(i \in [\ell]\) such that during the \(i\)’th execution of the learning phase 1 we discover a label out of \(Q_B\) is at most \(k\). Therefore, over the randomness of \(m \leftarrow [\ell]\) the probability that the \(m+1\)’st execution discovers any new labels (generated in the obfuscation phase) is at most \(k/\ell \leq \delta/(3 \log |G|)\). \(\square\)

**Claim 4.4.26.** \(\Pr[E_1] < \delta/3\).

**Proof.** Call \(i \in [\ell]\) a bad index if event \(E_1\) happens conditioned on \(m = i\) during the execution of \(B'\) (which is the \((m+1)\)’s execution of learning phase 1). Whenever \(E_1\) happens at any moment, it means that the vector \(\mathbf{c}\) is not currently in \(W(Q_B)\), but it will be added \(W\) just after this query is made. We will show (Lemma 4.4.27 below) that the size of \(\text{span}_z(W)\) will at least double after this oracle query for some set \(\text{span}_z(W)\) that depends on \(W\) and that \(\text{span}_z(W) \subseteq G^k\), and so \(|\text{span}_z(W)| \leq |G|^k\). As a result the number of bad indexes \(i\) will be at most \(\log |G|^k = k \log |G|\). Therefore, over the randomness of \(m \in [\ell]\) the probability that \(m+1\) is a bad index is at most \(k \log |G|/\ell \leq \delta/3\). \(\square\)
Lemma 4.4.27. Let $W \subseteq G^k$ for some abelian group $G$. Let $\text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W) = \{ \sum_{w \in W} a_w w \mid a_w \in \mathbb{Z} \}$ be the module spanned by $W$ using integer coefficients. If $\overline{c} \not\in \text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W)$, then it holds that

$$|\text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W \cup \{\overline{c}\})| \geq 2 \cdot |\text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W)|.$$ 

Proof. Let $A = \text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W)$ and let $B = \{ \overline{c} + w \mid w \in \text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W) \}$ be $A$ shifted by $\overline{c}$. It holds that $|A| = |B|$ and $A \cup B \subseteq \text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W \cup \{\overline{c}\})$. It also holds that $A \cap B = \emptyset$, because otherwise then we would have $w + \overline{c} = w'$ for some $w, w' \in \text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W)$ which would mean $\overline{c} = w - w' \in \text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W)$ which is a contradiction. Therefore $|\text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W \cup \{\overline{c}\})| \geq |A| + |B| = 2 \cdot |\text{span}_\mathbb{Z}(W)|$. 

Soundness: VBB Simulatability. To derive the soundness we apply Lemma 4.4.5 as follows. $\nu O$ will be the obfuscator in the ideal model and $\hat{\nu} O$ will be our obfuscator in the plain model where $z' = Q_B, W, T, r$ is the extra information output by $\hat{\nu} O$. The algorithm $U$ will be a similar algorithm to $\nu O$ but only during its learning phase 1 and 2 starting from an already obfuscated $B$. However, $U$ will continue generating $z'$ using the actual oracle $\mathcal{I}[G \mapsto S]$ instead of inventing the answers through lazy evaluation. Since the emulation of the oracle during the learning phases, and that all of $Q_B, W, T, R$ could be obtained by only having $B$ (and no secret information about the obfuscation phase are not needed) the algorithm $U$ also has the properties needed for Lemma 4.4.5.

Remark 4.4.28 (General abelian vs $\mathbb{Z}_n$). Note that when $G = \mathbb{Z}_n$ is cyclic, the mapping $\rho_G : \mathbb{Z} \mapsto G$ of Lemma 4.4.4 will be equivalent to simply mapping every $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ to $(a \mod n) \in G$. Therefore, Definition 4.4.3 generalizes the notion of $\mathbb{Z}_n$ as a ring to general abelian groups, since the multiplication $x \cdot y \mod n$ in $\mathbb{Z}_n$ is the same as a multiplication in which $x$ is interpreted from $\mathbb{Z}$ (as in Definition 4.4.3) which is equivalent to doing the multiplication inside $G$ according to Lemma 4.4.4.

4.4.4 Degree-$O(1)$ Graded Encoding Model

In this section we will refer to Definition 2.3.4, which is an adaptation of the definition of the Graded Encoding Model (GEM) from [PS16] restricted to the degree-$d$ polynomials. For simplicity, as in [PS16] we also restrict ourselves to the setting in which only the obfuscator generates labels and the obfuscated code only does zero tests, but the proof directly extends to the more general setting of [BGK+14, BR14]. We also use only one finite ring $R$ in the oracle (whose size could in fact depend on the security parameter) but our impossibility result extends to any sequence of finite rings as well.

Remark 4.4.29. Remarks 4.4.16 and 4.4.17 regarding the stateful vs stateless oracles and the sparsity of the encoding in the context of generic group model apply to the graded encoding model as well. Therefore, as long as the encoding is sparse (which is the case in Definition 2.3.4) whenever $|R|$ is of size $\kappa^{\omega(1)}$ the probability of obtaining any valid label
\( h = \text{enc}(v, l) \) through any polynomial time algorithm without it being obtained from the oracle previously (by the same party or another party) becomes negligible, and so the model remains essentially equivalent (up to negligible error) even if the oracle does not keep track of which labels are obtained previously through \( L_O \).

We prove the following theorem generalizing a similar result by Pass and shelat [PS16] who proved this for any finite field; here we prove the theorem for any finite ring.

**Theorem 4.4.30.** Let \( R \) be any ring of size at most \( 2^{\text{poly}(\kappa)} \). Let \( v_O \) be any \( \epsilon \)-approximate VBB obfuscator for general circuits in the ideal degree-\( d \) graded encoding model \( M^d_R \) for \( d = O(1) \) where the initialization phase of \( M^d_R \) happens during the obfuscation phase. Then for any \( \delta = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa) \) there is an \( (\epsilon + \delta) \)-approximate obfuscator \( \hat{v}_O \) for poly-size circuits in the plain model.

As in previous sections, the following corollary is obtained from Theorem 4.4.30 by taking \( \delta = \epsilon/2 \).

**Corollary 4.4.31.** If TDPs exist, then there exists no \((1/2 - \epsilon)\)-approximate VBB obfuscator \( v_O \) for general circuits in the ideal degree-\( d \) graded encoding model \( M^d_R \) for any finite ring \( R \) of at most exponential size \(|R| \leq 2^{\text{poly}(\kappa)} \) and any constant degree \( d \), assuming the initialization phase of \( M^d_R \) happens during the obfuscation phase.

[PS16] state their theorem in a more general model where a sequence of fields of growing size are accessed. For simplicity, we state a simplified variant for simplicity of presentation where only one ring is accessed but we let the size of ring \( R \) to depend on the security parameter \( \kappa \). Our proof follows the footsteps of [PS16] but will deviate from their approach when \( R \neq \mathbb{Z}_p \) by using some of the ideas employed in Section 4.4.3.

Now we sketch the proof of Theorem 4.4.30 assuming the reader is familiar with the proof of Theorem 4.4.18 from the previous section. The high level structure of the proof remains the same.

**Construction.** The new obfuscator \( \hat{v}_O \) will have these phases:

- **Emulating obfuscation.** \( \hat{v}_O \) emulates \( v_O^{M^d_R}(C) \) to get circuit \( B \).

- **Learning heavy subspace of space of zero vectors:** The learning phase here will be rather simpler than those of Section 4.4.3 and will be just one phase. Here we repeat the learning phase \( m \) times where \( m \) is chosen at random from \( \ell = \lceil k \cdot \log(|G|)/\delta \rceil \). The variables \( W \) and \( T \) will be the same as in Section 4.4.3 with the difference that \( W \) will consist of the vector of coefficients for all polynomials whose zero test answer is true.

- The returned obfuscated code will be \( \hat{B} = (B, W, T, r) \) where \( r \) is again the randomness needed to run the obfuscated code.
• Executing \( \hat{B} \). To execute \( \hat{B} \) on input \( x \), we answer zero test queries as follows. For any query vector (of coefficients) \( a \) we test whether \( a \in \text{span}_Z(W) \).\(^{11}\) If \( a \in \text{span}_Z(W) \) then return \text{true}, otherwise return \text{false}.

Completeness and Soundness.

• The completeness follows from the same argument given for the soundness of Construction 4.4.3. Namely, the execution of \( \hat{B} \) is identical to the execution of the \( m+1 \)'s learning phase (as if it exists) up to a point where we return a wrong \text{false} answer to an answer that is indeed a zero polynomial. (Note that the converse never happens). However, when such event is about to happen, the size of \( \text{span}_Z(W) \) will double. Since the size of \( \text{span}_Z(W) \) is at most \( |R|^k \), if we choose \( m \) at random from \([\ell]\) the probability of the bad event (of returning a wrong \text{false} in \( m+1 \)'st execution) is at most \( k \log |R|/\ell = \delta \).

• The soundness follows from Lemma 4.4.5 similarly to the way we proved the soundness of the construction of Section 4.4.3.

Extension to avoid initialization. In Theorem 4.4.30 we have a restriction which says that the initialization phase must happen during the obfuscation phase only. We can extend the proof of Theorem 4.4.30 to the case that we don’t have this restriction. This entails allowing the obfuscator \( v_O \) and the obfuscation circuit \( B \) to ask any type of query (be it initialization phase queries or zero-testing queries) during their execution. The reason that we can avoid this restriction is that, whenever the obfuscated circuit \( B \) asks an initialization phase query \( \text{enc}(v,l) \), we can treat it as a polynomial containing \( v \). \( \text{enc}(1,l) \) and using that we can find out whether we should answer this query randomly or using one of the previous labels. This is very similar to the method that we employed in the learning and execution phases of generic group model case.

Claim 4.4.32. Let \( R \) be any ring of size at most \( 2^{\text{poly}(\kappa)} \). Let \( v_O \) be any \( \epsilon \)-approximate VBB obfuscator for general circuits in the ideal degree-\( d \) graded encoding model \( \mathcal{M}_R^d \) for \( d = O(1) \). Then for any \( \delta = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa) \) there is an \( (\epsilon + \delta) \)-approximate obfuscator \( \hat{v}_O \) for poly-size circuits in the plain model.

Proof. Suppose that obfuscated circuit is \( B \), and let \( \{h_i = \text{enc}(v_i,l_i)\}_1^k \) be the obfuscator’s queries. We already know that \( k \) is less than the running time of obfuscator. We might learn some pair of \((h_i,v_i)\) during the learning phase.

Construction. The new \( \epsilon \)-approximate obfuscator \( \hat{v}_O \) will have these phases:

• \textbf{Emulating obfuscation.} same as previous case.

\(^{11}\)Note that we do not solve a system of equations in \( R \) and rather search only integer solutions to \( xW = a \) as we did in Section 4.4.3.
• Learning obfuscator’s queries and heavy subspace of space of zero vectors: We do exactly what we did in previous learning phase. Also if obfuscated circuit asked initialization phase queries, we memorize it.

• The returned obfuscated code will be $\hat{B} = (B, W, T, r)$ where $r$ is again the randomness needed to run the obfuscated code.

• Executing $\hat{B}$. To execute $\hat{B}$ on input $x$, we do as follows. If we saw query $\text{enc}(v, l)$: First we check, if we memorized query $\text{enc}(v, l)$ before, we answer it using memorized queries list otherwise we answer it randomly. Also we treat $\text{enc}(v, l)$ as a polynomial $v \cdot \text{enc}(1, l)$. We answer zero test queries as follows. For any query vector (of coefficients) $a$ we test whether $a \in \text{span}_Z(W)$.\(^{12}\) If $a \in \text{span}_Z(W)$, return true, otherwise return false.

Completeness and Soundness.

• The proof of completeness is same as previous case. The only difference is that here we need to be sure that we answer initialization phase query correctly (call it event $E$). Let $j_i$ be the index such that we saw the query $\text{enc}(v_i, l_i)$ for the first time. $E$ happens if we hit one of the index $j_i$. Since we chose $m$ at random, we can always bound $pr(E)$ by choosing the right $l$.

• The soundness is same as previous case.

\[\Box\]

**Remark 4.4.33.** Note that our proof of Theorem 4.4.30 does not assume any property for the multiplication (even the associativity!) other than assuming that it is distributive. Distributivity is needed by the proof since we need to be able to conclude that the summation of the vectors of the coefficients of two zero polynomials is also the vector of the coefficients of a zero polynomial; the latter is implied by distributivity.

### 4.5 Impossibility of VBB Obfuscation in the random TDP Model

In this section we formally prove Theorem 4.2.3 showing that any obfuscator $vO$ with access to a random trapdoor permutation oracle $T$ (see Definition 2.3.2 for the definition of the oracle) can be transformed into a new obfuscator $\hat{vO}$ in the plain model (no access to an ideal oracle) with some loss in correctness. We start by defining query tuples with respect to a random trapdoor permutation model followed by the formalization of Theorem 4.2.3.

\(^{12}\)Note that we do not solve a system of equations in $R$ and rather search only integer solutions to $xW = a$ as we did in Section 4.4.3.
Definition 4.5.1 (TDP query tuple). Given a random TDP oracle $T_{\kappa} = (G, F, F^{-1})$ for security parameter $\kappa$, a TDP query tuple consists of three query-answer pairs $(V_G, V_F, V_{F^{-1}})$ where:

- $V_G = (sk, pk)$ represents a query to $G$ on input $sk$ and its corresponding answer $pk$
- $V_F = ((pk, x), y)$ represents a query to $F[pk]$ on input $x$ and its corresponding answer $y$
- $V_{F^{-1}} = ((sk, y), x')$ represents a query to $F^{-1}[sk]$ on $y$ and its corresponding answer $x'$

We say that a TDP query tuple $(V_G, V_F, V_{F^{-1}})$ is consistent if $x = x'$.

Definition 4.5.2 (Partial TDP query tuple). A partial TDP query tuple is one where one or more of the elements of the tuple are unknown and we denote the missing elements with a period. For example, we say a query set $Q$ contains a TDP query tuple $(\cdot, V_F, \cdot)$ if it contains the query-answer pair $V_F = ((pk, x), y)$ but is missing the query-answer pairs $V_G = (sk, pk)$ and $V_{F^{-1}} = ((sk, y), x')$.

Theorem 4.5.3 (Theorem 4.2.3 formalized). Let $v_O$ be an $\epsilon$-approximate obfuscator for poly-size circuits in the random TDP oracle model. Then, for any $\delta = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$, there exists an $(\epsilon + \delta)$-approximate obfuscator $\tilde{v}_O$ in the plain model for poly-size circuits.

Before proving Theorem 4.5.3, we state a corollary of this theorem to rule out approximate VBB obfuscation in the ideal TDP model. Since [BP13] showed that assuming TDPs exist, $(1/2 - 1/\text{poly})$-approximate VBB obfuscator does not exist for general circuits, we obtain the following corollary by taking $\delta = \epsilon/2$.

Corollary 4.5.4. If TDPs exist, then there exists no $(1/2 - \epsilon)$-approximate VBB obfuscator $v_O$ for general circuits in the ideal random TDP model for any $\epsilon = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$.

The proof of Theorem 4.5.3 now follows in the next two sections. We will first describe the algorithm of the obfuscator in the plain model, and then will analyze its completeness and soundness.

4.5.1 The Construction

We first describe how the new obfuscator $\tilde{v}_O$ generates some data $\tilde{B}$, and then we will show how to use $\tilde{B}$ to run the new obfuscated circuit in the plain model. We also let $l_O, l_B = \text{poly}(\kappa)$, respectively, be the number of queries asked by the obfuscator $v_O$ and the obfuscated code $B$ to the random trapdoor permutation oracle $T$. Note that, for simplicity of exposition, we assume the adversary only asks the oracle for queries of size $\kappa$ (i.e., the domain of the permutations in $T$ are of fixed size $\kappa$). However, as mentioned in Section 4.3.3, we can easily extend the argument to handle $O(\log(\kappa))$-size or $\omega(\log(\kappa))$-size queries to $T$. 53
How to Obfuscate

The new obfuscator $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}$ in plain model. Given an $\epsilon$-approximate obfuscator $\mathcal{O}$ in the random TDP model, we construct a plain-model obfuscator $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}$ such that, given a circuit $C \in \{0, 1\}^n$, works as follows:

1. **Emulation phase**: Emulate $\mathcal{O}^T(C)$. Let $Q_O$ represent the set of queries asked by $\mathcal{O}^T$ and their corresponding answers. We initialize $Q_O = \emptyset$. For every query $q$ asked by $\mathcal{O}^T(C)$, we would answer the query uniformly at random conditioned on the answers to previous queries.

2. **Canonicalize $B$**: Let the obfuscated circuit $B$ be the output of $\mathcal{O}(C)$. Modify $B$ so that, before asking any query of the form $F^{-1}[sk](y)$, it would first ask $G(sk)$ to get some answer $pk$ followed by $F^{-1}[sk](y)$ to get some answer $x$ then finally asks $F[pk](x)$ to get the expected answer $y$.

3. **Learning phase**: Set $Q_B = \emptyset$. Let the number of iterations to run the learning phase be $m = \frac{2l_B}{\delta}$ where $l_B \leq |B|$ represents the number of queries asked by $B$ and $l_O \leq |O|$ represents the number of queries asked by $\mathcal{O}$. For $i = \{1, ..., m\}$:
   - Choose $x_i \leftarrow D_{|C|}$
   - Run $B(x_i)$. For every query $q$ asked by $B(x_i)$:
     - If $(q, a) \in Q_O \cup Q_B$ for some answer $a$, answer consistently with $a$
     - Otherwise, answer $q$ uniformly at random and conditioned on the answers of previous related queries in $Q_O \cup Q_B$
     - Let $a$ be the answer to $q$. If $(q, a) \notin Q_B$, add the pair $(q, a)$ to $Q_B$.

4. The output of the obfuscation algorithm will be $\tilde{B} = (B, Q_B, R)$ where $R = \{r_1, ..., r_{|B|}\}$ is a set of (unused) oracle answers that are generated uniformly at random.

How to Execute

To execute $\tilde{B}$ on an input $x$ using $(B, Q_B, R)$ we simply emulate $B(x)$. For every query $q$ asked by $B(x)$, if $(q, a) \in Q_B$ for some $a$ then return $a$. Otherwise, answer randomly with one of the answers $a$ in $R$ and add $(q, a)$ to $Q_B$.

4.5.2 Completeness and Soundness

**Completeness**: Approximate functionality. Consider two separate experiments (real and ideal) that construct the plain-model obfuscator exactly as described in section 4.5.1 but differ when executing $\tilde{B}$. Specifically, in the real experiment, $\tilde{B}$ emulates $B(x)$ on a random input $x$ using $Q_B$ and $R$, whereas in the ideal experiment, we execute $\tilde{B}$ and answer $B(x)$’s queries using the actual oracle $T$ instead. In essence, in the real experiment, we can think of the execution as $B^T(x)$ where $\hat{T}$ is the TDP oracle simulated by $\tilde{B}$ using $Q_B$ and $R$ as
the oracle’s answers (without knowing \(Q_O\), which is part of oracle \(T\)). We will contrast the real experiment with the ideal experiment and show that the statistical distance between these two executions is at most \(\delta\). In order to achieve this, we will identify the events that differentiate between the executions \(B^T(x)\) and \(B^I(x)\), and to that end we will make use of the following two lemmas:

**Lemma 4.5.5** ([GKLM12]). Let \(B\) be a canonical oracle-aided algorithm that asks \(t\) queries to a TDP oracle \(T\). Let \(E_G\) be the event that \(B\) asks a query of the form \(V_G = (sk, pk)\) after asking query \(V_F = ((pk, x), y)\), then \(\Pr[E_G] \leq O(t^2/2^\kappa)\).

**Lemma 4.5.6** ([GKLM12]). Let \(B\) be an oracle-aided algorithm that asks \(t\) queries to a TDP oracle \(T\) and let \(Q\) be the set of queries that \(B\) have issued. Then for any new query \(x\), the answer is either (1) determined completely by \(Q\) or (2) is drawn from a distribution with a statistical distance of \(O(t/2^\kappa)\) away from the uniform distribution.

Now let \(q\) be a new query that is being asked by \(B^I(x)\). We present a case-by-case analysis of all possible queries to identify the cases that can cause discrepancies between the real and ideal experiments:

- **Case 1**: If \(q\) is determined by the queries in \(Q_B\) in the real experiment then it is also determined by \(Q_B\) in the ideal experiment.

- **Case 2**: If \(q\) is not determined by \(Q_B \cup Q_O\) in the ideal experiment then it is also not determined by \(Q_B\) in the real experiment. In the ideal experiment the query will be answered randomly and consistently with respect to \(Q_B \cup Q_O\) whereas in the real experiment the query will be answered randomly and consistently with respect to \(Q_B\). By Lemma 4.5.6, the answers will be from a distribution that is statistically close to uniform.

- **Case 3**: If \(q\) is not determined by \(Q_B\) in the real experiment then, depending on the queries in \(Q_O\), it may or may not be so the ideal experiment:
  - **Case 3a**: The query \(q\) is in \(Q_O\). In that case, in the real experiment, the answer would be random whereas in the ideal experiment it would use the correct answer from \(Q_O\).
  - **Case 3b**: The query \(q\) is of type \(V_G = (sk, pk)\) and the corresponding partial TDP query tuple \((., V_F, V_{F-1})\) is in \(Q_O\)
  - **Case 3c**: The query \(q\) is of type \(V_F = ((pk, x), y)\) and the corresponding partial TDP query tuple \((V_G, ., V_{F-1})\) is in \(Q_O\)
  - **Case 3d**: The query \(q\) is of type \(V_{F-1} = ((sk, y), x)\) and the corresponding partial TDP query tuple \((V_G, V_F, .)\) is in \(Q_O\)
  - **Case 3e**: The query \(q\) is of type \(V_F = ((pk, x), y)\) and \(V_G = (sk, pk)\) is in \(Q_B\), but \(V_{F-1} = ((sk, y), x)\) is in \(Q_O\)
- **Case 3f**: The query $q$ is of type $V_{F-1} = ((sk,y), x)$ and $V_G = (sk, pk)$ is in $Q_B$, but $V_F = ((pk,x), y)$ is in $Q_O$

- **Case 3g**: The query $q$ is of type $V_F = ((pk,x), y)$ and $V_{F-1} = ((sk,y), x)$ is in $Q_B$, but $V_G = (sk, pk)$ is in $Q_O$

- **Case 3h**: The query $q$ is of type $V_{F-1} = ((sk,y), x)$ and $V_F = (pk,x), y)$ is in $Q_B$, but $V_G = (sk, pk)$ is in $Q_O$

We note that the bad events that can cause any differences between the real and ideal experiments are case 2 and parts of case 3. For case 2, Lemma 4.5.6 ensures that this event happens with negligible probability. For case 3a, learning heavy queries would diminish the effect of this event. For cases 3b, 3c, and 3f, Lemma 4.5.5 ensures that this event happens with negligible probability since $V_G$ was issued after $V_F$ and/or $V_{F-1}$ was asked. For cases 3a, 3b, and 3d, the remaining query from the tuple would have been defined in $Q_O$ and is thus captured during the learning of heavy queries. For case 3g, if $V_G$ and $V_{F-1}$ were asked during the emulation or learning phases, then $V_F$ would also be defined and thus can be learned. However, if $V_{F-1}$ was asked during the execution phase then, due the canonicalization of $B$, it would have to ask $V_G \in Q_O$ which reduces to case 3a. Similarly, for case 3h, due the canonicalization of $B$, we would have to ask $V_G \in Q_O$ and this reduces to case 3a once again.

For any $x$, define $E_k(x)$ to be the event that case $k$ happens and let event $E(x) = (E_2(x) \lor E_{3a}(x) \lor E_{3b}(x) \lor E_{3c}(x) \lor E_{3d}(x) \lor E_{3f}(x))$. Assuming that event $E$ does not happen, the output distributions of $B^T(x)$ and $\hat{B}^T(x)$ are identical. More formally, the probability of correctness for vO is:

$$\Pr_x[B^{\hat{T}}(x) \neq C(x)] = \Pr_x[B^{\hat{T}}(x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] + \Pr_x[B^{\hat{T}}(x) \neq C(x) \land E_1(x)]$$

$$\leq \Pr_x[B^{\hat{T}}(x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] + \Pr_x[E(x)]$$

By the approximate functionality of vO, we have that:

$$\Pr_x[vO^T(C)(x) \neq C(x)] = \Pr_x[B^T(x) \neq C(x)] \leq \epsilon(\kappa)$$

Therefore,

$$\Pr_x[B^{\hat{T}}(x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] = \Pr_x[B^T(x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] \leq \epsilon$$

We are thus left to show that $\Pr_x[E(x)] \leq \delta$. By Lemma 4.5.6, $\Pr[E_2(x)] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$ and by Lemma 4.5.5, $\Pr[E_{3b} \lor E_{3c}(x) \lor E_{3d}(x)] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$ via a union bound. The probability of event $E_{3a}$ was already given in [CKP15], but for the sake of completeness we show our version of the analysis here. As a result, we get that $\Pr[E(x)] \leq \delta/2 + \text{negl}(\kappa) \leq \delta$.

**Claim 4.5.7.** It holds that $\Pr_x[E_{3a}(x)] \leq \delta/2$.

**Proof.** Let $(q_1, ..., q_{l_B})$ be the sequence of queries asked by $B^T(x)$ where $l_B \leq |B|$, and let $q_{i,j}$ be the $j$th query that is asked by $B^T(x)$ during the $i$th iteration of the learning phase. We define $E_{3a}(x)$ to be the event that the $j$th query of $B(x)$ is in $Q_O$ but not in $Q_B$. We also
define \( p_{q,j} \) to be the probability that \( q_j = q \) for any query \( q \) and \( j \in [l_B] \). We can then write the probability of \( E_{3a} \) as follows:

\[
\Pr_x[ E_{3a}(x) ] \leq \Pr_x[ E_{3a}^1(x) \lor \ldots \lor E_{3a}^{l_B}(x) ]
\]

\[
= \sum_{j=1}^{l_B} \Pr_x[ \neg E_{3a}^1(x) \land \ldots \land \neg E_{3a}^{j-1}(x) \land E_{3a}^j(x) ]
\]

\[
\leq \sum_{j=1}^{l_B} \sum_{q \in Q_O} \Pr[q_j = q \land (q_{1,j} \neq q \land \ldots \land q_{m,j} \neq q)]
\]

\[
= \sum_{j=1}^{l_B} \sum_{q \in Q_O} p_{q,j}(1 - p_{q,j})^m \leq \sum_{j=1}^{l_B} \sum_{q \in Q_O} \frac{1}{m} \leq \sum_{j=1}^{l_B} \frac{l_O}{m} = \frac{l_B l_O}{m}.
\]

Thus, given that \( m = 2l_B l_O / \delta \), we get \( \Pr[E_{3a}(x)] \leq \delta/2 \).

Soundness: VBB Simulatability. To show that the security property is satisfied, it suffices to provide a PPT algorithm \( U^T \) in the ideal TDP model that takes as input \( vO^T(C) \) for some circuit \( C \) and outputs a distribution that is statistically close to the output distribution of \( \hat{vO} \). If that is the case, we can invoke Lemma 4.4.5 and conclude that \( \hat{vO} \) is also VBB-secure.

The description of \( U \) is precisely the same as Steps 2-4 of the procedure detailed in Section 4.5.1 except that queries made by \( B = vO^T(C) \) are answered using oracle \( T \) instead of being randomly simulated. If we let \( (B, Q_B, R) \) be the output of \( U^T(vO^T(C)) \) then we can easily see that it is identically distributed to the output distribution of \( \hat{vO} \) since, in both cases, \( Q_B \) has query-answers with consistent and random TDP query tuples. They differ only by how these query answers are generated (\( U^T \) answers them using \( T \), while \( \hat{vO} \) simulates them using lazy evaluation with respect to some oracle \( \hat{T} \) distributed the same as \( T \)).

### 4.5.3 Extension to hierarchical random TDP

In this section, we reason that the proof for the ideal TDP case can be extended to hierarchical TDP oracles as well. We start by defining how the oracle for the random hierarchical trapdoor permutation primitive changes from Definition 2.3.2.

**Definition 4.5.8** (Random Hierarchical Injective Trapdoor Functions). For any security parameter \( n \) and \( l = \text{poly}(\kappa) \), an \( l \)-level random hierarchical injective trapdoor function (HTDF) oracle \( T^*_l \) consists of \( 2l + 3 \) subroutines \( \{J_i\}_{i=1}^{l+1}, \{K_i\}_{i=0}^{l+1} \) defined as follows:

- \( K_i[j_{i-2}, id_{i-1}](td_i) \): An injective function, indexed by identity vector \( j_{i-2} = (id_0, \ldots, id_{i-2}) \) and \( id_{i-1} \), that accepts as input an \( i \)-level trapdoor \( td_i \in \{0, 1\}^m \) and outputs a randomly chosen identity \( id_i \in \{0, 1\}^n \) where \( m = 10\kappa l \) if \( i \in [1, l] \) and \( m = \kappa \) (i.e. it is a permutation) if \( i = \{0, l + 1\} \).
- $J_i[f_{i-2}, td_{i-1}](id_i)$: An injective function, indexed by identity vector $f_{i-2} = (id_0, ..., id_{i-2})$ and $td_{i-1}$ that, given the identity $id_i \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$, outputs the corresponding trapdoor $td_i \in \{0,1\}^m$ where $m = 10ld$ if $i \in [1, l]$ and $m = \kappa$ (i.e. it is a permutation) if $i = \{0, l+1\}$.

Note that, for any fixed $f_{i-2}$, if $td_i = J_i[f_{i-2}, td_{i-1}](id_i)$ and $id_{i-1} = K_i[f_{i-2}, id_{i-2}](td_{i-1})$ then $id_i = K_i[f_{i-2}, id_{i-1}](td_i)$. In other words, we can think of $K_i$ as the inverse of $J_i$ only if the indices of the two functions match (that is, the trapdoor $td_{i-1}$ indexing $J_i$ corresponds to the identity $id_{i-1}$ indexing $K_i$).

**Remark 4.5.9.** It is also crucial to note that we used (sparse) injective functions for generating the intermediate levels of trapdoor. Such a change was made in order to obtain interesting primitives from this oracle, such as fully-secure hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE). If permutations were used instead, we would only achieve HIBE with security against adversaries that do not choose an identity for the permutation $F$ to attack. Furthermore, removing $K_i$ for $i \in [1, l]$ as a way to prevent this attack’s capability hinders our ability to perform the canonicalization procedure for the obfuscated circuit.

**Remark 4.5.10.** For the special case of 1-level HTDF (i.e. TDP), we only have three permutations: $K_0$, $K_1[id_0]$ and $J_1[id_0]$, which correspond to permutations $G$, $F[pk]$, and $F^{-1}[sk]$, respectively in the language of TDP that we used in Definition 2.3.2. Note that here, we refer to 0-level identities as master public keys and 0-level trapdoors as master secret keys.

We also present a variant of TDP query tuples that generalizes Definition 4.5.1 to work with hierarchical injective trapdoor functions.

**Definition 4.5.11** (HTDF query tuple). Given a random $l$-level HTDF oracle given as $T^l_\kappa = (\{J_i\}_{i=1}^{l-1}, \{K_i\}_{i=0}^{l-1})$, an $i$-level HTDF query tuple consists of three (possibly) related query-answer pairs $(V_{K_{i-1}}, V_K, V_J)$ where, for any fixed $f_{i-2} = (id_0, ..., id_{i-2})$:

- $V_{K_{i-1}} = (td_{i-1}, id_{i-1})$ represents a query to $K_{i-1}[f_{i-3}, id_{i-2}]$ on input $td_{i-1}$ and its corresponding answer $id_{i-1}$
- $V_K = ((id_i, td_i), id_i)$ represents a query to $K_i[f_{i-2}, id_{i-1}]$ on input $td_i$ and its corresponding answer $id_i$
- $V_J = ((td_{i-1}, id_i), td'_i)$ represents a query to $J_i[f_{i-2}, td_{i-1}]$ on input $id_i$ and its corresponding answer $td'_i$

We say that an $i$-level HTDF query tuple is consistent if $td_i = td'_i$.

**Remark 4.5.12.** For the purposes of comparison, we note that, for the special case of 1-level HTDF (i.e. TDP), we only have TDP query tuples of the form $(V_{K_0}, V_K, V_J) = (V_G, V_F, V_F^{-1})$. Thus, $V_G = (sk, pk)$ represents a query to $G$ on $sk = td_0$ and the answer $pk = id_0$, $V_F = ((pk, x), y)$ represents a query to $F[pk]$ on $x = td_1$ and the answer $y = id_1$, and $V_F^{-1} = ((sk, y), x')$ represents a query to $F_{sk}^{-1}$ on $y$ and the answer $x'$, which should be $x$ if the tuple is consistent.
Extension of the proof. The extension of the impossibility result to random HTDF is straightforward, so we will outline the main differences between the TDP case and describe how to resolve the issues that are related to this oracle. First, we still perform the normalisation procedure on $\hat{vO}$ and $B$ where the query behaviour of these algorithms are modified such that for any query $q$ of the form $J_i[f_{i-2}, td_{i-1}](id_i)$, we first ask $K_{i-1}[f_{i-3}, id_{i-2}](td_{i-1})$ to get $id_{i-1}$. This allows us to discover whether we have a query $K_i[f_{i-2}, id_{i-1}](td_i)$ whose answer is $id_i$, in which case we can answer $q$ with $td_i$. This procedure ensures that all query tuples that contain $J_i$ queries are consistent.

We now turn to verifying whether the proof of approximate functionality for TDP holds in this case as well and, in particular, focus on the event $E(x)$ that was defined Section 4.5.2. The main issue that we have to consider, which is unique to the HTDF case, is the possibility that different consistent TDP query tuples can be related to each other, and an overlap between these queries may cause an inconsistency in one of the tuples. Specifically, an $i$-level TDP query tuple of the form $(V_{K_{i-1}}, \cdot, \cdot)$ might overlap with an $(i - 1)$-level TDP query tuple $(\cdot, \cdot, V_{J_{i-1}})$ from $Q_O$, where the answer of $V_{K_{i-1}}$ is inconsistent with that of $V_{J_{i-1}}$. However, our normalisation procedure prevents precisely this issue as any TDP query tuple that contains $V_{J_{i-1}}$ must also have $V_{K_{i-1}}$, which means that the queries should not overlap otherwise event $E_1$ occurs leading to a contradiction to our initial assumption.
Chapter 5

Separating IO from Standard Assumptions

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter we begin by describing our first set of impossibility results for IO. We start by showing a lower-bound for IO that holds for any primitive implied by a random oracle (e.g., exponentially secure one-way functions or collision-resistant hash functions) and applies to fully black-box constructions that treat the primitive and the adversary in a black-box way (see Definition 3.1.2). We then show a hardness result for semi-black-box constructions of IO from any primitive implied by the random trapdoor permutation oracle or the constant-degree graded encoding model. Finally, we prove fully black-box separations of IO from any primitive implied by the random trapdoor permutation oracle or the constant-degree graded encoding model (thus improving upon the second result).

In this section, we discuss at a high level the ideas behind each result then dedicate a separate section for each result to discuss the details and full proofs.

5.1.1 Technical Overview: Separating IO from the Random-Oracle

Our first lower bound proves that any primitive implied by a random oracle does not imply an IO scheme with perfect completeness in a black-box way.

**Theorem 5.1.1** (Fully black-box separation from primitives implied by random oracle). If NP ≠ co-NP, there is no fully black-box construction of perfectly complete IO from collision-resistant hash functions or more generally any primitive implied by a random oracle in a black-box way.

**Intuition behind the proof.** To prove Theorem 5.1.1 we first prove a useful lemma (Lemma 5.2.2) which, roughly speaking, asserts that for any pair of circuits C_1, C_2, either (1) a (computationally unbounded) polynomial-query attacker can guess which one is obfuscated in the random oracle model with a probability close to one, or that (2) there is a way to
obfuscate them into the same output circuit $B$. The latter can be used as a witness that $C_1$ and $C_2$ compute the same function, assuming that the obfuscation is an IO. Now consider the set of equivalent and same-size circuit $\mathcal{C} = \{(C_0, C_1) \mid C_0 \equiv C_1 \land |C_0| = |C_1|\}$. If Case (1) happens for an infinite subset of $\mathcal{C}$, we get a poly-query attacker against iO in the random oracle model which is sufficient for deriving the black-box separations of Theorem 5.1.1. On the other hand, if Case (1) happens only for a finite subset of $\mathcal{C}$, we get an efficient procedure to certify the equivalence of two given circuits, implying $NP \neq P$. We prove Lemma 5.2.2 by reducing it to a result by Mahmoody and Pass [MP12] who ruled out the existence of non-interactive commitments from one-way functions. To do so, we construct a non-interactive commitment scheme based on common input $(C_1, C_2)$ in the random oracle model, and we show that: the cheating receiver strategy of [MP12] implies our Case (1), and the cheating sender strategy of [MP12] implies our Case (2). The result of [MP12] shows that either of these strategies always exist. See Section 5.2 for the formal proof.

5.1.2 Technical Overview: Hardness of Semi-Black-Box Constructions of IO

Our second lower bound does not rule out black-box construction of IO, but rather shows that achieving such constructions from a large variety of primitives is as hard as the long standing open question of basing public-key encryption on one-way functions. It also captures a larger class of security reductions known as semi-black-box reductions [RTV04] that allow the security reduction to access the adversary in a non-black-box way (see Definition 3.1.3).

**Theorem 5.1.2** (Hardness of semi-black-box construction). Let $\mathcal{P}$ be a primitive that provably exists relative to the random trapdoor permutation oracle, the generic group model (for any finite abelian group) or the degree-$O(1)$ graded encoding model (for any finite ring). Any semi-black-box construction of IO from $\mathcal{P}$ (constructively) implies a construction of semantically secure public-key encryption from one-way functions.

**Primitives captured by Theorem 5.1.2.** Theorem 5.1.2 captures a large set of powerful cryptographic primitives that could be constructed in idealized models. For example trapdoor permutations (and any primitive implied by TDPs in a black-box way) trivially exist relative to the idealized model of random TDPs. Other primitives that exist in this model include such powerful objects as non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for $NP$ [BY93,Gol11]. Even primitives that we do not know how to construct from TDPs in a black-box way (e.g., CCA secure public key encryption) are known to exist in the random TDP model [BR93]. The generic group model defined by Shoup [Sho97] (see Definition 2.3.3) is an idealized model in which (a black-box form of) the DDH assumption holds unconditionally. Therefore, our separation of Theorem 5.1.2 covers any primitive that could be constructed from DDH assumption in a black-box way. The same holds for bilinear assumptions in the graded encoding model (see Definition 2.3.4) of degree 2. Namely, primitives that could be constructed from bilinear assumptions (in a black-box way) exist in the degree-$O(1)$ graded
encoding model unconditionally. This includes one-round 3-party key-agreement [Jou00], (hierarchical) identity based encryption [BF01, GS02, HL02], etc.

**Intuition behind the proof.** Our main tool in proving Theorem 5.1.2 is the following theorem which is an implicit consequence of the techniques used in Chapter 4. Even though the focus of that chapter was on virtual black-box obfuscation, the same construction presented there for the case of VBB implies the following theorem for IO.

**Theorem 5.1.3 (Informal).** The existence of IO in any of the idealized models of: random trapdoor permutation oracle, generic group model for finite abelian groups, or the degree-$O(1)$ graded encoding model for finite rings, implies $1/p(\kappa)$-approximate IO in the plain model for any polynomial $p(\kappa)$.

We then show that the existence of $(1/6)$-approximate IO and any one-way functions imply the existence of “approximately correct” and “approximately secure” public-key encryption schemes. In order to prove this we employ a construction of Sahai and Waters [SW14] in which they show that IO and OWF imply PKE. Here we show that the same construction, when instantiated using approximate IO, leads to “approximately correct” and “approximately secure” public-key encryption. Finally we use Holenstein [Hol06] result to amplify any approximately-correct and approximately-secure PKE into a standard semantically secure PKE for sufficiently good approximation. See Section 5.3 for the details.

**Remark 5.1.4.** Our proof of Theorem 5.1.1 relies on perfect completeness of IO. Theorem 5.1.2 above holds even if with negligible probability over the obfuscator’s randomness the obfuscated circuit does not compute the same function. We will later develop more techniques extending Theorem 5.1.1 to allow negligible error over the randomness of the obfuscator.

**Previous work on hardness of black-box constructions.** Theorem 5.1.2 has the same spirit as the result by Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] who show that any semi-black-box construction of key agreement from one-way functions would imply $P \neq NP$. Therefore, the fact that we are far from proving $P \neq NP$ implies that we as far from basing key agreements on one-way functions in a black-box way.\(^1\) Similarly, our Theorem 5.1.2 shows that as long as we are not able to base public-key encryption on one-way functions, we cannot base IO on a variety of strong primitives in a semi-black-box way. Other results of the same flavor exist in connection with program checkers [BK95] for NP. Mahmoody and Xiao [MX10] showed that any construction of one-way functions based on worst-case hardness of NP implies program checkers for NP whose existence is one of the long standing open questions in complexity theory.

\(^1\)Formalizing semi-black-box constructions interpreting the result of [IR89] in this context is due to [RTV04].
Falsifiability of IO. An intriguing open question regarding assumption complexity of IO is whether IO can be based on a “falsifiable” assumption [Nao03]. A falsifiable assumption is one with an efficient challenger security game. The question arises because an adversary attacking an IO scheme starts by proposing two equivalent circuits but an efficient challenger has no direct way to verify the equivalence. Since our primitives used in the theorems above are falsifiable, a separation of IO from falsifiable assumptions would imply our results for the case of polynomially secure primitives. However, constructions of IO based on exponentially secure falsifiable assumptions are known [PST14]. Therefore, our results are interesting even if one can prove that IO cannot be based on falsifiable assumptions. Moreover, the known lower bounds against falsifiable assumptions [Pas11,GW11] are proved only for black-box proofs of security in which the adversary is used in a black-box way. Our Theorem 5.1.2 holds even for semi-black-box constructions in which the security reduction could use the adversary in a non-black-box manner.

5.1.3 Technical Overview: Separating IO from TDP and Constant-Degree GEM

By relying on the recent elegant work of Brakerski, Brzuska, and Fleischhacker [BBF16] in which they rule out statistically secure approximately correct IO (based on standard assumptions) we can improve upon Theorem 5.1.2 and rule out fully black-box constructions of IO from all the primitives of Theorem 5.1.2 (based on the same assumptions used in [BBF16]). Namely, the following holds:

Theorem 5.1.5. Let \( P \) be a primitive that provably exists relative to random trapdoor permutation oracle, the generic group model (for any finite abelian group) or the degree-O(1) graded encoding model (for any finite ring) in a way that it is secure against any “bounded-query” (computationally unbounded) attacker with probability (measure) one. Assuming the existence of one-way functions and that \( \text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM} \) (which is true if the polynomial-time hierarchy does not collapse) there is no fully black-box construction of IO from any such primitives \( P \).

Even though Theorem 5.1.2 is potentially applicable to more primitives, all the primitives that we listed after Theorem 5.1.2 which fit into the requirements of Theorem 5.1.2 have black-box proofs in their corresponding idealized models, and thus Theorem 5.1.5 applies to them as well.

Intuition behind the proof. Recall that a fully black-box construction of a primitive \( Q \) from another primitive \( P \) consists of two oracle PPT algorithms \((Q,S)\) such that \( Q^P \) implements \( Q \) given access to any oracle \( P \) that implements \( P \), and \( S^{P,A} \) turns any oracle attacker \( A \) against \( Q^P \) into an attack against \( P \) itself (see Definition 3.1.2 for more details).

Similar to the first result (and in general for any black-box separation), our proof that a primitive \( P \) does not imply IO in a black-box way presents a polynomial-query attacker \( A \) that breaks the security of any IO construction IO in an idealized model \( I \) that provides an
unquestionably secure" instantiation $\mathcal{P}$ (against computationally unbounded polynomial-query attackers). Intuitively, the existence of such an $A$ rules out the possibility of a fully black-box construction construction (iO, $S$) of IO from $\mathcal{P}$ by simple composition. First, the construction $\text{iO}^{P^I} = (\text{iO}^{P})^I$ yields an implementation of IO in the same idealized model $\mathcal{I}$. But attacker $A$ breaks every such construction of IO and therefore the security reduction $S^{P^I,A^I}$ implies the existence of a new attacker $(S^A)^I$ that calls the idealized oracle $\mathcal{I}$ a polynomial number of times and breaks the implementation $P^I$ of $\mathcal{P}$. But this leads to a contradiction in this model which is a contradiction. That is because $P^I$ is an “unquestionably secure” construction of $\mathcal{P}$ in $\mathcal{I}$. Based on this rather informal argument, it seems what we need is just a poly-query attack against any implementation of IO in idealized models.

The recent work of Brakerski et al. [BBF16], when combined with the techniques of Chapter 4 show an attacker that can break any IO scheme in either of the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ of random trapdoor permutations and degree-$O(1)$ graded encoding models by asking a polynomial number of oracle queries. In particular, the techniques of Chapter 4 show how to “compile out” the idealized oracle $\mathcal{I}$ from the IO scheme and achieve an approximately-correct IO scheme in the plain model that is correct on, say, $99/100$ of the input points. Brakerski et al. then show that any such approximately-correct IO scheme can be broken by a computationally unbounded attacker.\footnote{The attack of [BBF16] assumes the existence of OWFs and that $\text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM}$, and that is where we get these assumptions for our separation as well.} As pointed out in [BBF16], this means that any IO scheme will be broken in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$, and in particular the computationally unbounded attacker $B$ can be modified into a computationally unbounded, yet polynomial-query attacker $A$ against the original IO in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$.

At a first glance, it seems that the attacker $A$ of [BBF16] against IO in an idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ would immediately imply the desired black-box separation between IO and primitives that exist in model $\mathcal{I}$. However, the challenge, roughly speaking, is that this attacker of does not succeed in breaking IO with probability close to 1, and doing so is left as an open question. In order to see the challenge more clearly, we need to further discuss the big picture argument above and see how an attack in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ exactly implies the black-box separation.

A crucial point is that to apply the security reduction $S^{P^I,A^I}$ and get the desired attack against $P^I$, we must fix the oracles $P^I$ and $A^I$ into deterministic functions (which requires us to sample and fix $\mathcal{I}$) because only then is $S$ guaranteed to generate an attack. However, while fixing $\mathcal{I}$, we want to keep the promise that $A^I$ is still a “successful” attack. Handling both tasks simultaneously may raise an issue because all attacks in idealized models and in particular the attack against IO in idealized models that is implied by [BBF16] are successful with probability taken over the randomness of the idealized oracle $\mathcal{I}$.

Here is where the Borel-Cantelli lemma (Lemma 2.2.1) usually comes to help, but only if the attack succeeds with high probability. In particular, if the demonstrated attacker $A$ wins the security game for security parameter $\kappa$ with probability e.g., $1 - 1/\kappa^4$, then by an averaging argument, with probability at least $1 - 1/\kappa^2$ over the sampled oracle $\mathcal{I}$, $A$ successfully attacks the game on security parameter $\kappa$. Therefore, since the probability of
the “fail” event is \( \sum_{\kappa=1}^{\infty} 1/\kappa^2 = O(1) \), Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that with measure one over\(^3\) the sampled oracle \( I \) it holds that \( A \) is a successful attack for all but finitely many security parameters.

By the above discussion on how to use Borel-Cantelli, we would be done if the attacker of \([BBF16]\) succeeds with probability \( 1 - 1/\text{poly}(\kappa) \). However, their attack works against \((\epsilon, \delta)\) statistical approximate\(^4\) IO when \( 2\epsilon + 3\delta < 1 \); thus, by making optimal parameter choices, their attacker only succeeds (in guessing the obfuscated circuit) with probability \( \approx 1/2 + 1/6 \) which is not arbitrarily close to 1. As a result, when combined with the compilation techniques of Chapter 4, we would only get an attack against IO in idealized models that succeeds with some constant advantage over \( 1/2 \) (and thus fails with some constant probability). Thus, we can no longer apply the Borel-Cantelli lemma as we did before because the summation of the probability of failure becomes unbounded. Thus, we can no longer conclude that this attack would remain successful for an infinite sequence of security parameters \( \kappa \)^5 when we sample and fix the idealized oracle \( I \). In fact, there are examples of protocols in idealized models with attacks against them with \( 1/\text{poly}(\kappa) \) advantage over the trivial bound, but once the randomized oracle is sampled and fixed, they do not remain successful over an infinite sequence of security parameters (see Remark 3.1.7).

To overcome this issue, we provide a variant of the Borel-Cantelli lemma (see Lemma 2.2.2) which allows us to make sufficiently strong conclusions about the attacker as long as the attacker \( A \) succeeds with a constant advantage over the trivial bound. Note that Borel-Cantelli (when applicable) would imply a stronger result, because it shows that the attack will remain successful for all but finitely many security parameters, while our lemma shows that it only succeeds for an infinite sequence of security parameters. However, even this weaker conclusion is still enough for the security reduction \( S_{P^I,A^I} \) to be able to use \( A \) and give a polynomial-query attack against \( P^I \).

The scope of this argument does not seem to be at all limited to proving separations for IO, and we believe that it could potentially be applied to other primitives as well. Namely, it shows that to derive a black-box separation of \( Q \) from \( P \), it is enough to break \( Q \) in an idealized model that gives \( P \) by asking a polynomial number of queries and a constant advantage over the trivial bound.

### 5.2 Separating IO from Random Oracle Based Primitives

In this section we prove the following formalization of Theorem 5.1.1.

**Theorem 5.2.1** (Theorem 5.1.1 formalized). If \( \text{NP} \neq \text{co-NP} \) then there is no fully black-box construction of IO from any primitive \( P \) that exists relative to a random oracle in a

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\(^3\) Since the probability distribution here is over infinite-size oracles, we cannot assign probabilities to arbitrary events, but we can alternatively work with measurable sets.

\(^4\) Here \( \epsilon \) refers to the correctness error, and \( \delta \) refers to the statistical closeness (see Definition 2.5.5).

\(^5\) Here \( \kappa \), the security parameter, is equal to the circuit size.
black-box way. This includes exponentially secure one-way functions and collision-resistant hash functions.

To prove Theorem 5.2.1 we will first prove a useful lemma (see Lemma 5.2.2) which, roughly speaking, asserts that for any pair of circuits \(C_1, C_2\), either an attacker can guess which one is obfuscated in the random oracle model with a probability close to one, or that there is a way to obfuscate them into the same output circuit \(B\). The latter could be used as a witness that \(C_1\) and \(C_2\) compute the same function, assuming that the obfuscation is an IO.

**Lemma 5.2.2 (Distinguish or Witness).** Let \(iO\) be an oracle aided randomized polynomial-time algorithm taking circuits as input such that for every length-preserving oracle \(f\) and every randomness \(r\) it holds that \(iO_r^f(C) \equiv C\) (i.e., \(iO\) always outputs circuits with the same input/output functionality as the input circuit \(C\)). Then, at least one of the following holds:

1. There is an infinite sequence of circuits \((C_0^i, C_1^i), \ldots, (C_0^i, C_1^i), \ldots\) such that \(|C_0^i| = |C_1^i|\) for all \(i\), and there exists a (computationally unbounded) \(\text{poly}(\kappa)\)-query \(A\) such that the following holds for all \(i\):
   \[
   \Pr_{r,s,f,b} \left[ A^f_s(B) = b : b \leftarrow \{0,1\}, B = iO^f_r(C_b^i) \right] \geq 1 - 1/\kappa^2
   \]
   where \(\kappa\) is the bit size of the circuits: \(|C_0^i| = |C_1^i| = \kappa\).

2. \(\mathbf{NP} = \mathbf{co-NP}\).

We will first prove Theorem 5.2.1 using Lemma 5.2.2, and then we will prove Lemma 5.2.2.

**Proof of Theorem 5.2.1.** In what follows we will always assume \(\mathbf{NP} \neq \mathbf{co-NP}\). We will describe the proof for one-way functions, but it can be verified that the same proof holds for any primitive that holds relative to random oracles in a black-box way (see Definition 3.1.4).

Suppose \((iO, S)\) is a fully black-box construction of IO from one-way functions. We use a random oracle \(f\) to implement the one-way function required by \(iO\). By Lemma 5.2.2 and the assumption that \(\mathbf{NP} \neq \mathbf{co-NP}\) we know that there is a computationally unbounded attacker \(A\) and an infinite sequence of equivalent and same-size circuits \((C_0^i, C_1^i), \ldots, (C_0^i, C_1^i), \ldots\) such that \(A\) breaks the security of IO over the challenge circuits \((C_0^i, C_1^i)\) of length \(|C_0^i| = \kappa = |C_1^i|\) by guessing which one of them is being obfuscated with probability \(\geq 1 - 1/\kappa^2\). Let \(\epsilon = 1/4\).

By an averaging argument, with probability at least \(1 - O(1/\kappa^2)\) over the choice of oracle \(f\), it holds that the probability that \(A\) correctly guesses which one of \((C_0^i, C_1^i)\) is being obfuscated is at least \(1/2 + \epsilon\). Since the summation \(\sum_i 1/i^2 = O(1)\) converges, by Borel-Cantelli lemma, for measure one of the random oracles \(f\) it holds that \(A\) \(\epsilon\)-breaks the implemented obfuscator \(iO^f\).

Now that \(A\) is a “legal” adversary, by definition of fully black-box IO, the security reduction \(S^f, A\) shall break the one-way property of \(f\). Algorithms \(A\) and \(S\) are both \(\text{poly}(\kappa)\)-query
attackers, and so the combination \( B = S^4 \) also asks only a polynomial number of queries to \( f \) and succeeds in breaking the one-wayness of \( f \) for nonzero measure of samples for \( f \).

The existence of such \( B \), however, is impossible since a random oracle \( f \), with measure one, is secure against attackers who ask only a polynomial number of queries [IR89,GT00].

Now to prove Lemma 5.2.2, we use the following lemma from [MP12].

**Lemma 5.2.3** ([MP12]). Suppose \( S \) is an oracle-aided PPT algorithm that calls oracle \( f \) and takes private input \( b \in \{0,1\} \), randomness \( r \), and common input \( z \in \{0,1\}^\kappa \) (where \( \kappa \) is the security parameter) and outputs \( c = S^f_r(z,b) \). For any \( \delta = \delta(\kappa) \leq 1/100 \), there is a (computationally unbounded) oracle-aided algorithm \( R \) such that for all \( z \in \{0,1\}^\kappa \) at least one of the following holds.

1. If \( f \) is the random oracle, \( R^f(z,c) \) asks \( \text{poly}(\kappa/\delta) \) queries and correctly guesses the random bit \( b \) that \( S^f_r(z,b) \) used to generate \( c \) with probability \( \geq 1 - \delta(\kappa) \). Namely:

   \[
   \Pr_{f,r,b} \left[ R^f(z,c) = b : b \in \{0,1\}, c = S^f_r(z,b) \right] \geq 1 - \delta(\kappa).
   \]

2. There is a partial oracle \( f' \) of size \( \text{poly}(\kappa) \) and two random seeds \( r_0, r_1 \) and a message \( c \) such that \( S^f_{r_0}(z,0) = c = S^f_{r_1}(z,1) \). In other words, there is a message \( c \) that could be opened into both \( b = 0 \) and \( b = 1 \) using random seeds \( r_0, r_1 \), and the queries asked by \( S \) during these two possible executions are all described by the partial function \( f' \).

**Proof Sketch of Lemma 5.2.3.** Let \( \epsilon \) be a parameter to be chosen later. Let \( R \) be an attacker who maintains a list of “learned” oracle queries \( \mathcal{L} \) and, given \( c \) sent by the sender for \( b \in \{0,1\} \) and common input \( z \), it adaptively asks the lexicographically first oracle query \( x \notin \mathcal{L} \) that has at least \( \epsilon \) chance of being asked by sender \( S \) conditioned on the knowledge of \( (\mathcal{L}, z) \). After asking such \( x \) from \( f \), \( A \) adds \( (x, f(x)) \) to \( \mathcal{L} \). As long as such query \( x \) exists, \( R \) asks them. It was shown in [BMG07] that this learning algorithm asks, on average, at most \( m/\epsilon \) number of queries where \( m = \text{poly}(|z|) \) is the number of queries asked by the sender. So as long as \( \epsilon = \text{poly}(\kappa/\delta) \) this learning algorithm is efficient.

Now, let \( \mathcal{L} \) be the final learned set by \( R \). If conditioned on \( \mathcal{L} \) it holds that both of \( b = 0 \) and \( b = 1 \) have at least \( \rho \) probability of being used by \( S \), then by conditioning on the distribution of the sender’s view on \( b = 0 \) or \( b = 1 \) all the unlearned queries remain at most \( \epsilon/\rho = \sigma \)-heavy. Now it is easy to see that if we sample a random view for \( S \) conditioned on \( \mathcal{L}, b = 0 \) and \( \mathcal{L}, b = 1 \) and call them \( V_0 \) and \( V_1 \), the probability that queries of \( V_0 \) and \( V_1 \) collide out of \( \mathcal{L} \) is at most \( m \cdot \sigma \leq m \cdot \epsilon/\rho \). For \( \rho > m \cdot \epsilon \) this probability is less than one, which means that if \( \rho > m \cdot \epsilon \), then there exists a consistent pair of views for \( S \) that he can use to output \( c \) for both cases of \( b = 0 \) and \( b = 1 \). This means that Case 2 happens.

\[^{6}\text{The works of [IR89,GT00] work with polynomial time Turing machines or circuits, however their goal is to fix the random oracle } f \text{ before enumerating the attackers. However, if the attacker is fixed before the sampling of } f, \text{ the proofs of [IR89,GT00] imply the one-wayness of } f \text{ with measure one even if the fixed attacker is computationally unbounded.}\]
Now let us assume that Case 2 does not happen. It means that for all executions of the algorithm $A$, when $A$ is done with learning the $\epsilon$ heavy queries, the probability of either $b = 1$ or $b = 0$ conditioned on $L$ is at most $\epsilon$. This means that $A$ can guess $b$ correctly with probability $1 - \epsilon$.

If we can choose $\rho = O(m/\epsilon)$ and $\epsilon = \delta$ in the argument above (assuming that Case 2 does not happen) we get an attacker $A$ that asks $O(m/\epsilon) = O(m)$ queries. We can alternatively choose smaller $\rho$ and cut $A$’s execution after it asks $O(m/\delta)$ number of queries and use $\epsilon = \delta/10$. By an application of the Markov inequality $A$ will ask more than $100(m/\delta)$ number of queries with probability at most $\epsilon$, and so $A$ will ask at most $O(m/\delta)$ number of queries and will guess $b$ correctly with probability at least $2\epsilon < \delta$.

Remark 5.2.4. Mahmoody and Pass [MP12] proved a more general lemma ruling out (even “somewhere binding”) non-interactive commitment schemes in the random oracle model. Lemma 5.2.3 is a special case of their result which suffices for our use. In the setting of [MP12] the security parameter is given to the parties in the form of $1^\kappa$, but their proof handles parties who in addition receive an auxiliary $z \in \{0, 1\}$ and the parties’ behavior could also depend on the given $z$.

Proof of Lemma 5.2.2. Consider the set of circuit pairs that are equivalent and of the same size: $\mathcal{C} = \{(C_0, C_1) \mid C_0 \equiv C_1 \land |C_0| = |C_1|\}$. We apply Lemma 5.2.3 for $\delta = 1/\kappa^2$ as follows. Use $(C_0, C_1) = z \in \mathcal{C}$ as the common input given to both parties. Let $S$ be a sender strategy that, given input bit $b$, obfuscates $C_b$ and sends out the obfuscated circuit $B$.

By Lemma 5.2.3 for each $(C_0, C_1) = z \in \mathcal{C}$ either of the following holds:

1. $A_f^f((C_0, C_1), B)$ can guess the random $b$ in the random oracle model correctly with probability at least $1 - 1/\kappa^2$.

2. There is a partial oracle $f'$ of polynomial size and two random strings $r_0, r_1$ such that $iO_{r_b}(C_b) = B$ for both $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Note that if $C_0 \neq C_1$ then Case (2) cannot happen as no such $(f', r_0, r_1)$ can exist by perfect completeness of iO. Therefore, if Case (2) happens, the existence of $(f', r_0, r_1)$ serves as an efficiently verifiable proof that $C_0 \equiv C_1$.

Now let $\mathcal{C}_a$ be the subset of $\mathcal{C}$ for which Case (1) holds. There are two cases:

1. $\mathcal{C}_a$ is not finite, in which case we have shown that Case 1 of the lemma holds.

2. If $\mathcal{C}_a$ is finite, then for all (except a finite number) of $(C_0, C_1) \in \mathcal{C}$ we can efficiently prove that $C_0, C_1$ are equivalent circuits. This would give a proof system for proving the equivalency of two given circuits, but this problem is co-NP-complete. Thus, $\text{co-NP} = \text{NP}$. 

□
5.3 Hardness of Semi-Black-Box Constructions of IO

In this section, we prove Theorem 5.1.2. We will first show that approximate IO is still powerful enough to base public-key cryptography on private-key cryptography.

**Theorem 5.3.1.** The existence of $(1/6)$-approximate IO and any one-way functions imply the existence of semantically secure public-key encryption schemes.

In order to prove the above we will need the following theorem which is a more formal version of Theorem 5.1.3 and a direct consequence of the techniques used in Chapter 4 and in particular Theorems 4.4.18, 4.4.30, and 4.5.3.

**Theorem 5.3.2.** Suppose $iO'$ is an approximately correct obfuscation algorithm with error at most $\epsilon'$ in idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ where $\mathcal{I}$ is random trapdoor permutation oracle or the degree-$O(1)$ graded encoding model for finite rings. Suppose $\epsilon'' \geq 1/poly(\kappa)$. Then there is another obfuscation algorithm $iO$ in the plain model such that:

- The running time of $iO$ is $\text{poly}(\kappa/\epsilon''(\kappa))$ where $\kappa$ is the size of the input circuit and it is approximately correct with error at most $\epsilon = \epsilon' + \epsilon''$.

- There is a simulator $\text{Sim}$ in the idealized model that runs in time $\text{poly}(\kappa/\epsilon''(\kappa))$, and for any circuit $C$, the distributions $\text{Sim}_I^T(iO'_I(C))$ and $iO(C)$ have statistical distance $\text{negl}(|C|)$.

We first prove Theorem 5.1.2 using Theorems 5.3.2 and 5.3.1 then later prove Theorem 5.3.1.

**Proof of Theorem 5.1.2 using Theorems 5.3.2 and 5.3.1.** Let $\mathcal{P}$ be any such primitive with implementation $P$ relative to the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$, and suppose $iO$ is any such semi-black-box construction of IO from $\mathcal{P}$. By Lemma 3.1.8 (the Composition Lemma), we conclude that $iO' = iO^P$ is a construction of IO in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$. This, together with Theorem 5.3.2 imply that there is a $(1/6)$-approximate IO in the plain model. Finally, by Theorem 5.3.1 and the existence of $(1/6)$-approximate IO implies that we can construct semantically secure public-key encryption from one-way functions. 

**Proving Theorem 5.3.1** We now prove that $(1/6)$-approximate IO and one-way functions imply semantically secure public-key encryption. Therefore, any provably secure construction of $(1/6)$-approximate IO would enable us to take any one-way functions and construct a secure public-key encryption scheme from it. In the terminology of [IR89] it means that Cryptomania collapses to Minicrypt if $(1/6)$-approximate IO exists.

**Intuition.** Sahai and Waters [SW14] showed that IO and OWF imply PKE. Here we show that the very same construction, when instantiated using approximate IO, leads to “approximately correct” and “approximately secure” public-key encryption. Then, using a result of [Hol06] we amplify the soundness and correctness to get a full fledged semantically secure public key encryption scheme.
**Definition 5.3.3** (Approximate correctness and security for PKE). We call a public-key bit-encryption scheme \((\text{Gen, Enc, Dec})\) for message space \(\{0, 1\}\) \(\epsilon(\kappa)\)-correct if

\[
\Pr[\text{Dec}_{dk}(\text{Enc}_{ek}(b)) = b : (ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa), b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}] \geq 1 - \epsilon(\kappa)
\]

where the probability is over the randomness of the key generation, encryption, decryption, and the bit \(b\). We call \((\text{Gen, Enc, Dec})\) \(\delta(\kappa)\)-secure if for any PPT adversary \(A\), it holds that

\[
\Pr[A(pk, \text{Enc}_{pk}(b)) = b] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \delta(\kappa)
\]

where the probability is over the randomness of generation, encryption, the adversary, and bit \(b\).

Holenstein [Hol06] shows how to amplify any \(\epsilon\)-correct and \(\epsilon\)-secure PKE into a full fledged (semantically secure) PKE for sufficiently small \(\epsilon\).

**Theorem 5.3.4** (Implied by Corollary 7.8 in [Hol06]). Suppose \((\text{Gen, Enc, Dec})\) is \(\epsilon\)-correct and \(\delta(\kappa)\)-secure for constants \(\epsilon, \delta\) such that \((1 - 2 \cdot 1/6)^2 > 2\delta\). Then there exists a semantically secure PKE.

Theorem 5.3.5 below asserts that approximate IO and one-way functions imply approximately correct and approximately secure PKE.

**Theorem 5.3.5** (Approximate IO + OWF \(\Rightarrow\) Approximate PKE). If \(\epsilon\)-approximate IO and one-way functions exist, then there is an \(\epsilon\)-correct and \((\epsilon + \text{negl}(\kappa))\)-secure public-key bit encryption scheme.

We first prove Theorem 5.3.1 using Theorem 5.3.5 and then will prove 5.3.5.

**Proof of Theorem 5.3.1.** Because \((1 - 2 \cdot 1/6)^2 > 2 \cdot 1/6\), Theorem 5.3.1 follows immediately from Theorem 5.3.4 and the following Theorem 5.3.5 using \(\epsilon = 1/6\). \(\square\)

In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 5.3.5.

**Proof of Theorem 5.3.5.** We show that the very same construction of PKE from IO and OWF presented by Sahai and Waters [SW14], when instantiated with an \(\epsilon\)-approximate IO, has the demanded properties of Theorem 5.3.5.

**Properties of the construction of [SW14].** We first describe the abstract properties of the construction of [SW14] (for PKE using IO and OWFs) and its security proof that we need to know.

- Construction/correctness:
  1. The key generation process generates a circuit \(C\) and publishes \(\text{iO}(C) = B\) as public key where \(\text{iO}\) is an IO scheme.
2. The encryption simply runs $B$ on $(r, b)$ where $r$ is the encryption randomness and $b$ is the bit to be encrypted.

3. The scheme has completeness 1.

- Security: [SW14] proves the security of the construction above by showing that no PPT algorithm can distinguish between the following two random variables $X_0, X_1$ defined as:

$$X_b \approx (iO_s(C), C(r, b)) \approx (B, C(r, b))$$

where $s$ is the randomness for iO. When clear from the context we drop the randomness $s$ and simply write $iO(C)$ denoting it as a random variable over the randomness of iO.

It can be verified by inspection that the proof of [SW14] for indistinguishability of $X_0$ and $X_1$ does not rely on completeness of the obfuscation iO and only relies on its indistinguishability (when applied to circuits with the same functions). We will rely on this feature of the proof of [SW14] in our analysis.

Below we analyze the correctness and security of the construction of [SW14] when iO is an $\epsilon$-approximate IO.

Correctness. By the definition of $\epsilon$-approximate IO and $\epsilon$-correct bit encryption, and the fact that the [SW14] construction has perfect completeness when iO is an IO, it follows that the completeness of the new scheme (when $b$ is also chosen at random) is at least $1 - \epsilon$. Thus the scheme is $\epsilon$-correct.

Security. First recall that for the basic construction of [SW14] using (perfect) IO, no PPT attacker $A$ can guess $b$ with probability better than $1/2 + \negl(\kappa)$ when $b$ is chosen at random and $A$ is given a sample from the random variable $X_b$ (for random $b$). As we mentioned above, the proof of this statement does not rely on the correctness of the used IO and only relies on its indistinguishability.

Now we want to bound the distinguishing advantage of PPT adversaries between the following random variables $Y_0, Y_1$:

- $Y_b \approx (B, B(r, b)) \approx (iO_s(C), iO_s(C)(r, b))$ where $s$ is the randomness of the obfuscator iO.

The difference between $Y_b$’s and $X_b$’s stems from the fact that the public-key $B = iO(C)$ no longer computes the same exact function as the circuit $C$ as the obfuscation only guarantees approximate correctness. We reduce the analysis of the new scheme to the original analysis of [SW14].

By the analysis of [SW14] we already know that if any PPT $A$ is given a sample from $X_b$ for a random $b$ it has at most $1/2 + \negl(\kappa)$ chance of correctly guessing $b$. Also note that the distributions $X_b$ and $Y_b$ for a random $b$ are $\epsilon$-close due to the $\epsilon$-correctness of the obfuscation. More formally, the distributions $X_b$ and $Y_b$ could be defined over the same sampling space.
using: random seeds of key generation, obfuscation, encryption, and bit $b$. This way with probability $\geq 1 - \varepsilon$ (and by the $\varepsilon$-approximate correctness of the obfuscation) the actual sampled values of $X_b$ and $Y_b$ will be equal, and this implies that they are $\varepsilon$-close. As a result, when we switch the distribution of the challenge given to the adversary and give a sample of $Y_b$ (for random $b$) instead of a sample from $X_b$, the adversary’s chance of guessing $b$ correctly can increase at most by $\varepsilon$ and reach at most $1/2 + \text{negl} + \varepsilon$. Therefore, the new scheme is $(\varepsilon + \text{negl})$-secure according to Definition 5.3.3.

5.4 Separating IO from TDP and Constant-Degree GEM

In this section we improve upon the previous section’s result by showing that building IO in the examined idealized models is not just as hard as basing public-key encryption on private-key encryption but in fact impossible to achieve in a fully black-box way.

A fully-black-box construction of approximate computational CIO from primitive $P$ could be defined through a combination of Definitions 3.1.2 and 2.5.5. Here we emphasize that the input circuits do not have any oracle gates while the obfuscation algorithm and the final circuits could use the oracle implementing $P$. This seemingly restricted model is in fact sufficient for all known applications.

We are now ready to formally prove this section’s result. First we formalize the statement by specifying the way $P$ is constructed in the idealized models.

**Theorem 5.4.1 (Main Result).** Assuming the existence of one-way functions and $\text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM}$, there is no fully-black-box construction of IO from any primitive $P$ that has an oracle-fixed black-box construction (see Definition 3.1.4) in the random trapdoor permutation oracle or the degree-$O(1)$ graded encoding model for any finite ring.

In fact, we prove a stronger separation that holds for approximate computational CIO as well.

**Theorem 5.4.2.** Assuming there is no $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-approximate statistical CIO, there is no fully-black-box construction of $(\varepsilon', \delta')$-approximate computational CIO for any $\varepsilon' \leq \varepsilon - \kappa^{-\Omega(1)}$, $\delta' \leq \delta - \Omega(1)$ from any of the primitives that can be constructed in the idealized models listed in Theorem 5.4.1.

In order to prove this we will rely on the result of a previous work due to Brakerski et al. [BBF16], which states that (approximate) statistically-secure IO is impossible to achieve.

**Theorem 5.4.3 (Impossibility of Approximate Statistically-secure IO [BBF16]).** Suppose one-way functions exist, $\text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM}$, and $\delta, \varepsilon : \mathbb{N} \mapsto [0,1]$ are such that $2\varepsilon(\kappa) + 3\delta(\kappa) < 1 - 1/poly(\kappa)$. Then there is no $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-approximate statistically-secure CIO (see Definition 2.5.4) for all poly-size circuits.
**Proving Theorem 5.4.1 using Theorems 5.4.3 and 5.4.2.** Theorem 5.4.3 rules out \((\epsilon, \delta)\)-approximate statistical CIO (assuming OWFs and \(\mathsf{NP} \not \subseteq \mathsf{coAM}\)) for some \(\epsilon = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)\) and \(\delta = 0.3\). Thus, if we choose \(\epsilon' = \epsilon/2\) and \(\delta' = \delta/2\), then Theorem 5.4.1 follows from Theorems 5.4.2 and 5.4.3.

In the following we will focus on proving Theorem 5.4.2.

**Remark 5.4.4** (The need for constant \(\delta\)). Our proof of Theorem 5.4.2 crucially relies on the fact that \(\delta - \delta' \geq \Omega(1)\) which in turn requires \(\delta \geq \Omega(1)\). Thus, the separation holds because the attacker of [BBF16] could achieve \(\delta \approx 1/3\) (as opposed to just \(1/\text{poly}(\kappa)\)). More technically, our proof will make use of Lemma 2.2.2 rather than the Borel-Cantelli lemma, and that is the source of our need for \(\delta \geq \Omega(1)\). However, in case one can improve the result of [BBF16] to cover the setting of \(\epsilon = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)\) and \(\delta = 1 - \alpha\) for arbitrary small \(\alpha = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)\), then our Theorem 5.4.2 could be improved to any \(\delta' = \delta - 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)\). In fact the proof will be simple and will not use our Lemma 2.2.2 and could be based on the Borel-Cantelli lemma (see the end of this section for a sketch).

**Remark 5.4.5** (Ruling out relativizing constructions). In Theorem 5.4.1 we focus on ruling out fully-black-box constructions. However, the proof can be extended to rule out relativizing constructions (of IO from the set of listed primitives) using standard techniques and the fact that an optimal statistical distinguisher can be implemented in \(\mathsf{PSPACE}\). In particular, the separating oracle would be a random sample from the idealized oracle \(I \leftarrow I\) and an oracle for a \(\mathsf{PSPACE}\)-complete oracle. However, interestingly, in our case the sampled \(I \leftarrow I\) would only work with constant measure (which is enough since it is still a positive measure) due to using Lemma 2.2.2 as opposed to measure one, which is typically the case in black-box separations.

**Proof of Theorem 5.4.2.** In the following, let \(Q\) denote the primitive of \((\epsilon', \delta')\)-approximate computational CIO. Also let \(P\) be any primitive that can be constructed in the idealized models listed in Theorem 5.4.1 (according to Definition 3.1.4), and let \(P\) be the implementation of \(P\) relative to \(I\).

For sake of contradiction, in the following we let \(Q\) be the fully-black-box construction of \(Q\) from \(P\). We will first make use of Lemma 3.1.8 (the Composition Lemma) to show that \(Q\) could also be implemented relative to \(I\) as well. Then we rule out the existence of black-box constructions of \(Q\) from \(I\) to conclude that \(Q\) could not exist.

In the following we will use Theorems 5.3.2 and 5.4.3 to rule out the possibility of any oracle-fixed black-box construction of \(Q\) relative to \(I\) which (with Lemma 3.1.8) shows that \(Q\) could not exist.

Let \(\epsilon'' = \epsilon - \epsilon' \geq 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)\) and \(\delta'' = \delta - \delta' \geq \Omega(1)\). Since \(P\) is a construction of \(P\) relative to \(I\), we have that \(\text{iO}^I = (Q^P)^I\) is an \(\epsilon''\)-approximate obfuscation mechanism relative to \(I\). Let \(\text{iO}\) be the \(\epsilon\)-approximate obfuscator in the plain model that exists due to Theorem 5.3.2. The assumption in Theorem 5.4.2 is that \(\text{iO}\) cannot be an \((\epsilon, \delta)\)-approximate statistical CIO. Therefore, there exists a computationally unbounded adversary \(A\) and an infinite sequence of circuit pairs \((C^1_0, C^1_1), \ldots, (C^n_0, C^n_1), \ldots\) such that for all \(i\): \(|C^i_0| = |C^i_1|\), \(C^i_0 \equiv C^i_1\), and \(\Pr_{b \in \{0,1\}}[A(\text{iO}(C^i_b)) = b] \geq 1/2 + \delta(\kappa)/2\).
Now consider another attacker $A'$ in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ which, given a circuit $B'$ as input, runs the simulator of Theorem 5.3.2 to get the circuit $B = \text{Sim}^\mathcal{I}(B')$ and then runs $A$ over $B$ to output whatever $A$ does. By the property of the simulator $\text{Sim}$ we conclude that $A'$ is an efficient query (computationally unbounded) attacker in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$ that achieves
\[
\Pr_{b \leftarrow \{0,1\}, I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}} [A'^I(iO^I(C_b^i)) = b] \geq 1/2 + \delta'(\kappa)/2 - \text{negl}(\kappa)
\]
where $|C_b^i| = |C_i| = \kappa$.

A crucial point is that the above probability is also over the randomness of the oracle $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ for every $i$, while we are interested in fixing $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ and getting a successful attack for infinitely many pairs of circuits at the same time. By a simple averaging argument we can get:
\[
\Pr_{I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}} \left[ \Pr_{b \leftarrow \{0,1\}} [A'^I(iO^I(C_b^i)) = b] \geq 1/2 + \delta'(\kappa)/2 \right] \geq \delta''(\kappa)/2 - \text{negl}(\kappa).
\]
Thus, if we define the event $E_i$ over the sampled oracle $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ as:
\[
E_i \text{ holds if: } \Pr_{b \leftarrow \{0,1\}} [A'^I(iO^I(C_b^i)) = b] \geq 1/2 + \delta'/2
\]
then we get $\Pr[E_i] \geq \delta''(\kappa)/2 - \text{negl}(\kappa) \geq \delta''/3$ for every $i \in \mathbb{N}$. Now we can apply Lemma 2.2.2 to conclude that, with probability at least $\delta''/3$ over the choice of $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$, an infinite number of the events $E_i$’s would happen at the same time for $I$. We call $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ a good oracle if it is indeed the case that infinitely many of the events $E_i$’s happen over $I$. By definition, for any good oracle $I$, the attacker $A'$ successfully breaks $(Q^P)^I$ (as an implementation of $Q$ in model $\mathcal{I}$) over infinitely many pairs of circuits while asking only an efficient number of oracle queries to $I$. The existence of such $A'$ who breaks $(Q^P)^I$ for non-zero (in fact $\geq \delta''/3$) measure of the choice of the oracles $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ prevents $Q^P$ from being a oracle-fixed black-box construction of $Q$ relative to $\mathcal{I}$.

**Case of $\delta' \approx 1 - 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$.** Theorem 5.4.2 was sufficient for us to derive Theorem 5.4.1, however that is not the strongest separation one can imagine for approximate computational CIO as it does not cover the case of $1 - 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$. The work of [BBF16] shows that whenever $2\epsilon + \delta > 1$ then there is in fact a way to achieve $(\epsilon, \delta)$-approximate statistical CIO. Thus one can imagine the possibility that the result of [BBF16] could ultimately be improved to rule out $(\epsilon, \delta)$-approximate statistical CIO for $O(\epsilon) + \delta < 1 - 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$. Below, we show that such a result, if proved, could be used to derive lower bounds on the complexity of $(\epsilon', \delta')$-approximate computational CIO for $\delta' \approx 1 - 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$.

**Theorem 5.4.6.** If there is no $(\epsilon, \delta)$-approximate statistical CIO for $\delta = 1 - \rho$ for sufficiently small $\rho = 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$ (e.g., $\rho = 1/\kappa^4$ suffices), then there is no fully-black-box construction of $(\epsilon', \delta' = 1 - \sqrt{\rho})$-approximate computational CIO for any $\epsilon' \leq \epsilon - \kappa^{-\Omega(1)}$ from the primitives of Theorem 5.4.1.
Thus, the main difference between Theorem 5.4.2 and Theorem 5.4.6 is that in Theorem 5.4.6 we cover the case of $\delta' = 1 - 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$, but we also rely on stronger assumption that $\delta = 1 - 1/\text{poly}(\kappa)$.

**Proof of Theorem 5.4.6.** The proof is identical to that of Theorem 5.4.2 except for the following. Since the attackers $A$ and $A'$ will succeed in guessing the correct circuit with probability $1 - 1/\text{poly}(\kappa) \approx 1$ we can do a better averaging argument to get a better attack after fixing the oracle. Namely, define the event $E_i$ as:

$$E_i \text{ holds if: } \Pr_{b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}}[A'^I(iO'^I(C_i^b)) = b] \geq 1 - \sqrt{\rho(\kappa)/2}$$

where $\kappa$ is the size of the circuits $C_0^i, C_1^i$. Then we can conclude that $\Pr[E_i] \geq 1 - 10\sqrt{\rho(\kappa)}$. Now, since the events $E_i$ happen with large probability and that $\sum_\kappa 10\sqrt{\rho(\kappa)} < \infty$ we can apply the Borel-Cantelli lemma (Lemma 2.2.1) to conclude that with measure one over the choice of the oracle $I \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ all but finitely many of $E_i$'s would happen. The rest of the proof remains unchanged. \qed
Part II

Monolithic Separations for Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Chapter 6

Extending the Black-box Framework

6.1 Introduction

Before we delve into separating IO from more sophisticated primitives we will have to address the current black-box framework since it is incapable of capturing constructions of IO from more advanced primitives. We will start by motivating the need for this new framework.

Recall that the black-box framework (discussed in Chapter 3) restricts to constructions that use the primitive and the adversary (in the security reduction) as a black-box. The reason that this framework does not work out-of-the-box for our separation results is that the constructions of IO from powerful encryption primitive allow for a very natural non-black-box use. In fact, the construction of IO from compact functional encryption (FE) \cite{AJ15,BV15,AJS17} is non-black-box in its use of functional encryption. This is not a coincidence (or, just one example) and many applications of functional encryption (as well as other powerful encryption schemes) and IO are non-black-box \cite{Gen09,SW14,BZ14,GP16,GPZ17}. Note that the difference between these powerful primitives and the likes of one-way functions, hash functions, etc., is that these powerful primitives include subroutines that take arbitrary circuits as inputs. Therefore, it is very easy to self-feed the primitive. In other words, it is easy to plant gates (or function calls) of its own subroutines (or, subroutines of other cryptographic primitives) inside such a circuit that is then fed to it as input. For example, the construction of IO from FE plants FE’s encryption subroutine as a gate inside the circuit for which it issues decryption keys. This makes FE a “special” primitive in that at least one of its subroutines takes an arbitrary circuit as input and we could plant code of its subroutines in this circuit. Consequently, the obtained construction would be non-black-box in the underlying primitive. This special aspect is present in all of the primitives that we aim to separate IO from in the subsequent chapters. For example, one of the subroutines of predicate encryption (see Definition 2.6.4) takes a circuit as input and this input circuit is used to test whether the plaintext is revealed during the decryption or not. Along similar lines, evaluation subroutine of a fully-homomorphic scheme (see Definition 2.6.6) is allowed to take as input a circuit that is executed on an encrypted message.

The above “special” aspects of the encryption functionalities (i.e. that they take as
input general circuits or Turing machines and execute them) is the main reason that many of the applications of these primitives are non-black-box constructions. Therefore, any effort to prove a meaningful impossibility result should aim for proving the result with respect to a more general framework than that of [IR89,RTV04]. In particular, this more general framework should incorporate the aforementioned non-black-box techniques as part of the framework itself.

The previous works of Brakerski, Katz, Segev, and Yerukhimovich [BKSY11] and the more recent works of Asharov and Segev [AS15,AS16] are very relevant to our studies here. All of these works also deal with proving limitations for primitives that in this work we call special (i.e. those that take general circuits as input), and prove impossibility results against constructions that use these special primitives while allowing some form of oracle gates to be present in the input circuits. A crucial point, however, is that these works still put some limitation on what oracle gates are allowed, and some of the subroutines are excluded. The work of [BKSY11] proved that the primitive of Witness Indistinguishable (WI) proofs for $NP^O$ statements where $O$ is a random oracle does not imply key-agreement protocols in a black-box way. However, the WI subroutines themselves are not allowed inside input circuits. The more recent works of [AS15,AS16] showed that by using IO over circuits that are allowed to have one-way functions gates one cannot obtain collision resistant hash functions or (certain classes of) one-way permutations families (in a black-box way). However, not all of the subroutines of the primitive itself are allowed to be planted as gates inside the input circuits (e.g., the evaluation procedure of the IO).

As a result, we are going to revisit the models used in [BKSY11,AS15,AS16] who allowed the use of one-way function gates inside the given circuits and study a model where there is no limitation on what type of oracle gates could be used in the circuits given as input to the special subroutines, and in particular, the primitive’s own subroutines could be planted as gates in the input circuits. We believe a model that captures the “gate plantation” technique without putting any limitation on the types of gates used is worth to be studied directly and at an abstract level, due to actual positive results that exactly benefit from this “self-feeding” non-black-box technique. For this goal, here we initiate a formal study of a model that we call the monolithic model, which captures the above-described non-black-box technique that is commonplace in constructions that use primitives with subroutines that take arbitrary circuits as input.

More formally, suppose $\mathcal{P}$ is a primitive that is special as described above, namely, at least one of its subroutines might receive a circuit or a Turing machine $C$ as input and executes $C$ internally in order to obtain the answer to one of its subroutines. Examples of $\mathcal{P}$ are predicate encryption, fully homomorphic encryption, etc. A monolithic construction of another primitive $\mathcal{Q}$ (e.g., IO) from $\mathcal{P}$ will be allowed to plant the subroutines of $\mathcal{P}$ inside the circuit $C$ as gates with no further limitations. To be precise, $C$ will be allowed to have oracle gates that call $\mathcal{P}$ itself. Some of major examples of non-black-box constructions that fall into this monolithic model are as follows.

- Gentry’s bootstrapping construction [Gen09] plants FHE’s own decryption gates inside a circuit that is given as input to the evaluation subroutine. This trick falls into the
The above examples show the power of the monolithic model in capturing one of the most commonly used non-black-box techniques in cryptography and especially in the context of powerful encryption primitives.

**What is not captured by the monolithic model?** It is instructive to understand the kinds of non-black-box techniques not captured by our extension to the black-box model. This model does not capture non-black-box techniques that break the computation of a primitives sub-routines into smaller parts — namely, we do not include techniques that involve partial computation of a sub-routine, save the intermediate state and complete the computation later. In other words, the planted sub-routines gates must be executed in one-shot. Therefore, in our model given just an oracle that implements a one-way function it is not possible to obtain garbled circuits that evaluate circuits with one-way function gates planted in them. For example, Beaver’s OT extension construction cannot be realized given just oracle access to a random function.

However, a slight workaround (though a bit cumbersome) can still be used to give meaningful impossibility results that use garbled circuits (or, randomized encodings more generally) in our model. Specifically, garbled circuits must now be modeled as a special primitive that allows for inputs that can be arbitrary circuits with OWF gates planted in them. With this change the one-way function gate planted inside circuit fed to the garbled circuit construction is treated as a individual unit. With this change we can realize Beaver’s OT extension construction in our model.

In summary, intuitively, our model provides a way to capture “black-box” uses of the known non-black-box techniques. While the full power of non-black-box techniques in cryptography is yet to be understood, virtually every known use of non-black-box techniques follows essentially the same principles, i.e. by planting subroutines of one primitive as gates in a circuit that is fed as input to the same (or, another) primitive. Our model captures any such non-black box use of the considered primitives.
6.2 Our Results

In this chapter we will describe ideas that lead to an extension to the black-box framework of [IR89, RTV04], which we call the *monolithic framework* where a common *non-black-box* technique is allowed in the constructions.

The goal of this chapter is to explain and justify the way we define “monolithic” constructions that use specific primitives such as witness encryption (see Definition 2.6.1). As it will become clear later, our definition of monolithic constructions is meaningful with respect to a “special” primitive with a “special” subroutine. But, to be fully formal, we will give formal definitions of what this monolithic model means when we use the exact set of primitives mentioned in our main theorem. This way, we can give *full formal definitions as to what we mean by an monolithic construction for our specific primitives* that are needed for the separations in Theorem 7.1.1, and we also give full proofs of separations for them under this more relaxed black-box notion. However, we emphasize that, for a new primitive \( \mathcal{P} \), one still has to give a formal definition of what it means to use \( \mathcal{P} \) in an monolithic way. What we discuss in this section lays down the main intuitive features that, if \( \mathcal{P} \) possesses them, a monolithic use of \( \mathcal{P} \) is possible.

Intuitively, this monolithic model allows the construction of a primitive \( \mathcal{Q} \) based on another primitive \( \mathcal{P} \) to plant oracle gates (or oracle calls) to \( \mathcal{P} \) itself in the circuits (or Turing machines) in generic computations done by \( \mathcal{P} \) whenever \( \mathcal{Q} \) has the choice of doing so by choosing certain inputs given to \( \mathcal{P} \). For example, to get identification protocols from one-way functions and zero-knowledge proofs [FS87, FFS88] one has to use the code of one-way functions and feed it to the zero-knowledge protocol used. This makes the final construction *non-black-box* according to the [RTV04] definition, however we would like to define a general abstract extended model of black-box constructions (i.e. monolithic constructions) that allows such techniques.

In Section 6.4 we get into the details of how to define black-box reductions for a class of “special” primitives with a special subroutine as described above that fall under the monolithic framework. In this technical overview, however, for sake of simplicity and concreteness at the same time, we focus on developing a formal definition of what it means to use *witness* encryption in a monolithic way.

6.3 A Concrete Definition for Case of WE

Consider the primitive of witness encryption \((\text{Enc, Dec})\) where one can run \(\text{Enc}(a, m) = c\) to encrypt a message \(m\) under a circuit \(a\), and then later on, one can also try to decrypt \(c\) by using a “witness” \(w\) for which \(a(w) = 1.1\). A black-box construction (see Definition 3.1.2) of a primitive based on witness encryption is limited to only encrypting messages under circuits \(a\) that are in the *plain* model. That is because the input-output function definition of primitive witness encryption (as stated above) only accepts plain circuits as input. However, in many applications of witness encryption, when we use witness encryption, we end up

\footnote{This way of defining witness encryption is based on the \(\text{NP}\) complete problem of circuit satisfiability.}
using *oracle* circuits $a^O$. The reason that doing so is fine (even though the definition of witness encryption requires plain circuits) that those procedures of $O$ would be eventually implemented efficiently and could be turned into circuits (using the Cook-Levin reduction).

A monolithic construction from witness encryption is exactly allowed to do the above trick (of planting oracle gates in the input circuits) but it does so *regardless* of having an efficient implementation for the subroutines of WE. In other words, even if we use an inefficient oracle to implement WE, we still get an inefficient implementation for the constructed primitive. Now, we can let $a$ to be an oracle circuit calling either of $(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ freely, when $(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ themselves are available as oracle subroutines (and might be *inefficiently* implemented). We emphasize that, by allowing this extension, we might eventually get multiple levels of *nested* oracle calls (since the circuit given to the decryption, can potentially have decryption gates itself), and allowing this to happen makes this model more powerful. However we should also be careful that this nested sequence of calls does not lead to exponential time.

### Monolithic Construction = Fully Black-box Use of an Extended Primitive

The above-mentioned example of how a monolithic construction using WE works shows that monolithic constructions using witness encryption could be interpreted in an equivalent way in which the construction is in fact *fully* black-box (see Definition 3.1.2), but it uses a *stronger* “extended” variant of the WE primitive where we allow oracle gates (calling the same primitive, namely witness encryption) to be planted in the circuits given as input to the encryption subroutine. Note that the extended WE is technically a *different* primitive than WE (because for inefficient implementations of WE, we would accept inefficient circuits as inputs as well), even though the two primitives are equivalent in a *non-black-box* way.

The following is the way we define extended WE in a “symmetric” way such that either the given input instance is a circuit (by interpreting it so and running it over the witness), or the instance is actually an input to a circuit and it is the *witness* that is the circuit. See Definition 6.5.9 for a more detailed version.

#### Definition 6.3.1 (Extended Witness Encryption). Let $V$ be an *oracle* algorithm that takes “instance” $a$ and “witness” $w$ as inputs, interprets $a$ as an oracle-aided circuit, then outputs $a^{(\cdot)}(w)$. An *extended witness encryption* scheme for a relation given by $V$ consists of two PPT algorithms $(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V)$ defined as follows:

- $\text{Enc}(a, m, 1^\kappa)$ : given an instance $a \in \{0,1\}^*$ and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$ outputs $c \in \{0,1\}^*$.

- $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ : given ciphertext $c$ and “witness” string $w$, it either outputs a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$ or $\bot$.

An extended witness encryption scheme satisfies the the same completeness and security properties as the standard Definition of WE (see Definition 2.6.1).

We can also define a symmetric variant of extended WE where the relation $V$ interprets $w$ as the circuit instead and runs $w(a)$. In either case, we note that, since $V$ is a relation that
acts as a universal circuit, the running time of $V(w, a)$ is guaranteed to be $\text{poly}(n)$ where $n = |a| + |w|$. That is due to the fact that each recursive call is invoked on inputs of a smaller size (in fact of length $n - 1$) which results in a halting execution of time at most $O(n^2)$.

Using the same idea, one can define extended variants of many other primitives (see Definition 6.5.10). Finally, after defining what an extended WE primitive is, we can formally define what it means to have an monolithic construction that uses WE:

**Definition 6.3.2** (Monolithic Construction of WE). Suppose $Q$ is a primitive and $\tilde{\text{WE}}$ is an extended version of WE defined as in Definition 6.3.1. Any fully black-box construction (see Definition 3.1.2) for $Q$ from $\tilde{\text{WE}}$ (i.e. an extended version of WE) is also a monolithic construction of $Q$ from WE.

Again, the idea extends beyond WE and we apply it to all the other primitives that we deal with in our main Theorem 7.1.1.

**Monolithic Separations through Fully Black-Box Separations.** The crucial point here is that because monolithic constructions are in fact fully black-box constructions based on the extended variants of the same primitive, at least we will have a path to prove impossibility results in this monolithic model via proving fully black-box constructions; however, the catch is that we have to do so with respect to a much stronger variant of the original primitive, namely its more powerful extensions.

### 6.3.1 A Transitivity Lemma for Deriving More Separations

The way we defined monolithic constructions (based on black-box constructions using the extended primitive) allows us to prove a transitivity lemmas that will then pave our way towards proving more separations in the monolithic framework. Namely, it can be shown that if $P, Q, R$ are cryptographic primitives and (1) there is an monolithic construction of the extended variant of $Q$ from $P$ and (2) there is an monolithic construction of $R$ from $Q$, then there is a monolithic construction of $R$ from $P$ (see Lemma 6.6.3 and its proof). Therefore, to prove that a primitive $P$ (e.g., predicate encryption) does not imply IO, we could employ the following argument outline:

1. Separate IO from WE in the monolithic model. In other words, prove that there is no fully black-box construction of IO from the extended variant of WE.

2. Prove that the extended variant of the primitive $P$ could be obtained from witness encryption in a monolithic way.

We will apply the above idea to various forms of witness encryption and different all-or-nothing encryption primitives $P$.  

82
6.4 An Abstract Extension of the Black-Box Model

In what follows, we will gradually develop an extended framework of constructions that includes the fully black-box framework of [RTV04] and allows certain non-black-box techniques by default. This model uses steps already taken in works of Brakerski, Katz, Segev, and Yerukhimovich [BKSY11] and the more recent works of Asharov and Segev [AS15, AS16] and takes them to the next level by allowing even non-black-box techniques involving ‘self-calls’ [AJ15, BV15, AJS15]. In a nutshell, this framework applies to ‘special’ primitives that accept generic circuits as input and run them on other inputs; therefore one can plant oracle gates to the same primitives inside those circuits. We will define such constructions using the fully black-box framework by first extending these primitives and then allowing the extensions to be used in a black-box way.

Special Primitives Receiving Circuits as Input

At a very high level, we call a primitive ‘special’, if it takes circuits as input and run those circuits as part of the execution of its subroutines, but at the same time, the exact definition depends on the execution of the input circuit only as a ‘black-box’ while the exact representation of the input circuits do not matter. In that case one can imagine an input circuit with oracle gates as well. We will simply call such primitives special till we give formal definitions that define those primitives as ‘families’ of primitives indexed by an external universal algorithm.

Here is a list of examples of special primitives.

- **Zero-knowledge proofs of circuit satisfiability (ZK-Cir-SAT).** A secure protocol for ZK-Cir-SAT is an interactive protocol between two parties, a prover and a verifier, who take as input a circuit $C$. Whether or not the prover can convince the verifier to accept the interaction depends on the existence of $x$ such that $C(x) = 1$. This definition of the functionality of ZK-Cir-SAT does not depend on the specific implementation of $C$ and only depends on executing $C$ on $x$ ‘as a black-box’.

- **Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).** FHE is a semantically secure public-key encryption where in addition we have an evaluation sub-routine Eval that takes as input a circuit $f$ and ciphertexts $c_1, \ldots, c_k$ containing plaintexts $m_1, \ldots, m_k$, and it outputs a new ciphertext $c = \text{Eval}(f, c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ such that decrypting $c$ leads to $f(m_1, \ldots, m_k)$. The correctness definition of the primitive FHE only uses the input-output behavior of the circuit $f$, so FHE is a special primitive.

- **Encrypted functionalities.** Primitives such as attribute, predicate, and functional encryption all involve running some generic computation at the decryption phase before deciding what to output. There are two ways that this generic computation could be fed as input to the system:

  - Key policy [SW05, GPSW06]: Here the circuit $C$ is given as input to the key generation algorithm and then $C(m)$ is computed over plaintext $m$ during the decryption.
Ciphertext policy [BSW07]: Here the circuit $C$ is the actual plaintext and the input $m$ to $C$ is used when issuing the decryption keys.

Both of these approaches lead to special primitives. For example, for the case of predicate encryption, suppose we use a predicate verification algorithm $P$ that takes $(k,a)$, interprets $k$ as circuit and runs $k(a)$ to accept or reject. Such $P$ would give us the key policy predicate encryption. Another $P$ algorithm would interpret $a$ as a circuit and runs it on $k$, and this gives us the ciphertext policy predicate encryption. In other words, one can think of the circuit $C$ equivalent to $P(k,·)$ (with $k$ hard coded in it, and $a$ left out as the input) being the “input” circuit given to the KGen subroutine, or alternatively one can think of $P(·,a)$ (with $a$ hard coded in it, and $k$ left out as the input) to be the “input” circuit given to the Enc subroutine. In all cases, the correctness and security definitions of these primitives only depend on the input-output behavior of the given circuits.

- **Witness Encryption.** The reason that witness encryption is a special primitive is very similar to the reason described above for the case of encrypted functionalities. Again we can think of $V(·,a)$ as the circuit given to the Enc algorithm. In this case, the definition of witness encryption (and it security) only depend on the input-output behavior of these ‘input circuits’ rather their specific implementations.

- **Indistinguishability Obfuscation.** An indistinguishability obfuscator takes as input a circuit $C$ and outputs $B$ that can be used later on the compute the same function as $C$ does. The security of IO ensures that for any two different equally-sized and functionally equivalent circuits $C_0, C_1$, it is hard to distinguish between obfuscation of $C_0$ and those of $C_1$. Therefore, the correctness and security definitions of IO depend solely on the input-output behavior (and the sizes) of the input circuits.

When a primitive is special, one can talk about “extensions” of the same primitive in which the circuits that are given as input could have oracle gates (because the primitive is special and so the definition of the primitive still extends to such inputs).

### 6.5 An Abstract Model for Extended Primitives and Constructions

We define special primitives as ‘restrictions’ of (a family of) primitives indexed by a subroutine $W$ to the case that $W$ is a universal circuit evaluator. We then define the extended version to be the case that $W$ accepts oracle-aided circuits. More formally we start by defining primitives indexed by a class of functions.

**Definition 6.5.1** (Indexed primitives). Let $\mathcal{W}$ be a set of (possibly inefficient) functions. A $\mathcal{W}$-indexed primitive $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}]$ is a set of primitives $\{\mathcal{P}[W]\}_{W \in \mathcal{W}}$ indexed by $W \in \mathcal{W}$ where, for each $W \in \mathcal{W}$, $\mathcal{P}[W] = (\mathcal{F}[W], \mathcal{R}[W])$ is a primitive according to Definition 3.1.1.
For the special case of $\mathcal{W} = \{W\}$ we get back the standard primitive of Definition 3.1.1. We will now define variations of indexed primitives that restrict the family to a smaller class $\mathcal{W}'$ and, for every $W \in \mathcal{W}'$, it might further restrict the set of correct implementations to be a subset of $\mathcal{F}[W]$. We first define restricted forms of indexed primitives then provide various restrictions that will be of interest to us.

**Definition 6.5.2** (Restrictions of indexed primitives). For $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}] = \{(\mathcal{F}[W], \mathcal{R}[W])\}_{W \in \mathcal{W}}$ and $\mathcal{P}'[\mathcal{W}'] = \{(\mathcal{F}'[W], \mathcal{R}'[W])\}_{W \in \mathcal{W}}$, we say $\mathcal{P}'[\mathcal{W}']$ is a restriction of $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}]$ if the following conditions hold: (1) $\mathcal{W}' \subseteq \mathcal{W}$, and (2) for all $W \in \mathcal{W}'$, $\mathcal{F}'[W] \subseteq \mathcal{F}[W]$, and (3) for all $W \in \mathcal{W}'$, $\mathcal{R}'[W] = \mathcal{R}[W]$.

**Definition 6.5.3** (Efficient restrictions). We call a restriction $\mathcal{P}'[\mathcal{W}']$ of $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}]$ an efficient restriction if $\mathcal{W}' = \{w\}$ where $w$ is a polynomial time algorithm (with no oracle calls). In this case, we call $\mathcal{P}'[w]$ simply a $w$-restriction of $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}]$.

We are particularly interested in indexed primitives when they are indexed by the universal algorithm for circuit evaluation. This is the case for all the primitives of witness encryption, predicate encryption, fully homomorphic encryption, and IO. All of the examples of the special primitives discussed in previous section fall into this category. Finally, the formal notion of what we previously simply called a ‘special’ primitives is defined as follows.

**Definition 6.5.4** (The universal variant of indexed primitives). We call $\mathcal{P}'[\{w\}]$ the universal variant of $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}]$ if $\mathcal{P}'[\{w\}]$ is an efficient restriction of $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}]$ for the specific algorithm $w(\cdot)$ that interprets its input as a pair $(x, C)$ where $C$ is a circuit, and then it simply outputs $C(x)$.

For example, in the case of witness encryption, the relation between witness $w$ and attribute $a$ is verified by running $a$ as a circuit over $w$ and outputting the first bit of this computation. In order to generalize the notion of universal variants of indexed primitives (i.e., special primitives for short) we need the following definition.

**Definition 6.5.5** ($w^{(\cdot)}$-restrictions). For an oracle algorithm $w^{(\cdot)}$ we call the indexed primitive $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}'] = \{(\mathcal{F}[W], \mathcal{R}[W])\}_{W \in \mathcal{W}'}$ the $w^{(\cdot)}$-restriction of $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}] = \{(\mathcal{F}[W], \mathcal{R}[W])\}_{W \in \mathcal{W}}$, if $\mathcal{P}'[\mathcal{W}]$ is constructed as follows. For all $W \in \mathcal{W}$ and $F$, we include $W \in \mathcal{W}'$ and $F \in \mathcal{F}'[W]$, if it holds that $W = w^{F}$ and $F \in \mathcal{F}[W]$.

**Definition 6.5.6** (The monolithically-extended variant of indexed primitives). We call $\mathcal{P}'[\mathcal{W}']$ the monolithically-extended variant of $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}]$ if $\mathcal{P}'[\mathcal{W}']$ is a $w^{(\cdot)}$-restriction of $\mathcal{P}[\mathcal{W}]$ for the specific $w^{(\cdot)}$ that interprets its input $(x, C)$ as a pair where $C^{(\cdot)}$ is an oracle-aided circuit such that $w(x, C)$ executes and outputs $C^{(\cdot)}(x)$ by forwarding all of $C$’s oracle queries to its own oracle.

---

2Even in this case, we can imagine that we are running a circuit on another input and take the first bit of it as the predicate.
Remark 6.5.7. While one may define various other forms of extensions for a primitive where \( w \) is not necessarily a universal circuit, we will mostly be concerned with the monolithically-extended variants of primitives as defined above. As such, for the sake of brevity, whenever we refer to the extended variant of primitives we mean the monolithically-extended primitive (unless explicitly noted otherwise).

Remark 6.5.8 (Non-black-box relation between the universal and extended variants of \( \mathcal{P} \)). We emphasize that even though the universal variant \( \mathcal{P}'[w] \) and the extended variant \( \mathcal{P}'[\mathcal{W}] \) of \( \mathcal{P} \) are tightly related, they are indeed different cryptographic primitives according to the [RTV04] framework, simply because their input formats are different. However, one can get one from the other one in a non-black-box way. Moreover, when we are in a relativized world where an inefficient oracle \( O \) is available for free, \( \mathcal{P}'[\mathcal{W}] \) could also have planted \( O \) gates in its input circuit, while this is not allowed in the universal variant \( \mathcal{P}'[w] \) since \( w \) is not an oracle algorithm.

Case of witness encryption. Here we show how to derive the definition of extended witness encryption as a special case. First note that witness encryption’s decryption is indexed by an algorithm \( V(w,a) \) that could be any predicate function. In fact, it could be any function where we pick its first bit and interpret it as a predicate. So WE is indeed indexed by \( V \in \mathcal{V} \) which is the set of all predicates. Then, the standard definition of witness encryption for circuit satisfiability (which is the most powerful WE among them all) is simply the universal variant of this indexed primitive \( \text{WE}[\mathcal{V}] \), and the following will be exactly the definition of the (monolithically) extended variant of \( \text{WE}[\mathcal{V}] \), which we simply call extended WE.

Definition 6.5.9 (Extended Witness Encryption). Let \( V^{(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})}(w,a) \) be the ‘universal circuit-evaluator’ Turing machine, which is simply an algorithm with oracle access to subroutines \( (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) that interprets \( a \) as a circuit with possible \( (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \) gates and runs \( a \) on \( w \) and forwards any oracle calls made by \( a \) to its own oracle and forwards the answer back to the corresponding gate inside \( a \) to continue the execution. The extended witness encryption scheme (defined by \( V \)) consists of two PPT algorithms \( (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V) \) defined as follows:

- \( \text{Enc}(a,m,1^\kappa) : \) is a randomized algorithm that given an instance \( a \in \{0,1\}^* \) and a message \( m \in \{0,1\}^* \), and security parameter \( \kappa \) (and randomness as needed) outputs \( c \in \{0,1\}^* \).

- \( \text{Dec}_V(w,c) : \) given ciphertext \( c \) and “witness” string \( w \), it either outputs a message \( m \in \{0,1\}^* \) or \( \perp \).

- Correctness and security are defined similarly to Definition 2.6.1. But the key point is that here the relation \( V^{(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})} \) is somehow recursively depending on the \( (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec} = \text{Dec}_V) \) on smaller input lengths (and so it is well defined).

Definition 6.5.10 (Extended variants of other specific primitives). Extended variants for the following primitives are defined similarly to Definition 6.5.9 by allowing their special subroutine to be based on an oracle algorithm that is the universal circuit evaluator:
• For attribute-based or predicate encryption, we allow the predicate algorithm $P(k, a)$ to be an oracle algorithm that interprets $k$ as an oracle-aided circuit and runs $a$ on $k$.

• For FHE and Spooky encryption we allow the evaluation function $F(f, m_1, ..., m_t)$ to be an oracle algorithm that interprets $f$ as an oracle-aided circuit and runs $f$ on $(m_1, ..., m_t)$.

### 6.6 Monolithic Constructions

We are finally ready to define our monolithic framework. Here we assume that for a primitive $P$ we have already defined what its extended variant $\tilde{P}$ means.

**Definition 6.6.1** (Monolithic Constructions – General Case). Suppose $Q$ is a primitive and $\tilde{P}$ is the extended variant of the primitive $P$. Any fully black-box construction for $Q$ from $\tilde{P}$ (i.e. the extended variant of $P$) is called a monolithic construction of $Q$ from $P$.

**Examples.** Below are some examples of non-black-box constructions in cryptography that fall into the monolithic framework of Definition 6.6.1.

• Gentry’s bootstrapping construction [Gen09] plants FHE’s own decryption in a circuit for the evaluation subroutine. This trick falls into the monolithic framework since planting gates inside evaluation circuits is allowed.

• The construction of IO from functional encryption by [AJ15,BV15] uses the encryption oracle of the functional encryption scheme inside the functions for which decryption keys are issued. Again, such non-black-box technique does fall into our monolithic framework.

**Definition 6.6.2** (Formal Definition of Monolithic Constructions for Specific Primitives). Let $P$ be any of the following primitives: attribute, predicate, functional, or witness encryption, FHE, multi-key FHE, or spooky encryption. Then a monolithic construction using $P$ is defined by first defining the extended variant $\tilde{P}$ for primitive $P$ according to Definitions 6.5.9 and 6.5.10, then applying Definition 6.6.1 (which is based on previously defined notion of fully black-box constructions).

The following transitivity lemma (which is a direct corollary to the transitivity of fully black-box constructions) allows us to derive more impossibility results.

**Lemma 6.6.3** (Composing monolithic constructions). Suppose $P$, $Q$, $R$ are cryptographic primitives and $\tilde{Q}$, $\tilde{P}$ are special primitive and $\tilde{Q}$ is the extended version of $Q$. If there is a monolithic construction of $\tilde{Q}$ from $\tilde{P}$ and if there is a monolithic construction of $R$ from $Q$, then there is a monolithic construction of $R$ from $P$.
Proof. Since there is a monolithic construction of $\mathcal{R}$ from $\mathcal{Q}$, by Definition 6.6.1 it means that there exists a extended variant $\tilde{\mathcal{Q}}$ of $\mathcal{Q}$ such that there is a fully black-box construction of $\mathcal{R}$ from $\tilde{\mathcal{Q}}$. On the other hand, again by Definition 6.6.1, for any extended variant of $\mathcal{Q}$, and in particular $\tilde{\mathcal{Q}}$, there is a fully black-box construction of $\tilde{\mathcal{Q}}$ from some extended variant $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}$ of $\mathcal{P}$. Therefore, since fully-black-box constructions are transitive under nested compositions, there is a fully construction of $\mathcal{R}$ from $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}$ which (by Definition 6.6.1) means that we have a monolithic construction of $\mathcal{R}$ from $\mathcal{P}$. \qed

Getting more separations. A corollary of Lemma 6.6.3 is that if one proves: (a) There is no monolithic construction of $\mathcal{R}$ from $\mathcal{P}$ and (b) there is a monolithic construction of any extended variant $\tilde{\mathcal{R}}$ (of $\mathcal{R}$) from $\mathcal{Q}$, then these two together imply that: there is no monolithic construction of $\mathcal{Q}$ from $\mathcal{P}$. We will use this trick to derive our impossibility results from a core of two separations regarding variants of witness encryption.
Chapter 7

Monolithic Separation of IO from All-or-Nothing Encryption Primitives

7.1 Introduction

After clearly defining our new monolithic framework, we can finally begin to use it to prove our separations of IO from more expressive primitives. Specifically, the main result of this chapter proves that several powerful (so-called “all-or-nothing”) encryption primitives such as predicate encryption and fully-homomorphic encryption are incapable of producing IO via a monolithic construction as described in Chapter 6. A summary of our results is presented in Figure 7.1. More specifically, we prove the following theorem.

Theorem 7.1.1 (Main Result). Let \( P \) be one of the following primitives: fully-homomorphic encryption, attribute-based encryption, predicate encryption, multi-key fully homomorphic encryption, or spooky encryption. Then, assuming one-way functions exist and \( \text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM} \), there is no construction of IO from \( P \) in the monolithic model where one is allowed to plant \( P \) gates arbitrarily inside the circuits that are given to \( P \) as input.

All-or-nothing aspect. One common aspect of all of the primitives listed in Theorem 7.1.1 is that they have an all-or-nothing nature. Namely, either someone has the right key to decrypt a message, in which case they can retrieve all of the message, or if they do not have the right key then they are supposed to learn nothing. In contrast, in a functional encryption scheme (a primitive that does imply IO) one can obtain a key \( k_f \) for a function \( f \) that allows them to compute \( f(x) \) from a ciphertext \( c \) containing the plaintext \( x \). So, they could legitimately

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{WE} &\quad\text{HWE} &\quad\text{IO} \\
\text{Spooky Encryption} &\quad\text{Attribute-Based FHE} \\
\text{Multi-Key FHE} &\quad\text{FHE}
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 7.1: Summary of our witness encryption separation results.
learn only a “partial” information about \( x \). Even though we do not yet have a general result that handles such primitives uniformly in one shot, we still expect that other exotic encryption primitives (that may be developed in the future) that are of the all-or-nothing flavor will also not be enough for realizing IO. Additionally, we expect that our techniques will be useful in deriving impossibility results in such case.

**What does our results say about learning with errors (LWE)?** Even though our separations of Theorem 7.1.1 covers most of the powerful LWE-based primitives known to date, it does not imply whether or not we can actually base IO on LWE, which is considered a standard, and hence a desirable, assumption [Reg05]. In fact, our result only rules out specific paths from LWE toward IO that would go through either of the primitives listed in Theorem 7.1.1. Whether or not a direct construction from LWE to IO is possible still remains as a major open problem in this area.

**Key Role of Witness Encryption.** Witness encryption and its variations play a key role in the proof or our impossibility results. Specifically, we consider two (incompatible) variants of WE — namely, instance hiding witness encryption and homomorphic witness encryption. The first notion boosts the security of WE and hides the statement while the second enhances the functionality of WE with some homomorphic properties. We obtain our separation results in two steps. First, we show that neither of these two primitives imply IO in a monolithic way. Next, we show that these two primitives imply extended versions of all the all-or-nothing primitives listed above in a monolithic way. The final separations follow from a specific transitivity lemma that holds in the monolithic model.

As described above, to derive more separation lower bounds for IO, e.g., from a primitive \( Q \), we could define a “middle primitive” \( P \) and the following: (1) show that \( P \) does not imply IO in the monolithic model, and (2) show that there is a monolithic construction of the extended version of \( Q \) from \( P \). In this work we will use variants of WE to play the role of this middle primitive \( P \). Namely we will use the following two variants: (1) “instance-hiding” WE, and (2) “instance-revealing homomorphic” WE.\(^1\) Below we will discuss these notions in more details, but before doing that we shall point out that these two notions are incomparable strengthenings of the basic notion of witness encryption. The first one strengthens witness encryption in terms of security (which is essential for achieving predicate encryption) while the latter strengthening is in terms of functionality (which is essential for achieving full-homomorphic encryption and its variants). These two notions are incomparable and in fact strengthen the standard notion of witness encryption in somewhat incomparable ways. As a side remark, we note that strengthening witness encryption to incorporate instance hiding property precludes us from also having compact homomorphism along with. Therefore, we need to consider these two primitives separately. Furthermore, showing that obfuscation is

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\(^1\)In fact, to be able to use these primitives to derive other primitives we will need these WE variants to have some “extractability” properties as well. However, in this technical overview we will not focus on that aspect and will describe only the main ideas through the simpler (non-extractable) versions of these primitives.
not possible from either of them poses different technical challenges.

In the following we will first focus on the simpler and basic case of separating IO from WE. This will allow us to communicate some basic tools that we use from previous work and also discuss some of our new ideas, and then we will turn into the specific variants of WE that we mentioned and explain the new ideas that each case requires. However, we first quickly recap the recent developments in previous work that provides us with a recipe of how to prove fully black-box lower bounds for IO. As we discussed above, that framework could still be used by us to prove lower bounds for IO in the monolithic model, but we have to do so with respect to the stronger variants of our primitives of interest (e.g., WE).

### 7.1.1 Known Recipe for Proving Lower-bounds for IO

Using the techniques and results of Section 5.4 we can arrive at the following (informally stated) lemma which provides us with an abstract method for proving fully black-box (and monolithic) lower bounds for IO.

**Lemma 7.1.2** (Proving Lower Bounds for IO (Informal)). *Suppose \( \mathcal{I} \) is an idealized oracle and suppose we can “compile out” \( \mathcal{I} \) from any IO construction in a world where \( \mathcal{I} \) is accessible to get an IO scheme in the plain model where the new scheme is only approximately correct: it computes the correct answer only over \( \frac{99}{100} \) fraction of the input. Also suppose primitive \( \mathcal{P} \) can be securely implemented in the randomized model \( \mathcal{I} \). Then there is no fully black-box construction of IO from \( \mathcal{P} \).*

See Section 7.2.1 (particularly Lemma 7.2.7 there) for details on how to derive this lemma in conjunction with previous works. Below we discuss how we apply this approach to the case of variants of witness encryption.

### 7.1.2 Warm-Up: The Basic Case of Witness Encryption

To separate IO from the *extended* variant of WE (i.e., separating IO from WE in the monolithic model) we can try to apply Lemma 7.1.2 and prove a fully black-box separation for IO from the *extended* variant of WE. Suppose \( \mathcal{V} \) is the oracle universal circuit algorithm that defines the witness verification of the *extended* WE primitive we would like to separate from IO. As a first try, let see what happens if we try to use the following simple idealized oracle to implement this extended WE primitive.

**The Idealized WE Oracle \( \mathcal{I} \).** We use a random injective oracle \( \text{Enc}(a, m) \mapsto c \) to encrypt any message \( m \) under the attribute-instance \( a \). The other oracle subroutine \( \text{Dec}_\mathcal{V}(w, c) \) does the decryption with respect to \( \mathcal{V} \) as follows:

1. If \( \nexists \ x \) such that \( \text{Enc}(x) = c \), output \( \bot \). Otherwise:
2. Find \( x \) such that \( \text{Enc}(x) = c \) and parse it as \( x = (a, m) \).
3. If $V^{\Theta}(w, a) = 0$ output $\bot$. (Note that this step might need launching some recursive oracle calls.) Otherwise, output $m$.

Now our goal is two-fold: showing that this oracle indeed gives us a secure implementation of the extended WE primitive (defined by relation $V$) and that the oracle $I$ can be securely compiled out of any IO construction (while keeping the approximate correctness). Proving that this oracle gives us a secure extended WE, while requiring an analysis that is quite involved, is often safe to believe is true due to the ideal nature of $I$. Thus, the challenge lies in the second goal of proving that we can compile out $I$ from an IO scheme while preserving correctness, and so we will discuss this in more detail.

**Trying to Compile out $I$ from any IO scheme $IO^I$.** Let $IO^I$ be an obfuscation in some idealized model $I$ that implements the extended WE primitive. As mentioned above, one of our main tasks is to “compile-out” the oracle from an ideal model secure obfuscator to get an approximate plain-model obfuscator $IO'$ that is also secure. To do so we use the ideas introduced in [CKP15] and those developed in Chapter 4 which is based on learning the “heavy queries” asked by the obfuscated code to the oracle and hard-coding them into the obfuscated code in the plain model.\(^2\) Specifically, the new plain-model obfuscator $IO'$, given a circuit $C$ to obfuscate would work in two steps. The first step of $IO'$ is to emulate $IO^I(C)$ to get an ideal-model obfuscation $B$, making sure to lazily evaluate (i.e., emulate) any queries issued to $I$. The second step of $IO'$ is to learn the queries that are “likely” to be asked by $B^I(x)$ for a random input $x$. We do this by executing $B^I(x_i)$ (while we emulate the queries to $I$ consistently) enough number of times for different $x_i$ in an effort to learn all the highly probable queries, which we denote by $Q_B$. The output of $IO'$ is the plain-model obfuscation $B' = (B, Q_B)$, where $B$ is the ideal-model obfuscation and $Q_B$ is the set of learned queries. To evaluate the obfuscation over a new random input $x$, we simply execute $B'(x) = B^I(x)$ while emulating any queries to $I$ consistently relative to $Q_B$.

**Security of compiler: only include simulatable information in $B'$.** The security of the new plain-model obfuscator crucially depends on whether the queries $Q_B$ that we publish are simulatable. In other words, we want to prove that if the adversary $A$ against this new plain-model does not gain any additional advantage because these queries can be simulated by having $A$ itself run $B^I(x_i)$ several times. As a result, we will only put queries in $Q_B$ (forwarded to be part of the plain-model obfuscator) where these queries could be obtained by the adversary as well. Doing so allows us to immediately reduce the security to that of the ideal-model obfuscation. It is therefore important to release only those queries that can be simulated to ensure security is preserved (for example, we cannot publish the queries asked during the emulation in step 1 as they are not simulatable).

The other task we will have is to prove the approximate correctness of the new model, which informally states that an execution $B'(x)$ should be correct with high probability.

\(^2\)Note that this compiling out process is not independent of the oracle being removed since different oracles may require different approaches to be emulated. However, the general high-level idea is the same.
over $x$. Note that unless we ask an unlearned query to $\mathcal{I}$ that was previously asked by some hidden part of the emulation process (e.g. during step 1), the execution should be statistically distributed to an ideal execution of $B'(x)$ where the queries are not emulated but answered using a real oracle. In fact if the oracle $\mathcal{I}$ did not involve any “internal/hidden” query asked by $\mathcal{V}$, we could use the arguments given in Chapter 4 to show that the probability that we ask an unlearned hidden query occurs with sufficiently small probability.

**Main challenge for proving the correctness** A subtle, but extremely important point here that prevents us from proving the approximate correct is that when we run a decryption query of the form $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ in the actual ideal model, we will not see what queries the verifier $\mathcal{V}$ asks from the oracle itself. That is the reason that we call any such query a “hidden” or “indirect” query (in eyes of the person asking the query $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ in the ideal model). Therefore, for sake of security we are not allowed to provide this information to the final plain-model obfuscated code, even though we have emulated all of these oracle query/answers from the beginning on our own! This is exactly the reason that the approximate correctness of the final plain-model obfuscated code $B'$ could be risked, because we might no longer be able to continue emulating the oracle consistently while executing $B'(x)$ on a random point $x$.

**Resolving the challenge.** The way we handle the above issue of finding the heavy queries, even if they are of the hidden/indirect type is as follows. We will make them to be clear! We will do so through a new subroutine in the oracle that will always reveal the instance/attribute $a$ inside a plaintext $c$. Namely, we add the following subroutine to $\mathcal{I}$:

- $\text{Rev}(c)$: given ciphertext $c$ outputs $a$ for which $\text{Enc}(a, m) = c$.

Now, we can pretend that any algorithm who wants to call a decryption query of the form $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ to our oracle, it will first obtain the relevant instance/attribute $a = \text{Rev}(c)$, run the verifier $\mathcal{V}(a, m)$ on its own, and if the test passes $\mathcal{V}(a, m) = 1$ the algorithm will indeed ask the query $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$. This is a simple “canonicalization” of the algorithms in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$, however this will be enough to guarantee that no internal/indirect query asked by $\mathcal{V}$ during the computation of $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ remains hidden! In other words, by running the obfuscated code on enough number of random points, we will be able to discover all the heavy queries that are needed for a successful execution of the new obfuscated code in the plain model.

We shall finally emphasize that the above trick of adding a new subroutine $\text{Rev}(c)$ does not violate the security of (extended) WE relative to our oracle $\mathcal{I}$.

**7.1.3 Separating IO from Instance-Hiding WE**

To derive our separations for primitives such as predicate encryption, we will first separate IO from a variant of WE which we call “instance hiding” WE, and we also show that this
primitive is strong enough to imply (even extended) PE in a monolithic way.\footnote{To be more formal, we need this \textit{primitive} to be “extractable” \textit{instance hiding} WE, but for sake of simplicity we defer the \textit{extractability} issue to the later sections where we define everything formally.} An instance hiding WE is a variant of WE where two ciphertexts $\text{Enc}(a_0, m_0) = c_0, \text{Enc}(a_1, m_1) = c_1$ that hide \textit{different} instance/attributes $a_0 \neq a_1$ are indistinguishable so long as there is no witness that satisfies either of these instances; namely $V(a_b, w) = 0$ for all $w$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$ (see Definition 2.6.3). The reason that we will need such variant of WE for constructing PE is that PE itself has the same nature and different ciphertexts under unsatisfiable attributes should remain indistinguishable.

**Challenge:** \textbf{we cannot have Rev(·) as part of oracle.} It becomes immediately clear that we cannot use the same oracle of the previous section (for the case of basic WE) to prove our separation for IHWE anymore. The reason is that the subroutine $\text{Rev}(c) = a$ clearly destroys the instance hiding property that we want to keep!

**Idea: revealing attribute \textit{a} conditionally, at decryption time.** The new idea that we will introduce in for the case of IHWE is that we will still “weaken” the security (towards helping the discovery of the hidden queries asked by $V(w, a)$ for a decryption oracle query). However, we will do so in a conditional way so that it will not contradict the instance hiding property. Namely, we will only reveal $a$ if the decryption succeeds. More formally, we will use the following decryption subroutine. $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ does the decryption with respect to $V$ as follows:

1. If \( \not\exists \ x \) such that $\text{Enc}(x) = c$, output $\perp$. Otherwise:

2. Find $x$ such that $\text{Enc}(x) = c$ and parse it as $x = (a, m)$.

3. If $V^\Theta(w, a) = 0$ output $\perp$. (Note that this step might launch some recursive oracle calls.) Otherwise, output both of $(a, m)$.

Note that the above modified way of decryption ciphertexts will \textit{not} interfere with the instance hiding property of the scheme. However, it will be hugely important for us to still be able to discover the heavy queries of the obfuscated code in the idealized model (and so we can still compile out the idealized oracle from any IO construction). Unfortunately, we are not able to discover all the hidden/internal queries of a decryption query immediately, but we can do so only conditionally. Specifically, whenever the obfuscated circuit calls a decryption query $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ and the underlying message $x$ is successfully decrypted, the obfuscated circuit can now run $V^\Theta(w, a) = 1$ to reveal the queries asked. This can be thought of as a weaker form of canonicalization of the code of the verifier that still \textit{sometimes} reveals the hidden parts of the oracle computation. That is because, it is possible that the decryption fails, in which case we may have some hidden queries $Q_V$ asked by an underlying $V^\Theta(w, a) = 0$ that cannot be revealed or learned. Nonetheless, we show using a careful argument that by doing enough rounds of learning (over random inputs) and “opening up” the internal hidden
parts of the verification queries as much as possible, we will still get enough information to run the final (plain model) obfuscated code $B'$ with approximate correctness close to 1. We refer the reader to the next sections for formal proofs.

### 7.1.4 Separating IO from Homomorphic WE

For obtaining our separations for IO from the set of “homomorphic” primitives listed in Theorem 7.1.1 we will employ a “middle” primitive called “homomorphic (instance revealing) witness encryption”. Roughly speaking, this primitive allows homomorphic operations over the ciphertexts that are encrypted under the same attribute/instance. However, it is possible to always extract this attribute efficiently (this is exactly how we modified the witness encryption in our basic case to be able to prove the separation from IO). In other words, we will need an extra functionality over the instance revealing WE as described in previous section.

**New challenge: homomorphic queries.** Due to the fact that we are still working with an instance revealing form of WE, this simplifies our job and we will not fall into the challenges that we faced for the case of Instance-hiding WE. However, we will have a new challenge: we need to find the heavy queries that are asked during the evaluation procedure! This is something that did not exist in the basic and instance hiding versions of WE. In Section 7.5 we will show that, essentially, the same learning procedure will allow us to learn enough information to simulate the last final (real) execution of the obfuscated code on a given input. In particular, for an evaluation query $\text{Eval}_F(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ that computes some homomorphic evaluation $F(m_1, \ldots, m_k)$ over the plaintexts inside $(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$, there are two cases: either we already have learned the messages $m_1, \ldots, m_k$ in which case we can also run the algorithm $F(m_1, \ldots, m_k)$, but we do not know any of these messages, we will simply generate a random answer and use it to emulate the answer to the homomorphic operation. A careful analysis is needed to prove that this in fact leads to an approximately correct execution of the code in the plain model.

### 7.1.5 Primitives Implied by Our Variants of WE

We now describe our ideas on how the previously described variants of WE can be used to imply extended PE and extended FHE. Building on similar principles we can also obtain extended spooky encryption and extended attribute-based FHE. In realizing these primitives we use the extended and extractable versions of these variants of WE. The constructions are based on ideas developed to demonstrate how WE [GGSW13] and extractable WE [BCP14, ABG⁺13] can be used to construct various exotic cryptographic primitives.
Getting Extended PE from Instance Hiding WE

We start by showing how instance-hiding WE implies extended selectively-secure PE for the predicate $P(k, a)$ where $k \in K$ and $a \in A$. The idea is straightforward. A secret key for a string $k$ is just a signature on it and a ciphertext encrypting a message $x = (a, m)$ is an (instance hiding) witness encryption with respect to the attribute $C$ that represents a Boolean circuit for verifying the signature and checking that $P(k, a) = 1$.

To decrypt the ciphertext, we use the decryption of the (instance hiding) witness encryption that takes as input the signature $sk_k$ (acting as a key for the string $k$) and outputs $m$ if $C(k, sk_k, a) = 1$. Security of this construction follows directly from the security of the extractable instance-hiding witness encryption scheme and the existential unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme. More specifically, by security of witness encryption we have that any adversary distinguishing witness encryption ciphertexts can be used to recover a witness which our case serves as an existential forger. Note that $P$ is allowed to have gates of the PE subroutines planted in them. In the main body, we argue that the above described construction supports this.

Getting Extended FHE from Homomorphic WE

Realizing extended FHE from instance-revealing homomorphic witness encryption is essential the same as the Garg et al. [GGSW13] construction of public-key encryption from WE and PRG. The public-key for the FHE is just the output $PK = G(s)$ of a PRG $G$ on input a seed $s$ and ciphertext is just a witness encryption ciphertext encrypting $m$ for $V$ where $V(w, CP_K) = 1$ if and only if $CP_K(w) = 1$ where $CP_K(w)$ checks if $PK = G(w)$, outputs 1 if it is the case and 0 otherwise. Now by the homomorphic property of the witness encryption this new encryption scheme is also homomorphic. On the other hand, security follows directly from the security of the PRG and the WE scheme. Note that the evaluation procedure of the homomorphic encryption scheme is allowed to have gates of its subroutines planted in it. In the main body, we argue that the above described construction supports this.

7.2 Approach for Proving Lower Bounds on IO

In this section we provide a general approach for proving lower bounds on IO schemes under a given idealized model. We develop this approach based on the techniques used in Chapter 4 where we proved the impossibility of VBB obfuscation under different idealized models and Section 5.4 where we showed how to prove fully black-box separations of IO using [BBF16]. The abstract blueprint outlined here will later be applied and instantiated in different ways during the subsequent chapters when we prove IO separation results from various primitives. Each application of this approach offers unique challenges that depends on the underlying primitive that we would want to separate IO from, and we will address these challenges in their respective upcoming chapters.

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4Details on strengthening the result to full-security have been postponed to the main body.
7.2.1 General Approach

Our techniques that we will develop for proving separations for IO rely on the process of “compiling out” an idealized oracle $I$ from an IO construction. Suppose that we can indeed remove the oracle from the obfuscator in a manner similar to how we did in Chapter 4. Since we know that statistically secure IO does not exist in the plain model [GR07] this indicates that perhaps we can compose the two steps and get a query-efficient attacker against IO in the idealized model $I$. The more accurate line of argument is more subtle and needs to work with approximately correct IO and uses a recent result of Brakerski, Brzuska, and Fleischhacker [BBF16] who ruled out the existence of statistically secure approximate IO.

To formalize the notion of “compiling out” an oracle in more than one step we need to formalize the intuitive notion of sub oracles in the idealized/randomized context.

**Definition 7.2.1** (Sub-models). We call the idealized model/oracle $O$ a sub-model of the idealized oracle $I$ with subroutines $(I_1, \ldots, I_k)$, denoted by $O \subset I$, if there is a (possibly empty) $S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, k\}$ such that the idealized oracle $O$ is sampled as follows:

- First sample $I \leftarrow I$ where the subroutines are $I = (I_1, \ldots, I_k)$.
- Then provide access to subroutine $I_i$ if and only if $i \in S$ (and hide the rest of the subroutines from being called).

If $S = \emptyset$ then the oracle $O$ will be empty and we will be back to the plain model.

**Definition 7.2.2** (Simulatable Compiling Out Procedures for IO). Suppose $O \subset I$. We say that there is a simulatable compiler from IO in idealized model $I$ into idealized model $O$ with correctness error $\epsilon$ if the following holds. For every implementation $P_I = (iO_I, Ev_P)$ of $\delta$-approximate IO in idealized model $I$ there is an implementation $P_O = (iO_O, Ev_O)$ of $(\delta + \epsilon)$-approximate IO in idealized model $O$ such that the only security requirement for these two implementations is that they are related as follows:

- Simulation: There is an efficient PPT simulator $S$ and a negligible function $\mu(\cdot)$ such that for any $C$:
  \[ \Delta(S(iO^I(1^\kappa, C)), iO^O(1^\kappa, C)) \leq \mu(\kappa) \]

  where $\Delta(\cdot, \cdot)$ denotes the statistical distance between random variables.

The above definition generalizes the VBB simulatability requirement that a compiler possessed in Theorem 4.4.5 to the setting of IO. It is easy to see that the existence of the simulator according to Definition 7.2.2 implies that $P_O$ in idealized model $O$ is “as secure as” $P_I$ in the idealized model $I$ since a compiler that guarantees such a simulation property would also imply indistinguishability security for the case of IO. Namely, any oracle-mixed attacker against the implementation $P_O$ in model $O$ with advantage $\delta$ (over an infinite sequence of security parameters) could be turned into an attacker against $P_I$ in model $I$ that breaks against $P_I$ with advantage $\delta - \text{negl}(\kappa)$ over an infinite sequence of security parameters.
parameters. Therefore one can compose the compiling out procedures for a constant number of steps (but not more, because there is a polynomial blow up in the parameters in each step).

By composing a constant number of compilers and relying on the recent result of Brakerski, Brzuska, and Fleischhacker [BBF16] one can get a general method of breaking IO in idealized models. We first state the result of [BBF16].

**Theorem 7.2.3** (Impossibility of Approximate Statistically-secure IO [BBF16]). Suppose one-way functions exist, \( \text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM} \), and \( \delta, \epsilon : \mathbb{N} \mapsto [0, 1] \) are such that \( 2\epsilon(\kappa) + 3\delta(\kappa) < 1 - \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\kappa)} \). Then there is no \((\epsilon, \delta)\)-approximate statistically-secure CIO (see Definition 2.5.4) for all poly-size circuits.

The above theorem implies that if we get any implementation for IO in the plain model that is \( \frac{1}{100} \)-approximately correct, then there is a computationally unbounded adversary that breaks the statistical security of IO with advantage at least \( \frac{1}{100} \) over an infinite sequence of security parameters. Using this result, the following lemma shows a way to obtain attacks against IO in idealized models.

**Lemma 7.2.4** (Attacking IO Using Nested Oracle Compilers). Suppose \( \emptyset = \mathcal{I}_0 \sqsubseteq \mathcal{I}_1 \cdots \sqsubseteq \mathcal{I}_k = \mathcal{I} \) for constant \( k = O(1) \) are a sequence of idealized models. Suppose for every \( i \in [k] \) there is a simulatable compiler for IO in model \( \mathcal{I}_i \) into model \( \mathcal{I}_{i-1} \) with correctness error \( \epsilon_i < 1/(100k) \). Then, assuming one-way functions exist, \( \text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM} \), any implementation \( P \) of IO in the idealized model \( \mathcal{I} \) could be oracle-mixed broken by a polynomial-query adversary \( A \) with a constant advantage \( \delta > 1/100 \) for an infinite sequence of security parameters.

**Proof.** Starting with our initial ideal-model construction \( P_{\mathcal{I}} = P_{\mathcal{I}_k} \), we iteratively apply the simulatable compiler to get \( P_{\mathcal{I}_{i-1}} \) from \( P_{\mathcal{I}_i} \) for \( i = \{ k, \ldots, 1 \} \). Note that the final correctness error that we get is \( \epsilon_{\mathcal{I}_0} < k/(100k) < 1/100 \), and thus by Theorem 5.4.3 there exists a computationally unbounded attacker \( A_{\mathcal{I}_0} \) against \( P_{\mathcal{I}_0} \) with constant advantage \( \delta \). Now, let \( S_i \) be the PPT simulator whose existence is guaranteed by Definition 7.2.2 for the compiler that transforms \( P_{\mathcal{I}_i} \) into \( P_{\mathcal{I}_{i-1}} \). We inductively construct an adversary \( A_{\mathcal{I}_i} \) against \( P_{\mathcal{I}_i} \) from an adversary \( A_{\mathcal{I}_{i-1}} \) for \( P_{\mathcal{I}_{i-1}} \), starting with \( A_{\mathcal{I}_0} \). The construction of \( A_{\mathcal{I}_i} \) simply takes its input obfuscation in the \( \mathcal{I}_i \) ideal-model \( \text{iO}^{\mathcal{I}_i} \), runs \( S_i(\text{iO}^{\mathcal{I}_i}) \) and feeds the result to \( A_{\mathcal{I}_{i-1}} \) to get its output. Note that, after constant number \( k \), we still get \( \delta' < \delta - k \text{negl}(\kappa) \) a constant advantage over infinite sequence of security parameters against \( P_{\mathcal{I}_k} \). \(\square\)

Using a variant of the Borel–Cantelli lemma, we can in fact prove that oracle-mixed attacks with constant advantage lead to breaking oracle-fixed constructions.

**Lemma 7.2.5.** If there is an algorithm \( A \) that oracle-mixed breaks a construction \( P^\mathcal{I} \) of \( \mathcal{P} \) in idealized model \( \mathcal{I} \) with advantage \( \epsilon(\kappa) \geq \Omega(1) \) for an infinite sequence of security parameters, then the same attacker \( A \) oracle-fixed breaks the same construction \( P^\mathcal{I} \) over a (perhaps more sparse but still) infinite sequence of security parameters.
**Proof.** Let \( A \) be an oracle mixed attacker against \( \mathcal{P} \) in the idealized model \( \mathcal{I} \) with advantage \( \epsilon(\kappa) \) and define \( E_{A,\kappa}^{\mathcal{P}} \) to be the event that \( A \) succeeds in breaking security of \( \mathcal{P} \) over security parameter \( \kappa \). Then we have that for infinitely many security parameters \( \kappa \):

\[
\Pr_{A,I}^{\mathcal{P}}[E_{A,\kappa}^{\mathcal{P}}] \geq \epsilon(\kappa)
\]

Note that since this is an oracle-mixed attacker, the probability is over the randomness of the adversary, the experiment and the oracle \( I \). Now define functions \( \epsilon' \) and \( \epsilon'' \) such that \( \epsilon'' = \epsilon - \epsilon' \geq \Omega(1) \). Then, by an averaging argument we get the following:

\[
\Pr_{I}^{A}[\Pr_{A,I}^{\mathcal{P}}[E_{A,\kappa}^{\mathcal{P}}] \geq \epsilon'(\kappa)] \geq \epsilon''(\kappa)
\]

Let \( D_i \) be the event that \( \Pr_{A,I}^{\mathcal{P}}[E_{A,\kappa}^{\mathcal{P}}] \geq \epsilon' \). From the above we can see that \( \Pr_{I}^{A}[D_i] \geq \epsilon''(\kappa) \) for every \( i \in \mathbb{N} \). Now, since \( \epsilon''(\kappa) \geq \Omega(1) \), by Lemma 2.2.2 we can conclude that with probability \( \epsilon''(\kappa) \) over the choice of \( \mathcal{I}, D_i \) happens for infinitely many \( i \). Thus, since there exists non-zero (in fact, constant) measure of oracles that \( A \) can break successfully over infinitely many security parameters, we can fix any oracle out of those that \( A \) can break thus yielding an oracle-fixed attack on \( \mathcal{P} \).

The reader may notice that the above lemma has already been implicitly used (and independently proven) in Section 5.4 for the case that \( \mathcal{P} \) is the IO primitive. Indeed Lemma 7.2.5 generalizes this to any primitive and states that such a reduction is independent of the primitive and relies only on the advantage of the attacker.

The next lemma follows as a direct corollary to Lemmas 3.1.8 and 7.2.5, and implies that it suffices to provide a “good” oracle-mixed attacker against \( \mathcal{Q} \) in ideal model \( \mathcal{I} \) in order to show a separation of \( \mathcal{Q} \) from any \( \mathcal{P} \) that exists relative to \( \mathcal{I} \).

**Lemma 7.2.6 (Separation Using Idealized Models).** Suppose \( \mathcal{I} \) is an idealized model, and the following conditions are satisfied:

- **Proving oracle-fixed security of \( \mathcal{P} \).** There is an oracle fixed black-box construction of \( \mathcal{P} \) relative to \( \mathcal{I} \).

- **Breaking oracle-mixed security of \( \mathcal{Q} \) with \( \Omega(1) \) advantage.** For any construction \( Q^{\mathcal{P}} \) of \( \mathcal{Q} \) relative to \( \mathcal{I} \) there is a computationally-unbounded query-efficient attacker \( A \) (whose query complexity is bounded by the level of security demanded by \( \mathcal{P} \)) such that for an infinite sequence of security parameters \( \kappa_1 < \kappa_2 < \ldots \) the advantage of \( A \) in oracle-mixed breaking \( Q^{\mathcal{I}} \) is at least \( \epsilon(\kappa_i) \geq \Omega(1) \).

Then there is no fully black-box construction for \( \mathcal{Q} \) from \( \mathcal{P} \).

Finally, by putting Lemma 7.2.4 and 7.2.6 together we get a lemma for proving black-box lower bounds for IO.
Lemma 7.2.7 (Lower Bounds for IO using Oracle Compilers). Suppose $\varnothing = \mathcal{I}_0 \sqsubseteq \mathcal{I}_1 \cdots \sqsubseteq \mathcal{I}_k = \mathcal{I}$ for constant $k = O(1)$ are a sequence of idealized models. Suppose for every $i \in [k]$ there is a simulatable compiler for IO in model $\mathcal{I}_i$ into model $\mathcal{I}_{i-1}$ with correctness error $\epsilon_i < 1/(100k)$. If primitive $\mathcal{P}$ can be oracle-fixed constructed in the idealized model $\mathcal{I}$, then there is no fully black-box construction of IO from $\mathcal{P}$.

We will indeed use Lemma 7.2.7 to derive lower bounds for IO even in the monolithic model by relating such constructions to fully black-box constructions.

7.3 Separating IO from Instance Revealing Witness Encryption

In this section, we formally prove our first main separation theorem which states that there is no monolithic construction of IO from WE (under believable assumptions). It equivalently means that there will be no fully black-box construction of indistinguishability obfuscation from extended witness encryption scheme.

Theorem 7.3.1. Assume the existence of one-way functions and that $\text{NP} \nsubseteq \text{coAM}$. Then there exists no monolithic construction of indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) from witness encryption (WE).

In fact, we prove a stronger result by showing a separation of IO from a stronger (extended) version of witness encryption, which we call extractable instance-revealing witness encryption. Looking ahead, we require the extractability property to construct (extended) attribute-based encryption (ABE) from this form of witness encryption. By using Lemma 6.6.3, this would also imply a separation of IO from extended ABE.

Definition 7.3.2 (Extended Extractable Instance-Revealing Witness Encryption (ex-EIRWE)). Let $V$ be a universal circuit-evaluator Turing machine as defined in Definition 6.5.9. For any given security parameter $\kappa$, an extended extractable instance-revealing witness encryption scheme consists of three PPT algorithms $P = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec})$ defined as follows:

- $\text{Enc}(a, m, 1^\kappa)$: given an instance $a \in \{0,1\}^*$ and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and security parameter $\kappa$ (and randomness as needed) it outputs $c \in \{0,1\}^*$.
- $\text{Rev}(c)$: given ciphertext $c$ outputs $a \in \{0,1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$.
- $\text{Dec}(w, c)$: given ciphertext $c$ and “witness” string $w$, it outputs a message $m' \in \{0,1\}^*$.

An extended extractable instance-revealing witness encryption scheme satisfies the following completeness and security properties:

- **Decryption Correctness**: For any security parameter $\kappa$, any $(w, a)$ such that $V^P(w, a) = 1$, and any $m$ it holds that
  $$\Pr_{\text{Enc,Dec}}[\text{Dec}(w, \text{Enc}(a, m, 1^\kappa)) = m] = 1$$
• **Instance-Revealing Correctness**: For any security parameter \( \kappa \) and any \((a, m)\) it holds that:

\[
\Pr_{\text{Enc,Rev}}[\text{Rev(Enc}(a, m, 1^\kappa)) = a] = 1
\]

Furthermore, for any \( c \) for which there is no \( a, m, \kappa \) such that \( \text{Enc}(a, m, 1^\kappa) = c \) it holds that \( \text{Rev}(c) = \perp \).

• **Extractability**: For any PPT adversary \( A \) and polynomial \( p_1(.) \), there exists a PPT (black-box) straight-line extractor \( E \) and a polynomial function \( p_2(.) \) such that the following holds. For any security parameter \( \kappa \), for all \( a \in \{0, 1\}^* \), and any \( m_0 \neq m_1 \) of the same length \( |m_0| = |m_1| \), if:

\[
\Pr[A(1^\kappa, c) = b \mid b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a, m_b, 1^\kappa)] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{p_1(\kappa)}
\]

Then:

\[
\Pr[E^A(a) = w \land V^P(w, a) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{p_2(\kappa)}
\]

Given the above definition of ex-EIRWE, we prove the following theorem, which states that there is no fully black-box construction IO from extended EIRWE.

**Theorem 7.3.3.** Assume the existence of one-way functions and that \( \text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM} \). Then there exists no monolithic construction of indistinguishability obfuscation from extractable instance-revealing witness encryption.

Since extended EIRWE implies witness encryption as defined in Definition 2.6.1, Theorem 7.3.1 trivially follows from Theorem 7.3.3, and thus for the remainder of this section we will focus on proving Theorem 7.3.3.

### 7.3.1 Overview of Proof Techniques

To prove Theorem 7.3.3, we will apply Lemma 7.2.7 for the idealized extended IRWE model \( \Theta \) (formally defined in Section 7.3.2) to prove that there is no black-box construction of IO from any primitive \( \mathcal{P} \) that can be oracle-fixed constructed (see Definition 3.1.4) from \( \Theta \). In particular, we will do so for \( \mathcal{P} \) that is the extended EIRWE primitive. Our task is thus twofold: (1) to prove that \( \mathcal{P} \) can be oracle-fixed constructed from \( \Theta \) and (2) to show a simulatable compilation procedure that compiles out \( \Theta \) from any IO construction. The first task is proven in Section 7.3.3 and the second task is proven in Section 7.3.4. By Lemma 7.2.7, this would imply the separation result of IO from \( \mathcal{P} \) and prove Theorem 7.3.3.

Our oracle, which is more formally defined in Section 7.3.2, resembles an idealized version of a witness encryption scheme, which makes the construction of extended EIRWE straightforward. As a result, the main challenge lies in showing a simulatable compilation procedure for IO that satisfies Definition 7.2.2 in this idealized model.
7.3.2 The Ideal Model

In this section, we define the distribution of our ideal randomized oracle.

Definition 7.3.4 (Random Instance-revealing Witness Encryption Oracle). Let $V$ be a universal circuit-evaluator Turing machine (as defined in Definition 2.1.1) that takes as input $(w, x)$ where $x = (a, m) \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and outputs $b \in \{0, 1\}$. We define the following random instance-revealing witness encryption (rIRWE) oracle $\Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V)$ as follows. We specify the sub-oracle $\Theta_n$ whose inputs are parameterized by $n$, and the actual oracle will be $\Theta = \{\Theta_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$.

- **Enc**: $\{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ is a random injective function.
- **Rev**: $\{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^* \cup \perp$ is a function that, given an input $c \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$, would output the corresponding attribute $a$ for which $\text{Enc}(a, m) = c$. If there is no such attribute then it outputs $\perp$ instead.
- **Dec$_V$**: $\{0, 1\}^s \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n \cup \{\perp\}$: Given $(w, c) \in \{0, 1\}^s$, $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ allows us to decrypt the ciphertext $c$ and get $x = (a, m)$ as long as the predicate test is satisfied on $(w, a)$. More formally, do as follow:
  
  1. If $\nexists x$ such that $\text{Enc}(x) = c$, output $\perp$. Otherwise, continue to the next step.
  2. Find $x$ such that $\text{Enc}(x) = c$.
  3. If $V^{\Theta}(w, a) = 0$ output $\perp$. Otherwise, output $x = (a, m)$.

We define a query-answer pair resulting from query $q$ to subroutine $T \in \{\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Rev}\}$ with some answer $\beta$ as $(q \mapsto \beta)_T$. The oracle $\Theta$ provides the subroutines for all inputs lengths but, for simplicity, and when $n$ is clear from the context, we use $\Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V)$ to refer to $\Theta_n$ for a fixed $n$.

Remark 7.3.5. We note that since $V$ is a universal circuit-evaluator, the number of queries that it will ask (when we recursively unwrap all internal queries to Dec) is at most a polynomial. This is due to the fact that the sizes of the queries that $V$ asks will be strictly less than the size of the inputs to $V$. In that respect, we say that $V$ has the property of being extended poly-query.

7.3.3 Witness Encryption exists relative to $\Theta$

In this section, we show how to construct a semantically-secure extended extractable IRWE for universal circuit-evaluator $V$ relative to $\Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V)$. More formally, we will prove the following lemma.

Lemma 7.3.6. There exists a correct and subexponentially-secure oracle-fixed implementation (Definition 3.1.4) of extended extractable instance-revealing witness encryption in the ideal $\Theta$ oracle model.
We will in fact show how to construct a primitive (in the Θ oracle model) that is simpler to prove the existence of and for which we argue that it is sufficient to get the desired primitive of EIRWE. We give the definition of that primitive followed by a construction.

**Definition 7.3.7** (Extended Extractable One-way Witness Encryption (ex-EOWE)). Let \( V \) be a universal circuit-evaluator Turing machine (as defined in Definition 6.5.9) that takes an instance \( a \) and witness \( w \) and outputs a bit \( b \in \{0,1\} \). For any given security parameter \( \kappa \), an extended extractable one-way witness encryption scheme for \( V \) consists of the following PPT algorithms \( P = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V) \) defined as follows:

- \( \text{Enc}(a,m,1^\kappa) \): given an instance \( a \in \{0,1\}^* \), message \( m \in \{0,1\}^* \), and security parameter \( \kappa \) (and randomness as needed) it outputs \( c \in \{0,1\}^* \).
- \( \text{Rev}(c) \): given ciphertext \( c \) returns the underlying attribute \( a \in \{0,1\}^* \).
- \( \text{Dec}_V(w,c) \): given ciphertext \( c \) and “witness” string \( w \), it outputs a message \( m' \in \{0,1\}^* \).

An extended extractable one-way witness encryption scheme satisfies the same correctness properties as Definition 7.3.2 but the extractability property is replaced with the following:

- **Extractable One-Wayness:** For any PPT adversary \( A \) and polynomial \( p_1(.) \), there exists a PPT (black-box) straight-line extractor \( E \) and a polynomial function \( p_2(.) \) such that the following holds. For any security parameter \( \kappa \), \( k = \text{poly}(\kappa) \), and for all \( a \), if:

\[
\Pr \left[ A(1^\kappa, c) = m \mid m \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k, c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a,m,1^\kappa) \right] \geq \frac{1}{p_1(\kappa)}
\]

Then:

\[
\Pr [E^A(a) = w \land V^P(w,a) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{p_2(\kappa)}
\]

**Construction 7.3.8** (Extended Extractable One-way Witness Encryption). For any security parameter \( \kappa \) and oracle \( \Theta \) sampled according to Definition 7.3.4, we will implement an extended EOWE scheme \( P \) for the universal circuit-evaluator \( V \) using \( \Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V) \) as follows:

- \( \text{WEnc}(a,m,1^\kappa) \): Given security parameter \( 1^\kappa \), \( a \in \{0,1\}^* \), and message \( m \in \{0,1\}^{n/2} \) where \( n = 2 \max(|a|,\kappa) \), output \( \text{Enc}(x) \) where \( x = (a,m) \).
- \( \text{WDec}(w,c) \): Given witness \( w \) and ciphertext \( c \), let \( x' = \text{Dec}_V(w,c) \). If \( x' \neq \bot \), parse as \( x' = (a',m') \) and output \( m' \). Otherwise, output \( \bot \).

**Remark 7.3.9** (From one-wayness to indistinguishability.). We note that the primitive ex-EOWE, which has one-way security, can be used to build an ex-EIRWE, which has security that is indistinguishability-based, through a simple application of the Goldreich-Levin theorem [GL89]. Namely, to encrypt a one-bit message \( b \) under some attribute...
a, we would output the ciphertext \( c = (\text{Enc}(a, r_1), r_2, \langle r_1, r_2 \rangle \oplus b) \) where \( r_1, r_2 \) are randomly sampled and \( \langle r_1, r_2 \rangle \) is the hardcore bit. To decrypt a ciphertext \( c = (y_1, r_2, y_3) \) we would run \( r_1 = \text{Dec}(w, y_1) \), find the hardcore bit \( p = \langle r_1, r_2 \rangle \) then output \( b = p \oplus y_3 \).

We obtain the desired indistinguishability security since, by the hardcore-bit security of the one-way function \( \text{Enc}'_a(r_1, r_2) := (\text{Enc}(a, r_1), r_2, \langle r_1, r_2 \rangle \oplus 0) \approx (\text{Enc}(a, r_1), r_2, \langle r_1, r_2 \rangle \oplus 1) \) for any fixed \( a \).

**Lemma 7.3.10.** Construction 7.3.8 is a correct and subexponentially-secure oracle-fixed implementation (Definition 3.1.4) of extended extractable one-way witness encryption in the ideal \( \Theta \) oracle model.

**Proof.** To prove the security of this construction, we will show that if there exists an adversary \( A \) against scheme \( P \) (in the \( \Theta \) oracle model) that can invert an encryption of a random message with non-negligible advantage then there exists a (fixed) deterministic straight-line (non-rewinding) extractor \( E \) with access to \( \Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V) \) that can find the witness for the underlying instance of the challenge ciphertext.

Suppose \( A \) is an adversary in the inversion game with success probability \( \epsilon \). Then the extractor \( E \) would work as follows: given \( a \) as input and acting as the challenger for adversary \( A \), it chooses \( m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k \) uniformly at random then runs \( A^\Theta(1^\kappa, c^*) \) where \( c^* \leftarrow \text{WEnc}(a, m, 1^\kappa) \) is the challenge. Queries issued by \( A \) are handled by \( E \) as follows:

- To answer any query \( \text{Enc}(x) \) asked by \( A \), it forwards the query to the oracle \( \Theta \) and returns some answer \( c \).

- To answer any query \( \text{Rev}(c) \) asked by \( A \), it forwards the query to the oracle \( \Theta \) and returns some answer \( a \).

- To answer any query \( \text{Dec}_V(w, c) \) asked by \( A \), the extractor first issues a query \( \text{Rev}(c) \) to get some answer \( a \). If \( a \neq \bot \), it would execute \( V^\Theta(w, a) \), forwarding queries asked by \( V \) to \( \Theta \) similar to how it does for \( A \). Finally, it forwards the query \( \text{Dec}(w, c) \) to \( \Theta \) to get some answer \( x \). If \( a = \bot \), it returns \( \bot \) to \( A \) otherwise it returns \( x \).

While handling the queries made by \( A \), if a decryption query \( \text{Dec}_V(w, c^*) \) for the challenge ciphertext is issued by \( A \), the extractor will pass this query to \( \Theta \), and if the result of the decryption is \( x \neq \bot \) then the extractor will halt execution and output \( w \) as the witness for instance \( x \). Otherwise, if after completing the execution of \( A \), no such query was asked then the extractor outputs \( \bot \). We prove the following lemma.

**Lemma 7.3.11.** For any PPT adversary \( A \), instances \( a \), if there exists a non-negligible function \( \epsilon(.) \) such that:

\[
\Pr \left[ A^\Theta(1^\kappa, c) = m \mid m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k, c \leftarrow \text{WEnc}(a, m, 1^\kappa) \right] \geq \epsilon(\kappa) \tag{7.1}
\]

Then there exists a PPT straight-line extractor \( E \) such that:

\[
\Pr \left[ E^{\Theta, A}(a) = w \land V^\Theta(w, a) = 1 \right] \geq \epsilon(\kappa) - \text{negl}(\kappa) \tag{7.2}
\]
Proof. Let $A$ be an adversary satisfying Equation (7.1) above and let $\text{AdvWin}$ be the event that $A$ succeeds in the inversion game. Furthermore, let $\text{ExtWin}$ be the event that the extractor succeeds in extracting a witness (as in Equation (7.2) above). Observe that:

$$
\Pr_{\Theta,m}[\text{ExtWin}] \geq \Pr_{\Theta,m}[\text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin}]
= 1 - \Pr_{\Theta,m}[\text{ExtWin} \lor \overline{\text{AdvWin}}]
= 1 - \Pr_{\Theta,m}[\text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin}] - \Pr_{\Theta,m}[\overline{\text{AdvWin}}]
$$

Since $\Pr[\text{AdvWin}] \geq \epsilon$ for some non-negligible function $\epsilon$, it suffices to show that $\Pr[\text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin}]$ is negligible. Note that, by our construction of extractor $E$, this event is equivalent to saying that the adversary succeeds in the inversion game but never asks a query of the form $\text{Dec}_V(w,c^*)$ for which the answer is $x \neq \perp$ and so the extractor fails to recover the witness. For simplicity of notation define $\text{Win} := \overline{\text{ExtWin}} \land \text{AdvWin}$.

We will show that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of oracle $\Theta$, the probability of $\text{Win}$ happening is negligible. That is, we will prove the following claim:

**Claim 7.3.12.** For any negligible function $\delta$, $\Pr_{\Theta}[\Pr_m[\text{Win}] \geq \sqrt{\delta}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$

Proof. Define $\text{Bad}$ to be the event that $A$ asks (directly or indirectly) a query of the form $\text{Dec}_V(w,c')$ for some $c' \neq c^*$ for which it has not asked $\text{Enc}(x) = c$ previously. We have that:

$$
\Pr_{\Theta,m}[\text{Win}] \leq \Pr_{\Theta,m}[\text{Win} \land \overline{\text{Bad}}] + \Pr_{\Theta,m}[\text{Bad}]
$$

The probability of $\text{Bad}$ over the randomness of $\Theta$ is at most $1/2^n$ as it is the event that $A$ hits an image of a sparse random injective function without asking the function on the preimage beforehand. Thus, $\Pr_{\Theta,m}[\text{Bad}] \leq 1/2^n$.

It remains to show that $\Pr_{\Theta,m}[\text{Win} \land \overline{\text{Bad}}]$ is also negligible. We list all possible queries that $A$ could ask and argue that these queries do not help $A$ in any way without also forcing the extractor to win as well. Specifically, we show that for any such $A$ that satisfies the event $(\text{Win} \land \overline{\text{Bad}})$, there exists another adversary $\hat{A}$ that depends on $A$ and also satisfies the same event but does not ask any decryption queries (only encryption queries). This would then reduce to the standard case of inverting a random injective function, which is known to be hard. We define the adversary $\hat{A}$ as follows. Upon executing $A$, it handles the queries issued by $A$ as follows:

- If $A$ asks a query of the form $\text{Enc}(x)$ then $\hat{A}$ forwards the query to $\Theta$ to get the answer.
- If $A$ asks a query of the form $\text{Rev}(c)$ then since $\text{Bad}$ does not happen, it must be the case that $c = \text{Enc}(a,m)$ is an encryption that was previously asked by $A$ and therefore $\hat{A}$ returns $a$ as the answer.
• If \( A \) asks a query of the form \( \text{Dec}(w, c^*) \) then \( w \) must be a string for which \( V(w, a^*) = 0 \) or otherwise the extractor wins, which contradicts that \( \overline{\text{ExtWin}} \) happens. If that is the case, since \( w \) is not a witness, \( \hat{A} \) would return \( \perp \) to \( A \) after running \( V^\Theta(w, a^*) \) and answering its queries appropriately.

• If \( A \) asks a query of the form \( \text{Dec}(w, c') \) for some \( c' \neq c^* \) then, since \( \text{Bad} \) does not happen, it must be the case that \( A \) has asked a (direct or indirect) visible encryption query \( \text{Enc}(x') = c' \). Therefore, \( \hat{A} \) would have observed this encryption query and can therefore run \( V^\Theta(w, a') \) and return the appropriate answer (\( x \) or \( \perp \)) depending on the answer of \( V \).

Given that \( \hat{A} \) perfectly emulates \( A \)'s view, the only possibility that \( A \) could win the inversion game is by asking \( \text{Enc}(x^*) = c^* \) and hitting the challenge ciphertext, which is a negligible probability over the randomness of the oracle. By a standard averaging argument, we find that since \( \Pr_{\Theta, m}[\text{Win} \land \text{Bad}] \leq \delta(\kappa) \) for some negligible \( \delta \) then \( \Pr_{\Theta}[\Pr_m[\text{Win} \land \text{Bad}] \leq \sqrt{\delta}] \geq 1 - \sqrt{\delta} \), which yields the result.

To conclude the proof of Lemma 7.3.11, we can see that the probability that the extractor wins is given by \( \Pr[\overline{\text{ExtWin}}] \geq 1 - \Pr[\overline{\text{ExtWin}} \land \text{AdvWin}] - \Pr[\overline{\text{AdvWin}}] \geq \epsilon(\kappa) - \text{negl}(\kappa) \) where \( \epsilon \) is the non-negligible advantage of the adversary \( A \).

It is clear that Construction 7.3.8 is a correct implementation. Furthermore, by Lemma 7.3.11, it satisfies the extractability property. Thus, this concludes the proof of Lemma 7.3.10.

of Lemma 7.3.6. The existence of extractable instance-revealing witness encryption in the \( \Theta \) oracle model follows from Lemma 7.3.10 and Remark 7.3.9.

7.3.4 Compiling out \( \Theta \) from IO

In this section, we show a simulatable compiler for compiling out \( \Theta \). We adapt the approach outlined in Section 7.3.1 to the ideal IRWE oracle \( \Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V) \) while making use of Lemma 7.2.4, which allows us to compile out \( \Theta \) in two phases: we first compile out part of \( \Theta \) to get an approximately-correct obfuscator \( \hat{O}^R \) in the random oracle model (that produces an obfuscation \( \hat{B}^R \) in the RO-model), and then use the previous result of [CKP15] to compile out the random oracle \( R \) and get an obfuscator \( O' \) in the plain-model. Since we are applying this lemma only a constant number of times (in fact, just twice), security should still be preserved. Specifically, we will prove the following claim:

Lemma 7.3.13. Let \( R \sqsubseteq \Theta \) be a random oracle where \( \sqsubseteq \) denotes a sub-model relationship (see Definition 7.2.1). Then the following holds:
For any IO in the Θ ideal model, there exists a simulatable compiler with correctness error $\epsilon < 1/200$ for it that outputs a new obfuscator in the random oracle $R$ model.

For any IO in the random oracle $R$ model, there exists a simulatable compiler with correctness error $\epsilon < 1/200$ for it that outputs a new obfuscator in the plain model.

Proof. The second part of Lemma 7.3.13 follows directly by [CKP15], and thus we focus on proving the first part of the claim. Before we start describing the compilation process, we present the following definition of canonical executions that is a property of algorithms in this ideal model and dependent on the oracle being removed.

**Definition 7.3.14** (Canonical executions). We define an oracle algorithm $A^\Theta$ relative to rIRWE to be in canonical form if before asking any $\text{Dec}_\Theta(w, c)$ query, $A$ would first get $a \leftarrow \text{Rev}(c)$ then run $\text{V}^\Theta(w, a)$ on its own, making sure to answer any queries of $\text{V}$ using $\Theta$. Furthermore, after asking a query $\text{Dec}_\Theta(w, c)$ for which the returned answer is some message $m \neq \perp$, it would ask $\text{Enc}(x)$ where $x = (a, m)$. Note that any oracle algorithm $A$ can be easily modified into a canonical form by increasing its query complexity by at most a polynomial factor (since $\text{V}$ is an extended poly-query algorithm).

**Definition 7.3.15** (Query Types). For any (not necessarily canonical) oracle algorithm $A$ with access to a rIRWE oracle $\Theta$, we call the queries that are asked by $A$ to $\Theta$ as direct queries and those queries that are asked by $\text{V}^\Theta$ due to a call to $\text{Dec}$ as indirect queries. Furthermore, we say that a query is visible to $A$ if this query was issued by $A$ and thus it knows the answer that is returned by $\Theta$. Conversely, we say a query is hidden from $A$ if it is an indirect query that was not explicitly issued by $A$ (for example, $A$ would have asked a $\text{Dec}_\Theta$ query which prompted $\text{V}^\Theta$ to ask its own queries and the answers returned to $\text{V}$ will not be visible to $A$). Note that, once we canonicalize $A$, all indirect queries will be made visible since, by Definition 7.3.14, $A$ will run $\text{V}^\Theta$ before asking $\text{Dec}_\Theta$ queries and the query-answer pairs generated by $\text{V}$ will be revealed to $A$.

We now proceed to present the construction of the random-oracle model obfuscator that, given an obfuscator in the $\Theta$ model, would compile out and emulate queries to Dec and Rev while forwarding any Enc queries to $R$. Throughout this process, we assume that the obfuscators and the obfuscated circuits are all canonicalized according to Definition 7.3.14.

**7.3.5 The new obfuscator $\widehat{\text{IO}}^R$ in the random oracle model**

Let $R = \{R_n\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ be the (injective) random oracle where $R_n : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}$. Given a $\delta$-approximate obfuscator $\text{IO} = (i\text{O}, \text{Ev})$ in the rIRWE oracle model, we construct an $(\delta + \epsilon)$-approximate obfuscator $\widehat{\text{IO}} = (\widehat{i\text{O}}, \widehat{\text{Ev}})$ in the random oracle model.
Algorithm 1: EmulateCall

**Input:** Query-answer set $Q$, query $q$  
**Oracle:** Random Oracle $R$  
**Output:** $\rho_q$ a query-answer pair containing the answer of query $q$

**Begin:**  
if $q$ is a query of type $\text{Enc}(x)$ then  
| Set $\rho_q = (x \mapsto R(x))_{\text{Enc}}$

end  
if $q$ is a query of the form $\text{Rev}(c)$ then  
| if $\exists (x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q$ where $x = (a, m)$ then  
| | Set $\rho_q = (c \mapsto a)_{\text{Rev}}$
| else  
| | Set $\rho_q = (c \mapsto \perp)_{\text{Rev}}$

end  
if $q$ is a query of the form $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ then  
| if $\exists (x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q$ then  
| | Initialize $Q_V = \emptyset$ and emulate $b \leftarrow V^\Theta(w, x)$  
| | for each query $q_V$ asked by $V$ do  
| | | $\rho_V \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q \cup Q_V, q_V)$  
| | | $Q_V = Q_V \cup \rho_V$
| | end  
| | if $b = 1$ then  
| | | Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto x)_{\text{Dec}}$
| | else  
| | | Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto \perp)_{\text{Dec}}$
| | end  
| else  
| | Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto \perp)_{\text{Dec}}$

end  
Return $\rho_q$

Subroutine $\hat{iO}^R(C)$:

1. **Emulation phase:** Emulate $iO^\Theta(C)$. Let $T_O$ be the transcript of this phase and initialize $Q_O := Q(T_O) = \emptyset$. For every query $q$ asked by $iO^\Theta(C)$, call $\rho_q \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q_O, q)$ and add $\rho_q$ to $Q_O$.

Note that, since $iO$ is a canonical algorithm, there are no hidden queries resulting from queries asked by $V$ (via Dec queries) since we will always run $V^\Theta$ before asking/emulating a Dec query.
2. **Learning phase:** Set $Q_B = \emptyset$ to be the set of query-answer pairs learned during this phase. Set $m = 2\ell_O/\epsilon$ where $\ell_O \leq |i_O|$ represents the number of queries asked by $i_O$. Choose $t \leftarrow [m]$ uniformly at random then for $i = \{1, \ldots, t\}$:

- Choose $z_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{C_i}$ uniformly at random
- Run $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z_i)$. For every query $q$ asked by $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z_i)$, call and retrieve the answer $\rho_q \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q_O \cup Q_B, q)$ then add $\rho_q$ to $Q_B$.

Similar to Step 1, since $\text{Ev}$ is a canonical algorithm and $\text{Enc}$ is a injective function, with overwhelming probability, there will be no hidden queries as a result of asking any Dec queries.

3. The output of the RO model obfuscation algorithm $\hat{i}_O^R(C)$ will be $\hat{B} = (B, Q_B)$.

**Subroutine $\hat{\text{Ev}}^R(\hat{B}, z)$:** To evaluate $\hat{B} = (B, Q_B)$ on a new random input $z$ we simply emulate $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z)$. For every query $q$ asked by $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z)$, run and set $\rho_q = \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q_B, q)$ then add $\rho_q$ to $Q_B$.

**The running time of $\hat{i}_O$.** We note that the running time of the new obfuscator $\hat{i}_O$ remains polynomial time since we are emulating the original obfuscation once followed by a polynomial number $m$ of learning iterations. Furthermore, while we are indeed working with an oracle where the PPT $V$ can have oracle gates to subroutines of $\Theta$, we emphasize that since $V$, which we are executing during $\text{EmulateCall}$, is a universal circuit evaluator, its effective running time remains to be a strict polynomial in the size of $V$ and so the issue of exponential or infinite recursive calls is non-existent.

**Proving Approximate Correctness.** Consider two separate experiments (real and ideal) that construct the random oracle model obfuscator exactly as described above but differ when evaluating $\hat{B}$. Specifically, in the real experiment, $\hat{\text{Ev}}^R(\hat{B}, z)$ emulates $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z)$ on a random input $z$ and answers any queries by running $Q_B$, whereas in the ideal experiment, we execute $\hat{\text{Ev}}^R(\hat{B}, z)$ and answer the queries of $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z)$ using the actual oracle $\Theta$ instead. In essence, in the real experiment, we can think of the execution as $\text{Ev}^\hat{\Theta}(B, z)$ where $\hat{\Theta}$ is the oracle simulated by using $Q_B$ and oracle $R$. We will compare the real experiment with the ideal experiment and show that the statistical distance between these two executions is at most $\epsilon$. In order to achieve this, we will identify the events that differentiate between the executions $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z)$ and $\text{Ev}^\hat{\Theta}(B, z)$.

Let $q$ be a new query that is being asked by $\text{Ev}^\hat{\Theta}(B, z)$ and handled by calling the subroutine $\text{EmulateCall}^R(Q_B, q)$. The following are the cases that should be handled:

1. If $q$ is a query of type $\text{Enc}(x)$, then the answer to $q$ will be distributed the same in both experiments.
2. If $q$ is a query of type Dec($w,c$) or Rev($c$) whose answer is determined by $Q_B$ in the real experiment then it is also determined by $Q_O \cup Q_B \supseteq Q_B$ in the ideal experiment and the answers are distributed the same.

3. If $q$ is of type Dec($w,c$) or Rev($c$) that is not determined by $Q_O \cup Q_B$ in the ideal experiment then this means that we are attempting to decrypt a ciphertext for which we have not encrypted before and we will therefore answer it with $\bot$ with overwhelming probability. In that case, $q$ will also not be determined by $Q_B$ in the real experiment and we will answer it with $\bot$.

4. **Bad Event 1**: Suppose $q$ is of type Dec($w,c$) that is not determined by $Q_B$ in the real experiment and yet is determined by $Q_O \cup Q_B$ in the ideal experiment to be some answer $x \neq \bot$. This implies that the query-answer pair $(x \mapsto c)_{Enc}$ is in $Q_O \setminus Q_B$. That is, we are for the first time decrypting a ciphertext that was encrypted in Step 1 because we failed to learn the underlying $x$ for ciphertext $c$ during the learning phase of Step 2. In that case, in the real experiment, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding message $x$ whereas in the ideal experiment it would use the correct answer from $Q_O \cup Q_B$ and output $x$. However, we will show that this event is unlikely due to the learning procedure.

5. **Bad Event 2**: Suppose $q$ is of type Rev($c$) that is not determined by $Q_B$ in the real experiment and yet is determined by $Q_O \cup Q_B$ in the ideal experiment. This implies that the query-answer pair $((a,m) \mapsto c)_{Enc}$ is in $Q_O \setminus Q_B$. That is, we are for the first time attempting to reveal the attribute of a ciphertext that was encrypted in Step 1 because we failed to learn the answer of this reveal query during the learning phase of Step 2. In that case, in the real experiment, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding attribute $a$ whereas in the ideal experiment it would use the correct answer from $Q_O \cup Q_B$ and output $a$. However, we will show that this event is unlikely due to the learning procedure.

For input $x$, let $E(x)$ be the event that Case 4 or 5 happen. Assuming that event $E(x)$ does not happen, both experiments will proceed identically the same and the output distributions of $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B,x)$ and $\text{Ev}^{\hat{\Theta}}(B,x)$ will be statistically close. More formally, the probability of correctness for $\text{iO}$ is:

$$\Pr_x[\text{Ev}^{\hat{\Theta}}(B,x) \neq C(x)] = \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^{\hat{\Theta}}(B,x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)]$$

$$+ \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^{\hat{\Theta}}(B,x) \neq C(x) \land E(x)]$$

$$\leq \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^{\hat{\Theta}}(B,x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] + \Pr_x[E(x)]$$

By the approximate functionality of IO, we have that:

$$\Pr_x[\text{iO}^\Theta(C)(x) \neq C(x)] = \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\Theta(B,x) \neq C(x)] \leq \delta(n)$$

110
Therefore,
\[
\Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] = \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] \leq \delta
\]

We are thus left to show that \( \Pr[E(x)] \leq \epsilon \). Since both experiments proceed the same up until \( E \) happens, the probability of \( E \) happening is the same in both worlds and we will thus choose to bound this bad event in the ideal world.

**Claim 7.3.16.** \( \Pr_x[E(x)] \leq \epsilon \).

*Proof.* For all \( i \in [t] \), let \( Q'_B_i = Q_{B_i} \cap Q_O \) be the set of query-answer pairs generated by the \( i \)'th evaluation \( \text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z_i) \) during the learning phase (Step 2) and are also generated during the obfuscation emulation phase (Step 1). In particular, \( Q'_B_i \) would contain the query-answer pairs \( ((a, m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \) for encryptions that were generated by the obfuscation and later discovered during the learning phase. Note that, since the maximum number of learning iterations \( m > \ell_O \) and \( Q'_B_i \subseteq Q'_{B_{i+1}} \), the number of learning iterations that would increase the size of the set of learned obfuscation queries is at most \( 2\ell_O \) since there are at most \( \ell_O \) obfuscation ciphertexts that can be fully discovered during the learning phase and at most \( \ell_O \) obfuscation ciphertexts that can be partially discovered (just finding out the underlying attribute \( a \)) via Rev queries during the learning phase.

We say \( t \leftarrow^S [m] \) is bad if it is the case that \( Q'_B_t \neq Q'_{B_{t+1}} \) (i.e. \( t \) is an index of a learning iteration that increases the size of the learned obfuscation queries). This would imply that after \( t \) learning iterations in the ideal world, the final evaluation \( Q'_B_B := Q'_{B_{t+1}} \) would contain a new unlearned query-answer pair that was in \( Q_O \). Thus, given that \( m = 2\ell_O / \epsilon \), the probability (over the selection of \( t \)) that \( t \) is bad is at most \( 2\ell_O / m < \epsilon \).

**Proving Security.** To show that the resulting obfuscator is secure, it suffices to show that the compilation process represented as the new obfuscator’s construction is simulatable. We show a simulator \( S \) (with access to \( \Theta \)) that works as follows: given an obfuscated circuit \( B \) in the \( \Theta \) ideal model, it runs the learning procedure as shown in Step 2 of the new obfuscator \( \widehat{iO} \) to learn the heavy queries \( Q_B \) then outputs \( \widehat{B} = (B, Q_B) \). Note that this distribution is statistically close to the output of the real execution of \( \widehat{iO} \) and, therefore, security follows.

### 7.4 Separating IO from Instance Hiding Witness Encryption

In this section, we formally prove our second main separation theorem which states that there is no fully black-box construction of indistinguishability obfuscation from any *extended* predicate encryption scheme.

**Theorem 7.4.1.** Assume that \( \text{NP} \nsubseteq \text{coAM} \) and that one-way functions exist. Then there exists no monolithic construction of indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) from predicate encryption (PE).
In fact, we prove a stronger result by showing a separation of IO from a more generalized primitive, which we call extended extractable instance-hiding witness encryption, that implies extended predicate encryption and is a stronger variant of witness encryption.

**Definition 7.4.2** (Extended Extractable Instance-Hiding Witness Encryption (ex-EIHWE)). Let \( V \) be a universal circuit-evaluator as defined in Definition 6.5.9. For any given security parameter \( \kappa \), an extended extractable instance-hiding witness encryption scheme consists of two PPT algorithms \( P = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V) \) defined as follows:

- \( \text{Enc}(a, m, 1^\kappa) \): given an instance \( a \in \{0, 1\}^* \), message \( m \in \{0, 1\}^* \), and security parameter \( \kappa \) (and randomness as needed) it outputs \( c \in \{0, 1\}^* \).

- \( \text{Dec}_V(w, c) \): given ciphertext \( c \) and “witness” string \( w \), it outputs a message \( m' \in \{0, 1\}^* \).

An extended extractable instance-hiding witness encryption scheme satisfies the following completeness and security properties:

- **Correctness**: For any security parameter \( \kappa \), any \( m \in \{0, 1\}^* \), and any \( (w, (a, m)) \) such that \( V^P(w, (a, m)) = 1 \), it holds that

\[
\Pr_{\text{Enc, Dec}}[\text{Dec}(w, \text{Enc}(a, m, 1^\kappa)) = m] = 1
\]

- **Instance-hiding Extractability**: For any PPT adversary \( A \) and polynomial \( p_1(.) \), there exists a PPT (black-box) straight-line extractor \( E \) and a polynomial function \( p_2(.) \) such that the following holds. For security parameter \( \kappa \), for all \( a_0, a_1 \) of the same length \( |a_0| = |a_1| \) and any \( m_0 \neq m_1 \) of the same length \( |m_0| = |m_1| \), if:

\[
\Pr\left[ A(1^\kappa, c) = b \mid b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a_b, m_b, 1^\kappa) \right] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{p_1(\kappa)}
\]

Then:

\[
\Pr[E^A(a_0, a_1) = w \land \exists b \in \{0, 1\} \ s.t. \ V^P(w, a_b) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{p_2(\kappa)}
\]

**Generalizing the verification algorithm.** Note that while the standard witness encryption scheme defines the verification algorithm as operating on an witness-instance pair \( (w, a) \), since we are elevating the security to be instance-hiding, we can generalize the verifier to allow it to accept and act on not only the instance \( a \) but also the message \( m \) as input. That is, the verifier \( V \) in our definition of instance-hiding witness encryption would accept \( (w, x) \) instead of just \( (w, a) \) where \( x = (a, m) \). As a result, whenever it is unambiguous, we would often refer to \( x \) as the instance.
Given the above definition of ex-IHWE, we prove the following theorem, which states that there is no fully black-box construction IO from extended IHWE.

**Theorem 7.4.3.** Assume that $\text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM}$ and that one-way functions exist. Then there exists no monolithic construction of indistinguishability obfuscation from instance-hiding witness encryption.

In Section 7.6.1, we prove that extended EIHWE implies extended predicate encryption. As a result, Theorem 7.4.1 would follow from Theorem 7.4.3, Lemma 7.6.1 and Lemma 6.6.3 (the transitivity lemma). Hence, for the remainder of this section we will focus on proving Theorem 7.4.3.

### 7.4.1 Overview of Proof Techniques

To prove Theorem 7.4.3, we will apply Lemma 7.2.7 for the idealized IHWE model $\Theta$ (formally defined in Section 7.4.2) to prove that there is no black-box construction of IO from any primitive $P$ that can be oracle-fixed constructed from $\Theta$. In particular, we will do so for $P$ that is the extended IHWE primitive. Our task is thus twofold: (1) to prove that $P$ can be oracle-fixed constructed from $\Theta$ and (2) to show a simulatable compilation procedure that compiles out $\Theta$ from any IO construction. The first task is proven in Section 7.4.3 and the second task is proven in Section 7.4.4. By Lemma 7.2.7, this would imply the separation result of IO from $P$ and prove Theorem 7.4.3.

Our oracle, which is more formally defined in Section 7.4.2, resembles an idealized version of a (instance-hiding) witness encryption scheme, which makes the construction of extended IHWE straightforward. As a result, the main challenge lies in showing a simulatable compilation procedure for IO that satisfies Definition 7.2.2 in this idealized model, and therefore, it is instructive to look at how the compilation process works and what challenges are faced with dealing with oracle $\Theta$.

### High-level Compiler Structure and Challenges

Recall that the solution adopted for the (extended) IRWE oracle was to canonicalize the obfuscated circuits such that queries made by the verification algorithm through decryption queries are made manifest so that they can be publicized without affecting security. However, we shall see that this is not enough to argue that (approximate) correctness is maintained.

#### The Challenge Faced with (Instance-hiding) Witness Encryption

Here we are again faced with a problem when we try to emulate decryption queries. Very much like the setting of extended IRWE, since $\Theta$ represents an idealized extended primitive, the verification algorithm $V$ associated with the language defined by $\Theta$ might make oracle calls during the learning process. However, precisely due to the instance-hiding property, one cannot canonicalize the obfuscated circuits as before since we cannot efficiently extract the attribute or the message to run $V^\Theta(x, w)$ and discover the queries asked. This creates the possibility that the execution $B'(x)$ might call such a hidden query and emulating it incorrectly.
Resolving the Challenge. While a full canonicalization is not possible here, we still perform it partially. Specifically, whenever the obfuscated circuit calls a decryption query \( \text{Dec}(w, c) \) and the underlying message \( x \) is successfully decrypted, the obfuscated circuit can now run \( V^\Theta(x, w) = 1 \) to reveal the queries asked. However, it is possible that the decryption fails, in which case we may have some hidden queries \( Q_V \) asked by an underlying \( V^\Theta(x, w) = 0 \) that cannot be revealed or learned. Nonetheless, we argue that the gathered information is enough for an approximately correct emulation of the plain-model obfuscated code.

7.4.2 The Ideal Model

In this section, we formally define the distribution of our ideal randomized oracle.

**Definition 7.4.4 (Random Instance-hiding Witness Encryption Oracle).** Let \( V \) be a PPT universal circuit-evaluator as defined in Definition 2.1.1 that takes as input \( (w, x) \) where \( x \in \{0,1\}^n \) and outputs \( b \in \{0,1\} \). We define the following random instance-hiding witness encryption (rIHWE) oracle \( \Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V) \) as follows. We specify the sub-oracle \( \Theta_n \) whose inputs are parameterized by \( n \), and the actual oracle will be \( \Theta = \{\Theta_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \).

- **Enc**: \( \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}^{2n} \) is a random injective function. We will use the Enc oracle to encrypt a message \( x \in \{0,1\}^n \) to obtain a ciphertext \( c \in \{0,1\}^{2n} \).
- **Dec**: \( \{0,1\}^s \mapsto \{0,1\}^n \cup \{\perp\} \): Given \( w \in \{0,1\}^k, c \in \{0,1\}^{2n} \) as inputs and \( s = k+2n \), \( \text{Dec}(w, c) \) allows us to decrypt the ciphertext \( c \) and get \( x \) as long as the predicate test is satisfied on \( (w, x) \). More formally, do as follow:
  1. If \( \nexists \) \( x \) such that \( \text{Enc}(x) = c \), output \( \perp \). Otherwise, continue to the next step.
  2. Find \( x \) such that \( \text{Enc}(x) = c \).
  3. If \( V^\Theta(w, x) = 0 \) output \( \perp \). Otherwise, output \( x \).

We define a query-answer pair resulting from query \( q \) to subroutine \( T \in \{\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}\} \) with some answer \( \beta \) as \( (q \mapsto \beta)_T \). The oracle \( \Theta \) provides the subroutines for all inputs lengths but, for simplicity, and when \( n \) is clear from the context, we use \( \Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V) \) to refer to \( \Theta_n \) for a fixed \( n \).

7.4.3 (Instance-hiding) Witness Encryption exists relative to \( \Theta \)

In this section, we show how to construct a semantically-secure extended EIHWE with corresponding verification algorithm \( V \) relative to \( \Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V) \).

**Construction 7.4.5 (Extended Extractable Instance-Hiding Witness Encryption).** Let \( V \) be a universal circuit-evaluator as defined in Definition 2.1.1. For any security parameter \( \kappa \) and oracle \( \Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V) \) sampled according to Definition 7.4.4, we will implement an extended EIHWE scheme \( P \) as follows:
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{WEnc}(a, m, 1^\kappa) : Given \(a \in \{0, 1\}^*\), message \(m \in \{0, 1\}\) and security parameter \(1^\kappa\), let \(n = 2 \max(\kappa, |a|)\). Sample \(r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n/2-1}\) uniformly at random then output \(c = \text{Enc}(x)\) where \(x = (a, m)||r\).
  \item \textbf{WDec}(w, c) : Given witness \(w\) and ciphertext \(c\), let \(x' = \text{Dec}_V(w, c)\). If \(x' \neq \perp\) then parse as \(x' = (a', m')||r'\) and output \(m'\). Otherwise, output \(\perp\).
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Lemma 7.4.6.} Construction 7.4.5 is a correct and subexponentially-secure oracle-fixed implementation (Definition 3.1.4) of extended extractable instance-hiding witness encryption in the ideal \(\Theta\) oracle model.

To prove the security of this construction, we will show that if there exists an adversary \(A\) against scheme \(P\) (in the \(\Theta\) oracle model) that can distinguish between encryptions of two different messages with non-negligible advantage then there exists a (fixed) deterministic straight-line extractor \(E\) with access to \(\Theta = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V)\) that can find the witness for the underlying instance of the challenge ciphertext.

Suppose \(A\) is an adversary in the indistinguishability game with success probability \(1/2 + \epsilon\). Then the extractor \(E\) would works as follows: given \((a_0, a_1)\) as input and acting as the challenger for adversary \(A\), it runs \(A^{\Theta}(1^\kappa, c^*)\) where \(c^* \leftarrow \text{WEnc}(a_b, m_b, 1^\kappa)\) is the challenge ciphertext. To answer any query \(\text{Enc}(x)\) asked by \(A\), it forwards the query to the oracle \(\Theta\) and returns some answer \(c\). To answer any query \(\text{Dec}(w, c)\) for \(c \neq c^*\) asked by \(A\), the extractor will instead attempt to simulate this query for \(A\) instead of asking \(\Theta\) directly. In particular, it first verifies whether there exists a query-answer pair \((x \mapsto c)\) that was generated by \(A\) previously. If such a query-answer pair exists then the extractor will run \(V^\Theta(w, x) = \beta\) and if \(\beta = 1\) it returns to \(A\) the answer \(x\). If such a query-answer pair does not exist or \(\beta = 0\) then it returns \(\perp\) to \(A\). Note that, while running \(V^\Theta(w, x)\), the extractor will also need to answer the queries asked by \(V\) similar to how it did for \(A\). While handling the queries made by \(A\), if a decryption query \(\text{Dec}_V(w, c^*)\) for the challenge ciphertext is issued by \(A\), the extractor will pass this query to \(\Theta\), and if the result of the decryption is \(x \neq \perp\) then the extractor will halt execution and output \(w\) as the witness for instance \(x\). Otherwise, if after completing the execution of \(A\), no such query was asked then the extractor outputs \(\perp\). We prove the following lemma.

\textbf{Lemma 7.4.7.} For any PPT adversary \(A\), pair of instances \(a_0, a_1\) of the same length \(|a_0| = |a_1|\) and any \(m_0 \neq m_1\) of the same length \(|m_0| = |m_1|\), if there exists a non-negligible function \(\epsilon(.)\) such that:

\[
\Pr\left[ A^{\Theta}(1^\kappa, c^*) = b \mid b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, c^* \leftarrow \text{WEnc}(a_b, m_b, 1^\kappa) \right] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(\kappa) \tag{7.3}\]

Then there exists a PPT extractor \(E\) such that:

\[
\Pr\left[ E^{\Theta,A}(a_0, a_1) = w \land V^\Theta(w, a_b) = 1 \mid b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \right] \geq \epsilon(\kappa) - \text{negl}(\kappa) \tag{7.4}\]

115
Let $A$ be an adversary satisfying Equation (7.3) above and let $AdvWin$ be the event that $A$ succeeds in the distinguishing game. Furthermore, let $ExtWin$ be the event that the extractor succeeds in extracting a witness (as in Equation (7.4) above). Observe that:

$$\Pr_{\Theta, b, r}[ExtWin] \leq \Pr_{\Theta, b, r}[ExtWin \land AdvWin] + \Pr_{\Theta, b, r}[AdvWin]$$

Since $\Pr[AdvWin] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon$ for some non-negligible function $\epsilon$, it suffices to show that $\Pr[ExtWin \land AdvWin]$ is negligibly close to $1/2$. Note that, by our construction of extractor $E$, this event is equivalent to saying that the adversary succeeds in the distinguishing game but never asks a query of the form $Dec_V(w, c^*)$ for which the answer is $x \neq \bot$ and so the extractor fails to recover the witness. For simplicity of notation define $Win := ExtWin \land AdvWin$.

We will show that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of oracle $\Theta$, the probability of $Win$ happening is only a negligible factor over the trivial advantage. That is, we will prove the following claim:

**Claim 7.4.8.** For any negligible $\epsilon$, $\Pr_{\Theta}[Pr_{b, r}[Win] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$

**Proof.** We first show that we can construct an adversary $\hat{A}$ that has the same winning advantage as $A$ but does not ask decryption queries (only encryption queries). Define $Bad$ to be the event that $A$ asks (directly or indirectly) a query of the form $Dec_V(w, c')$ for some $c' \neq c^*$ for which it has not asked $Enc(x) = c'$ previously. Given the challenge $c^*$, the new adversary $\hat{A}$ executes $A^{\Theta}(c^*)$ and answers the queries as follows: if the query is an encryption query then it is directly forwarded to $\Theta$ to get the answer. If it is a $Dec(w, c')$ query for some $c' \neq c^*$ then it will check if $Enc(x') = c'$ was asked by $A$ before in which case it runs $V^{\Theta}(w, x') = \beta$ and returns the answer $x'$ if and only if $\beta = 1$. If no such encryption was asked then event $Bad$ has happened and we abort the execution. If a query $Dec(w, c')$ was asked then we return $\bot$ immediately since $ExtWin$ does not happen and therefore the Dec is expected to fail anyway. Thus, as long as $Bad$ does not happen, the advantage of $\hat{A}$ in winning the distinguishing game is at least the advantage of $A$.

It is straightforward to show, by a standard application of an averaging argument, that the expression $\Pr_{\Theta}[Pr_{b, r}[Bad] \geq \epsilon/3] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$. Specifically, we know that the probability of $Bad$ over the randomness of $\Theta$ is at most $1/2^\kappa$ as it is the event that $A$ hits an image of a sparse random injective function without asking the function on the preimage beforehand. Thus, $\Pr_{\Theta, b, r}[Bad] \leq 1/2^\kappa$ and hence by an averaging argument $\Pr_{\Theta}[Pr_{b, r}[Bad] \geq \epsilon/3] \leq \Pr_{\Theta}[Pr_{b, r}[Bad] \geq 2^{-n/2}] \leq 2^{-n/2}$.

We now proceed to show that $\hat{A}$ only succeeds with negligible advantage while asking only encryption queries. Define $Hit$ to be the event that $A$ happens to ask $Enc(x^*) = c^*$.  

116
Then we have that:

$$\Pr_{\Theta} \left[ \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Win}] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \right] \leq \Pr_{\Theta} \left[ \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Win} \land \overline{\text{Bad}} \land \text{Hit}] + \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Bad}] + \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Hit}] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \right]$$

$$\leq \Pr_{\Theta} \left[ \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Win} \land \overline{\text{Bad}} \land \text{Hit}] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{3} + \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Bad}] \geq \frac{\epsilon}{3} \vee \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Hit}] \geq \frac{\epsilon}{3} \right]$$

$$\leq \Pr_{\Theta} \left[ \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Win} \land \overline{\text{Bad}} \land \text{Hit}] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{3} \right] + \Pr_{\Theta} \left[ \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Hit}] \geq \frac{\epsilon}{3} \right]$$

We can bound the event Hit from happening since it is the event that we invert the image of a random injective function. This can be done over the randomness of the oracle then, using an averaging argument, deduce that the probability that Hit happens for a non-negligible fraction of oracles Θ is negligible.

We will thus focus on proving the first term. In doing so, we will reduce the problem of indistinguishability to that of predicting the output of a random Boolean function on a random point in the domain of this function. We then prove that the latter problem is hard using a compression technique which allows to argue that an adversary that can win the prediction game with non-negligible advantage can only do so for a negligible fraction of the oracles. We will make use of the following lemma that shows the existence of a randomized compression technique for random Boolean functions using adversaries against the prediction game.

**Lemma 7.4.9 (Lemma 10.4 [DTT10]).** Let A be an oracle algorithm that makes q queries to some fixed oracle predicate $p : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, never queries the oracle on its input and satisfies the following for some $\epsilon$:

$$\Pr[A^p(x) = p(x)] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon$$

Then there exists a randomized encoder E and a randomized decoder D such that:

$$\Pr_{r}[D(E(p,r), r) = p] \geq \epsilon/q$$

and $|E(p,r)| \leq 2^n - \epsilon^2 2^n/q$.

For any fixed pair $(a_0, a_1)$ and given adversary $\hat{A}$ that wins in the indistinguishability game without asking any decryption queries, we can construct a new oracle-aided adversary $\tilde{A}$ that aims to win in the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\tilde{A}}(1^n, a_0, a_1)$ as defined in Figure 7.2 without querying the oracle on its input and without asking any decryption queries. The adversary $\tilde{A}$ will have access to oracle Θ and $P^\Theta$, which is defined as follows:

$$P(a_0, a_1, r, c_0, c_1) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c_0 = \text{Enc}(a_0||0||r) \text{ and } c_1 = \text{Enc}(a_1||1||r) \\ 1 & \text{if } c_0 = \text{Enc}(a_1||1||r) \text{ and } c_1 = \text{Enc}(a_0||0||r) \\ \bot & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
Experiment $\text{Exp}_A^P(1^\kappa, a_0, a_1)$:

1. $r \overset{s}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{n/2-1}, b \overset{s}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$
2. $c^*_0 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a_0 || b || r)$, $c^*_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a_1 - b || 1 - b || r)$
3. $b' \leftarrow A^P, \Theta, (r, c^*_0, c^*_1)$ where $A$ is not allowed to query $P$ on $(a_0, a_1, r, c^*_0, c^*_1)$ or $(a_0, a_1, r, c^*_1, c^*_0)$
4. Output 1 if $b = b'$ and 0 otherwise.

Figure 7.2: The 2-instance $\text{Exp}_A^P$ Experiment

The adversary $\tilde{A}$, given $(r, c^*_0, c^*_1)$, would execute $b' \leftarrow \tilde{A}(c^*_0)$ and outputs $b'$ as its answer. We can modify $\tilde{A}$ so that whenever it issues a query to $\text{Enc}(a || b || r) = c_b$, it would also call $\text{Enc}(a || 1 - b || r) = c_{1-b}$ followed by a call to $P(a, a, r, c_0, c_1)$. This ensures that any encryption query to $\Theta$ is translated into a query to $P$.

Note that $P$ can be interpreted as an alternative description for $\Theta$. That is, given $P : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ where $m = 11n/2 - 1$, one can reconstruct $\Theta$ on any point in its domain. Define $P_{a_0, a_1} := P(a_0, a_1, \ldots, \ldots)$ to be the function $P$ restricted to the attributes $a_0$ and $a_1$. By Lemma 7.4.9, we can encode $P_{a_0, a_1}$ using at most $m - \epsilon^2 m / 9$ bits where $q$ is the number of queries that $A$ makes. Thus, we have compressed the entire oracle by saving $\alpha = \epsilon^2 m / 9q$ bits. Hence, assuming that $\epsilon = \text{negl}(\kappa)$ and $q = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ we find that the fraction of oracles for which $\tilde{A}$ can win on is at most $1/2^\alpha = \text{negl}(\kappa)$.

Proof of Lemma 7.4.6. It is clear that the Construction 7.4.5 is correct. Furthermore, by Lemma 7.4.7, it also satisfies the extractability property.

7.4.4 Compiling out $\Theta$ from IO

In this section, we show a simulatable compiler for compiling out $\Theta$. We formalize the approach outlined in Section 7.4.1 while making use of Lemma 7.2.4, which allows us to compile out $\Theta$ in two phases: we first compile out part of $\Theta$ to get an approximately-correct obfuscator $\widehat{IO}^R$ in the random oracle model (that produces an obfuscation $\widehat{B}^R$ in the RO-model), and then use the previous result of [CKP15] to compile out the random oracle $R$ and get an obfuscator $IO'$ in the plain-model. Since we are applying this lemma only a constant number of times (in fact, just twice), security should still be preserved. Specifically, we will prove the following claim:

Lemma 7.4.10. Let $R \equiv \Theta$ be a random oracle where “$\equiv$” denotes a sub-model relationship (see Definition 7.2.1). Then the following holds:
• For any IO in the Θ ideal model, there exists a simulatable compiler for it with correctness error $\epsilon < 1/200$ that outputs a new obfuscator in the random oracle $R$ model.

• [CKP15] For any IO in the random oracle $R$ model, there exists a simulatable compiler for it with error correctness $\epsilon < 1/200$ that outputs a new obfuscator in the plain model.

Proof. The second part of Lemma 7.4.10 follows directly from the previous result of [CKP15], and thus we focus on proving the first part of the claim. Before we start describing the compilation process, we present the following definition of canonical executions that is a property of algorithms in this ideal model and dependent on the oracle being removed, then we describe the notation and terminology used throughout the proof.

Definition 7.4.11 (Canonical executions). We define an oracle algorithm $A^\Theta$ relative to rIHWE to be in canonical form if right after asking any $\text{Dec}_V(w, c) = x$ where $x \neq \perp$, $A$ would also additionally ask the query $\text{Enc}(x)$ followed by directly executing $V^\Theta(w, x)$ on its own. Note that any algorithm $A$ can be easily modified into a canonical form by increasing its query complexity at most by a polynomial factor (since $V$ is a PPT algorithm).

Definition 7.4.12 (Query Types). For any canonical oracle algorithm $A$ with access to a rIHWE oracle $\Theta$, we call the queries that are asked by $A$ to $\Theta$ as direct queries and those queries that are asked by $V^\Theta$ due to a call to Dec as indirect queries. Furthermore, we say that a query is visible to $A$ if this query was issued by $A$ and thus it knows the answer that is returned by $\Theta$. Conversely, we say a query is hidden from $A$ if it is an indirect query that was not explicitly issued by $A$ (for example, $A$ would have asked a $\text{Dec}_V$ query which prompted $V^\Theta$ to ask its own queries and the answers returned to $V$ will not be visible to $A$).

Note that, while all direct queries are visible to $A$, an indirect query $q$ may or not may visible to $A$; an indirect query $q$ is visible to $A$ if it runs $V^\Theta$ and $q$ is asked by $V$ then forwarded to $A$ (where $q$ was not previously asked by $A$ in an explicit manner).

Transcripts. We use bold fonts (e.g., $\mathbf{T}$) to denote the distribution from which we sample an actual transcript $T \leftarrow \mathbf{T}$. For any transcript $T$ of some oracle algorithm, we define $U(T)$ to be the set of query-answer pairs asked of $\Theta$ during the generation of $T$ and define $Q(T)$ to be the projection of $U(T)$ onto the first element, which represents the set of queries only.

We now proceed to present the construction of the random-oracle model obfuscator that, given an indistinguishability obfuscator $\text{IO} = (\text{iO}, \text{Ev})$ in the $\Theta$ model, would compile out and emulate queries to Dec while forwarding any Enc queries to $R$. Throughout this process, we assume, without loss of generality, that the ideal-model obfuscator $\text{iO}$ and the ideal-model evaluation of the obfuscation $\text{Ev}$ are both in canonical form according to Definition 7.4.11. For these canonical algorithms, let $\ell_O, \ell_B = \text{poly}(n)$, respectively, be the number of queries asked by the ideal-model obfuscator $\text{iO}$ and the evaluation $\text{Ev}$ to the rIHWE oracle $\Theta$. 119
Algorithm 2: EmulateCall

**Input:** Query-answer set $U$ and query $q$

**Oracle:** Random oracle $R$

**Output:** $(\rho_q, W_H)$ where $\rho_q$ is a query-answer pair containing the answer of query $q$ and $W_H$ is the set of indirect query-answer pairs (those asked by $V$)

**Begin:**

1. Initialize $W_H = \emptyset$
2. if $q$ is a query of type $\text{Enc}(x)$ for any $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ then
   - Set $\rho_q = (x \mapsto R(x))_{\text{Enc}}$
3. end
4. if $q$ is a query of the form $\text{Dec}_V(w,c)$ for any $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $c \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ then
   - if $\exists (x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in U$ then
     - Emulate $b \leftarrow V^\Theta(w)$
     - for each query $q_V$ asked by $V$ do
       - $(\rho_V, W_V) \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^R(U \cup W_H, q_V)$
       - $W_H = W_H \cup (\rho_V \cup W_V)$
     - end
   - if $b = 1$ then
     - Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto x)_{\text{Dec}}$ /* Canonical caller can now call $V^\Theta(w, x)$ to publicize $W_H$ */
   - else
     - Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto \perp)_{\text{Dec}}$
   - end
5. else
   - Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto \perp)_{\text{Dec}}$
6. end

**Return** $(\rho_q, W_H)$

---

The new obfuscator $\widehat{IO}^R$ in the random oracle model

Let $R = \{R_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be the (injective) random oracle where $R_n : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$. Given a $\delta$-approximate obfuscator $\text{IO} = (\text{iO}_E, \text{Ev})$ in the rIHWE oracle model, we construct an $(\delta + \epsilon)$-approximate obfuscator $\widehat{IO} = (\widehat{iO}, \widehat{Ev})$ in the random oracle model.

**Subroutine $\widehat{IO}^R(C)$:**

1. **Emulation phase:** Given input circuit $C \in C_n$, emulate $\text{iO}^\Theta(C)$ and let $B$ be the output of this emulation. Let $T_O$ be the transcript of this phase and initialize $Q_O := U(T_O) = \emptyset$. For every query $q$ asked by $\text{iO}^\Theta(C)$:
   - Call $(\rho_q, W_H) \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q_O, q)$ as shown in Algorithm 2 and return the answer in $\rho_q$
• Add $\rho_q$ and $W_H$ to $Q_O$

Note that we will not pass any query-answer pairs $Q_O$ asked by $iO^\Theta$ to the output of this new obfuscation. All of the query-answer pairs in $Q_O$, be it visible or hidden, will only be used for emulation purposes in the following step.

2. Learning phase: Let $Q_B$ be the set of all visible queries that will be learned, $Q_B^h$ be the set of hidden queries that we will keep track of for emulation purposes. Set $m = 3\ell_O/\epsilon$ where $\ell_O \leq |iO|$ represents the number of queries asked by $iO$. Choose $t \leftarrow [m]$ uniformly at random then for $i = \{1, ..., t\}$ do the following:

• Choose $z_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{|C|}$ uniformly at random
• Run $Ev^\Theta(B, z_i)$. For every query $q$ asked by $Ev^\Theta(B, z_i)$:
  – Call $(\rho_q, W_H) \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q_O \cup Q_B \cup Q_B^h, q)$ and return the answer in $\rho_q$
  – Add $\rho_q$ to $Q_B$ and add $W_H$ to $Q_B^h$.

Since $Ev$ is a canonical algorithm, in addition to the direct queries asked by $Ev^\Theta(B, z_i)$ to $\Theta$, the resulting query set $Q_B$ would also include the indirect queries that have resulted from $Ev^\Theta(B, z_i)$ running $V^\Theta(w, x) = 1$ on a successful decryption query.

3. The output of the random oracle model obfuscation algorithm $\widehat{iO}_R^R(C)$ will be $\widehat{B} = (B, Q_B)$ where $Q_B$ is the set of visible (direct and/or indirect) query-answer pairs.

Subroutine $\widehat{Ev}^R(\widehat{B}, z)$: Initialize $Q_{\widehat{B}} = \emptyset$ to be the set of queries asked when evaluating $\widehat{B}$. To evaluate $\widehat{B} = (B, Q_B)$ on a new random input $z$ we simply emulate $Ev^\Theta(B, z)$. For every query $q$ asked by $Ev^\Theta(B, z)$, run and set $(\rho_q, W_H) = \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q_B \cup Q_{\widehat{B}}, q)$ then return the answer in $\rho_q$ and add $(\rho_q, W_H)$ to $Q_{\widehat{B}}$.

Note that, since we are emulating query calls with respect to $Q_B \cup Q_{\widehat{B}}$, all the indirect query-answer pairs $W_H$ returned from queries of the form $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ are due to knowing the underlying $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ (i.e. $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_B \cup Q_{\widehat{B}}$) so $W_H$ is visible and therefore used in the emulation of any subsequent queries issued during this execution.

The running time of $\widehat{iO}$. We note that the running time of the new obfuscator $\widehat{iO}$ remains polynomial time since we are emulating the original obfuscation once followed by a polynomial number $m$ of learning iterations. Furthermore, while we are indeed working with an oracle where the PPT universal circuit evaluator $V$ can have oracle gates to subroutines of $\Theta$, we emphasize that in our framework of extended primitives, the effective running time of $V$, which we are executing during $\text{EmulateCall}$, remains to be a strict polynomial in the size of $V$ and so the issue of exponential or infinite recursive calls is non-existent.

121
Proving Approximate Correctness. Let $Q_S = (Q_O \cup Q_B \cup Q_B^h \cup Q_B^\hat{h})$ be the set of all query-answer pairs asked during the emulation, learning, and evaluation phases. We define the following hybrid experiments to show that the correctness of the new random-oracle model obfuscator that simulates an execution of a $\Theta$-model obfuscation is sufficiently close to the correctness of an ideal execution of the $\Theta$-model obfuscation. We denote the distribution of Hybrid $i$ as $H^i = (Q^i_O, Q^i_B, Q^i_B^h, Q^i_B^\hat{h})$.

- Hybrid 0: This is the real experiment, which is represented as the construction in Section 7.4.4.

- Hybrid 1: This is the same as Hybrid 0 except for two differences:
  - The queries asked during emulation (Step 1) and learning (Step 2) answered relative to a true oracle $\Theta$ instead of emulating them using $\text{EmulateCall}$.
  - We modify the final execution $\hat{E}_v(\hat{B}, z)$ such that, when we execute $E^\Theta_v(B, z)$, we would forward all queries to $\Theta$ instead of using $\text{EmulateCall}$ except when the query is of the form $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ for some $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_B \cup Q_B^\hat{h}$, in which case we do not forward this query to $\Theta$ and use $\bot$ as the answer instead. We will refer to such decryption queries as being unknown.

- Hybrid 2: This is the ideal experiment, where all the queries asked during emulation, learning and final execution are answered relative to a true oracle $\Theta$. That is, all queries whose answers are emulated using $\text{EmulateCall}$ throughout the obfuscation and final evaluation phases will instead be answered directly using $\Theta$.

Claim 7.4.13. $\Delta(H^0, H^1) \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$

Proof. We first observe that the emulation and learning processes of Hybrid 0 is a statistical simulation of the true oracle. Furthermore, if the final execution phase asks a query $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ for which $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_B \cup Q_B^\hat{h}$ then the answer in both hybrids will be consistent with each other otherwise the answer is $\bot$ in both hybrids. Consequently, any encryption query will be answered in Hybrid 0 using random oracle $R$ and in Hybrid 1 using $\Theta$, and Hybrid 0 statistically simulates decryptions queries without access to $\Theta$.

The only event that can cause a discrepancy between these two hybrids is during the emulation and learning phases where a decryption query $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ is issued and $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_S$ but $c$ is a valid ciphertext (i.e. there exists $x$ such that $\text{Enc}(x) = c$). In that case, in Hybrid 0, the answer to such a query will be $\bot$ whereas the answer in Hybrid 1 will be $x$. However, the probability of that happening in Hybrid 1 (over the randomness of oracle $\Theta$) is at most $(2^n - p)/(2^{2n} - p) \leq 1/2^{n-1} = \text{negl}(\kappa)$ given that $p = tl_B l_O = \text{poly}(\kappa)$.

Claim 7.4.14. $\Delta(H^1, H^2) \leq \epsilon$

Proof. Note that, since the emulation and learning processes are the same in both hybrids, we have that $(Q^1_O, Q^1_B, Q^1_B^h) = (Q^2_O, Q^2_B, Q^2_B^h)$ and so we omit the superscripts when referencing these query-answer sets for simplicity of notation. In Hybrid 1, the execution of $\hat{B}$
emulates $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z)$ on a random input $z$ and answers all queries using $\Theta$ except for unknown decryption queries, whereas in Hybrid 2, we execute $\widehat{B}$ and answer all of $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z)$’s queries using the actual oracle $\Theta$. In essence, in Hybrid 1, we can think of the execution as $\text{Ev}^{\widehat{\Theta}}(B, z)$ where $\widehat{\Theta}$ is the oracle simulated by $\widehat{B}$ using $Q_B$ and $\Theta$. We will identify the events that differentiate between the executions $\text{Ev}^\Theta(B, z)$ and $\text{Ev}^{\widehat{\Theta}}(B, z)$.

Assume that the query-answer pairs so far during the execution of $\widehat{B}$ are the same in both hybrids. That is, we start with some $Q^1_B = Q^2_B = Q_{\widehat{B}}$ for the sake of proving inductively that any subsequent query-answer pairs are closely distributed between the two hybrids. Let $q$ be a new (possibly indirect) query that is being asked by $\text{Ev}^{\widehat{\Theta}}(B, z)$. We present a case-by-case analysis of all possible query types to identify the cases that can cause discrepancies between the two hybrids:

1. If $q$ is a query of type $\text{Enc}(x)$, then it will be answered the same in both hybrids using the true oracle $\Theta$.

2. If $q$ is of type $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ for which there exists $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_B \cup Q_{\widehat{B}}$ then the answer to $q$ would be determined the same in both hybrids. In particular, both hybrids will run $V^\Theta(w, x) = b$, adding any indirect queries to $Q_{\widehat{B}}$ and answering $q$ with $x$ if and only if $b = 1$.

3. If $q$ is of type $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ such that $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_S$ then this means that we are attempting to decrypt a ciphertext for which we have not encrypted before (either directly or indirectly). In Hybrid 2, since Enc is a sparse random injective function, the answer would be $\bot$ with overwhelming probability as $c$ would be invalid, and in Hybrid 1 the answer will also be $\bot$ by the definition of $\text{Ev}^{\widehat{\Theta}}(B, z)$ in this hybrid. Note that in both hybrids, there will not be any indirect queries in $Q_{\widehat{B}}$ as a result of this query since the ciphertext $c$ is deemed invalid and $V$ will not even be executed.

4. Suppose $q$ is of type $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ that is not determined by $Q_B \cup Q_{\widehat{B}}$ in Hybrid 1 and yet is determined by $Q_S$ in Hybrid 2. We list the different cases here that may cause problems:

   (a) If $q$ is of type $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ such that $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_S$ and $V^\Theta(w, x) = 0$ then this means that we are attempting to decrypt a ciphertext for which the decryption will fail. The answer will be $\bot$ in Hybrid 1 by the definition of $\text{Ev}^{\widehat{\Theta}}(B, z)$ and is also $\bot$ in Hybrid 2 since we are using the real oracle $\Theta$. However, one crucial point here is that, while there will possibly exist hidden queries due to the internal execution of $V^\Theta(w, x)$ in Hybrid 2, such hidden queries will not be present in Hybrid 1 as we do not run $V$ there. As we shall see later on, this presents a potential source of inconsistency for subsequent queries.

   (b) **Bad Event 1:** The query-answer pair $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is in $Q_O \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_{\widehat{B}})$ and $V^\Theta(w, x) = 1$. That is, we are for the first time decrypting a ciphertext that was encrypted in Step 1 because we failed to learn the answer of this decryption query
during the learning phase of Step 2. In that case, in Hybrid 1, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding message $x$ whereas in Hybrid 2 it would use the answer consistent with $Q_O \subseteq Q_S$ and output $x$.

(c) **Bad Event 2:** The query-answer pair $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is in $Q_B^h \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_B^\hat{h})$ and $\mathsf{V}(w, x) = 1$. That is, we are for the first time decrypting a ciphertext from a hidden encryption query in Step 2. In that case, in Hybrid 1, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding message $x$ whereas in Hybrid 2 it would use the answer consistent with $Q_h^B \subseteq Q_S$ and output $x$.

(d) **Bad Event 3:** The query-answer pair $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is in $Q_B^h \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_B^\hat{h})$ and $\mathsf{V}(w, x) = 1$ where $Q_B^h$ is the set of hidden queries generated in Hybrid 2 as a result of queries from Case 4a. In that case, in Hybrid 1, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding message $x$ whereas in Hybrid 2 it would use the answer consistent with $Q_h^B \subseteq Q_S$ and output $x$.

While the above bad events will generate indirect queries in Hybrid 2 (the ciphertext is valid there), these indirect queries will not be present in Hybrid 1, and may cause inconsistencies between the two hybrids when evaluating subsequent queries. However, as long as we show that the bad events happen with small probability, those indirect queries will also be generated in Hybrid 2 only with small probability.

For input $x$, let $E_1(x)$ be the event that Case 4b happens, $E_2(x)$ be the event that Case 4c happens, and $E_3(x)$ be the event that Case 4d happens. Assuming that event $E(x) = (E_1(x) \lor E_2(x) \lor E_3(x))$ does not happen, both experiments will proceed identically the same and the output distributions of $\text{Ev}^\theta(B, x)$ and $\text{Ev}^\hat{\theta}(B, x)$ will be statistically close. More formally, the probability of correctness for $\text{IO}$ is:

$$
\Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\hat{\theta}(B, x) \neq C(x)] = \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\hat{\theta}(B, x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)]
$$

$$
+ \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\hat{\theta}(B, x) \neq C(x) \land E(x)]
$$

$$
\leq \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\hat{\theta}(B, x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] + \Pr_x[E(x)]
$$

By the approximate functionality of IO, we have that:

$$
\Pr_x[\text{iO}^\theta(C)(x) \neq C(x)] = \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\theta(B, x) \neq C(x)] \leq \delta(n)
$$

Therefore,

$$
\Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\hat{\theta}(B, x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] = \Pr_x[\text{Ev}^\theta(B, x) \neq C(x) \land \neg E(x)] \leq \delta
$$

We are thus left to show that $\Pr[E(x)] = \Pr[E_1(x)] + \Pr[E_2(x) \mid \overline{E}_1(x)] + \Pr[E_3(x) \mid \overline{E}_1(x) \land \overline{E}_2(x)] \leq \epsilon$. Since both experiments proceed the same up until $E$ happens, the probability of $E$ happening is the same in both worlds and we will thus choose to bound these bad events in Hybrid 2.
Claim 7.4.15. \( \Pr_x[E_1(x)] \leq \epsilon/3. \)

**Proof.** Recall that \( E_1 \) is the event that during the final execution of the obfuscation \( \hat{B} \) on a random input, a \( \text{Dec}(w,c) \) query is asked for some \( c \) that was generated during the obfuscation phase but such a decryption query was never asked during the learning phase (Case 4b). For all \( i \in [t] \), let \( Q_{B_i} = (Q_{B_i} \cup Q_{B_i}^h) \cap Q_O \) be the set of query-answer pairs generated by the \( i \)'th evaluation \( \text{Ev}^{\Theta}(B, z_i) \) during the learning phase (Step 2) and are also generated during the obfuscation emulation phase (Step 1). Note that, since the maximum number of learning iterations \( m > \ell_O \) and \( Q_{B_i} \subseteq Q_{B_{i+1}} \), the number of learning iterations that increase the size of the set of learned obfuscation queries is at most \( \ell_O \). We say \( t \) is bad if it is the case that \( Q_{B_t} \neq Q_{B_{t+1}} \) (i.e. \( t \) is an index of a learning iteration that increases the size of the learned obfuscation queries). This would imply that after \( t \) learning iterations in Hybrid 1, the real execution \( Q_{\hat{B}} := Q_{B_{t+1}} \) would contain a new unlearned query that was in \( Q_O \). Thus, given that \( m = 3\ell_O/\epsilon \), the probability (over the selection of \( t \)) that \( t \) is bad is at most \( \ell_O/m < \epsilon/3 \).

\( \square \)

Claim 7.4.16. \( \Pr_x[E_2(x) \mid \overline{E_1(x)}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa) \)

**Proof.** Recall that \( E_2 \) is the event that during the final execution of the obfuscation \( \hat{B} \) on a random input, a query is asked that was issued during the learning phase but was part of the hidden set and therefore never publicized (Case 4c).

For all \( i \in [t] \), let \( Q_{B_i} = (Q_B \cup Q_{B_i}^h) \) be the set of (public and hidden) query-answer pairs generated by the \( i \)'th evaluation \( \text{Ev}^{\Theta}(B, z_i) \) during the learning phase (Step 2) and \( Q_{\hat{B}} \) be all the query-answer pairs of the final evaluation of the obfuscation. Note that in Hybrid 2, the real oracle \( \Theta \) is used and therefore each execution of \( \text{Ev}^{\Theta}(B, z_i) \) is independent of the other executions. In particular, we can think of the final evaluation as iteration \( t + 1 \) of the learning phase with query-answer pairs \( Q_{B_{t+1}} = Q_{\hat{B}} \). Now, we can think of an intermediate hybrid with distribution \( H^2 \) where the executions are randomly permuted in a way such that execution \( t + 1 \) in Hybrid 2 is now the first execution in Hybrid 2'. Note that, since the executions are independent, the distributions \( H^2 \) and \( H^2' \) are equivalent and it remains to show that \( E_2 \) is unlikely to happen in Hybrid 2'. Specifically, we need to show that the first execution of the learning phase (with query-answer pairs \( Q_{B_{t+1}} \)) does not decrypt a ciphertext generated by any previous hidden queries in the learning phase. However, since this is the first execution, there exists no hidden queries from previous executions and it suffices to argue that it does not decrypt a ciphertext generated by any hidden queries \( Q_{B_{t+1}}^h \) from its own execution.

Since \( E_1 \) does not happen and since the probability that \( \text{Ev}^{\Theta}(B, z_{t+1}) \) decrypts a ciphertext that was never encrypted during the whole process is negligible, the only ciphertexts that this execution will attempt to decrypt are ones that were generated during this very same execution. Therefore, \( E_2 \) only happens with negligible probability when a ciphertext that was never encrypted before is being decrypted.

\( \square \)

Claim 7.4.17. \( \Pr[E_3(x) \mid \overline{E_1(x)} \wedge \overline{E_2(x)}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa) \)

125
Proof. We bound this event in Hybrid 1. Given that the final execution in this hybrid does not issue unknown decryption queries, there are no hidden queries generated in this hybrid and so $E_3$ only happens with negligible probability when a ciphertext that was never encrypted before is being decrypted.

Combining the results of the above claims, we get that $\Pr_x[E(x)] \leq \Pr[E_1(x)] + \Pr[E_2(x) \mid \overline{E_1(x)}] + \Pr[E_3(x) \mid \overline{E_1(x)} \land \overline{E_2(x)}] \leq \epsilon/3 + \text{negl}(n) \leq \epsilon$.

Proving Security. To show that the resulting obfuscator is secure, it suffices to show that the compilation process represented as the new obfuscator’s construction is simulatable. We show a simulator $S$ (with access to $\Theta$) that works as follows: given an obfuscated circuit $B$ in the $\Theta$ ideal model, it runs the learning procedure as shown in Step 2 of the new obfuscator $\hat{\text{IO}}$ to learn the heavy queries $Q_B$ then outputs $\hat{B} = (B, Q_B)$. Note that this distribution is statistically close to the output of the real execution of $\hat{\text{IO}}$ and, therefore, security follows.

7.5 Separating IO from Homomorphic Witness Encryption

In this section, we formally prove our third main separation theorem which states that there is no fully black-box construction of indistinguishability obfuscation from any extended fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

Theorem 7.5.1. Assume the existence of one-way functions and that $\text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM}$. Then there exists no monolithic construction of indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) from fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).

In fact, we prove a stronger result by showing a separation of IO from a more generalized and powerful version of witness encryption, which we call extended extractable homomorphic witness encryption. In essence, this is an instance-revealing witness encryption (Definition 2.6.2) with added homomorphic capabilities and extractable security.

Definition 7.5.2 (Extended Extractable Instance-Revealing Homomorphic Witness Encryption). Let $V$ be a universal circuit-evaluator that takes instance $a$ and witness $w$ and either accepts or rejects. Furthermore, let $F$ be a universal circuit evaluator that takes as input a sequence of messages $m_1, ..., m_k$ to output some value $m'$. For any given security parameter $\kappa$, an extended extractable instance-revealing homomorphic witness encryption (ex-EIRHWE) scheme defined for $(V, F)$ consists of four PPT algorithms $P = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V, \text{Eval}_F)$ defined as follows:

- $\text{Enc}(a, m, 1^\kappa)$: given an instance $a \in \{0,1\}^*$ and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and security parameter $\kappa$ (and randomness as needed) it outputs $c \in \{0,1\}^*$.
• **Rev(c)**: given ciphertext c outputs \( a \in \{0,1\}^* \cup \{\bot\} \).

• **Dec\(_\mathcal{V}(w,c)\)**: given ciphertext c and “witness” string w, it outputs a message \( m' \in \{0,1\}^* \).

• **Eval\(_F(c_1,\ldots,c_k)\)**: given ciphertexts \( c_1 = \text{Enc}(a_1,m_1,1^\kappa), \ldots, c_k = \text{Enc}(a_k,m_k,1^\kappa) \), it outputs \( \{c'_i\}_{i=1}^p \) where \( p = |U| \) and \( U \subseteq A \) is the set of distinct attributes from \( A = \{a_1,\ldots,a_k\} \).

An extended extractable instance-revealing homomorphic witness encryption scheme satisfies the following completeness and security properties:

• **Decryption Correctness**: For any security parameter \( \kappa \), we have that the following two conditions are satisfied:
  
  - For any \( (w,a) \) such that \( \mathcal{V}(w,a) = 1 \), and any \( m \):
    \[
    \Pr_{\text{Enc,Dec}}[\text{Dec}(w,\text{Enc}(a,m,1^\kappa)) = m] = 1
    \]
  
  - For any \( (w_i,a_i) \) such that \( \mathcal{V}(w_i,a_i) = 1 \), and any \( m_1,\ldots,m_k \):
    \[
    \Pr_{\text{Enc,Dec,Eval}}[\text{Dec}(w_i,\text{Eval}(c_1,\ldots,c_k)) = \mathcal{F}(m_1,\ldots,m_k)|_{i}] = 1
    \]

    where \( c_i = \text{Enc}(a_k,m_k,1^\kappa) \) for all \( i \in [k] \) and \( \mathcal{F}(m_1,\ldots,m_k)|_{i} \) denotes the \( i \)th secret share of \( \mathcal{F}(m_1,\ldots,m_k) \).

• **Instance-Revealing Correctness**: For any security parameter \( \kappa \) and any \( (a,m) \) it holds that:
  \[
  \Pr_{\text{Enc,Rev}}[\text{Rev}(\text{Enc}(a,m,1^\kappa)) = a] = 1
  \]

  Furthermore, for any \( c \) for which there is no \( a,m,\kappa \) such that \( \text{Enc}(a,m,1^\kappa) = c \) it holds that \( \text{Rev}(c) = \bot \).

• **Extractability**: For any PPT adversary \( A \) and polynomial \( p_1(.) \), there exists a PPT (black-box) straight-line extractor \( E \) and a polynomial function \( p_2(.) \) such that the following holds. For any security parameter \( \kappa, \) for all \( a \) and any \( m_0 \neq m_1 \) of the same length \( |m_0| = |m_1| \), if:
  \[
  \Pr\left[A(1^\kappa,c) = b \mid b \leftarrow \{0,1\}, c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a,m_k,1^\kappa)\right] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{p_1(\kappa)}
  \]

  Then:
  \[
  \Pr[E^A(a) = w \wedge \mathcal{V}(w,a) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{p_2(\kappa)}
  \]

\(^5\)Without loss of generality, we exclude from the input to the evaluation any explicit in-the-clear representation of a function \( f \in \mathcal{F} \) to compute on the underlying messages as we can interpret the function \( f \) as a “message” \( m_f = f \), encrypt it to get \( c_f \) and include it as input to the evaluation.
Given the above definition of ex-EIRHWE, we prove the following theorem, which states that there is no fully black-box construction IO from extended EIRHWE.

**Theorem 7.5.3.** Assume the existence of one-way functions and that $\text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM}$. Then there exists no monolithic construction of indistinguishability obfuscation from extractable instance-revealing homomorphic witness encryption for any PPT verification algorithm $V$ and function $F$.

Since extended EIRHWE implies extended fully homomorphic encryption (in fact, in Sections 7.6.2 and 7.6.3, we show that it also implies other more powerful primitives such as extended attribute-based FHE and spooky encryption), Theorem 7.5.1 follows from Theorem 7.5.3, the above observations, and Lemma 6.6.3 (the transitivity lemma). As a result, for the remainder of this section we will focus on proving Theorem 7.5.3.

### 7.5.1 Overview of Proof Techniques

To prove Theorem 7.5.3, we will apply Lemma 7.2.7 for the rIRHWE model $\Psi$ (formally defined in Section 7.5.2) to prove that there is no black-box construction of IO from any primitive $P$ that can be oracle-fixed constructed from the $\Psi$. In particular, we will do so for $P$ that is the extended IRHWE primitive. Our task is thus twofold: (1) to prove that $P$ can be oracle-fixed constructed from $\Psi$ and (2) to show a simulatable compilation procedure that compiles out $\Psi$ from any IO construction. The first task is proven in Section 7.5.3 and the second task is proven in Section 7.5.4. By Lemma 7.2.7, this would imply the separation result of IO from $P$ and prove Theorem 7.5.3.

Our oracle, which is more formally defined in Section 7.5.2, resembles an idealized version of a homomorphic witness encryption scheme, which makes the construction of extended IRHWE straightforward. As a result, the main challenge lies in showing a simulatable compilation procedure for IO that satisfies Definition 7.2.2 in this idealized model, and therefore, it is instructive to look at how the compilation process works and what challenges are faced with dealing with oracle $\Psi$.

**High-level Compiler Structure and Challenges**

Here we briefly discuss the general structure of the proposed compiler before going over the issues that arise when dealing with how to compile out $\Psi$. In this ideal model, we will aim to compile out both the decryption and evaluation procedures to reduce the $\Psi$ oracle into a basic random oracle. Note, however, that while we will be using an instance-revealing oracle (and therefore we can run $V$ on the revealed attribute to discover its indirect queries similar to the IRWE case), we still have to handle those hidden queries issued by the evaluation function $F$.

**The Challenge Faced with Homomorphic Witness Encryption.** Similarly to the case of compiling out rIHWE, since $\Psi$ is an extended oracle, the algorithm $F$ is allowed to
issues queries to any subroutine in $\Psi$. As a result, during the learning process of the compilation procedure, a query to $\text{Eval}_F$ might be asked for which queries issued by $F$ would remain hidden (see Definition 7.4.12) and therefore may affect correctness when a new execution of $\hat{B}(x)$ hits one of those queries.

**Resolving the Challenge.** We resolve this problem by canonicalizing the emulation and learning processes as well as the obfuscation $B$ so that we force the obfuscation $B$, upon issuing a query $q$ of the form $\text{Eval}_F(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$, to explicitly reveal any queries asked by $F$ by having it call $F^\Psi(m_1, \ldots, m_k)$ if it knows all of the encryptions $\text{Enc}(a_i, m_i) = c_i$. However, we still need to consider the case that, when executing $\hat{B}(\Theta)(x)$, at least one of the encryptions are unknown, in which case, we simply emulate the answer of $q$ to be set of uniformly random ciphertexts (which we will categorize as fake ciphertexts). We argue that unless a $\text{Dec}$ query is asked to decrypt one of the fake ciphertexts then the real execution’s distribution is close to an ideal execution’s distribution. We prove that due to the learning procedure, such a decryption query has a low probability of happening.

### 7.5.2 The Ideal Model

In this section, we define the distribution of our ideal randomized oracle.

**Definition 7.5.4** (Random Instance-revealing Witness Homomorphic Encryption Oracle). Let $V$ be a universal circuit-evaluator that takes instance $a$ and witness $w$ and either accepts or rejects. Furthermore, let $F$ be a universal circuit evaluator that takes as input a sequence of messages $m_1, \ldots, m_k$ to output some value $m'$. Let $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ be a public random hash function. We define the following random instance-revealing witness homomorphic encryption (rIRWHE) oracle $\Psi_{V,F,n} = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V, \text{Eval}_F)$ as follows:

- **Enc**: $\{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ is a random injective function. We will use the Enc oracle to encrypt a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ with respect to attribute $a \in \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ to obtain a ciphertext $c \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$.

  For any $c \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$, we call $c$ valid if there exists $x$ such that $\text{Enc}(x) = c$ and fake otherwise.

- **Rev**: $\{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \cup \bot$ is a function that, given an input $c \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$, would output the corresponding $a$ for which $\text{Enc}((a, m)) = c$. If there is no such preimage then it outputs $\bot$ instead.

- **Dec$_V$**: $\{0, 1\}^{s} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n} \cup \{\bot\}$: Given $w \in \{0, 1\}^{k}, c \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ as inputs where $k = \text{poly}(n)$ and $s = k + 2n$, $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ allows us to decrypt the ciphertext $c$ and get $x = (a, m)$ as long as the predicate test is satisfied on $(w, a)$. More formally, do as follow:

  1. If $\not\exists$ $x$ such that $\text{Enc}(x) = c$, output $\bot$. Otherwise, continue to the next step.
2. Find $x$ such that $\text{Enc}(x) = c$.
3. If $V^\Theta(w,a) = 0$ output $\bot$. Otherwise, output $x = (a,m)$.

- $\text{Eval}_F : \{0,1\}^{2nk} \mapsto \{0,1\}^{2np}$: Given a sequence of inputs $c_1, ..., c_k$, this subroutine performs the following:
  1. If for some $i \in [k]$ $\nexists x_i = (a_i,m_i)$ for $\text{Enc}(x_i) = c_i$, then output $\bot$. Otherwise, continue to the next step.
  2. For each $i \in k$, find $x_i = (a_i, m_i)$ such that $\text{Enc}(x_i) = c_i$ (this is an inefficient process). Let $\{a'_1, ..., a'_p\}$ be the set of distinct attributes embedded in $x_1, ..., x_k$ where $p \leq k$.
  3. Run $b = \Psi^\Psi(m_1, ..., m_k)$
  4. Output $\{c'_i\}_{i=1}^p$ where, for all $i \in [p]$, $c'_i = \text{Enc}(x'_i)$, $x'_i = (a'_i, b_i || h_i)$, where the value $h$ is defined as $h_i = H(i, a_1, ..., a_k, m_1, ..., m_k)$ and $b_i$ is the $i$’th share of $b$.

We define a query-answer pair resulting from query $q$ to subroutine $T \in \{\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V, \text{Eval}_F\}$ with some answer $\beta$ as $(q \mapsto \beta)_T$. For simplicity, when $n$ is clear from the context, we use $\Psi = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V, \text{Eval}_F)$ to refer to $\Psi_{V,F,n}$ for a fixed $n$.

Remark 7.5.5. Note that for the sake of achieving the most general case of extended primitives from this oracle, we will allow both $F$ and $V$ to have any oracle gates to $\Psi = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_V, \text{Rev}, \text{Eval}_F)$.

### 7.5.3 Homomorphic Witness Encryption exists relative to $\Psi$

In this section, we show how to construct a semantically-secure extended extractable IRHWE with corresponding universal-circuit evaluators $V$ and $F$ relative to $\Psi = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V, \text{Eval}_F)$. More specifically, we will show how to construct a primitive (in the $\Psi$ oracle model) that is simpler to prove the existence of and yet still implies EIRHWE.

**Definition 7.5.6** (Extended Extractable One-way Homomorphic Witness Encryption (ex-EOWHWE)). Let $V$ be a universal circuit-evaluator that takes instance $a$ and witness $w$ and either accepts or rejects. Furthermore, let $F$ be a universal circuit evaluator that takes as input a sequence of messages $m_1, ..., m_k$ to output some value $m'$. For any given security parameter $\kappa$, an extended extractable one-way homomorphic witness encryption scheme consists of the following PPT algorithms $P = (\text{Enc}, \text{Rev}, \text{Dec}_V, \text{Eval}_F)$ defined as follows:

- $\text{Enc}(a,m,1^\kappa)$: given an instance $a \in \{0,1\}^*$, message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and security parameter $\kappa$ (and randomness as needed) it outputs $c \in \{0,1\}^*$.
- $\text{Rev}(c)$: given ciphertext $c$ returns the underlying attribute $a \in \{0,1\}^*$.
- $\text{Dec}_V(w,c)$: given ciphertext $c$ and “witness” string $w$, it outputs a message $m' \in \{0,1\}^*$.
An extended extractable one-way homomorphic witness encryption scheme satisfies the same completeness properties of Definition 7.5.2 but with the extractability property replaced with the following:

- **Extractable One-Wayness**: For any PPT adversary $A$ and polynomial $p_1(\cdot)$, there exists a PPT (black-box) straight-line extractor $E$ and a polynomial function $p_2(\cdot)$ such that the following holds. For any security parameter $\kappa$, $k = \text{poly}(\kappa)$, and for all $a$, if:

$$
\Pr[A(1^\kappa, c) = m \mid m \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k, c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a, m, 1^\kappa)] \geq \frac{1}{p_1(\kappa)}
$$

Then:

$$
\Pr[E^{A}(a) = w \land \text{V}(w, a) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{p_2(\kappa)}
$$

**Construction 7.5.7** (Extended Extractable One-Way Homomorphic Witness Encryption). Let $V$ be a universal circuit-evaluator that takes instance $a$ and witness $w$ and either accepts or rejects. Furthermore, let $F$ be a universal circuit evaluator that takes as input a sequence of messages $m_1, \ldots, m_k$ to output some value $m'$. For any security parameter $\kappa$ and oracle $\Psi_k$ sampled according to Definition 7.5.4, we will implement an extended EOHWE scheme $P$ for messages $m \in \{0, 1\}^k$ where $k = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ as follows:

- $\text{WEnc}(a, m, 1^\kappa)$: Given $a \in \{0, 1\}^s$, message $m \in \{0, 1\}^k$ and security parameter $1^\kappa$, output $\text{Enc}(x)$ where $x = (a, m)$.

- $\text{WDec}(w, c)$: Given witness $w$ and ciphertext $c$, let $x' = \text{Dec}_V(w, c)$. If $x' \neq \perp$, parse as $x' = (a', m')$ and output $m'$. Otherwise, output $\perp$.

- $\text{WEval}(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$: Given ciphertexts $c_1, \ldots, c_k$, it outputs $\text{Eval}_F(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$.

**Remark 7.5.8** (From one-wayness to indistinguishability.). We note that the primitive ex-EOHWE, which has one-way security, can be used to build an indistinguishability-based ex-IRHWE. For any $a$, since $\text{Enc}(a, \cdot)$ is a random injective function (and hence one-way) we have that, by the Goldreich-Levin theorem [GL89], there exists a hardcore predicate $b = \langle r, r' \rangle$ for the one-way function $\text{Enc}'(a, r, r') :\langle \text{Enc}(a, r), r' \rangle$. Now, to encrypt a one-bit message $b$ under some attribute $a$, we would output the ciphertext $c = \langle \text{Enc}(a, r), r' \rangle$ where $r, r' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ are randomly sampled conditioned on $b = \langle r, r' \rangle$. Furthermore, to perform an evaluation $\text{Eval}'(c_1, \ldots, c_p)$ over a set of ciphertexts of the form $c_i = \langle c_i', r_i' \rangle$ where $c_i' = \text{Enc}(a, r_i)$, we will first choose $r_i'$ uniformly at random then run $\text{Eval}_F(c_i', \ldots, c_p')$ where $F$ is defined such that it outputs random $r_F$ for which $\langle r_F, r_i' \rangle = F'(\langle r_1, r_1' \rangle, \ldots, \langle r_p, r_p' \rangle)$. We then output $c_F = \langle \text{Enc}(a, r_F), r_F' \rangle$ as the new evaluated ciphertext.

**Lemma 7.5.9.** Construction 7.5.7 is a correct and subexponentially-secure oracle-fixed implementation (Definition 3.1.4) of an extended extractable one-way homomorphic witness encryption in the ideal $\Psi$ oracle model.
To prove the security of this construction, we will show that if there exists an adversary $A$ against scheme $P$ (in the $Ψ$ oracle model) that can invert an encryption of a random message with non-negligible advantage then there exists a (fixed) deterministic straight-line extractor $E$ with access to $Ψ = (Enc, Rev, DecV, EvalF)$ that can find the witness for the underlying instance of the challenge ciphertext.

Suppose $A$ is an adversary in the inversion game with success probability $ε$. Then the extractor $E$ would work as follows: given $a$ as input and acting as the challenger for adversary $A$, it chooses $m ← \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random then runs $A^Ψ(1^κ, c^*)$ where $c^* ← WEnc(a, m, 1^κ)$ is the challenge. Let $QA$ be the set of query-answer pairs for the encryption queries that $A$ will ask. Queries issued by $A$ are handled by $E$ as follows:

- To answer any query $Enc(x)$ asked by $A$, it forwards the query to the oracle $Ψ$ and returns some answer $c$. Add $(x → c)_{Enc}$ to $QA$.

- To answer any query $Rev(c)$ asked by $A$, it forwards the query to the oracle $Ψ$ and returns some answer $a$.

- To answer any query $DecV(w, c)$ asked by $A$, the extractor first issues a query $Rev(c)$ to get some answer $a$. If $a ≠ ⊥$, it would execute $V^Ψ(w, a)$, forwarding queries asked by $V$ to $Ψ$ similar to how it does for $A$ and adds any resulting query-answer pairs to $QA$. Finally, it forwards the query $DecV(w, c)$ to $Ψ$ to get some answer $x$. If $a = ⊥$, it returns $⊥$ to $A$ otherwise it returns $x$ and adds $(x → c)_{Enc}$ to $QA$ if $x ≠ ⊥$.

- To answer any query $EvalF(c_1, ..., c_k)$ asked by $A$, the extractor first issues queries $Rev(c_1), ..., Rev(c_k)$ to get a sequence of answers $(a_1, ..., a_k)$. Let $(a'_1, ..., a'_p)$ be the set of unique attributes from $(a_1, ..., a_k)$. If $a'_i ≠ ⊥$ for all $i ∈ [p]$, it would check if there exists $((a_i, m_i) → c_i)_{Enc}$ for all $i ∈ [k]$ in $QA$. If so, it proceeds to run $m' ← F^Ψ(m_1, ..., m_k)$, forwarding queries asked by $F$ to $Ψ$, then finally returns $\{c'_i\}_{i=1}^p$ where $c'_i = Enc(a'_i, b_i|hi)$, $b_i$ is the $i$’th random additive share of $m'$ and the value of $hi$ is equal to $H(i, a_1, ..., a_k, m_1, ..., m_k)$. Finally, it adds all of $(x'_i → c'_i)_{Enc}$ to $QA$ where $x'_i = (a'_i, b_i|hi)$.

However, if $(x_i → c_i)_{Enc} ∉ QA$ for some $i ∈ [k]$, and in particular if $c_i = c^*$ for some $i$, then the extractor would instead emulate the ciphertext evaluations $c'_i$ by encrypting a random message for each different attribute $a'_i$ (since it does not know the underlying plaintext and cannot run $F$) and we call $c'_i$ fake ciphertexts. Note that by the collision resistance property of $H$, $A$ would not be able to distinguish between such fake ciphertexts and real evaluated ones.

While handling the queries made by $A$, if a decryption query $DecV(w, c)$ is issued by $A$ (perhaps even indirectly as a result of running $V$ or $F$) for some $c$ such that $Rev(c) = Rev(c^*)$ (this includes either decrypting $c^*$ directly or another $c'$ having the same attribute as $c^*$ that was perhaps generated as a result of an evaluation query with $c^*$ as one of the inputs), the extractor will pass this query to $Ψ$, and if the result of the decryption is $x ≠ ⊥$ then the extractor will halt execution and output $w$ as the witness for instance $x^* = (a, m)$. Otherwise,
assuming that several bad events do not happen. Let $B$ be the bad event that $E$ succeeds in extracting a witness (as in Equation (7.6) above). Note that, by our construction of extractor $E$, when $E$ executes $A$, it perfectly simulates the oracle $\Psi$ for $A$ assuming that several bad events do not happen. Let $B_1$ be the bad event that $A$ asks Dec$(w, c_1)$ or Eval$(c_1, ..., c_k)$ where $(x_i \mapsto c_i)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_A$ for some $i \in [k]$. Let $B_2$ be the bad event that $A$ asks Dec$(w, c_1)$ or Eval$(c_1, ..., c_k)$ where $(x_i \mapsto c_i)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_A$ for some $i$ is a hidden query that was asked due to a previous query Eval$(y_1, ..., y_k)$ and $y_j = c^*$ or is otherwise fake for some $j$ (so $F$ could not be executed by the extractor). As long as $B = (B_1 \lor B_2)$ does not happen then the extractor will perfectly simulate $A$’s view.

Note that for the special case of FHE, as long as $B$ does not happen then all fake ciphertexts have the same attribute as $c^*$ since the only case that Eval$(c_1, ..., c_k)$ would generate a fake ciphertext is when Rev$(c_i) = \text{Rev}(c^*)$ for all $i$. If $A$ issues Dec$\psi(w, c'_i)$ for some fake ciphertext $c'_i$ then the extractor would return the answer returned by $\Psi$ even though that answer might be a random incorrect answer. However, this is safe to do since once $A$ successfully decrypts a fake ciphertext (which must have an attribute equal to the attribute of $c^*$), the extractor wins immediately.

For the more general case where a fake ciphertext $c'_i$ generated by $(c'_1, ..., c'_k) \leftarrow \text{Eval}(c_1, ..., c_k)$ queries may have different attributes (depending on the attribute value of the input ciphertexts), we argue that decrypting $c'_i$ where Rev$(c'_i) \neq \text{Rev}(c^*)$ will not affect the distribution of the view of $A$. Recall that, by the design of the extractor, $c'_i$ would be an encryption of a random message when in the ideal world it would have been an encryption of the $i$’th random additive share of $F(m_1, ..., m_k)$. However, by the security of the random secret sharing, we can argue that, without knowing all the other secret shares, the distributions Dec$(w, c'_i)$ and $U_{n/2}$ are statistically close.

As a result of the above, the event $B$ reduces to finding an image of a sparse random injective function, which is negligibly hard to accomplish. Now we show that whenever $A$ wins then $E$ must win as well. Observe that:

$$\Pr_{\Theta, m} [\text{ExtWin}] \leq \Pr_{\Theta, m} [\text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin} \land \overline{B}] + \Pr_{\Theta, m} [\text{AdvWin}] + \Pr_{\Theta, m} [B]$$

Since $\Pr[\text{AdvWin}] \geq \epsilon$ for some non-negligible function $\epsilon$ and $\Pr[B] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$, it suffices to show that $\Pr[\text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin} \land \overline{B}]$ is negligible. Note that this event is equivalent to
saying that the adversary succeeds in the inversion game but never asks a query of the form \( \text{Dec}_\Psi(w, c') \) such that \( \text{Rev}(c') = \text{Rev}(c^*) \) and for which the answer is \( x \neq \bot \) so the extractor fails to recover the witness. For simplicity of notation define \( \text{Win} := \text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin} \land \bar{B} \).

We will show that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of oracle \( \Psi \), the probability of \( \text{Win} \) happening is negligible. That is, we will prove the following claim:

**Claim 7.5.11.** For any negligible \( \delta \), \( \Pr_\Theta \left[ \Pr_m[\text{Win}] \geq \sqrt{\delta} \right] \leq \sqrt{\delta} \)

**Proof.** We list all possible queries that \( A \) could ask and argue that these queries do not help \( A \) in any way without also forcing the extractor to win as well. Specifically, we show that for any such \( A \) that satisfies the event \( \text{Win} \), there exists another adversary \( \hat{A} \) that depends on \( A \) and also satisfies the same event but does not ask any decryption or evaluation queries (only encryption queries). This would then reduce to the standard case of inverting a random injective function, which is known to be hard over the randomness of the oracle. We define the adversary \( \hat{A} \) as follows. Upon executing \( A \), it handles the queries issued by \( A \) as follows:

- If \( A \) asks a query of the form \( \text{Enc}(x) \) then \( \hat{A} \) forwards the query to \( \Psi \) to get the answer.
- If \( A \) asks a query of the form \( \text{Rev}(c) \) then, since \( B \) does not happen, it must be the case that \( ((a, m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_A \) and therefore \( \hat{A} \) returns \( a \).
- If \( A \) asks a query of the form \( \text{Dec}(w, c^*) \) or \( \text{Dec}(w, c') \) where \( c' \) has the same attribute as \( c^* \) then \( w \) must be a string for which \( V^\Psi(w, c^*) = 0 \) or otherwise the extractor wins, which contradicts that \( \text{ExtWin} \) happens. If that is the case, since \( w \) is not a witness, \( \hat{A} \) would return \( \bot \) to \( A \) after running \( V^\Psi(w, c^*) \) and answering its queries appropriately.
- If \( A \) asks a query of the form \( \text{Dec}(w, c') \) for some \( c' \neq c^* \) then, since \( B \) does not happen, it must be the case that \( A \) has asked a (direct or indirect) visible encryption query \( \text{Enc}(x') = c' \). Therefore, \( \hat{A} \) would have observed this encryption query and can therefore run \( V^\Psi(w, a') \) and return the appropriate answer (\( x \) or \( \bot \)) depending on the answer of \( V \).
- If \( A \) asks a query of the form \( \text{Eval}_F(c_1, \ldots, c_k) \) and \( ((a_i, m_i) \mapsto c_i)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_A \) for all \( i \) then \( \hat{A} \) can compute \( \beta = F^\Psi(m_1, \ldots, m_k) \), handling its queries, returning the correct encryptions of each share of \( \beta \), and adding the resulting new encryptions to \( Q_A \).
- If \( A \) asks a query of the form \( \text{Eval}_F(c_1, \ldots, c_k) \) and \( c_i = c^* \) or is otherwise a fake ciphertext then \( \hat{A} \) returns encryptions of random messages under the same attributes as the input ciphertexts (without running \( F \)). Note that, while an ideal execution would generate hidden encryption queries from running \( F \), since \( B \) does not happen, these hidden encryption queries will not be decrypted with high probability.

Given that \( \hat{A} \) perfectly emulates \( A \)'s view, the only possibility that \( A \) could win the inversion game is by asking \( \text{Enc}(x^*) = c^* \) and hitting the challenge ciphertext. By a standard averaging argument, we find that since \( \Pr_\Theta_m[\text{Win}] \leq \delta(\kappa) \) for some negligible \( \delta \) then \( \Pr_\Theta[\Pr_m[\text{Win}] \leq \sqrt{\delta}] \geq 1 - \sqrt{\delta} \), which yields the result.  

134
To conclude the proof of Lemma 7.5.10, we can see that the probability that the extractor wins is given by $\Pr[\text{ExtWin}] \geq 1 - \Pr[\text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin} \land \overline{B}] - \Pr[\text{AdvWin}] - \Pr[B] \geq \epsilon - \text{negl}(\kappa)$ where $\epsilon$ is the advantage to $A$.

Proof of Lemma 7.5.9. It is clear that the Construction 7.5.7 is correct. Furthermore, by Lemma 7.5.10, it also satisfies the extractability property.

7.5.4 Compiling out $\Psi$ from IO

In this section, we show a simulatable compiler for compiling out $\Psi$. We formalize the approach outlined in Section 7.5.1 while making use of Lemma 7.2.4, which allows us to compile out $\Psi$ in two phases: we first compile out part of $\Psi$ to get an approximately-correct obfuscator $\widehat{IO}^R$ in the random oracle model, and then use the result of [CKP15] to compile out $R$ and get an obfuscator $\widehat{IO}$ in the plain-model. Since we are applying this lemma only a constant number of times (in fact, just twice), security should still be preserved. Specifically, we will prove the following claim:

Lemma 7.5.12. Let $R \sqsubseteq \Psi$ be a random oracle where “$\sqsubseteq$” denotes a sub-model relationship (see Definition 7.2.1). Then the following holds:

- For any IO in the $\Psi$ ideal model, there exists a simulatable compiler with correctness error $\epsilon < 1/200$ for it that outputs a new obfuscator in the random oracle $R$ model.
- For any IO in the random oracle model, there exists a simulatable compiler with correctness error $\epsilon < 1/200$ for it that outputs a new obfuscator in the plain model.

Proof. The second part of Lemma 7.5.12 follows directly from [CKP15], and thus we focus on proving the first part of the claim. Before we start describing the compilation process, we present the following definition of canonical executions that is a property of algorithms in this ideal model and dependent on the oracle being removed.

Definition 7.5.13 (Canonical executions). We define an oracle algorithm $A^\Psi$ relative to rIRHWE to be in canonical form if it satisfies all of the following requirements:

- Before asking any Dec$_V(w, c)$ query for a valid $c$ query, $A$ would first get $a \leftarrow \text{Rev}(c)$ then run $V^\Psi(w, a)$ on its own, making sure to answer any queries of $V$ using $\Psi$.
- After asking a query Dec$_V(w, c)$ for which the returned answer is some message $m \neq \bot$, issue a query $a \leftarrow \text{Rev}(c)$ followed by Enc$(x)$ where $x = (a, m)$.
- Before $A$ asks a query Eval$_F(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ for which it knows the corresponding encryptions $c_1 = \text{Enc}(a_1, m_1), \ldots, c_k = \text{Enc}(a_k, m_k)$, it would first call $b \leftarrow F^\Psi(m_1, \ldots, m_k)$, making sure to answer any queries of $F$ using $\Psi$. Let $(a'_1, \ldots, a'_p)$ be the distinct attributes from $(a_1, \ldots, a_k)$ where $p \leq k$ and $b_i$ be the $i$'th share of $b$ where $i \in [p]$. $A$ would then issue calls to Enc$(x'_i)$ where for all $i \in [p], x'_i = (a_i, b_i | H(i, a_1, \ldots, a_k, m_1, \ldots, m_k))$. 

135
After $A$ asks a query $\text{Eval}_\mathcal{F}(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ for which the returned answer is a sequence of ciphertexts $c'_1, \ldots, c'_p$ where $p \leq k$, issue queries $\text{Rev}(c'_i)$ for all $i \in [p]$.

Note that any oracle algorithm $A$ can be easily modified into a canonical form by increasing its query complexity by at most a polynomial factor (since $V$ and $F$ are PPT algorithms).

We now proceed to present the construction of the random oracle model obfuscator $\hat{\text{IO}} = (\hat{iO}, \hat{\text{Ev}})$ that, given an obfuscator in the $\Psi$ model, would compile out and emulate queries to $\text{Rev}$, $\text{Dec}$ and $\text{Eval}$ while forwarding any $\text{Enc}$ queries to $R$. Throughout this process, we assume that the obfuscator $iO$ and evaluation procedure $\text{Ev}$ are all canonicalized according to Definition 7.5.13. For these canonical algorithms, let $l_O, l_B = \text{poly}(\kappa)$, respectively, be the number of queries asked by the ideal-model obfuscator $iO$ and the evaluation $\text{Ev}$ to the rIRHWE oracle $\Psi$.

The new obfuscator $\hat{\text{IO}}^R$ in the random oracle model

Let $R = \{R_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be the (injective) random oracle where $R_n : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2^n}$. Given a $\delta$-approximate obfuscator $\text{IO} = (iO, \text{Ev})$ in the rIRWHE oracle model, we construct an $(\delta + \epsilon)$-approximate obfuscator $\hat{\text{IO}} = (\hat{iO}, \hat{\text{Ev}})$ in the random oracle model.

Subroutine $\hat{iO}^R(C)$:

1. **Emulation phase**: Given input $C \in C_n$, emulate $iO^\Psi(C)$ and let $B$ be the output of this emulation. Let $T_O$ be the transcript of this phase and initialize $Q_O := Q(T_O) = \emptyset$. For every query $q$ asked by $iO^\Psi(C)$:
   - Call $(\rho_q, W_H) \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^\Psi(Q_O, q)$ as shown in Algorithm 3 and return the answer in $\rho_q$
   - Add $\rho_q$ and $W_H$ to $Q_O$

   Note that we will not pass any query-answer pairs $Q_O$ asked by $iO^\Psi$ to the output of this new obfuscation. All of the query-answer pairs in $Q_O$ will only be used for emulation purposes in the following step.

2. **Learning phase**: Let $Q_B$ be the set of all visible queries that will be learned (which will be passed on to the obfuscated circuit) and let $Q^h_B$ be the set of hidden queries that we will keep track of for emulation purposes (which will not be made public to the obfuscated circuit). Set $m = 4\ell_O/\epsilon$ where $\ell_O \leq |iO|$ represents the number of queries asked by $iO$. Choose $t \leftarrow \mathcal{S}[m]$ uniformly at random then for $i = 1, \ldots, t$ do the following:
   - Choose $z_i \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{|C|}$ uniformly at random
   - Run $\text{Ev}^\Psi(B, z_i)$. For every query $q$ asked by $\text{Ev}^\Psi(B, z_i)$:
     - Call $(\rho_q, W_H) \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q_O \cup Q_B \cup Q^h_B, q)$ and return the answer in $\rho_q$. Add $\rho_q$ to $Q_B$ and add $W_H$ to $Q^h_B$. 

136
Algorithm 3: EmulateCall

**Input:** Query-answer set $Q$, query $q$

**Oracle:** Random Oracle $R$, Hash function $H$

**Output:** $(\rho_q, W_H)$ where $\rho_q$ is a query-answer pair containing the answer of query $q$ and $W_H$ is the set of indirect query-answer pairs (those added by $F$)

**Begin:**

Initialize $W_H = \emptyset$

if $q$ is a query of type $\text{Enc}(x)$ then

| Set $\rho_q = (x \mapsto R(x))_{\text{Enc}}$

end

if $q$ is a query of the form $\text{Rev}(c)$ then

| if $\exists (x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q$ where $x = (a, m)$ then

| | Set $\rho_q = (c, a)$

| else

| | Set $\rho_q = (c, \bot)$

end

end

if $q$ is a query of the form $\text{Dec}_V(w, c)$ then

| if $\exists (x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q$ for some $x = (a, m)$ then

| | Emulate $b \leftarrow V^*(w, a)$ while handling its queries using EmulateCall

| | if $b = 1$ then

| | | Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto x)_{\text{Dec}}$

| | else

| | | Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto \bot)_{\text{Dec}}$

| | end

else

| Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto \bot)_{\text{Dec}}$

end

end

[Continued next page...]

137
Algorithm 3: `EmulateCall` (Continued)

if \( q \) is a query of the form `Eval_F(c_1, \ldots, c_k)` then

- For all \( i \in [k] \), get \((\rho_{a_i}, W_{a_i}) \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}(Q, \text{Rev}(c_i))\) then add \( \rho_{a_i} \) to \( Q \)
- Let \( \{a'_1, \ldots, a'_p\} \) be the distinct attributes of \( \{a_1, \ldots, a_k\} \)
- If \( a_i = \perp \) for some \( i \) then return \( ((q \mapsto \perp) \text{Eval}, W_H) \)
- if \( \forall i \exists ((a_i, m_i) \mapsto c_i)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q \) and \( c_i \) are valid then
  - Emulate \( b \leftarrow F^\Psi(m_1, \ldots, m_k) \)
  - for each query \( q_F \) asked by \( F \) do
    - \((\rho_{F}, W_{F}) \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q \cup W_H, q_F)\)
  - \( W_H = W_H \cup (\rho_{F} \cup W_{F}) \)
- else
  - For all \( a'_i \in \{a'_1, \ldots, a'_p\} \), set \( c'_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a'_i, r_i) \) where \( r_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \) and add to \( W_H \)
  - Set \( \rho_q = ((c_1, \ldots, c_k) \mapsto (c'_1, \ldots, c'_p))_{\text{Eval}} \)

end

Return \((\rho_q, W_H)\)

---

Since `Ev` is a canonical algorithm, in addition to the direct queries asked by `Ev^\Psi(B, z_i)` to `Ψ`, the resulting query set \( Q_B \) would also include the indirect queries that have resulted from `Ev^\Psi(B, z_i)` running `V^\Psi(w, a)`. Furthermore, if a query `Eval_F(c_1, \ldots, c_k)` is issued where `\text{Enc}((a_i, m_i)) = c_i` then the indirect queries asked by `F^\Psi(m_1, \ldots, m_k)` will be made visible to the final execution so long as the query-answer pairs `((a_i, m_i) \mapsto c_i)_{\text{Enc}}` for all \( i \) were directly asked beforehand (i.e. were in \( Q_B \)).

3. The output of the random oracle model obfuscation algorithm \( \widehat{iO}^R(C) \) will be \( \widehat{B} = (B, Q_B) \) where \( Q_B \) is the set of visible (direct/indirect) query-answer pairs.

**Subroutine** \( \widehat{Ev}^R(\widehat{B}, z) \): Initialize \( Q_{\widehat{B}} = \emptyset \) to be the set of queries asked when evaluating \( \widehat{B} \). To evaluate \( \widehat{B} = (B, Q_B) \) on a new random input \( z \), we emulate `Ev^\Psi(B, z)`. For every query \( q \) asked by `Ev^\Psi(B, z)`:  

- Run and set \((\rho_q, W_H) = \text{EmulateCall}^R(Q_B \cup Q_{\widehat{B}}, q)\) then return the answer in \( \rho_q \).
- Add \( \rho_q \) and \( W_H \) to \( Q_{\widehat{B}} \)

**Remark 7.5.14** (Fake ciphertexts). Throughout the circuit evaluation \( \widehat{Ev}(\widehat{B}, z) \) subroutine, note that if a query of the form `Eval_F(c_1, \ldots, c_k)` is asked where at least one of the input ciphertexts \( c_i \) is not known to the evaluator, the answer to the query will be simulated as a
sequence of encryptions of random messages (since at least one the underlying messages is unknown and therefore $F$ cannot be computed). From here on, we refer to such simulated ciphertexts as *fake ciphertexts*.

**The running time of $\hat{iO}$.** We note that the running time of the new obfuscator $\hat{iO}$ remains polynomial time since we are emulating the original obfuscation once followed by a polynomial number $m$ of learning iterations. Furthermore, while we are indeed working with an oracle where the universal circuit evaluators $V$ and $F$ can have oracle gates to subroutines of $\Psi$, we emphasize that in our framework of extended primitives, the effective running times of $V$ and $F$, which we are executing during $\text{EmulateCall}$, remain a strict polynomial in the size of the original circuits and so the issue of exponential or infinite recursive calls is non-existent.

**Proving Approximate Correctness.** Let $Q_S = (Q_O \cup Q_B \cup Q_B^h \cup Q_{\hat{B}})$ be the set of all query-answer pairs asked during the emulation, learning, and final execution phases. We define the following hybrid experiments to show that the correctness of the new random-oracle model obfuscator that simulates an execution of a $\Psi$-model obfuscation is sufficiently close to the correctness of an ideal execution of the $\Psi$-model obfuscation. We denote the distribution of Hybrid $i$ as $H^i = (Q_O^i, Q_B^i, Q_B^{ih}, Q_{\hat{B}}^i)$.

- **Hybrid 0:** This is the real experiment, which is represented as the construction in Section 7.5.4.
- **Hybrid 1:** This is the same as Hybrid 0 except for two differences:
  - The queries asked during emulation (Step 1) and learning (Step 2) answered relative to a true oracle $\Psi$ instead of emulating them using $\text{EmulateCall}$.
  - We modify the final execution $\hat{\text{Ev}}(\hat{B}, z)$ such that, when we execute $\text{Ev}^\Psi(B, z)$, we would forward all queries to $\Psi$ instead of using $\text{EmulateCall}$ except when the query $q$ is of the form $\text{Eval}(c_1, ..., c_k)$ where $(x_i \mapsto c_i)_{E\text{nc}} \notin Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}$ for some $c_i$, in which case we do not forward this query to $\Psi$ and use the simulated answer returned by $\text{EmulateCall}(Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}, q)$ as the answer instead (which does not run $F$ and returns fake ciphertexts instead).
- **Hybrid 2:** This is the ideal experiment, where all the queries asked during emulation, learning and final execution are answered relative to a true oracle $\Psi$. That is, all queries whose answers are emulated using $\text{EmulateCall}$ throughout the obfuscation and final evaluation phases will instead be answered directly using $\Psi$.

**Claim 7.5.15.** $\Delta(H^0, H^1) \leq \frac{\epsilon}{2} + \text{negl}(\kappa)$

**Proof.** We first observe that the emulation and learning processes of Hybrid 0 is a statistical simulation of the true oracle. The only event that can cause a discrepancy between these two hybrids during the emulation and learning phases is when a query of the form $\text{Rev}(c)$,
Dec\(_\Psi(w,c)\), or Eval\((c_1,\ldots,c_k)\) is issued but the emulator has never issued an encryption query that maps to an input of those queries (hitting a valid ciphertext without knowing the underlying plaintext). In that case, in Hybrid 0, the answer to such a query will be \(\bot\) as defined by \texttt{EmulateCall} whereas the answer in Hybrid 1 will be consistent with the true oracle and return the correct answer. However, the probability of that happening in Hybrid 1 (over the randomness of oracle \(\Psi\)) is at most \((2^n-p)/(2^{2n}-p)\) \(\leq 1/2^{n-1} = \text{negl}(\kappa)\) given that \(p = tl_{BlO} = \text{poly}(\kappa)\).

Next, we need to show that the distribution of query-answer pairs in the final execution phase is close. In Hybrid 0, the execution of \(\hat{B}\) emulates \(\text{Ev}^\Psi(B,z)\) on a random input \(z\) and emulates the answers of all queries using \texttt{EmulateCall}, whereas in Hybrid 1 we answer all queries of \(\text{Ev}^\Psi(B,z)\) using the true \(\Psi\) except for Eval\((c_1,\ldots,c_k)\) queries for which \((x_i \mapsto c_i)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}\) for some \(c_i\). In essence, in Hybrid 0, we can think of the execution as \(\text{Ev}^\Psi(B,z)\) where \(\tilde{\Psi}\) is the oracle simulated using just \(Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}\), and in Hybrid 1, we can think of the execution as \(\text{Ev}^\Psi(B,z)\) where \(\tilde{\Psi}\) is the oracle simulated using just \(Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}\) and \(\Psi\) except for evaluation queries of the aforementioned type (which generate fake ciphertexts). We will identify the events that differentiate between the executions \(\text{Ev}^\Psi(B,z)\) and \(\text{Ev}^\Psi(B,z)\).

Assume that the query-answer pairs so far during the execution of \(\hat{B}\) are the same in both hybrids. That is, we start with some \(Q_B^0 = Q_{\hat{B}}^0 = Q_{\hat{B}}\) for the sake of proving inductively that any subsequent query-answer pairs are closely distributed between the two hybrids. Let \(q\) be a new (possibly indirect) query that is being asked by \(\text{Ev}(B,z)\). We present a case-by-case analysis of all possible query types to identify the cases that can cause discrepancies between the two hybrids:

1. If \(q\) is a query of type \(\text{Enc}(x)\), then it will be answered the same in both hybrids using the random oracle \(R\) in Hybrid 0 and using the true oracle \(\Psi\) in Hybrid 1.

2. If \(q\) is of type \(\text{Rev}(c)\) for which there exists \(((a,m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}\) or \((c \mapsto a)_{\text{Rev}} \in Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}\) then the answer to \(q\) would be \(a\) in both hybrids.

3. If \(q\) is of type \(\text{Dec}(w,c)\) for which there exists \((x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}\) then the answer to \(q\) would be determined the same \((x\) is returned\) in both hybrids.

4. If \(q\) is of type \(\text{Eval}(c_1,\ldots,c_k)\) for which there exists \(((a_i,m_i) \mapsto c_i)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}\) then the answer to \(q\) would be determined the same in both hybrids. In particular, both hybrids will run \(F^\Psi(m_1,\ldots,m_k)\), adding any indirect queries to \(Q_{\hat{B}}\) and answering \(q\) with the a set of correctly generated ciphertexts.

5. If \(q\) is of type \(\text{Rev}(c_1)\), \(\text{Dec}(w,c_1)\), or \(\text{Eval}(c_1,\ldots,c_k)\) such that there exists \((x_i \mapsto c_i)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_S\) for some \(i \in [k]\) then this means that we are attempting to decrypt a ciphertext for which we have not encrypted before (either directly or indirectly). In Hybrid 1, since \(\text{Enc}\) is a sparse random injective function, the answer would be \(\bot\) with overwhelming probability as \(c\) would be invalid, and in Hybrid 0 the answer will also be \(\bot\) by the definition of \(\hat{\text{Ev}}(\hat{B},z)\) in this hybrid. Note that in both hybrids, there will
not be any indirect queries in $Q_B$ as a result of this query since the ciphertexts that are being queried on are deemed invalid and neither $V$ or $F$ will be executed.

6. If $q$ is of type $\text{Eval}(c_1, ..., c_k)$ such that there exists $(x_i \mapsto c_i)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_S \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_\hat{B})$ for some $i \in [k]$ then this means that we are attempting to decrypt a ciphertext that was not learned. However in both hybrids we will simulate the answer as encryptions of random messages and in both hybrids there will not be any hidden indirect queries in $Q_\hat{B}$ as a result of this query.

7. Suppose $q$ is of type $\text{Rev}(c)$ that is not determined by $Q_B \cup Q_\hat{B}$ in Hybrid 0 and yet is determined by $Q_S$ in Hybrid 1. We list the different cases here that may cause problems:

   (a) **Bad Event 1**: The query-answer pair $((a,m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is in $Q_O \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_\hat{B})$. That is, we are for the first time revealing a valid ciphertext that was encrypted in Step 1 because we failed to learn the answer of this query during the learning phase of Step 2. In that case, in Hybrid 0, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding attribute $a$ whereas in Hybrid 1 it would use $\Psi$ to produce the answer consistent with $Q_O \subseteq Q_S$ and output $a$.

   (b) **Bad Event 2**: The query-answer pair $((a,m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is in $Q_B^h \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_\hat{B})$. That is, we are for the first time revealing a ciphertext from a hidden encryption query in Step 2. In that case, in Hybrid 0, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding attribute $a$ whereas in Hybrid 1 it would use the answer consistent with $Q_B^h \subseteq Q_S$ and output $a$.

8. Suppose $q$ is of type $\text{Dec}(w,c)$ that is not determined by $Q_B \cup Q_\hat{B}$ in Hybrid 0 and yet is determined by $Q_S$ in Hybrid 1. We list the different cases here that may cause problems:

   (a) If $q$ is of type $\text{Dec}(w,c)$ such that $((a,m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_S \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_\hat{B})$ and $V^\Psi(w,a) = 0$ then this means that we are attempting to decrypt a ciphertext for which the decryption will fail. The answer will be $\bot$ in Hybrid 0 by the definition of $\text{EmulateCall}$ and is also $\bot$ in Hybrid 1 since we are using the real oracle $\Psi$. Note that in both hybrids, while there will be indirect queries (as a result of running $V^\Psi(w,a)$), such queries will be visible in both worlds.

   (b) **Bad Event 3**: The query-answer pair $((a,m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is in $Q_O \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_\hat{B})$ and $V^\Psi(w,a) = 1$. That is, we are for the first time decrypting a valid ciphertext that was encrypted in Step 1 because we failed to learn the answer of this query during the learning phase of Step 2. In that case, in Hybrid 0, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding message $x = (a,m)$ whereas in Hybrid 1 it would use $\Psi$ to produce the answer consistent with $Q_O \subseteq Q_S$ and output $x$.

   (c) **Bad Event 4**: The query-answer pair $((a,m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is in $Q_B^h \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_\hat{B})$ and $V^\Psi(w,a) = 1$. That is, we are decrypting a ciphertext from a hidden encryption
query in Step 2. In that case, in Hybrid 0, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding message $x = (a, m)$ whereas in Hybrid 1 it would use the answer consistent with $Q^h_B \subseteq Q_S$ and output $x$.

(d) **Bad Event 5**: The query-answer pair $\rho_e = ((c_1, ..., c_k) \mapsto (c'_1, ..., c'_p))_{\text{Eval}}$ is in $Q_S \setminus Q_{B^i}$, $c = c'_i$ for some $i \in [p]$, $\exists(x_j \mapsto c_j)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_B \cup Q_{B^i}$ and $\mathcal{V}^ρ(w, a'_i) = 1$ where $a'_i = \text{Rev}(c'_i)$. That is, we are decrypting one of the (non-fake) ciphertexts created from an evaluation query for which the underlying plaintexts of at least one of the ciphertext inputs to the evaluation are unknown to the evaluator. In that case, in Hybrid 0, the answer would be $\bot$ since we do not know the corresponding message underlying $c$ whereas in Hybrid 1 it would use the answer supplied by $\Psi$ and output the correct answer. We argue that that this bad event can be reduced to the previous bad events.

- If $\rho_e \in Q_O$ then this implies that $(x \mapsto c'_i)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q_O$ due to our canonicalization procedure. As a result, this means that we are for the first time successfully decrypting a ciphertext from Step 1, which reduces to Case 8b.
- If $\rho_e \in Q_B \cup Q^h_B$ then this implies that $(x \mapsto c'_i)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q^h_B$ due to our emulation procedure. As a result, this means that we are for the first time successfully decrypting a ciphertext from a hidden encryption query in Step 2, which reduces to Case 8c.

(e) The query-answer pair $((c_1, ..., c_k) \mapsto (c'_1, ..., c'_p))_{\text{Eval}}$ is in $Q_{B^i}$, $c = c'_i$ for some $i \in [p]$, $\exists(x_j \mapsto c_j)_{\text{Enc}} \notin Q_B \cup Q_{B^i}$ and $\mathcal{V}^ρ(w, a'_i) = 1$ where $a'_i = \text{Rev}(c'_i)$. That is, we are decrypting a fake ciphertext created from an evaluation query for which the underlying plaintexts of at least one of the ciphertext inputs to the evaluation are unknown to the evaluator. However, since the query was generated during the evaluation phase, the fake ciphertext $c$ was also generated during the evaluation and therefore $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is known where $x = (a||r)$ for some random $r$. Thus, in both Hybrids, the answer would be $x$.

For input $x$, let $E_1(x)$ be the event that Case 8b or Case 7a happens, and $E_2(x)$ be the event that Case 8c or Case 7b happens. Assuming that event $E(x) = (E_1(x) \lor E_2(x))$ does not happen, both experiments will proceed identically the same and the output distributions of $\mathcal{E}^ρ(B, z)$ and $\mathcal{E}^ρ(B, z)$ will be statistically close.

**Claim 7.5.16.** $\Pr_x[E_1(x)] \leq \epsilon/4$.

**Proof.** We bound this event in Hybrid 1. Recall that $E_1$ is the event that during the final execution of the obfuscation $\hat{B}$ on a random input, a successful decryption or reveal query is asked for the first time for a ciphertext that was generated during the obfuscation phase but was not learned during the learning phase. For all $i \in [t]$, let $Q'_{B^i} = (Q_{B^i} \cup Q^h_{B^i}) \cap Q_O$ be the set of query-answer pairs generated by the $i$'th evaluation $\mathcal{E}^ρ(B, z_i)$ during the learning phase (Step 2) and are also generated during the obfuscation emulation phase (Step 1). Note that, since $t > \ell_O$ and $Q'_{B^i} \subseteq Q'_{B^{i+1}}$, the number of learning iterations that increase the size...
of the set of learned obfuscation encryption queries is at most $\ell$. We say $t \leftarrow [m]$ is bad if it is the case that $Q_{Bt}^t \neq Q_{Bt+1}^t$ (i.e. $t$ is an index of a learning iteration that increases the size of the learned obfuscation encryption queries). This would imply that after $t$ learning iterations in Hybrid 1, the real execution $Q_{Bt}^t := Q_{Bt+1}^t$ would contain a new unlearned query that was in $Q_O$. Thus, given that $m = 4\ell/\epsilon$, the probability (over the selection of $t$) that $t$ is bad is at most $\ell/2m < \epsilon/4$.

Claim 7.5.17. $\Pr_x[E_2(x) \mid E_1(x)] \leq \epsilon/4 + \text{negl}(\kappa)$

Proof. Recall that $E_2$ is the event that during the final execution of the obfuscation $\hat{B}$ on a random input, a decryption or reveal query is asked for a ciphertext that was generated during the learning phase but was part of the hidden set and therefore never publicized. We will in fact first bound this event (assuming $E_1$ does not happen) in Hybrid 2.

For all $i \in [t]$, let $Q_{B_i} = (Q_{B_i} \cup Q_{B_i}^h)$ be the set of (public and hidden) query-answer pairs generated by the $i$’th evaluation $\text{Ev}_\Psi(B, z_i)$ during the learning phase (Step 2) and $Q_{\hat{B}}$ be the query-answer pairs of the final evaluation of the obfuscation. Note that in Hybrid 2, the real oracle $\Psi$ is used and therefore each execution of $\text{Ev}_\Psi(B, z_i)$ is independent of the other executions. In particular, we can think of the final evaluation as iteration $t + 1$ of the learning phase with query-answer pairs $Q_{Bt+1}^h = Q_{\hat{B}}$. Now, we can think of an intermediate hybrid with distribution $H_2$ where the executions are randomly permuted in a way such that execution $t + 1$ in Hybrid 2 is now the first execution in Hybrid $2'$. Note that, since the executions are independent, the distributions $H_2$ and $H_2'$ are equivalent and it remains to show that $E_2$ is unlikely to happen in Hybrid $2'$. Specifically, we need to show that the first execution of the learning phase (with query-answer pairs $Q_{Bt+1}$) does not decrypt a ciphertext generated by any previous hidden queries in the learning phase. However, since this is the first execution, there exists no hidden queries from previous executions and it suffices to argue that it does not decrypt a ciphertext generated by any hidden queries $Q_{Bt+1}^h$ from its own execution.

Since $E_1$ does not happen and since the probability that $\text{Ev}_\Psi(B, z_{t+1})$ decrypts a ciphertext that was never encrypted during the whole process is negligible, the only ciphertexts that this execution will attempt to decrypt are ones that were generated during this very same execution. Therefore in Hybrid 2, $E_2$ only happens with negligible probability when a ciphertext that was never encrypted before is being decrypted. Now using Claim 7.5.18 we can conclude that this event in Hybrid 1 happens with probability at most $\epsilon/4 + \text{negl}(\kappa)$.

Thus, using Claims 7.5.16 and 7.5.17, we find that $\Delta(H^0, H^1) \leq \epsilon/2 + \text{negl}(\kappa)$.

Claim 7.5.18. $\Delta(H^1, H^2) \leq \epsilon/4 + \text{negl}(\kappa)$

Proof. The only difference between the two hybrids is that in Hybrid 1, we do not forward to $\Psi$ any queries of the form $\text{Eval}(c_1, ..., c_k)$ for which we do not know all of $c_i$, and instead we will use some simulated (fake) ciphertexts. Whereas in Hybrid 2, we do indeed execute
them using the real oracle. Thus, while there may be hidden queries as a result of running $F$ in Hybrid 2, the counterparts in Hybrid 1 do not have such hidden queries and are instead replaced with fake ciphertexts. As a result, we have to consider the cases where Rev, Dec or $Eval$ might use any hidden ciphertexts in Hybrid 2 and/or fake ciphertexts in Hybrid 1.

Assume that the query-answer pairs so far during the execution of $\hat{B}$ are the same in both hybrids. That is, we start with some $Q_B^1 = Q_B^2 = Q_{\bar{B}}$ for the sake of proving inductively that any subsequent query-answer pairs are closely distributed between the two hybrids. Let $q$ be a new (possibly indirect) query that is being asked by $\hat{Ev}(B, z)$.

1. Determined queries: If $q$ is a query of type $Enc(x)$ then it will answered the same in both hybrid using $R$. If $q$ is of type $Rev(c)$ for any $c$ then the answer will be the same in both hybrids. If $q$ is of type $Dec(w, c)$ for any non-fake ciphertext $c$ where $(x \mapsto c)Enc \in Q_S \setminus Q_{\bar{B}}$, then the answer will be the same in both hybrids. If $q$ is of type $Eval(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ whose answer can be determined by $Q_B \cup Q_{\bar{B}}$ then the answer will be the same in both hybrids.

2. Bad Event 1: If $q$ is of type $Eval(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ such that there exists $(x_i \mapsto c_i)Enc \in Q_S \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_{\bar{B}})$ for some $i \in [k]$ then this means that we are evaluating on some ciphertext that was not learned. In this case in Hybrid 1 the answer would be a set of fake ciphertexts generated by encrypting random messages under their respective attributes. However, in Hybrid 2 the answer would be a set of ciphertexts generated by encrypting shares of the true evaluation. Note that by the collision resistance property of $H$ and the injectivity of $Enc$, the two sets of ciphertexts (the fake and non-fake) will be statistically close.

3. Suppose that $q$ is of type $Dec(w, c)$. We list the different cases that can cause problems:

   (a) Bad Event 2: There exists a query-answer pair $(x \mapsto c)Enc \in Q_{\bar{B}} \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_{\bar{B}})$ that was generated as one of the hidden queries issued by some evaluation query during execution $\hat{Ev}(\bar{B}, z)$. In that case, in Hybrid 1, the answer would be $\perp$ with overwhelming probability since the encryption was never created there, whereas in Hybrid 2, the answer would be $x$. However we note that the probability of that happening in Hybrid 1 is negligible since it is equal to the event that a ciphertext was hit that has not been generated before.

   (b) Bad Event 3: The query-answer pair $((c_1, \ldots, c_k) \mapsto (c'_1, \ldots, c'_p))Eval$ is in $Q_{\bar{B}}$, $c = c'_i$ for some $i \in [p]$, $\exists((a_j, m_j) \mapsto c_j)Enc \notin Q_B \cup Q_{\bar{B}}$ and $\forall^{\Psi}(w, a'_i) = 1$ where $a'_i = Rev(c'_i)$. That is, we are decrypting one of the (fake) ciphertexts from the output of an evaluation query for which the underlying plaintexts of at least one of the ciphertext inputs to the evaluation query is unknown. Note that each fake ciphertext $c'_i$ corresponds to an encryption query $(x'_i \mapsto c'_i)Enc \in Q_{\bar{B}}$ for some $x'_i = (a'_i, r_i)$ and independently chosen random string $r_i$. In that case, in Hybrid 1, the answer would be $x'_i$ whereas in Hybrid 2 it would use the answer supplied by $\Psi$ and output the answer of the evaluation $x_i = (a'_i, m'_i)$ where $m'_i$ is an evaluated answer based on the messages encrypted by $(c_1, \ldots, c_k)$.
For the case of FHE (or multi-key FHE), decrypting any fake ciphertext implies decrypting for the first time all of the input ciphertexts, which must have originated from \( Q^O \) or \( Q^B \) since we need to know witnesses for all the input ciphertexts \((c_1, ..., c_k)\) in order to decrypt \( c \). Thus, this event is similar to Case 8d of Claim 7.5.15 and so we refer to the proof there for this case.

For the more general case of spooky encryption, we may decrypt a fake ciphertext without needing to know witnesses for all the input ciphertexts and so we cannot argue that we are decrypting for the first time some input ciphertext. Nevertheless, all we obtain by decrypting a single (or even \( p-1 \)) ciphertexts are individual shares of the evaluation result, which are identically distributed to random values \( r_i \) as long as we do not have witnesses for all the input ciphertexts (if we do then we are back to the multi-key FHE case).

Thus, using the same reasoning as Claims 7.5.16 and 7.5.17, we find that \( \Delta(H^1, H^2) \leq \epsilon/4 + \text{negl}(\kappa) \).

Using Claims 7.5.15 and 7.5.18 we can finally conclude the proof of approximate correctness since we can now show that \( \Delta(H^0, H^1) + \Delta(H^1, H^2) \leq 3\epsilon/4 + \text{negl}(\kappa) \leq \epsilon \).

**Proving Security.** To show that the resulting obfuscator is secure, it suffices to show that the compilation process represented as the new obfuscator’s construction is simulatable. We show a simulator \( S \) (with access to \( \Psi \)) that works as follows: given an obfuscated circuit \( B \) in the \( \Psi \) ideal model, it runs the learning procedure as shown in Step 2 of the new obfuscator \( \hat{iO} \) to learn the heavy queries \( Q_B \) then outputs \( \hat{B} = (B, Q_B) \). Note that this distribution is statistically close to the output of the real execution of \( iO \) and, therefore, security follows.

### 7.6 Primitives Implied by Our Variants of Witness Encryption

In this section, we will show that extended witness encryption (or one of its variants) implies extended versions of several encryption primitives of the all-or-nothing flavor. Recall that we previously argued that witness encryption and its considered variants do not imply indistinguishability obfuscation in a monolithic way. This allows us to conclude a monolithic separation between the studied all-or-nothing encryption primitives and indistinguishability obfuscation.

#### 7.6.1 Extended Predicate Encryption

In this section, we will show a monolithic construction of extended PE from EIHWE and one-way function. Since, one-way functions imply digital signatures in a black-box manner,
we will assume that there exists a signature scheme \((\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})\) where these procedures only make black-box calls to the OWF. Let \((\text{WEnc}, \text{WDec}_V)\) be an EIHWE scheme where \(V\) is the universal circuit evaluator (see Definition 2.1.1) that is allowed to have OWF gates, and \(\text{WEnc}\) and \(\text{WDec}_V\) gates. The relation \(V\) is defined such that \(V((k, sk_k), C_{\text{MPK},a,m}) = C_{\text{MPK},a,m}(k, sk_k)\) where circuit \(C_{\text{MPK},a,m}\) is defined as follows:

\[
C_{\text{MPK},a,m}(k, sk_k) := (P(k, a) = 1 \land \text{Verify}(\text{MPK}, k, sk_k) = 1)
\]

Then, our extended PE scheme for the universal class of predicates \(P_{K,A}\) (computed by Turing Machine \(P\) as in Definition 2.6.4) and message space \(M\) corresponds to the PPT algorithms \((\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_P)\) defined below. Note that we are constructing an extended PE scheme and therefore \(P\) is allowed to have OWF, \(\text{Setup}\), \(\text{KGen}\), \(\text{Enc}\), and \(\text{Dec}_P\) gates.

- **Setup(1\(^\kappa\))**: outputs \((\text{MPK}, \text{MSK})\) where \((\text{MPK}, \text{MSK}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1\(^\kappa\))\).
- **KGen(\(\text{MSK}, k\))**: given \(k \in K\) and the master secret key \(\text{MSK} \in \{0, 1\}^n\), outputs the decryption key \(sk_k = \text{Sign}(\text{MSK}, k)\). If \(k = \epsilon\), it outputs \(\epsilon\).
- **Enc(\(\text{MPK}, (m, a)\))**: outputs ciphertext \(c = \text{WEnc}(C_{\text{MPK},a,m}, (a, m))\) where \(C_{\text{MPK},a,m}\) is defined above.
- **Dec\(_P\)(\(sk_k, c\))**: given a secret key \(sk_k\) for \(k \in K\) and a ciphertext \(c\), obtain \((C_{\text{MPK},a,m}, a, m) = \text{WDec}_V((k, sk_k), c)\), and output \(m\).

**Specifying \(V\) given \(P\).** Since we are constructing extended predicate encryption, our \(P\) is allowed to have gates of OWFs, \(\text{Setup}\), \(\text{KGen}\), \(\text{Enc}\), and \(\text{Dec}_P\) planted in it. Next, observe from the scheme that \(V\) contains one \(P\) gate and one \(\text{Verify}\) gate. Also note that \(P\) does not make any calls to \(V\).

Next we argue that both the \(P\) gate and the one \(\text{Verify}\) gate can be simplified to OWF, \(\text{WEnc}\), and \(\text{WDec}_V\) gates that \(V\) is allowed to have. We modify \(V\) as follows.

1. We embed \(P\) in \(V\). Note that \(V\) now has all the gates \(P\) had and a \(\text{Verify}\) gate. Specifically, \(V\) has OWF, \(\text{Verify}\), \(\text{Setup}\), \(\text{KGen}\), \(\text{Enc}\), and \(\text{Dec}_P\) gates.

2. Next, we syntactically replace \(\text{Setup}\) gates with \(\text{Gen}\) gates, \(\text{KGen}\) gates with \(\text{Sign}\) gates, \(\text{Enc}\) gates with \(\text{WEnc}\) gates and \(\text{Dec}_P\) gates with \(\text{WDec}_V\) gates. Note that this replacement will require some additional code changes in \(V\) which all depend on the above described construction.

3. Next, since we use a known construction of the signature scheme \((\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})\) and it is black-box in the use of OWFs, we can replace these gates by just OWF gates along with some additional code that depends on the used signature scheme. Observe that we have reduced all gates in \(V\) to just OWF, \(\text{WDec}\), and \(\text{WDec}_V\) gates.

**Lemma 7.6.1.** Extended fully-secure PE scheme (Definition 2.6.4) is implied by extended EIHWE and OWFs.
Proof. Correctness of the above scheme follows from the observation that a witness encryption ciphertext along with a signature on \( k \), namely \( sk_k \), always yields the encrypted message whenever \( P(k, a) = 1 \). Next we prove security.

Let \( A \) be a computationally bounded adversary that asks a polynomial number of secret-key queries and breaks the security of the PE scheme. In other words, for some polynomial \( p(.) \),

\[
\Pr[\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{PE}}(1^\kappa) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{p(\kappa)}
\]

where \( \text{IND}_{A}^{\text{PE}} \) is the following experiment (recalled from Figure 2.1):

**Experiment** \( \text{IND}_{A}^{\text{PE}}(1^\kappa) \):
1. \((\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa))\)
2. \((x_0, x_1) \leftarrow A^{\text{KGen}(\text{MSK}, \cdot)}(\text{MPK})\) where \( x_b = (a_b, m_b) \) for \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), \( |a_0| = |a_1| \) and \( |m_0| = |m_1| \) and for each prior query \( k \) we require that \( P(k, a_0) = P(k, a_1) = 0 \)
3. \( b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \)
4. \( c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, x_b) \)
5. \( b' \leftarrow A^{\text{KGen}(\text{MSK}, \cdot)}(\text{MPK}, c)\) where for each query \( k \) we require that \( P(k, a_0) = P(k, a_1) = 0 \)
6. Output 1 if \( b = b' \) and 0 otherwise.

At a high level, we would like to use the attacker \( A \) above to contradict the security of the signature scheme. Towards this, our approach will be to use the extractor \( E \) of ex-EIHWE that translates \( A \)'s ability to distinguish ciphertexts to extracting a witness, which in our case is a forgery. However, a technical issue is that \( E \) might rewind \( A \) and \( A \) might fail on those correlated executions. We solve this issue by a standard probability argument as explained next.

Let \( T \) be the transcript of the inputs to \( A \) in steps 1 and 2 above — namely, \( T = (\text{MPK}, \{sk_k\}, x_0, x_1) \) where \( \{sk_k\} \) is the collection of secret-keys that \( A \) obtains in step 2 above. Then, for the machine \( A(\mathcal{T}) \) we define the following experiment:

**Experiment** \( \text{IND}_{A(\mathcal{T})}^{\text{PE-partial}}(1^\kappa, \text{MPK}, \text{MSK}) \):
1. \( b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \)
2. \( c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, x_b) \)
3. \( b' \leftarrow A(\mathcal{T})^{\text{KGen}(\text{MSK}, \cdot)}(\text{MPK}, c)\) where for each query \( k \) we require that \( P(k, a_0) = P(k, a_1) = 0 \)
4. Output 1 if \( b = b' \) and 0 otherwise.

By an averaging argument we have that if \( \Pr[\text{IND}_{A}^{\text{PE}}(1^\kappa) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{p(\kappa)} \) then for a non-negligible fraction of choices of \( (\mathcal{T}, \text{MPK}, \text{MSK}) \) we have that \( \Pr[\text{IND}_{A(\mathcal{T})}^{\text{PE-partial}}(1^\kappa, \text{MPK}, \text{MSK}) = \)
Towards contradiction, we will now show that given \( A \) we can break the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme under chosen message attack. On receiving the public-key \( \text{MPK} \) from the challenger we prepare the machine \( A(T) \) (by including signatures on keys of \( A \)'s choice in \( T \)). Next by Definition 7.4.2 we have that there exists an a black-box extractor \( E_A(T)(a_0, a_1) \) which with non-negligible probability outputs a signature on \( k^* \) for some choice of \( k^* \) such that \( P(k^*, a_0) = 1 \) or \( P(k^*, a_1) = 1 \). This breaks the security of the signature scheme.

Note that during the execution of \( E_A(T)(a_0, a_1) \), \( A \) could ask for more signature queries for any \( k \) such that \( P(k, a_0) = P(k, a_1) = 0 \). However, these queries can be answered with the help of the challenger.

\[ 1 \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2p(\kappa)}. \]

7.6.2 Extended Spooky Encryption

In this section, we will show a monolithic construction of extended spooky encryption from IRHWE and PRG. Let \( (\text{WEnc}, \text{WDec}_V, \text{WEval}_F) \) be an IRHWE scheme where \( F \) is a universal circuit evaluator and \( G \) be a length doubling pseudorandom generator. The relation \( V \) is defined such that \( V(w, C_{\text{MPK}}) = C_{\text{MPK}}(w) \) where circuit \( C_{\text{MPK}} \) is defined as follows:

\[
C_{\text{MPK}}(w) := (\text{MPK} = G(w))
\]

Then our extended spooky encryption scheme \( (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}_F, \text{Dec}) \) (where \( F_s \) denotes the universal circuit evaluation function for the spooky encryption scheme) is defined as follows:

- **Setup(1^\kappa)**: outputs \((\text{MPK} = G(s), \text{MSK} = s)\) where \( s \) is a randomly sampled seed of the pseudorandom generator.
- **Enc(\text{MPK}, m)**: outputs ciphertext \( c = \text{WEnc}(C_{\text{MPK}}, m) \) where \( C_{\text{MPK}} \) is defined above.
- **Eval\(_F_s(f, (\text{MPK}_1, c_1), \ldots, (\text{MPK}_t, c_t))**: output \( \text{WEval}_F(f, c_1, \ldots, c_t) \).
- **Dec(\text{MSK}, c)**: given a secret key \( \text{MSK} \) and a ciphertext \( c \), output \( \text{WDec}_V(\text{MSK}, c) \).

**Specifying V.** Observe that \( V \) in the extended spooky encryption scheme above only has one PRG gate that the extended IRHWE scheme supports.

**Specifying F\(_s\).** Since we are constructing extended spooky encryption, \( F_s \) is allowed to have gates of Setup, Enc, Dec, and \( \text{Eval}_F \) planted in it. We start by observing that for any \( F_s \) we can syntactically replace each Setup gate with a PRG gate, each Enc gate with a \( \text{WEnc} \) gate, each \( \text{Eval}_F \) gate with a \( \text{WEval}_F \) gate, and each Dec gate with a \( \text{WDec}_V \) gate. This change requires some additional code depending on the above described construction. This leaves us with only PRG, \( \text{WEnc}, \text{WDec}_V, \) and \( \text{WEval}_F \) gates that \( F \) of extended IRHWE supports. Thus the \( F_s \) supports gates as required by extended spooky encryption scheme.
Lemma 7.6.2. Extended spooky encryption scheme (Definition 2.6.8) is implied by extended IRHWE and PRG.

Proof. Correctness of the above scheme follows directly from the correctness of the IRHWE scheme. For security, we need to show that for any PPT adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that the following holds:

$$|\Pr[A(\text{MPK}, \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(\text{MPK}, \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 1)) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$$

where $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$ and the probability is over the randomness of $A$ and Enc. This follows by a simple argument as follows.

- $H_0$: This hybrid corresponds to the distribution $(\text{MPK}, \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 0))$ where $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$.
- $H_1$: In this hybrid, we change how $\text{MPK}$ is generated. Instead of generating $\text{MPK}$ as the output of $G$, we sample $\text{MPK}$ as a uniformly random string.

Indistinguishability between $H_0$ and $H_1$ follows from the pseudorandomness property of the PRG $G$.

- $H_2$: In this hybrid, instead of encrypting 0 we encrypt 1. Namely, the ciphertext is generated as $\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 1)$ instead of $\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 0)$.

Since $\text{MPK}$ is a chosen uniformly at random therefore except with negligible probability we have that $\forall w, \text{MPK} \neq G(w)$. Hence, by the security of witness encryption we have that the distribution $\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 1)$ is computationally indistinguishable from $\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 0)$.

- $H_3$: In this hybrid, we switch back to generating $\text{MPK}$ honestly (i.e., as the output of the pseudorandom generator).

Indistinguishability between $H_2$ and $H_3$ follows from the pseudorandomness property of the PRG $G$.

Observe that hybrid $H_3$ corresponds to the distribution $(\text{MPK}, \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, 1))$ where $(\text{MSK}, \text{MPK}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$. This concludes the proof.

7.6.3 Extended Attribute Based FHE

In this section, we will show a construction of extended Attribute Based FHE (ABFHE) from extended extractable instance-revealing homomorphic witness encryption (EIRHWE) and one-way functions (OWFs). Since one-way functions imply digital signatures in a black-box manner, we will assume that there exists a signature scheme $(\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$ where these procedures only make black-box calls to the OWF. Let $(W\text{Enc}, W\text{Rev}, W\text{Dec}_V, W\text{Eval}_F)$ be the ex-EIRHWE primitive and $V$ and $F$ are universal circuit evaluators that are allowed to
have OWF gates, and WEnc, WDec, and WEvalF oracle gates. The relation V is defined such that \( V((k, sk_k), C_{\text{MPK},a}) = C_{\text{MPK},a}(k, sk_k) \) where circuit \( C_{\text{MPK},a} \) is defined as follows:

\[
C_{\text{MPK},a}(k, sk_k) := (P(k, a) = 1 \wedge \text{Verify}(\text{MPK}, k, sk_k) = 1)
\]

Then, our extended ABFHE scheme for the universal predicate class \( P_{K,A} \) (computed by machine \( P \)) and message space \( M \) corresponds to the PPT algorithms \( \text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_P, \text{Eval}_{F_s} \) defined below. Note that we are constructing an extended ABFHE, therefore \( P \) and \( F_s \) are allowed to have OWF, Setup, KGen, Enc, DecP and EvalF gates.

- **Setup(1^\kappa)**: outputs \((\text{MPK}, \text{MSK})\) where \((\text{MPK}, \text{MSK}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)\).

- **KGen(\text{MSK}, k)**: given \( k \in K \) and the master secret key \( \text{MSK} \in \{0, 1\}^n \), outputs the decryption key \( sk_k = \text{Sign}(\text{MSK}, k) \). If \( k = \epsilon \), it outputs \( \epsilon \).

- **Enc(\text{MPK}, (m, a))**: outputs ciphertext \( c = \text{WEnc}(C_{\text{MPK},a}, m) \) where \( C_{\text{MPK},a} \) is defined above.

- **Eval_{F_s}(f, \text{MPK}, c_1, \ldots, c_t)**: If \( \text{WRev}(c_1) = \text{WRev}(c_2) = \cdots = \text{WRev}(c_t) \)\(^6\) then output \( \text{WEval}_{F_s}(f, c_1, \ldots, c_t) \) and otherwise output \( \perp \).

- **Dec_P(sk_k, c)**: given a secret key \( sk_k \) for \( k \in K \) and a ciphertext \( c \), output \( \text{WDec}( ((k, sk_k), c) \).

**Specifying V given P.** Since we are constructing extended ABFHE, our \( P \) is allowed to have gates of OWF, Setup, KGen, Enc, EvalF, and DecP planted in it. Observe from the scheme that \( V \) contains one \( P \) gate and one \( \text{Verify} \) gate. Next we argue that both these gates can be simplified to OWF, WEnc, WDec, and WEvalF gates that ex-EIRHWE supports. We modify \( V \) as follows.

1. We embed \( P \) in \( V \). Note that \( V \) now has all the gates \( P \) had and a \( \text{Verify} \) gate. Specifically, \( V \) has OWF, Verify, Setup, KGen, Enc, EvalF, and DecP gates.

2. Next, we syntactically replace Setup gates with \( \text{Gen} \) gates, KGen gates with \( \text{Sign} \) gates, Enc gates with WDec gates, EvalF gates with WEvalF gates and DecP gates with WDec gates. Note that this replacement will require some additional code changes in \( V \) which all depend on the above described construction.

3. Next, since we use a known construction of the signature scheme \( \text{(Gen, Sign, Verify)} \) and it is black-box in the use of OWFs, we can replace these gates by just OWF gates along with some additional code that depends on the used signature scheme. Observe that we have reduced all gates in \( V \) to just OWF, WEnc, WEvalF and WDec gates.

\(^6\)Here, \( \text{WRev} \) is the reveal function of the IRWHE that we ignored in the rest of the exposition. This function is only needed at this point.
Specifying $F$ given $F_s$. Since we are constructing extended ABFHE, $\text{Eval}_{F_s}$ is allowed to have gates of OWFs, Setup, KGen, Enc, Dec_P, and $\text{Eval}_{F_s}$ planted in it. We start by observing that for any $F_s$ we can syntactically replace each Setup and KGen gate with a OWF gates, each Enc, $\text{Eval}_{F_s}$ and Dec_P with WEnc, WEval_F and WDec_V, respectively. In making this change we need to add some additional code to $F$ depending on the above described construction and the code of the signature scheme. This leaves us with only OWF, WEnc, WDec_V, and WEval_F gates that $F$ of ex-EIRHWE supports. Thus the above described construction supports gates as required by the extended ABFHE scheme.

**Lemma 7.6.3.** Extended fully-secure ABFHE scheme is implied by ex-EIRHWE and OWFs.

*Proof.* Note that security game of the ABFHE scheme does not involve the $\text{Eval}_{F_s}$ function, which only affects functionality. Therefore, the proof of security of this claim is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 7.6.1. The only difference is that we are now using ex-EIRHWE instead of ex-EIHWE.

\[\square\]
Chapter 8

Monolithic Separation of IO from Functional Encryption

8.1 Introduction

After proving that several “all-or-nothing” encryption primitives are insufficient for giving us IO, we now turn to investigate the possibility of basing IO on an even more expressive primitive: functional encryption (FE). What is currently known about the power and complexity of functional encryption is the following:

1. **Compact single-key FE is known to imply IO.** Recent results by Ananth and Jain [AJ15] and Bitansky and Vaikuntanathan [BV15] show how to base IO on a compact FE scheme — namely, a (single-key) FE scheme (see Definition 2.6.9) for which the running time of the encryption circuit is independent of the size of the supported function class. Furthermore, the construction works even if the ciphertext is weakly compact, i.e. the length of the ciphertext grows sub-linearly in the circuit size but is allowed to grow arbitrarily with the depth of the circuit.

2. **Positive results on single-key FE.** The construction of IO from compact single-key FE puts us in close proximity to primitives known from standard assumptions. One prominent work, is the (single-key) functional encryption scheme of Goldwasser, Kalai, Popa, Vaikuntanathan and Zeldovich [GKP\textsuperscript{+}13] that is based on LWE. Interestingly, this encryption scheme is *weakly compact* for Boolean circuits. However, in this scheme the ciphertext grows additionally with the output length of the circuit for which the functional secret-key is issued. Hence, it is not known to imply IO.

In summary, the gap between the known single-key FE constructions from LWE and the single-key FE schemes known to imply IO (for the same ciphertext length properties) is only in the output length of circuit for which the functional secret-key is issued. In light of this, significant research continues to be invested towards realizing IO starting with various kinds of FE schemes (e.g. [BNPW16, BLP17]). This brings us to the question of what kind of functional encryption schemes realize (or cannot realize) IO.
8.2 Our Results

The main result of this chapter is to show that single-key FE schemes that support only functions with ‘short output’ are incapable of producing IO even when non-black-box use of the FE scheme is allowed in certain ways. We specifically use the monolithic framework developed in Chapter 6 which is equivalent to the fully black-box framework of [IR89,RTV04] applied to extended primitives (that can include all of their subroutines as gates inside circuits given to them as input). As we recall, this monolithic model captures the most commonly used non-black-box techniques in cryptography, including the ones used by Ananth and Jain [AJ15] and Bitansky and Vaikunthanathan [BV15] for realizing IO from FE. More formally, we prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 8.2.1 (Main Result–Informal).** Assuming one-way functions exist and \( \text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM} \), there is no construction of IO from “short” output single-key FE where one is allowed to plant FE gates arbitrarily inside the circuits that are given to FE as input. An FE scheme is said to be “short” output if

\[
t(n, \kappa) \leq p(n, \kappa) - \omega(n + \kappa),
\]

where \( n \) is the plaintext length, \( \kappa \) is the security parameter, \( p \) is the ciphertext length (for messages of length \( n \)) and \( t \) is the output length of the functions evaluated on messages of length \( n \).

As a special case, the above result implies that single-key FE for boolean circuits and other single-key FE schemes known from standard assumptions are insufficient for IO in a monolithic way.

**“Long-output” FE implies IO.** Complementing this negative result, we show that above condition on ciphertext length \( t \) is almost tight. In particular, we show that a “long output” single-key FE — namely, a single-key FE scheme with \( t = p + 1 \) (supporting an appropriate class of circuits) is sufficient for realizing IO. This construction is non-black-box (or, monolithic to be precise) and is obtained as a simple extension of the previous results of Ananth and Jain [AJ15] and Bitansky and Vaikuntanathan [BV15].

**Fully Black-Box Separation of IO from FE.** Finally, we show that some form of non-black-box techniques (beyond the fully black-box framework of [RTV04]) is necessary for getting IO from FE, regardless of the output lengths. Namely, we prove a fully black-box separation from FE to IO. Previously, Lin [Lin16] (Corollary 1 there) showed that the existence of such fully black-box construction from FE to IO would imply a construction of IO from LWE and constant-degree PRGs. Our result shows that no such fully black-box construction exists (but the possibility of IO from LWE and constant-degree PRGs remains open).

In close relation to this result, we make mention of the work of Ananth and Sahai [AS17] which, when combined with the result of Chapter 5, can be used to derive a special case of our
fully black-box separation of IO from FE. In more detail, [AS17] show that, assuming LWE, one can construct a sublinearly compact public-key FE scheme that makes black-box use of an underlying constant-degree encoding scheme (GES). On the other hand, in Section 5.4 we proved a fully black-box separation result of IO from \( O(1) \)-degree GES. The two results can be combined to imply a fully-black-box separation of IO from sublinearly compact FE. However, our result in this chapter is more general in the sense that we separate IO from even fully compact FE schemes, and we do so without the need for the additional LWE assumption.

**On the Relation to [GKP+13].** Note that in Chapter 7 rules out the existence of monolithic IO constructions from attribute-based encryption (ABE) and the existence of monolithic IO constructions from fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Furthermore, this result can be further broadened to separate IO from ABE and FHE in a monolithic way. One can then ask why the result in this chapter does not follow as a corollary from Chapter 7 and [GKP+13], where they construct single-key (non-compact) FE for general circuits from ABE and FHE.

We note that our result does not follow from the above observation for two reasons. First, the single-key FE construction of [GKP+13] also uses a garbling scheme in order to garble circuits with FHE decryption gates, whereas the impossibility in Chapter 7 does not capture such garbling mechanisms in the monolithic model. However, if one could improve the result of Chapter 7 in the monolithic model by adding a garbling subroutine that can accept ABE and FHE gates, then we can compose the results in Chapter 7 and [GKP+13] and obtain an impossibility of IO from \( t \)-bit output (non-compact) FE. Secondly, we note that this resulting \( t \)-bit output FE scheme has the property that \( t \leq p / \text{poly}(\kappa) \) (i.e. the ciphertext size is a (polynomial) multiplicative factor of the output length of the function), whereas in this work we show the stronger impossibility of basing IO on single-key FE for output-length \( t \leq p - \omega(\kappa) \).

### 8.3 Technical Overview

In order to demonstrate the ideas behind our impossibility, we start by recalling how the constructions of IO from FE [AJ15, BV15] work at a high level. Here, we present an ‘oversimplified’ version of their construction which aims at describing the ideas presented here at a high level. In their construction, an obfuscation for a circuit \( C : \{0, 1\}^\kappa \to \{0, 1\} \) is a sequence of \( \kappa+1 \) functional keys of \( \kappa+1 \) instances of a single-key FE scheme along with a ciphertext \( c_\phi \). These functional secret keys \( \text{FSK}_1, \ldots, \text{FSK}_{\kappa+1} \) corresponding to public keys \( \text{PK}_1 \ldots \text{PK}_{\kappa+1} \) are generated independently and the ciphertext \( c_\phi \) is obtained by encrypting the “empty” string under the first public-key \( \text{PK}_1 \). The ciphertext does contain some cryptographic keys. This includes the secret-key of a secret-key encryption scheme denoted by \( s \). The expression “empty” just refers to the fact that this ciphertext will be used to evaluate the obfuscation on all inputs. This will become clear in the following. The first \( \kappa \) function keys implement the “bit-extension” functionality. That is, the \( i^{th} \) function key corresponds to a function.
that takes in an \((i - 1)\)-bit string \(y \in \{0, 1\}^{i-1}\) as input and outputs encryptions of \((y|0)\) and \((y|1)\) under the public-key \(PK_{i+1}\). Finally, the functional key \(FSK_{\kappa+1}\) corresponds to the circuit \(C\).

To evaluate the obfuscated circuit on an input \(x \in \{0, 1\}^{\kappa}\), one does the following: decrypt \(c_{\phi}\) under \(FSK_1\) to obtain encryptions of 0 and 1 denoted as \(c_0\) and \(c_1\) respectively. Next, it decrypts \(c_{x_1}\) (where \(x_1\) is the first bit of \(x\)) using \(FSK_2\) and so on. Proceeding in this manner, in \(\kappa\) steps the evaluator obtains an encryption of \(x\) under \(PK_{\kappa+1}\) which can then be used to compute \(C(x)\) using \(FSK_{\kappa+1}\). Note that since the FE scheme does not hide the circuits embedded inside the functional secret-keys, therefore an encrypted version of the circuit \(C\) (under the key \(s\) also placed inside \(c_{\phi}\)) is embedded inside this key. The key \(s\) is passed along in each ciphertext. One can think of the construction as having a binary tree structure where evaluating the circuit on an input \(x\) corresponds to traversing along the path labeled \(x\). Observe that, for this construction, each functional secret-key is generating an output that is larger than the size of the ciphertext that is decrypted using it. In particular, the decryption yields two ciphertexts — an output that is double the size of the input. On the other hand, in case the output of a functional secret key is “sufficiently smaller” than a ciphertext, then this explosion in number of ciphertexts does not seem possible anymore. This is also the key to our impossibility. Roughly speaking, at the core of the proof of our impossibility result is to show that in this “small” output setting, the total number of ciphertexts that an evaluator can compute remains polynomially bounded. Turning this high level intuition into an impossibility proof requires several new ideas that we now elaborate upon below.

8.3.1 The Details of the Proof of Separation

As mentioned before, monolithic constructions of IO from FE are the same as fully black-box constructions of IO from extended FE which is a primitive that is similar to FE but it allows FE gates to be used in the circuits for which keys are issued. Therefore, to prove the separation, we can still use oracle separation techniques from the literature on black-box constructions [IR89].

In fact, for any candidate construction \(IO^{(i)}\) of indistinguishability obfuscation from extended FE, we construct an oracle \(O\) relative to which secure extended FE exists but the construction \(IO^O\) becomes insecure (against polynomial-query attackers). In order to do this, we will employ an intermediate primitive: a variant of functional witness encryption defined by Boyle, Chung, and Pass [BCP14]. We call this variant customized FWE (cFWE for short) and show that (1) relative to our oracle cFWE exists, (2) cFWE implies extended FE in a black-box way, and that (3) the construction \(IO^O\) is insecure. We opted to work with this intermediate primitive of cFWE since it is conceptually easier to work with than an ideal FE oracle and allows us to leverage the techniques of Section 7.2.1 to prove our separation in a modular way. Now in order to get (1) we directly define our oracle \(O\) to be an idealized version of cFWE. To get (2) we use the power of cFWE.\(^1\) To get (3) we rely on

\(^1\)In fact, as shown in [BCP14], without our customization, the original FWE implies, not just IO itself, but even di-IO.
the fact that cFWE is weakened in a careful way so that it does not imply IO. Below, we describe more details about our idealized oracle for cFWE and how to break the security of a given candidate IO construction relative to this oracle. We first recap the general framework for proving separations for IO.

**General recipe for proving separations for IO.** Let $\mathcal{I}$ be our idealized cFWE oracle. We will use the general approach developed in Section 7.2.1 for breaking $\text{IO}^\mathcal{I}$ using a polynomial number of queries to the oracle (i.e. the step (3) above). Recall that the process involves “compiling out” the oracle $\mathcal{I}$ from the obfuscation scheme to get a new secure obfuscator $\text{IO}' \ = \ (\text{IO}', \text{Ev}')$ in the plain-model that is only approximately-correct. Namely, by obfuscating $\text{IO}'(C) = B$ and running $B$ over a random input we get the correct answer with probability $99/100$. Then, by the result of [BBF16], doing so implies a polynomial query attacker against $\text{IO}^\mathcal{I}$ in model $\mathcal{I}$.

Note that this compiling out process (of $\mathcal{I}$ from $\text{IO}^\mathcal{I}$) is not independent of the oracle being removed since different oracles may require different approaches to be emulated. However, the general high-level of the compiler that is used in Chapters 5 and 7, and we use here as well, is the same: The new plain-model obfuscator $\text{IO}'$, given a circuit $C$ to obfuscate would work in two steps. The first step of $\text{IO}'$ is to emulate $\text{IO}^\mathcal{I}(C)$ (by simulating the oracle $\mathcal{I}$) to get an ideal-model obfuscation $B$, making sure to ‘lazily’ evaluate (emulate) any queries issued to $\mathcal{I}$. The second step of the compiler is to learn the queries that are likely to be asked by $\text{Ev}^\mathcal{I}(B, x)$ for a uniformly random input $x$, denote by $Q_B$, which can be found by by emulating $\text{Ev}^\mathcal{I}(B, x_i)$ enough number of times for different uniformly random $x_i$. Finally, the output of $\text{IO}'$ is the plain-model obfuscation $B' = (B, Q_B)$, where $B$ is the ideal-model obfuscation and $Q_B$ is the set of learned queries. To evaluate the obfuscation over a new random input $x$, we simply execute $\text{Ev}'(B, x) = \text{Ev}^\mathcal{I}(B, x)$ while emulating any queries to $\mathcal{I}$ consistently relative to $Q_B$.

Any compiler (for removing $\mathcal{I}$ from IO) that uses the approach describe above is in fact secure, because we only send emulated queries to the evaluator that could be simulated in the ideal world $\mathcal{I}$. The challenge, however, is to prove the correctness of the new obfuscator. So we shall prove that, by having enough iterations of the learning process (in the learning step of $\text{IO}'$), the probability that we ask an unlearned emulation query occurs with sufficiently small probability.

**The Challenge faced for Compiling Out Our Customized Functional Witness Encryption Oracle.** When $\mathcal{I}$ is defined to be our idealized cFWE oracle, in order to prove the approximate correctness of the plain-model obfuscator, we face two problems.

1. **The Fuzzy Nature of FWE:** Unlike ‘all-or-nothing’ primitives such as witness encryption and predicate encryption, functional witness encryption mechanisms allow for more relaxed decryption functionalities. In particular, decrypting a ciphertext does not necessarily reveal the whole message $m$. In fact, the decryptor will learn only $f(w, m)$, which is a function of the encrypted message and witness. As a result, even after many learning steps, when the actual execution of the obfuscated circuit starts, we might
aim for evaluating a ciphertext (generated during the obfuscation phase) on a new function. This challenge did not exist in the previous separations of Chapter 7 where we dealt with ‘all-or-nothing’ primitives, because the probability of not decrypting a ciphertext during all the learning steps and then suddenly trying to decrypt it during the final evaluation phase could be bounded to be arbitrary small. However, here we might try to decrypt this ciphertext in all these steps, every time with a different function, which could make the information gathered during the learning step useless for the final evaluation.

2. Unlearnable Hidden Queries: To get extended FE from our cFWE (step (2) above), our cFWE needs to be extended as well. Namely, we allow the functions evaluated by cFWE to accept circuits with all possible gates that compute the subroutines of cFWE itself. However, for technical reasons, we limit how the witness verification is done in cFWE to only accept one-way function gates. Now, since we are dealing with an oracle that is an ideal version of our cFWE primitive, the function \( f_{c\text{FWE}}(m, w) \) may also issue queries of their own. The challenge is that there could be many such indirect/hidden queries asked during the obfuscation phase (in particular during the learning step) that we cannot send over to the final evaluator simply because these queries are not suitable in the ideal world.

Resolving Challenges. Here we describe main ideas to resolve the challenges above.

1. To resolve the first challenge, we add a specific feature to cFWE so that no ciphertext \( c = \text{Enc}(x = (a, m)) \) would be decrypted more than once by the same person. More formally, we add a subroutine to FWE (as part of our cFWE) that reveals the message \( x = (a, m) \) fully, if one can provide two correct witnesses \( w_1 \neq w_2 \) for the attribute \( a \). This way, the second time that we want to decrypt \( c \), instead we can recover the whole message \( x \) and run the function \( f \) on our own! By this trick, we will not have to worry about the fuzzy nature of FWE, as each message is now decrypted at most once. In fact, adding this subroutine is the exact reason that cFWE is a weaker primitive than FWE.

2. To resolve the second challenge, we rely on an information theoretic argument. Suppose for simplicity that the encryption algorithm does not take an input other than the message\(^2\) \( x \). Suppose we use a random (injective) function \( \text{Enc}: x \mapsto c \) for encryption, mapping strings of length \( n \) to strings of length \( p = p(n) \). Then, if \( p \gg n \), information theoretically, any \( q \) query algorithm who has no special advice about the oracle has a chance of \( \approx q \cdot 2^{n-p} \) to find a valid ciphertext. If \( p \gg n \) this probability is very small, so intuitively we would need about \( p - n - \log(q) \) bits of advice to find such ciphertext. On the other hand, any decryption query over a ciphertext \( c \) will only return \( t = t(n) \) bits, which in our paper is assumed to be \( t \ll p - n \). Therefore, if we interpret the decryption like a ‘trade’ of information, we need to spend \( \approx \Omega(p - n) \) bits to get back only \( s \leq o(p - n) \) bits. This is the main idea behind our argument showing that during the learning phase, we will not discover more than a polynomial

\(^2\)This is not true as the encryption is randomized, but allows us to explain the idea more easily.
number of new ciphertexts, unless we have encrypted them! By running the learning step of the compiler enough number of times, we will learn all such queries and can successfully finish the final evaluation.

By the using above two ideas, we can successfully compile out our oracle $\mathcal{I}$ from any $\text{IO}^\mathcal{I}$ construction. The compilation process itself consists of two steps. The first step being compiling out just the decryption queries where we face and resolve the challenges that we described above. Once we do that, we get an approximate obfuscator in a new oracle model $\mathcal{I}'$ that is actually a variant of an idealized witness encryption oracle. The second step would be to compile out the oracle $\mathcal{I}'$, which was already shown in Section 7.3, to get the desired approximate obfuscator in the plain model.

8.4 Monolithic Separation of IO from Short-Output FE

In this section, we prove our main impossibility result which states that we cannot construct an IO scheme in a monolithic way from any single-key functional encryption scheme that is restricted to handling only functions of “short” output length. More formally, we prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 8.4.1.** Assume the existence of one-way functions and that $\mathsf{NP} \not\subseteq \mathsf{co-NP}$. Then there exists no monolithic construction of IO from any single-key $t$-bit-output functional encryption scheme where $t(n, \kappa) \leq p(n, \kappa) - \omega(n + \kappa)$, $n$ is the message length, $p$ is the ciphertext length, and $\kappa$ is the security parameter of the functional encryption scheme.

To prove Theorem 8.4.1, we will apply Lemma 7.2.7 for the idealized functional witness encryption model $\Gamma$ (formally defined in Section 8.4.1) to prove that there is no black-box construction of IO from any primitive $\mathcal{P}$ that can be black-box constructed from the $\Gamma$. In particular, we will do so for $\mathcal{P}$ that is the extended functional encryption primitive. Our task is thus twofold: (1) to prove that $\mathcal{P}$ can black-box constructed from $\Gamma$ and (2) to show a simulatable compilation procedure that compiles out $\Gamma$ from any IO construction. The first task is proven in Section 8.4.2 and the second task is proven in Section 8.4.5. By Lemma 7.2.7, this would imply the separation result of IO from $\mathcal{P}$ and prove Theorem 8.4.1.

Our oracle, which is more formally defined in Section 8.4.1, acts an idealized version of a single-key short-output functional encryption scheme, which makes the construction of secure FE quite straightforward. As a result, the main challenge lies in showing a simulatable compilation procedure for IO that satisfies Definition 7.2.2 in this idealized model, and therefore, it is instructive to look at how the compilation process works and what challenges are faced with dealing with oracle $\Gamma$.

8.4.1 The Ideal Model

In this section, we define the distribution of our idealized (randomized) oracle that can be used to realize some form of (extended) functional witness encryption. We also provide
several definitions regarding the algorithms in this model and the types of queries that these algorithms can make.

**Definition 8.4.2 (Randomized Functional Witness Encryption Oracle).** Let \( V \) be a PPT algorithm that takes as input \((w, a)\), outputs \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) and runs in time \( \text{poly}(|a|) \). Also, let \( F \) be a PPT algorithm that accepts as input a witness \( w \) and a message \( m \) then outputs a string \( y \in \{0, 1\}^* \). We denote the random \((V, F, p)\)-functional witness encryption (rFWE) oracle as \( \Gamma_{V, F, p} = \{\Gamma_{V, F, p, n}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \).

Let \( \Gamma \) be a PPT algorithm that accepts as input a witness \( w \) and a message \( m \) then outputs a string \( y \in \{0, 1\}^* \). We denote the random \((V, F, p)\)-functional witness encryption (rFWE) oracle as \( \Gamma_{V, F, p} = \{\Gamma_{V, F, p, n}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \).

When it is clear from context, we sometimes omit the subscripts from \( \text{Dec}_V \), \( \text{RevMsg}_V \), and \( \Gamma \) and simply write them as \( \text{Dec}, \text{RevMsg}, \) and \( \Gamma \), respectively. Furthermore, we denote any query-answer pair \((q, \beta)\) asked by some oracle algorithm \( A \) to a subroutine \( T \in \{\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Rev}, \text{RevMsg}\} \) as \((q \mapsto \beta)_T\).

**Definition 8.4.3 (Extended Randomized Functional Witness Encryption Oracle).** We define the randomized extended functional witness encryption oracle \( \Gamma_{V, F, p} \) as an rFWE oracle \( \Gamma_{V, F, p} = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_F, \text{Rev}_F, \text{RevMsg}) \) where \( V \) and \( F \) satisfy the following properties:

- \( V \) is a PPT oracle algorithm that takes as input \((w, a)\), interprets \( a^{(i)} \) as an oracle-aided circuit that can only make \( \text{Enc} \) calls, then outputs \( a^{\text{Enc}(w)} \).
- \( F \) is a PPT oracle algorithm that takes as input \((w, m)\), parses \( w = (z_1, z_2) \), interprets \( z_1^{(i)} \) as an oracle-aided circuit that can make calls to any subroutine in \( \Gamma = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Rev}, \text{RevMsg}) \), then outputs \( z_1^{\Gamma(m)} \).

For the purposes of this section, we will use the extended rFWE oracle \( \Gamma \) in order to prove our separation result of IO from extended functional encryption - mainly because this oracle is sufficient for getting extended FE. Nevertheless, we will still make use of \( \Gamma \) later on in Section 8.6 to prove the fully black-box separation of IO from (non-extended) functional encryption.
Next, we present the following definition of canonical executions that is a property of algorithms in this ideal model. This normal form of algorithms helps us in reducing the query cases to analyze since there are useless queries whose answers can be computed without needing to ask the oracle.

**Definition 8.4.4 (Canonical executions).** We define an oracle algorithm $A^Γ$ relative to the extended rFWE oracle to be in canonical form if the following conditions are satisfied:

- If $A$ has issued a query of the form $\text{Enc}(x) = c$, then it will not ask $\text{Dec}_{\gamma,F}(\ldots, c)$, $\text{Rev}(c)$, or $\text{RevMsg}_{\gamma}(\ldots, c)$ as it can compute the answers of these queries on its own. In particular, for $\text{Dec}_{\gamma,F}$ and $\text{RevMsg}_{\gamma}$ queries, it would run $V$ and $F$ directly to compute the query answers correctly.
- Before asking any $\text{Dec}_{\gamma,F}(w, c)$ query where $\text{Enc}(x) = c$ for some $x = (a, m)$, $A$ would go through the following steps first:
  - $A$ would get $a \leftarrow \text{Rev}(c)$ then run $V^{\text{Enc}}(w, a)$ on its own, making sure to answer any queries of $V$ using $\text{Enc}$. If $V^{\text{Enc}}(w, a) = 0$ then do not issue $\text{Dec}_{\gamma,F}(w, c)$ to $\Gamma$ and use $\bot$ as the answer instead. Otherwise, continue to the next step.
  - If $A$ has beforehand ran $V^{\text{Enc}}(w', a) = 1$ for some $w' \neq w$ then it does not ask $\text{Dec}_{\gamma,F}(w, c)$ and instead computes the answer to this query on its own. That is, it first gets $m \leftarrow \text{RevMsg}(w, w', c)$, computes on its own $F^\Gamma(w, m)$ and outputs $F^\Gamma(w, m)$ if $V^{\text{Enc}}(w, a) = 1$ or otherwise $\bot$.
  - If $A$ has not asked $\text{Dec}_{\gamma,F}(w', c)$ for any $w' \neq w$ (or did but it received $\bot$ as the answer) then it directly asks $\text{Dec}_{\gamma,F}(w, c)$ from the oracle.
- Before asking any $\text{RevMsg}_{\gamma}(w_1, w_2, c)$ query where $\text{Enc}(x) = c$ for some $x = (a, m)$, $A$ would go through the following steps first:
  - $A$ would get $a \leftarrow \text{Rev}(c)$ then run $V^{\text{Enc}}(w_i, a)$ for all $i \in \{1, 2\}$ on its own, making sure to answer any queries of $V$ using $\text{Enc}$. If $V^{\text{Enc}}(w_i, a) = 0$ for some $i$ then do not issue $\text{RevMsg}_{\gamma}(w_1, w_2, c)$ to $\Gamma$ and use $\bot$ as the answer instead. Otherwise, continue to the next step.
  - After issuing $\text{RevMsg}_{\gamma}(w_1, w_2, c)$ to $\Gamma$ and getting back an answer $m \neq \bot$, ask the query $\text{Enc}(x)$ where $x = (a, m)$ then run $F^\Gamma(w_1, m)$ and $F^\Gamma(w_2, m)$.

Note that any oracle algorithm $A$ can be easily modified into a canonical form by increasing its query complexity by at most a polynomial factor assuming that $F$ has extended polynomial query complexity.

**Remark 8.4.5.** We observe the following useful property regarding the number of queries of a specific type that a canonical algorithm in the $\Gamma$ oracle model can make. Namely, given a canonical $A$, for any ciphertext $c = \text{Enc}(x)$ where $x = (a, m)$ for which $A$ has not asked $\text{Enc}(x)$ before, $A$ would ask at most one query of the form $\text{Rev}(c)$, at most one query of the form $\text{Dec}_{\gamma,F}(w, c)$ for which $V^{\text{Enc}}(w, a) = 1$, and at most one query of the form $\text{RevMsg}_{\gamma}(w_1, w_2, c)$ for which $V^{\text{Enc}}(w_i, a) = 1$ where $i \in \{1, 2\}$. Furthermore, $A$ would never ask a query if $V^{\text{Enc}}(w, a) = 0$ since this condition can be verified independently by $A$ and the answer can be simulated as it would invariably be $\bot$.

Looking ahead, we will use this property later on to prove an upper bound on the number of ciphertexts that an adversary can decrypt without knowing the underlying message. Fur-
thermore, we stress that this property holds specifically due to the presence of the RevMsg subroutine which leaks the entire message of a given ciphertext once two different valid witnesses are provided. As a result, this shows that decrypting a ciphertext more than once (under different witnesses) does not help as the message could be revealed instead.

We also provide the following definitions to classify the ciphertext and query types. This would simplify our discussion and clarify some aspects of the details later in the proof.

Definition 8.4.6 (Ciphertext Types). Let $A$ be a canonical algorithm in the $\Gamma$ ideal model and suppose that $Q_A$ is the set of query-answer pairs that $A$ asks during its execution. For any $q$ of the form $\text{Dec}_V, F(w, c)$, Rev$(c)$, or RevMsg$(w_1, w_2, c)$, we say that $c$ is valid if there exists $x$ such that $c = \text{Enc}(x)$, and we say that $c$ is unknown (to $A$) if the query-answer pair $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is not in $Q_A$.

Definition 8.4.7 (Query Types). Let $A$ be a canonical algorithm in the $\Gamma$ ideal model and let $Q_A$ be the query-answer pairs that it has asked so far. For any query new query $q$ issued to $\Gamma$, we define several properties that such a query might have:

- **Determined**: We say $q$ is determined with respect to $Q_A$ if there exists $(q \mapsto \beta)_T \in Q_A$ for some answer $\beta$ or there exists some query $(q' \mapsto \beta')_T \in Q_A$ that determines that answer of $q$ without needing to issue $q$ to $\Gamma$.
- **Direct**: We say $q$ is a direct query if $A$ issues this query to $\Gamma$ to get back some answer $\beta$. The answers to such queries are said to be visible to $A$.
- **Indirect**: We say $q$ is an indirect query if $q$ is issued by $F^\Gamma$ during a Dec query that was issued by $A$. The answers to such queries are said to be hidden from $A$.

8.4.2 Extended Functional Encryption Exists Relative to $\Gamma$

In this section, we show how to construct a semantically-secure extended FE scheme. Namely, we prove the following:

Lemma 8.4.8. There exists a correct and subexponentially-secure implementation of extended functional encryption in the $\Gamma$ oracle model with measure one of oracles.

We do this in two steps: we first show how to construct an extended variant of a functional witness encryption (for a specific class of functions and relations) from the ideal oracle $\Gamma$ and then show how to use it to construct the desired functional encryption scheme. Our variant of FWE that we will construct is defined as follows.

Definition 8.4.9 (Customized Functional Witness Encryption (CFWE)). Given any one-way function $R$, let $V$ be a PPT oracle algorithm that takes as input an instance-message pair $x = (a, m)$ and witness $w$, interprets $a$ as a Boolean oracle circuit that can only make calls to $R$ (it returns 0 otherwise) then outputs $a^R(w)$. Furthermore, let $F$ be a PPT oracle algorithm that accepts as input a string $w = (z_1, z_2)$ and a message $m$, interprets $z_1$ as a circuit then outputs a string $y = z_1(m)$. 

161
For any given security parameter $\kappa$, a *customized functional witness encryption* scheme parameterized with $V$ and $F$ consists of three PPT algorithms $P = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_{V,F}, \text{Rev})$ defined as follows:

- $\text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m)$: given an instance $a \in \{0,1\}^*$, message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and security parameter $\kappa$, outputs $c \in \{0,1\}^*$.
- $\text{Rev}(c)$: given a ciphertext $c$, outputs the corresponding attribute $a$ under which the message is encrypted.
- $\text{Dec}_{V,F}(w, c)$: given ciphertext $c$ and “witness” string $w \in \{0,1\}^*$, outputs a message $m' \in \{0,1\}^*$.

A customized functional witness encryption scheme satisfies the following completeness and security properties:

- **Correctness:** For any security parameter $\kappa$, any $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and any $(w, (a,m))$ such that $V_R(w,a) = 1$, it holds that
  $$\Pr_{\text{Enc,Dec}}[\text{Dec}_{V,F}(w, \text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m)) = F_P(w, m)] = 1$$

- **Instance-Revealing:** For any security parameter $\kappa$, any $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, and any $(w, (a,m))$ such that $V_R(w,a) = 1$, it holds that
  $$\Pr[\text{Rev}(\text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m)) = a] = 1$$

- **Weak Extractability:** For any PPT adversary $A$ and polynomial $p_1(.)$, there exists a PPT extractor $E$ and a polynomial $p_2(.)$ such that for any security parameter $\kappa$, any $a$ for which $V_R(w,a) = 1$ for some $w$, and any $m_0, m_1$ where $|m_0| = |m_1|$, if:
  $$\Pr[A(1^\kappa, c) = b \mid b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}, c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m_b)] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{p_1(\kappa)}$$

Then:
$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l}
E^A(1^\kappa, a, m_0, m_1) = w : V^R(w,a) = 1 \land F_P(w, m_0) \neq F_P(w, m_1) \\
E^A(1^\kappa, a, m_0, m_1) = (w_1, w_2) : w_1 \neq w_2 \land V^R(w_1,a) = 1 \land V^R(w_2,a) = 1
\end{array} \right] \geq \frac{1}{p_2(\kappa)}$$

Note that we declared such a functional witness encryption as being customized since it deviates slightly (in an incomparable way) to standard FWE (Definition 2.6.10). Particularly, this customized FWE is essentially an *extended* FWE scheme with a *weaker* extractability property and is defined for a specific $V$ and a specific $F$ defined above. However, in order to minimize the number of descriptors attached to this primitive, we will simply say that this FWE is customized with the properties listed in Definition 8.4.9. It is important to note however that, irrespective of what this primitive is called or how it is defined, what we eventually care about is that one can use it to get extended FE, which is our desired target primitive.
8.4.3 Customized FWE in the $\Gamma$ Ideal Model

Here we provide the construction of customized FWE using the $\Gamma_{VF}$ oracle. We note that $\Gamma$ can be thought of as an ideal customized FWE and hence the construction of the CFWE primitive is straightforward.

Construction 8.4.10 (Customized Functional Witness Encryption). Let $V$ and $F$ be as defined in Definition 8.4.9. For any security parameter $\kappa$ and oracle $\Gamma_{VF}$ sampled according to Definition 8.4.3, we will implement a customized FWE scheme $P$ defined by $V$ and function class $F$ as follows:

- CFWE.Enc($1^\kappa, a, m$) : Given $a \in \{0,1\}^*$, message $m \in \{0,1\}^{|n|}$ and security parameter $1^\kappa$, let $n = \Theta(n' + |a| + \kappa)$. Sample $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\kappa$ uniformly at random then output $c = \text{Enc}(x)$ where $x = (a, (m, r))$.
- CFWE.Dec($w, c$) : Given string $w$ and ciphertext $c \in \{0,1\}^p$, get $y \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{VF}(w, c)$, then output $y$.
- CFWE.Rev($c$) : Given ciphertext $c \in \{0,1\}^p$, outputs Rev($c$).

Lemma 8.4.11. Construction 8.4.10 is a correct and subexponentially-secure implementation of customized functional witness encryption in the $\Gamma$ oracle model with measure one.

The correctness of the scheme follows immediately. The security also holds intuitively, since if there is any secure realization of this primitive, it should be the idealized version of it defined as an oracle. To prove the security of this construction formally, we will show that if there exists an adversary $A$ against scheme $P$ (in the $\Gamma_{VF}$ oracle model) that can distinguish between encryptions of two different messages $m_0, m_1$ (under the same instance $a^*$) with non-negligible advantage then there exists a (fixed) deterministic straight-line extractor $E$ with access to $\Gamma_{VF}$ that can find the valid witness $w^*$ for the underlying instance $a^*$ of the challenge ciphertext such that $F(w^*, m_0) \neq F(w^*, m_1)$ or find two distinct witnesses $(w_1^*, w_2^*)$ such that $V(w_1^*, a^*) = V(w_2^*, a^*) = 1$.

Suppose $A$ is an adversary in the indistinguishability game with success probability $1/2 + \epsilon$. Then there exists a canonical adversary $D$ that satisfies Definition 8.4.4 and has the same success probability as $A$. Let $Q_E$ be the query-answer pairs asked by the extractor during its execution. The extractor $E$ would work as follows: given $(a, m_0, m_1)$ as input and acting as the challenger for adversary $D$, it runs $D^F(1^\kappa, c^*)$ where $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(1^\kappa, a, m_0)$ is the challenge ciphertext and $b \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}$. To answer any query $q$ asked by $D$, the extractor will emulate the answer returned to $A$ as follows:

- If $q$ is a query of the form Enc($x$), it forwards the query to the oracle $\Gamma$ to get some answer $c$, adds $(x \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ to $Q_E$ then returns $c$ to $A$.
- If $q$ is a query of the form Rev($c$) for $c \neq c^*$ then it returns $\perp^3$. If $c = c^*$ then $E$ returns $a$ as the answer.
- If $q$ is a query of the form Dec$_{VF}(w, c)$ for $c \neq c^*$ then the extractor aborts with $\perp$. If $c = c^*$ then it must be the case that Dec($w, c^*$) $\neq \perp$ (otherwise the canonical $D$ would

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3 Even if it is a valid ciphertext - however querying an unknown valid ciphertext happens with negligible probability
Then there exists a PPT straight-line extractor $E$.

Furthermore, since $Pr$ hitting a point in the image of a random injective function without knowing the preimage.

Let $E$ target that evaluate the oracle in a ‘lazy’ way (upon request) as this is the probability of

\[ \Pr \left[ D^F(1^k, c^*) = b \mid b \Leftarrow \{0, 1\}, c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(1^k, a, m_b) \right] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(\kappa) \]  \hspace{1cm} (8.1)

Then there exists a PPT straight-line extractor $E$, a non-negligible function $\epsilon'(\cdot)$ and a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that:

\[ \Pr \left[ E^{F,D}(a, m_0, m_1) = w^* \land V^{\text{Enc}}(w^*, a) = 1 \land F^F(w^*, m_0) \neq F^F(w^*, m_1) \right] \geq \epsilon'(\kappa) - \text{negl}(\kappa) \]  \hspace{1cm} (8.2)

**Proof.** Let $D$ be an adversary satisfying Equation (8.1) above. We first define the following events that will be of interest to us:

- Let $\text{AdvWin}$ be the event that $D$ succeeds in the distinguishing game of Equation (8.1).
- Let $\text{ExtWin}$ be the event that the extractor succeeds in extracting a witness or a pair of witnesses (as in Equation (8.2) above).
- Let $\text{Bad}$ to be the event that $D$ asks (directly or indirectly via $F$) a query of the form $\text{Dec}_V, F(w, c')$ or $\text{RevMsg}_V(w_1, w_2, c')$ for some $c' \neq c^*$ for which it has not asked $\text{Enc}(x) = c'$ previously.

Note that as long as $\text{Bad}$ does not happen, the extractor will not abort due to failing to answer a valid $D$ Dec or $\text{RevMsg}$ query. Observe that by a union bound:

\[ \Pr_{\Gamma,b,r} \left[ \text{ExtWin} \right] \leq \Pr_{\Gamma,b,r} \left[ \text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin} \land \text{Bad} \right] + \Pr_{\Gamma,b,r} \left[ \text{AdvWin} \right] + \Pr_{\Gamma,b,r} \left[ \text{Bad} \right] \]

where $r$ is the randomness of the distinguisher $D$.

Note that, over the randomness of $\Gamma$, we find that $\Pr_{b,r}[\text{Bad}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$ by a standard argument that evaluate the oracle in a ‘lazy’ way (upon request) as this is the probability of hitting a point in the image of a random injective function without knowing the preimage. Furthermore, since $\Pr[\text{AdvWin}] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon$ for some non-negligible function $\epsilon$, it suffices to show
that $\Pr[\text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin} \land \text{Bad}]$ is negligible. Note that, by our construction of extractor $E$, this event is equivalent to saying that the adversary $D$ succeeds in the distinguishing game but never asks a query of the form $\text{Dec}_V(w, c^*) \neq \bot$ for which $F(w, m_0) \neq F(w, m_1)$ or a query of the form $\text{RevMsg}_V(w_1, w_2, c^*) \neq \bot$ and so the extractor fails to recover the witness(es). For simplicity of notation define $\text{Win} := \text{ExtWin} \land \text{AdvWin} \land \text{Bad}$.

We will show that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of oracle $\Gamma$, the probability of $\text{Win}$ happening is only a negligible factor over the trivial advantage. That is, we will prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 8.4.13.** For security parameter $\kappa$ and $\epsilon > 2^{-\kappa/10}$, $\Pr_{\Gamma}[\Pr_{b,r}[\text{Win}] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon] \leq 2^{-\epsilon/2^{165}}$

**Proof.** Since $\text{Bad}$ does not happen and $D$ wins but $E$ does not, we can conclude that $D$ only issues encryptions queries to $\Gamma$. We proceed to show that $D$ only succeeds with negligible advantage. Define $\text{Hit}$ to be the event that $D$ happens to ask $\text{Enc}(x^*) = c^*$. Then we have that:

\[
\Pr_{\Gamma}[\Pr_{b,r}[\text{Win}] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon] \leq \Pr_{\Gamma}[\Pr_{b,r}[\text{Win} \land \text{Hit}] + \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Hit}] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon]
\]

\[
\leq \Pr_{\Gamma}[\Pr_{b,r}[\text{Win} \land \text{Hit}] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon/2 \lor \Pr_{b,r}[\text{Hit}] \geq \epsilon/2]
\]

\[
\leq \Pr_{\Gamma}[\Pr_{b,r}[\text{Win} \land \text{Hit}] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon/2] + \Pr_{\Gamma}[\Pr_{b,r}[\text{Hit}] \geq \epsilon/2]
\]

We can bound the event $\text{Hit}$ from happening since it is the event that we invert the image of a random injective function. This can be done over the randomness of the oracle then, using an averaging argument, deduce that the probability that $\text{Hit}$ happens for a non-negligible fraction of oracles $\Gamma$ is negligible.

We will thus focus on proving the first term. In doing so, we will reduce the problem of indistinguishability to that of predicting the output of a random Boolean function on a random point in the domain of this function. We then prove that the latter problem is hard using a compression technique which allows to argue that an adversary that can win the prediction game with non-negligible advantage can only do so for a negligible fraction of the oracles. We will make use of the following lemma that shows the existence of a randomized compression technique for random Boolean functions using adversaries against the prediction game.

**Lemma 8.4.14** (Fact 10.1 and Lemma 10.4 [DTT10]). Let $A$ be an oracle algorithm that makes $q$ queries to some fixed oracle predicate $p : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, never queries the oracle on its input and satisfies the following for some $\epsilon$:

\[
\Pr[A^p(x) = p(x)] \geq 1/2 + \epsilon
\]

Then there exists a randomized encoder $E$ and a randomized decoder $D$ such that:

\[
\Pr_r[D(E(p, r), r) = p] \geq \epsilon/q
\]
and $|E(p, r)| \leq 2^n - \epsilon^2 2^n / q$.

For any given adversary $D$ that wins in the indistinguishability game of FWE with probability $1/2 + \epsilon/2$ without asking any Dec or RevMsg queries, we can construct a new oracle-aided adversary $\tilde{D}$ that aims to win in the experiment $\text{Exp}_D^P(1^\kappa)$ as defined in Figure 8.1. The adversary $\tilde{D}$ will have access to oracle $\Gamma$ and $P^\Gamma$, which is defined as follows:

$$P(a, r, c_0, c_1) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c_0 = \text{Enc}(a|0|r) \text{ and } c_1 = \text{Enc}(a|1|r) \\ 1 & \text{if } c_0 = \text{Enc}(a|1|r) \text{ and } c_1 = \text{Enc}(a|0|r) \\ \bot & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

However, we note that $\tilde{D}$ will not query $P$ on its input based on the definition of the experiment and will not ask any Dec or RevMsg queries from $\Gamma$ since $D$ will not either.

**Experiment $\text{Exp}_A^P(1^\kappa, a)$:**

1. $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa, b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$
2. $c_0^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a|b|r), c_1^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(a|(1-b)|r)$
3. $b' \leftarrow A^{P^\Gamma}(1^\kappa, r, c_0^*, c_1^*)$ where $A$ is not allowed to query $P$ on its input
4. Output $1$ if $b = b'$ and $0$ otherwise.

Figure 8.1: The single-instance $\text{Exp}_A^P$ Experiment

The adversary $\tilde{D}$, given $(1^\kappa, r, c_0^*, c_1^*)$, would execute $b' \leftarrow D(1^\kappa, c_0^*)$ and output $b'$ as its answer. We can modify $\tilde{D}$ so that whenever it issues a query to $\text{Enc}(a|b|r) = c_b$, it would also call $\text{Enc}(a|1-b|r) = c_{1-b}$ followed by a call to $P(a, r, c_0, c_1)$. This ensures that any encryption query issued to $\Gamma$ is translated into a query to $P$.

Define $P_a := P(a, \ldots, \ldots)$ to be the random predicate $P$ restricted to attribute $a$ where $P_a : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $\ell = \kappa + 2|c|$. Note that $P = \{P_a\}_{a \in \mathbb{N}}$ can be interpreted as an alternative description for $\Gamma$. That is, given $P$, one can reconstruct $\Gamma$ on any point in its domain. By Lemma 8.4.14, we can encode $P_a$ using at most $2^\ell - \epsilon^2 2^\ell / 4q$ bits where $q$ is the number of queries that $\tilde{D}$ makes. Thus, we have compressed the entire oracle $P$ by saving $\alpha = \epsilon^2 2^\ell / 4q$ bits. Hence, assuming that $\epsilon \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$ and $q \leq \text{poly}(\kappa)$ we find that the fraction of oracles for which $\tilde{D}$ can win on is at most $1/2^\alpha = \text{negl}(\kappa)$ assuming that we encrypt attributes $a$ of size $\text{poly}(\kappa)$ which would imply that $\ell = \text{poly}(\kappa)$. □

To conclude the proof of Lemma 8.4.12, we note that by Lemma 8.4.13 and the fact that $\Pr[\text{Bad}]$ is $\text{negl}(\kappa)$ we find that $\Pr_{\Gamma, b, r}[\text{ExtWin}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$. □
Proof of Lemma 8.4.11. It is clear that the Construction 8.4.10 is correct. Furthermore, by Lemma 8.4.12, it also satisfies the extractability property.

8.4.4 From CFWE to Functional Encryption

Construction 8.4.15 (Functional Encryption). Let $P_F = (\text{FE.Setup}, \text{FE.Keygen}, \text{FE.Enc}, \text{FE.Dec})$ be the functional encryption scheme for the function family $F$ that we would like to construct. Suppose $\text{Sig} = (\text{Sig.Gen}, \text{Sig.Sign}, \text{Sig.Ver})$ is a secure signature scheme.

Define a language $L$ with an associated PPT verifier $V$ such that an instance $a$ of the language corresponds to the signature verification circuit $\text{Sig.Ver}(vk,.)$ that takes as input $w = (f, sk_f)$ so that $V(w, a) = a(w) = 1$ if and only if $\text{Sig.Ver}(vk, w) = 1$ for some oracle-aided $f \in F$, $sk_f \leftarrow \text{Sig.Sign}(sk, f)$, and $(sk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Sig.Gen}(1^\kappa)$. Furthermore, let $F'$ be a PPT algorithm that takes as input $w = (f, sk_f)$ and a message $m$ then outputs $y = F'(w, m) = f(m)$.

Given a customized functional witness encryption scheme $\text{CFWE} = (\text{CFWE.Enc}, \text{CFWE.Dec}_{\mathcal{V}, F'}, \text{CFWE.Rev})$ for $V$ and $F'$ defined above, signature scheme $\text{Sig}$, and security parameter $\kappa$, we implement the extended FE scheme $P_F$ as follows:

- $\text{FE.Setup}(1^\kappa) : \text{Generate } (sk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Sig.Gen}(1^\kappa)$. Output $(\text{MPK}, \text{MSK})$ where $\text{MPK} = vk$ and $\text{MSK} = sk$.
- $\text{FE.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, f) : \text{Given } \text{MSK} = sk$ and $f \in F$, output $\text{SK}_f = (f, sk_f)$ where $sk_f \leftarrow \text{Sig.Sign}(\text{MSK}, f)$.
- $\text{FE.Enc}(\text{MPK}, m) : \text{Given } \text{MPK} \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and message $m \in \{0, 1\}^{n'}$, output ciphertext $c = \text{CFWE.Enc}(1^\kappa, \text{MPK}, m)$.
- $\text{FE.Dec}(\text{SK}_f, c) : \text{Given } \text{SK}_f = (f, sk_f)$ and ciphertext $c \in \{0, 1\}^p$, call and output the value returned by $\text{CFWE.Dec}_{\mathcal{V}, F'}(\text{SK}_f, c)$.

Lemma 8.4.16. Construction 8.4.15 is a fully black-box construction of extended functional encryption from customized functional witness encryption.

Proof. We first show that the construction is correct. Given $(\text{MPK}, \text{MSK}) \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\kappa)$, for any encryption $c \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{MPK}, m)$ of a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^{n'}$ and functional decryption key $\text{SK}_f \leftarrow \text{FE.Keygen}(\text{MSK}, f)$ for a function $f \in F$, we get that, if $V(w, a) = a^{\text{Sig}}(w) = \text{Sig.Ver}(vk, (f, sk_f)) = 1$ then:

$$\text{FE.Dec}(\text{SK}_f, c) = \text{CFWE.Dec}_{\mathcal{V}, F'}((f, sk_f), c) = F'((f, sk_f), m) = f^{P_f}(m)$$

Note that, since this is an monolithic construction, $f$ can have oracle gates to any subroutine in $P_F$. As a result, we need to make sure that $V$ are $F'$ are specified in a way so that all monolithic computations are valid. First, $V$ only has one $\text{Sig.Ver}$ gate which is supported by OWFs. Furthermore, $F'$ calls $f$ which has oracle gates to any subroutine in $P_F$. Nevertheless, we can reduce each gate to $P_F$ to CFWE or OWF gates. In particular, $\text{FE.Setup}$ can be reduced to $\text{Sig.Gen}$ gates, $\text{FE.Keygen}$ can be reduced to $\text{Sig.Sign}$ gates, $\text{FE.Enc}$ can be reduced to CFWE.$\text{Enc}$ gates, and $\text{FE.Dec}$ can be reduced to CFWE.$\text{Dec}$ gates. Thus, all gates in $F'$ can be reduced to those in $\text{FWE}$ or one-way functions.

167
Next, we prove the security of the scheme by reducing it to the underlying security of CFWE and Sig. Let $A$ be a computationally bounded adversary that asks one functional secret key query and breaks the security of the FE scheme. That is, for some non-negligible $\epsilon(.)$:

$$\Pr[\text{IND}_A^{\text{FE}}(1^\kappa) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(\kappa)$$

where $\text{IND}_A^{\text{FE}}$ is the experiment of Definition 2.6.9.

Towards contradiction, we will now show that, given $A$, we can build an attacker $B$ that can break the strong existential unforgeability of the signature scheme under chosen message attack. On receiving the public-key $\text{MPK}$ from the (signature game) challenger, $B$ forwards $\text{MPK}$ to $A$ and upon receiving $(f,m_0,m_1)$, requests the signature for $f$ and then randomly chooses a message to encrypt. Note that, since $\text{FE}.\text{Enc}(\text{MPK},m_b) = \text{CFWE}.\text{Enc}(1^\kappa,\text{MPK},m_b)$, $B$ can use $A$ to build a distinguisher $A'$ against CFWE. $B$ then runs the black-box straight-line extractor $E_{A'}$ (guaranteed to exist by the security definition of CFWE) where at least one of the following events will happen with non-negligible probability:

- The extractor returns a single witness $w^* = (f^*, sk_{f^*})$ such that $\text{V}(w^* , \text{MPK})$ outputs 1 and $\text{F}'(w^*,m_0) \neq \text{F}'(w^*,m_1) \implies f^*(m_0) \neq f^*(m_1)$. Note that this implies that $sk_{f^*}$ is a valid forgery since $f^*$ cannot be the function $f$ that $A$ requests the signature for (because $f(m_0) = f(m_1)$ in that case) and $w^*$ passed verification thus violating the security of the signature scheme.

- The extractor returns a pair of witnesses $(w^*_1, w^*_2)$ such that $w^*_1 \neq w^*_2$ and $\text{V}(w^*_1 , \text{MPK}) = \text{V}(w^*_2 , \text{MPK}) = 1$. This either implies that $w^*_i = (f^*, sk_{f^*})$ for some $i \in \{1,2\}$ is a valid witness and $f^* \neq f$ in which case we have a signature forgery, or it implies that $w^*_i = (f, sk_{f'})$ for some $i \in \{1,2\}$ and hence $sk_{f'} \neq sk_f$ (since even if $w^*_{i-1} = (f, sk_f)$ we have that $w^*_i \neq w^*_{i-1}$) which is also signature forgery.

In both of the above cases, an attack against the FE scheme results in an attack against the underlying signature scheme.

$\square$

### 8.4.5 Compiling out $\Gamma$ from IO

In this section, we show a simulatable compiler for compiling out $\Gamma_{\mathcal{V},F}$ when $F$ is short-output. We adapt the approach outlined in Section 7.2.1 to the extended rFWE oracle $\Gamma_{\mathcal{V},F} = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_{\mathcal{V},F}, \text{Rev}, \text{RevMsg}_\mathcal{V})$ while making use of Lemma 7.2.7, which allows us to compile out $\Gamma_{\mathcal{V},F}$ in two phases: we first compile out part of $\Gamma_{\mathcal{V},F}$ to get an approximately-correct obfuscator $\hat{\mathcal{O}}^\Theta$ in the random instance-revealing witness encryption model (that produces an obfuscation $\hat{B}^\Theta$ in the $\Theta$-model), and then use the previous result of Section 7.3 to compile out $\Theta$ and get an obfuscator $O'$ in the plain-model. Since we are applying this lemma only a constant number of times, security should still be preserved. Specifically, we will prove the following lemma:
Lemma 8.4.17. Let $F$ be a PPT oracle Turing machine that accepts as input a witness $w$ and a message $m$ then outputs a string $y \in \{0,1\}^*$ where $s(n) \leq t(n)$. Let $\Theta$ be a random instance-revealing witness encryption oracle. Then for any $\Gamma_{V,F,p}$ satisfying $t(n) \leq p(n) - \omega(n)$ and for $\Theta \subseteq \Gamma_{V,F,p}$, the following holds:

- For any IO in the $\Gamma_{V,F,p}$ ideal model, there exists a simulatable compiler with correctness error $\epsilon < 1/200$ for it that outputs a new obfuscator in the random instance-revealing witness encryption oracle $\Theta$ model.
- For any IO in the $\Theta$ oracle model, there exists a simulatable compiler with correctness error $\epsilon < 1/200$ for it that outputs a new obfuscator in the plain model.

We observe that by compiling out only the Dec queries of $\Gamma$, we will end up with queries only to $\text{Enc, Rev}$, and $\text{RevMsg}$. However, we note that $\text{Enc}$ and $\text{Rev}$ already are part of $\Theta$ and $\text{RevMsg}$ can in fact be interpreted as the decryption subroutine of $\Theta$ where $w' = (w_1, w_2)$ is defined as the witness to the decryption subroutine. Therefore, the second part of Lemma 8.4.17 follows directly from Lemma 7.3.13, which implies that we can compile out the ideal witness encryption oracle from any IO scheme, and thus we focus on proving the first part of the lemma. We will present the construction of the obfuscator in the random instance-revealing witness encryption model that, given an obfuscator in the $\Gamma$ model, would compile out and emulate queries to Dec, while forwarding any $\text{Enc, Rev, RevMsg}$ queries to $\Theta$. Throughout this section, for simplicity of notation, we will denote $\Gamma = \Gamma_{V,F,p}$ to be the oracle satisfying $t(n) \leq p(n) - \omega(n)$.

Remark 8.4.18. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that the compiler only asks the oracle for queries from $\Gamma_n$. However, our argument directly extends to handle arbitrary calls to the oracle $\Gamma$ using the following standard technique. As we will show, the “error” in our poly-query compiler in the ideal model will be at most $\text{poly}(q)/2^n$ (where $q = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ is a fixed polynomial over the security parameter $\kappa$ of the IO construction) when we only call $\Gamma_n$. It is also the case that this error adds up when we work with several input lengths $n_1, n_2, \ldots$, but it is still bounded by union bound. Therefore, the total error of the transformation will be at most $O(\text{poly}(n_1)/2^{n_1})$ where $n_1$ is the smallest integer for which $\Gamma_{n_1}$ is queried at some point. To make $n_1$ large enough (to keep the error small enough) we can modify all the parties to query $\Gamma$ on all oracle queries up to input parameter $n_1 = c(\log(\kappa))$ for sufficiently large $c$. (Note that this will be a polynomial number of queries in total.)

The new obfuscator $\hat{O}^\Theta$ in the instance-revealing witness encryption model

Given a $\delta$-approximate obfuscator $O = (iO, Ev)$ in the rFWE oracle model, we construct an $(\delta + \epsilon)$-approximate obfuscator $\hat{O} = (\hat{iO}, \hat{Ev})$ in the $\Theta$ oracle model. Throughout this process, we can assume that $iO$ and $Ev$ are in their canonical form as in Definition 8.4.4.
Algorithm 4: EmulateCall

Input: Query-answer set $Q$, query $q$ to a subroutine of $T \in \{\text{Enc, Dec, Rev, RevMsg}\}$ of $\Gamma$

Oracle: Random Instance-Revealing Witness Encryption Oracle

$\Theta = (\text{WEnc, WDec, WRevAtt})$

Output: A query-answer pair $\rho_q$, and the set $W$ of hidden queries

Begin:
if $\exists (q \mapsto \beta)_T \in Q$ for some answer $\beta$ then
  Set $\rho_q = (q \mapsto \beta)_T$
end

if $q = x$ is a query to Enc then
  Set $\rho_q = (x \mapsto \text{WEnc}(x))_{\text{Enc}}$
end

if $q = c$ is a query to Rev then
  Set $\rho_q = (c \mapsto \text{WRevAtt}(c))_{\text{Enc}}$
end

if $q = (w_1, w_2, c)$ is a query to RevMsg$_V$ then
  Set $\rho_q = (x \mapsto \text{WDec}_V((w_1, w_2), c))_{\text{Enc}}$
end

/* We simulate Dec queries */

if $q = (w, c)$ is a query to Dec$_{V,F}$ then
  Let $a_R$ be the attribute returned by EmulateCall($Q, q_R$) where $q_R$ is the query Rev($c$)
  Emulate $b \leftarrow V_{\text{Enc}}(w, a_R)$ while emulating any queries using EmulateCall
  if $b = 1$ and $\exists ((a, m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}} \in Q$ then
    Emulate $y \leftarrow F_{V}(w, m)$ while simulating any queries using EmulateCall
    Set $W$ to be the set of query-answer pairs asked by $F$
    Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto y)_{\text{Dec}}$
  else
    Set $\rho_q = ((w, c) \mapsto \bot)_{\text{Dec}}$
  end
end

Return $\rho_q, W$
Subroutine $\hat{iO}^\Theta(C)$:

1. **Emulation phase**: Emulate $iO^\Gamma(C)$. Initialize $Q_O = \emptyset$ to be the set of query-answer pairs asked by the obfuscation algorithm $iO$. For every query $q$ asked by $iO^\Gamma(C)$, call $(\rho_q, W) \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^\Theta(Q_O, q)$ and add $\rho_q$ to $Q_O$.

2. **Learning phase**: Set $Q_B = \emptyset$ to be the set of direct (visible) query-answer pairs asked during this phase (so far) and $Q^h_B = \emptyset$ to be the set of indirect (hidden) query-answer pairs (see Definition 8.4.7). Let $k = (\ell_O + \kappa)/\epsilon$ where $\ell_O \leq |iO|$ represents the number of queries asked by $iO$. Choose $\lambda \leftarrow [k]$ uniformly at random then for $i = \{1, ..., \lambda\}$ do the following:
   - Choose $z_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{C_i}$ uniformly at random
   - Run $Ev^\Gamma(B, z_i)$. For every query $q$ asked by $Ev^\Gamma(B, z_i)$, run the following and get $(\rho_q, W) \leftarrow \text{EmulateCall}^\Theta(Q_O \cup Q_B \cup Q^h_B, q)$, then add $\rho_q$ to $Q_B$ and $W$ to $Q^h_B$.

3. The output of the $\Theta$-model obfuscation algorithm $\hat{iO}^\Theta(C)$ will be $\hat{B} = (B, Q_B)$.

Subroutine $\hat{Ev}^\Theta(\hat{B}, z)$: Initialize $Q_{\hat{B}} = \emptyset$ to be the set of queries asked when evaluating $\hat{B}$. To evaluate $\hat{B} = (B, Q_B)$ on a new random input $z$ we simply emulate $Ev^\Gamma(B, z)$ as follows. For every query $q$ asked by $Ev^\Gamma(B, z)$, run and set $(\rho_q, W) = \text{EmulateCall}^\Theta(Q_O \cup Q_B \cup Q^h_B, q)$ then add $(\rho_q \cup W)$ to $Q_{\hat{B}}$.

The running time of $\hat{iO}$. We note that the running time of the new obfuscator $\hat{iO}$ remains polynomial time since we are emulating the original obfuscation once followed by a polynomial number $\lambda$ of learning iterations. Furthermore, since we are working with the extended oracle (see Definition 8.4.3), the way that $F$ is defined (as a universal circuit evaluator) makes it so that the number of recursive calls that appear due to emulating $F^\Gamma$ is upper-bounded by some polynomial (in fact even quadratic).

Proving Approximate Correctness. Define $Q^h_{\hat{B}}$ to be the set of hidden queries asked during the final execution phase. Set $Q_T = Q_O \cup Q_B \cup Q^h_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}$ to be the set of all (visible and hidden) query-answer pairs asked during all the phases. We consider two distinct experiments that construct the $\Theta$ oracle model obfuscator exactly as described above but differ when evaluating $\hat{B}$:

- **Real Experiment**: $\hat{Ev}^\Theta(\hat{B}, z)$ emulates $Ev^\Gamma(B, z)$ on a random input $z$ and answers any queries using $\text{EmulateCall}$.
- **Ideal Experiment**: $\hat{Ev}^\Gamma(\hat{B}, z)$ executes $Ev^\Gamma(B, z)$ and answers all the queries of $Ev^\Gamma(B, z)$ using the actual oracle $\Gamma$.

Note that the actual emulation of the new obfuscator is statistically close to an ideal emulation of the obfuscation and learning phases using $\Gamma$ and so it suffices to compare only the real and ideal final execution phases. In essence, in the real experiment, we can think of the
execution as $\text{Ev}^\hat{\Gamma}(B, z)$ where $\hat{\Gamma}$ is the oracle simulated using the learned query-answer pairs $Q_B$ and oracle $\Theta$. We will compare the real experiment with the ideal experiment and show that the statistical distance between these two executions is at most $\epsilon$. In order to achieve this, we will identify the events that make the executions $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z)$ and $\text{Ev}^\hat{\Gamma}(B, z)$ diverge (i.e. without them happening, they proceed statistically the same).

Let $q$ be a new query that is being asked by $\text{Ev}^\hat{\Gamma}(B, z)$ (i.e. in the real experiment) and handled using $\text{EmulateCall}^\Theta(Q_B \cup Q_{B}, q)$. The following are the cases that should be handled:

1. If $q$ is a query of type $\text{Enc}(x)$, then the answer to $q$ will be distributed the same in both experiments as they will be both answered using the subroutine $\text{WEnc}(c)$ of $\Theta$.

2. If $q$ is a query of type $\text{Rev}(c)$, then the answer to $q$ will be distributed the same in both experiments as they will be both answered using the subroutine $\text{WRevAtt}(c)$ of $\Theta$.

3. If $q$ is a query of type $\text{RevMsg}_V(w_1, w_2, c)$, then the answer to $q$ will be distributed the same in both experiments as they will be both answered using the subroutine $\text{WDec}_V(w', c)$ where $w' = (w_1, w_2)$.

4. If $q$ is a query of type $\text{Dec}_V, F(w, c)$ whose answer is determined by $Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}$ in the real experiment then it is also determined by $Q_T \supseteq (Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}})$ in the ideal experiment and the answers are therefore distributed the same.

5. Suppose $q$ is a query of type $\text{Dec}_V, F(w, c)$ that is not determined by $Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}}$ in the real experiment. Then the answer returned by $\text{EmulateCall}$ is $\bot$ since the underlying encryption query $((a, m) \mapsto c)_{\text{Enc}}$ is not known. In that case, we have to consider three different counterparts in the ideal experiment:

   (a) **Bad Event 1:** If $q$ is not determined by $Q_T$ in the ideal experiment then this implies that the ideal execution $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z)$ is for the first time hitting a valid ciphertext that was never generated by an encryption query asked during any of the phases. In that case, since $\text{Enc}$ is injective, the answer returned by $\Gamma$ would be $\bot$ with overwhelming probability.

   (b) **Bad Event 2:** The query $q$ is determined by $Q_T \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}})$ in the ideal experiment and the ideal execution $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z)$ has hit a valid unknown ciphertext that was generated by an encryption query in the obfuscation phase that was never learned. In this case, the answer will be $F^\Gamma(w, m)$ if the verification passes and $\bot$ otherwise.

   (c) **Bad Event 3:** The query $q$ is determined by $Q_T \setminus (Q_B \cup Q_{\hat{B}})$ in the ideal experiment then and the ideal execution $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z)$ has hit a valid unknown ciphertext that was generated as a hidden query (i.e. issued by inner $F$ executions) during the learning or evaluation phases. In this case, the answer will be $F^\Gamma(w, m)$ if the verification passes and $\bot$ otherwise.
Notice that the answer to such a query in the ideal experiment differs from that in the real experiment (which always outputs ⊥). However, we will show below that such an event is unlikely to occur.

For circuit input $z$, let $E(z)$ be the event that either one of Cases 5a, 5b, or 5c happen. More specifically, this is the event that $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z)$ asks a query $q$ of the form $\text{Dec}_{\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{F}}(w, c)$ where $c$ is a valid ciphertext that was either (i) never generated before during any of the phases, (ii) generated during the obfuscation phase, or (iii) generated by a hidden query in the learning and/or final evaluation phases. Assuming that event $E(z)$ does not happen, both experiments will proceed identically the same and the output distributions of $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z)$ and $\text{Ev}^\hat{\Gamma}(B, z)$ will be statistically close. More formally, the probability of correctness for $\hat{iO}$ is:

$$\Pr_z[\text{Ev}^\hat{\Gamma}(B, z) \neq C(z)] = \Pr_z[\text{Ev}^\hat{\Gamma}(B, z) \neq C(z) \land \neg E(z)] + \Pr_z[E^\hat{\Gamma}(B, z) \neq C(z) \land E(z)] \leq \Pr_z[\text{Ev}^\hat{\Gamma}(B, z) \neq C(z) \land \neg E(z)] + \Pr_z[E(z)]$$

By the approximate functionality of $iO$, we have that:

$$\Pr_z[iO^\Gamma(C)(z) \neq C(z)] = \Pr_z[\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z) \neq C(z)] \leq \delta(\kappa)$$

Therefore,

$$\Pr_z[\text{Ev}^\hat{\Gamma}(B, z) \neq C(z) \land \neg E(z)] = \Pr_z[\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z) \neq C(z) \land \neg E(z)] \leq \delta$$

We are thus left to show that $\Pr[E(z)] \leq \epsilon$. Since both experiments proceed the same up until $E$ happens, the probability of $E$ happening is the same in both worlds and we will thus choose to bound this bad event in the ideal world.

**Proof Intuition.** At a high-level, in order to show that $E$ is unlikely, we will show that the learning procedure and final execution phases, when treated as a single non-uniform query-adaptive algorithm $A$, will only ask a bounded number of queries for valid ciphertexts whose corresponding underlying message is unknown to this algorithm. Then, given this upper bound on such queries, we ensure that by running the learning procedure for sufficient number of times, the final execution phase will not ask such queries to unknown ciphertexts with high probability and we maintain the approximate correctness of the obfuscation.

In order to prove this upper bound on the number of ciphertexts that will be hit, we start with the query-adaptive $A$ which consists of the *combination* of the learning and final execution phases that accepts as input an obfuscation $B$ in the $\Gamma$ oracle model and is able to adaptively query $\Gamma$ when running $B$ on multiple randomly chosen inputs. We then show through a sequence of reductions to other adversaries that the advantage of such an attacker in hitting a specific number of unknown ciphertexts is upper bounded by the advantage of a different non-adaptive attacker $\hat{A}$ in hitting the same number of ciphertexts (up to some factor). We then finally show that $\hat{A}$ has a negligible advantage in succeeding.
We begin by defining the notion of query adaptivity for oracle algorithms and specify what it means for an adversary to hit a ciphertext.

**Definition 8.4.19 (Query Adaptivity).** Let $A$ be a poly-query randomized oracle algorithm that asks $\tau$ queries to some idealized oracle $I$. Suppose $Q$ is the set of queries that $A$ will ask. We define the level of query adaptivity of $A$ as being one of two possible levels:

- **Non-adaptive:** $Q$ consists of $\tau$ queries, possibly from different domains, and chosen by $A$ before it issues any query and/or independently of the answers of any previous query.

- **Fully adaptive:** $Q = (q_1, ..., q_\tau)$ consists of $\tau$ queries possibly from different domains where, for each $i \in [\tau]$, $q_{i+1}$ is determined by the answer returned by $q_i$.

**Definition 8.4.20 (Ciphertext Hit).** Let $A$ be a $\tau$-query oracle algorithm that has access to $\Gamma$. We say that $A$ has hit a ciphertext $c$ if it queries $\text{Dec}(., c)$, $\text{Rev}(c)$, or $\text{RevMsg}(., ., c)$ and $c$ is a valid unknown ciphertext (that is, $A$ has never asked $\text{Enc}(x) = c$). We denote the set of ciphertexts that $A$ has hit by $H_A$.

Our goal is to prove the following lemma which provides the desired upper bound on the number of ciphertexts that an attacker $A$ can hit.

**Lemma 8.4.21 (Hitting Ciphertexts).** Let $\Gamma_{V,F}$ be as in Definition 8.4.3, $n$ be a fixed number, and $t(n) \leq p(n) - \omega(n)$, where $t$ is the upper bound on the output length of $F$ and $p$ is the ciphertext length. Let $A$ be an adaptive $\tau$-query oracle algorithm that takes as input $z$ and has access to $\Gamma_{V,F}$. Let $H_A$ be the set of unknown valid ciphertexts that $A$ hits. Then for security parameter (of the obfuscation scheme) $\kappa$, $n \geq \lg \kappa$, $\tau \leq \text{poly}(\kappa) \leq \kappa^{O(1)}$ we have that for any $s \leq \tau$:

$$\Pr[|H_A| \geq s] \leq O(2^{\alpha-(t+\omega(n))s})$$

where $\alpha = |z| + (t + 2n)s$.

**Proof.** We will define a sequence of adversaries and show reductions between them in order to prove the upper bound stated above. Throughout, we assume that the algorithms are in canonical form (see Definition 8.4.4).

1. **Attacker $A$:** This is the original adaptive $\tau$-query attacker as defined in the statement of the lemma where it will receive some input $z$ and can ask $\tau$ queries to $\Gamma$. The goal of the adversary is to hit at least $s$ unknown valid ciphertexts via queries to $\text{Dec}$, $\text{Rev}$ or $\text{RevMsg}$.

2. **Attacker $A_u$:** This is the same attacker as $A$ but does not accept any input and is modified as follows. For any $\text{Dec}$, $\text{Rev}$ or $\text{RevMsg}$ queries asked to $\Gamma$ with some answer $y \neq \bot$, $A_u$ will instead use an answer that is part of some fixed string $u \in \{0,1\}^\alpha$ hardcoded within $A_u$ where $\alpha = |z| + (t + 2n)s$. The $\text{Enc}$ queries are handled normally as before. The goal of this adversary is to hit at least $s$ unknown valid ciphertexts via queries to $\text{Dec}$, $\text{Rev}$ or $\text{RevMsg}$. 

174
3. **Attacker** $A'$: This is the same attacker as $A_u$ for any fixed $u$. However, aside from Enc queries which are handled normally using $\Gamma$, the other query types are instead replaced with a single subroutine Test that takes as input a ciphertext $c$ and outputs 1 if $c$ is valid, and 0 otherwise. The goal of this adversary is to hit at least $s$ unknown valid ciphertexts via queries to Test.

4. **Attacker** $\widehat{A}$: This is the non-adaptive attacker where it will ask all its queries at once at the start of the experiment. Furthermore, it will not ask any Enc queries but will be constrained to asking only Test queries. The goal of this adversary is to hit at least $s$ unknown valid ciphertexts via queries to Test.

**Lemma 8.4.22.** For every $A$, there exists some $u \in \{0, 1\}^\alpha$ such that $\Pr[|H_A| \geq s] \leq 2^\alpha \Pr[|H_{A_u}| \geq s]$

**Proof.** Recall that $A$ accepts $z$ as input and, when it hits $s$ ciphertexts, it would receive back at most $(t + 2n)$ since we can either get back $t$ bits information as a result of getting back an answer from Dec_{VF} or at most $n$ bits of information from queries of Rev and RevMsg_{VF}. Furthermore, by the canonicalization of $A$, it can ask for any $c$ at most one query of each type Dec_{VF}, Rev, and RevMsg_{VF}. Thus, in order to say that $A_u$ would succeed at hitting $s$ with the same amount of information, the length of $u$ has to be $\alpha = |z| + (t + 2n)s$. Now, by a union bound over all $u$, the probability of success for $A$ is given as follows:

$$\Pr[|H_A| \geq s] \leq \Pr[\exists u : |H_{A_u}| \geq s] \leq \sum u \Pr[|H_{A_u}| \geq s] \leq 2^\alpha \Pr[|H_{A_u}| \geq s]$$

\[\square\]

**Lemma 8.4.23.** For any $u \in \{0, 1\}^\alpha$, $\Pr[|H_{A_u}| \geq s] = \Pr[|H_{A'}| \geq s]$

**Proof.** Since $A_u$ does not obtain any information regarding the actual answers to the Dec, Rev and RevMsg queries that it asks, we can think of these subroutines simply as a testing procedure that $A_u$ can use to determine whether any given ciphertext $c$ is valid or not, and this is signaled by whether the oracle returns $\perp$ or not to any of these queries. Therefore, we can interpret $A_u$ as an adversary $A'$ that simply calls Test instead of Dec, Rev and RevMsg queries as this yields the same result. \[\square\]

**Lemma 8.4.24.** $\Pr[|H_{A'}| \geq s] \leq \Pr[|H_{\widehat{A}}| \geq s]$

**Proof.** Given attacker $A'$ we can define $\widehat{A}$ that uses $A'$ and only issues Test queries (non-adaptively). Any Enc queries that $A'$ asks (from a specific Enc domain of size $n$) can be lazily evaluated (emulated) by $\widehat{A}$. Furthermore, any Test queries that $A'$ asks will be answered using one of $\widehat{A}$'s pre-issued Test queries while remaining consistent with the previous Enc queries that were issued. \[\square\]

Lastly, we state and prove the following lemma which will be used to bound the number of ciphertexts that any (poly-query) non-adaptive algorithm might obtain and use for its decryption and/or reveal queries.

175
Lemma 8.4.25 (Hitting Ciphertexts for Non-Adaptive Learners). Let $\Gamma$ be as in Definition 8.4.2 and $t(n) \leq p(n) - \omega(n)$ where $t$ is an upper bound on the output length of $F$ and $p$ is the ciphertext length. Let $\hat{A}$ be a non-adaptive $\tau$-query canonical algorithm as defined above and $\hat{H}_{\hat{A}}$ be the set of unknown valid ciphertexts that $\hat{A}$ hits via Test queries. Then for security parameter $\kappa$, fixed $n \geq \lg \kappa$, $\tau \leq \text{poly}(\kappa)$, we have that for any $s \leq \tau$:

$$\Pr[|\hat{H}_{\hat{A}}| \geq s] \leq O(2^{-(t+\omega(n))s})$$

Proof. Suppose $t \leq p - dn$ for $d = \omega(1)$ and let $\tau \leq \kappa/d^2 = 2^{d\lg \kappa} \leq 2^{dn}$ where $d' = d/2 = \omega(1)$ for the purposes of upper-bounding the probability for all poly-query algorithms $\hat{A}$. Recall that the function $\text{Enc}(\cdot)$ is injective and maps messages $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ to ciphertexts $c \in \{0, 1\}^{p(n)}$. For simplicity, assume that we want to compute the probability that $|\hat{H}_{\hat{A}}| = s$. For any set of $s$ ciphertexts that are in the image of some fixed $s$-sized set of the domain $\text{Enc}(\cdot)$, the probability that the $\tau$ queries will hit these $s$ ciphertexts is given by $\binom{s}{\tau}/\left(\binom{n}{s}\right)$. By a union bound over all the different $s$-sized sub-domains of $\text{Enc}(\cdot)$, we find that for sufficiently large security parameter $\kappa$:

$$\Pr[|\hat{H}_{\hat{A}}| = s] \leq \binom{2^n}{s} \frac{\binom{s}{\tau}}{\binom{n}{s}} \leq \frac{(2^n e)^s}{s^s} \left(\frac{\tau e}{s}\right)^s \leq \frac{2^p e}{s} \leq \frac{2^{d'n} e}{2^p} \leq \frac{2^{(1+d'/2)e^2}}{2^p} \leq O(2^{-(t+\omega(n))s})$$

The last inequality follows from the short-output property, that is $t \leq p - d \cdot n$ for some $d = \omega(1)$. Note that $\Pr[|\hat{H}_{\hat{A}}| = s + 1] \leq \Pr[|\hat{H}_{\hat{A}}| = s]$ and therefore $\Pr[|\hat{H}_{\hat{A}}| \geq s]$ is dominated by the largest term represented by $\Pr[|\hat{H}_{\hat{A}}| = s]$. \hfill \Box

Putting things together. By Lemmas 8.4.22, 8.4.23, and 8.4.24, and using Lemma 8.4.25, we find that:

$$\Pr[|H_A| \geq s] \leq O(2^{-(t+\omega(n))s})$$

Note that, for simplicity, Lemma 8.4.21 only considers hitting unknown ciphertexts from some fixed domain of size $n$. However, we observe that this argument can be extended for learners that can ask queries for different domain sizes as well. \hfill \Box

Lemma 8.4.26. $\Pr[E(x)] \leq \epsilon + \text{negl}(\kappa)$

Proof. Let $A$ be an adaptive non-uniform oracle algorithm in the ideal hybrid that has access to $\Gamma$ and works as follows:

- Initialize the query-answer set $Q_A = \emptyset$
- For $i = \{1, \ldots, k\}$, run $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z_i)$. For any query $q$ asked by $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z_i)$, if $(q \mapsto a)_T \in Q_A$ for subroutine $T$ then answer with $a$. Otherwise, handle the query in the canonical form as in Definition 8.4.4, and if a query was sent to $\Gamma$, add the new query-answer pair $(q \mapsto a)_T$ to $Q_A$.

176
• Output $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z_k)$

In essence, $A$ would run the learning and final execution phases (in total $k$ executions) making sure to only forward to $\Gamma$ the queries that are distinct and which cannot be computed from $Q_A$ so far. Given the above canonical $A$, we observe that for any unknown valid ciphertext $c = \text{Enc}(x)$ where $x = (a, m)$, $A$ would ask at most one query of the form $\text{Rev}(c)$, at most one query of the form $\text{Dec}(w, c)$ for which $\mathcal{V}_{\text{Enc}}(w, a) = 1$, and at most one query of the form $\text{RevMsg}(w_1, w_2, c)$ for which $\mathcal{V}_{\text{Enc}}(w_i, a) = 1$ where $i \in \{1, 2\}$. Furthermore, $A$ would never ask a query if $\mathcal{V}_{\text{Enc}}(w, a) = 0$ since this condition can be verified independently by $A$ and the answer can be simulated as it would invariably be $\perp$.

Given $A$, we can bound the number of distinct unknown ciphertexts that the $k$ executions will hit, which we denote by $|H_B| = \left| \bigcup_{i=1}^{k} H_{B_i} \right|$ where $H_{B_i}$ is the set of ciphertexts hit by the $i$th evaluation $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z_i)$. Note that the total number of queries that will be asked across all executions is $k\ell_B = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ where $\ell_B$ is the circuit size of $\text{Ev}(B, \cdot)$. It is straightforward to see that, for any $s$, $\Pr[|H_A| \geq s] = \Pr[|H_B| \geq s]$ since whenever one of the $k$ executions hits an unknown ciphertext $c$ for this first time, $A$ will also forward it to the oracle and hit it for the first time as well.

Since $A$ accepts as input the obfuscated circuit of size $|iO| = \ell_O$, by Lemma 8.4.21, the probability that $A$ hits at least $s = (\ell_O + \kappa)$ ciphertexts is at most $2^{\ell_O - \omega(n)s} / 2^{\omega(s)\kappa} = \text{negl}(\kappa)$. Therefore, the $k\ell_B$-query algorithm $A$ will hit at most $s = (\ell_O + \kappa)$ new unknown ciphertexts with overwhelming probability. Therefore we have that,

$$\Pr[|H_B| \geq s] = \Pr[|H_A| \geq s] \leq 2^{\ell_O - \omega(n)s}$$

Since the maximum possible number of learning iterations $k = (\ell_O + \kappa)/\epsilon > s$ and $\bigcup_{j=1}^{j+1} H_{B_j} \subseteq \bigcup_{j=1}^{j+1} H_{B_j}$ for any $i$, the number of learning iterations that increase the size of the set $H_B$ of unknown ciphertext hits (via one of the bad event queries) is at most $s$. A ciphertext that was hit could have its encryption query generated during the obfuscation phase or as one of the hidden queries issued by $F$ during one of the $k$ executions. We say $\lambda \in [k]$ is bad if it is the case that $\bigcup_{j=1}^{\lambda} H_{B_j} \subseteq \bigcup_{j=1}^{\lambda+1} H_{B_j}$ (i.e. $\lambda$ is an index of a learning iteration that increases the size of the hit ciphertexts). This would imply that after $\lambda$ learning iterations in the ideal experiment, the final execution with $H_B := \bigcup_{j=1}^{\lambda+1} H_{B_j}$ would contain an unknown ciphertext that we will hit for this first time and for which we cannot consistently answer the queries that reference it. Thus, given that we have set $k = (\ell_O + \kappa)/\epsilon$, the probability (over the selection of $\lambda$) that $\lambda$ is bad is at most $s/k < \epsilon$.

\[\square\]

**Proving Security.** To show that the resulting obfuscator is secure, it suffices to show that the compilation process represented as the new obfuscator’s construction is simulatable. We show a simulator $\text{Sim}$ (with access to $\Gamma$) that works as follows: given an obfuscated circuit $B$ in the $\Gamma$ ideal model, it runs the learning procedure as shown in Step 2 of the new obfuscator $iO$ to learn the heavy queries $Q_B$ then outputs $\hat{B} = (B, Q_B)$. Note that this distribution is statistically close to the output of the real execution of $iO$ and, therefore, security follows.
8.5 Extended Long-Output FE Implies Obfuscation

We show that for a certain choice of function family $G$ such that $\text{outlen}(g) \leq m + 1$ for any $g \in G$ (where $\text{outlen}(.)$ denotes the output length of a given function), there exists a monolithic construction of IO from a compact single-key FE with ciphertext length $m$ for the function family $G$.

**Theorem 8.5.1.** There exists a function family $G$ with $\text{outlen}(g) \leq m + 1$ for any $g \in G$ such that an $m$ ciphertext length compact single-key FE for the function family $G$ implies IO in a monolithic way.

In Lemma 8.5.2, we show that extended FE of the kind specified in the theorem above implies extended compact single-key FE. This, together with the fact that extended compact FE implies IO [AJ15,BV15], allows us to conclude the above theorem.

**Lemma 8.5.2.** For any function family $H$ with $\text{outlen}(h) \leq \ell$ for any $h \in H$, there exists a class of functions $\{g_i\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ with $\text{outlen}(g_i) \leq m + 1$ for all $i \in [\ell]$ such that there exists a monolithic construction of extended compact single-key FE for the function family $H$ from any $m$-ciphertext length compact single-key FE for the class of functions $\{g_i\}_{i \in [\ell]}$.

Given an extended FE (Setup, Enc, Dec) of the kind specified in the above lemma statement, and a secret-key encryption scheme $(S,E,D)^4$ we construct an extended compact single-key FE scheme $(\text{Setup}_H, \text{Enc}_H, \text{Dec}_H)$. In a bit more detail, realizing extended compact single-key FE for the family $H$ (where each $h \in H$ could have $\text{Setup}_H, \text{Enc}_H, \text{Dec}_H$ gates in it) with output length $\ell$ requires $\ell$ instances of the given FE scheme corresponding to functions $\{g_i\}_{i \in [\ell]}$. We describe these functions in Figure 8.2.

**Construction of Compact FE.** Next, we describe the construction of our compact single-key FE scheme $(\text{Setup}_H, \text{Enc}_H, \text{Dec}_H)$:

- **Setup$_H(1^\kappa, h)$**: Sample $s \leftarrow S(1^\kappa)$, set $\text{PK}_{\ell+1} = \perp$, and for each $i = \{\ell \ldots 1\}$ proceed as follows:
  1. $(\text{PK}_i, \text{SK}_i) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa, g_i[i, h, \alpha_i, \text{PK}_{i+1}])$, where $\alpha_i \leftarrow E(s, 0^{\kappa+1})$.

  Output $\{(\text{PK}_H = \text{PK}_1, \text{SK}_H = (\text{SK}_1, \ldots, \text{SK}_\ell))\}$

- **Enc$_H(\text{PK}_H = \text{PK}_1, y)$**: Given the public key $\text{PK}_H$ and input $x$, sample $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and output ciphertext $ct = \text{Enc}(\text{PK}_1, (0, y, r, 0^\kappa))$.

- **Dec$_H(\text{SK}_H = (\text{SK}_1, \ldots, \text{SK}_\ell), ct)$**: Let $ct_1 = ct$ and then for each $i = \{1 \ldots \ell\}$ proceed as follows:

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$^4$S(1$^\kappa$) on input the security parameter outputs a secret key $s$. $E(s, m)$ uses the secret-key $s$ to encrypt $m$ generating a ciphertext $c$. Finally, the generated ciphertext $c$ can be decrypted using $D(s, c)$ to recover the original message $m$ back. Note that such an encryption scheme is implied by a underlying single-key FE scheme.
$g_i[i,h,\alpha,PK](b,y,r,s)$

**Hardcoded Parameters:** The index $i$, function $h \in H$, a ciphertext string $\alpha$, and a public-key $PK$ of the underlying single-key FE scheme.

**Input:** A bit $b \in \{0,1\}$, input $y$ in the domain of $h$, randomness $r \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ and a secret key $s$ of the secret-key encryption.

**Computation:** It proceeds as follows:

1. If $b = 0$ and $i < \ell$, output $a_i \parallel \text{Enc}(PK,(0,y,r,0^\kappa);\text{PRF}_r(i))$, where $a = h(y)$ and $a_i$ is its $i^{th}$ bit.
2. If $b = 0$ and $i = \ell$, output $a_\ell \parallel 0^m$ where $a = h(y)$ and $a_\ell$ is its $\ell^{th}$ bit.
3. Else, output $D(s,\alpha)$.

Figure 8.2: The output-constrained circuit $g_i$ defined for the underlying compact FE scheme.

1. Parse $\text{Dec}(SK_i,ct_i)$ as $a_i \parallel ct_{i+1}$.
2. Output $a_1 \cdots a_\ell$.

**Gates planted in $h$.** Note that, since we are constructing an extended compact FE, $h$ can have $\text{Setup}_H$, $\text{Enc}_H$, and $\text{Dec}_H$ gates in it. Given the description of our scheme above we can replace each of these gates by $\text{Setup}$, $\text{Enc}$, and $\text{Dec}$ gates — namely, the gates of the underlying FE scheme. This allows us to conclude that each $g_i$ consists of only $\text{Setup}$, $\text{Enc}$, $\text{Dec}$, $E$, and $D$ gates. However, since $(S,E,D)$ is obtained by using $\text{Setup}$, $\text{Enc}$, and $\text{Dec}$, we have that the set of gates reduces to $\text{Setup}$, $\text{Enc}$, and $\text{Dec}$. Note that since we are assuming that the underlying FE scheme is extended this is allowed.

**Efficiency.** Observe that a ciphertext of the constructed FE scheme $(\text{Setup}_H,\text{Enc}_H,\text{Dec}_H)$ for the circuit $h$ consists only of a single ciphertext of the underlying FE scheme $(\text{Setup},\text{Enc},\text{Dec})$ for the circuit $g_1$. Therefore, we can conclude that the size of the encryption circuit of the constructed scheme is independent of the size of the circuit $h$.

**Correctness.** The correctness of our scheme follows directly from the correctness of the underlying FE scheme. Observe that for each $i$ decryption of ciphertext $ct_i$ generates the $i^{th}$ bit of the output of $h$ on input $y$ and the correctly formed ciphertext $ct_{i+1}$. This, by induction, allows us to conclude that decryption yields the correct output.

**Proof of Security.** We need to prove that the distributions \{PK_H,SK_H,\text{Enc}_H(PK_H,y_0)\} and \{PK_H,SK_H,\text{Enc}_H(PK_H,y_1)\} are computationally indistinguishable. We prove security via a sequence of hybrids.
• **H₀:** This hybrid corresponds to the distribution \{PK_H, SK_H, ct₁ = Enc_H(PK_H, y₀)\}, where PK_H = PK₁ and SK_H = (SK₁,...,SKₗ). Also, recall that PKᵢ, SKᵢ for each \(i \in [ℓ]\) is an instance of the underlying FE scheme for the circuit \(gᵢ[i, h, αᵢ, PK_{i+1}]\). Finally, let \(aᵢ||ctᵢ₊₁\) for \(i \in \{1\cdots ℓ\}\) be the output of Dec(SKᵢ,ctᵢ).

• **H₁:** In this hybrid, we change \(αᵢ\) for each \(i \in [ℓ]\) (the value hard-coded in the circuit \(gᵢ\)). Recall that in hybrid \(H₀\), \(αᵢ\) is obtained as \(E(s, 0^{nᵢ+1})\). Now we instead generate \(αᵢ\) as \(E(s, aᵢ||ctᵢ₊₁)\), where \(aᵢ||ctᵢ₊₁\) is the output from decryption of \(ctᵢ\) with secret-key SKᵢ.

Indistinguishability between hybrids \(H₀\) and \(H₁\) follows based on the semantic security of the secret-key encryption scheme \((S, E, D)\).

• **H₂,i:** For \(i \in \{1\cdots ℓ\}\) this hybrid is same as hybrid \(H₂,i₋₁\) except that we change how \(ctᵢ\) is generated. Specifically, we generate \(ctᵢ = Enc(PKᵢ, (1, 0ⁿᵢ, r, s))\) instead of \(Enc(PKᵢ, (0, y₀, r, 0ⁿ); PRFᵢ(i−1))\) when \(i ≠ 1\) and \(Enc(PKᵢ, (0, y₀, r, 0ⁿ))\) when \(i = 1\).\(^5\) Note that this is a sequence of \(ℓ + 1\) hybrids where \(H₂,₀\) is same as hybrid \(H₁\).

Next we show that hybrid \(H₂,i\) is indistinguishable from hybrid \(H₂,i₊₁\) for each \(i \in \{0\cdots ℓ\}\) relying on the security of the PRF and the underlying single-key FE. More specifically, observe that an attacker distinguishing \(H₂,i\) and \(H₂,i₊₁\) can be used to distinguish the following two distributions: \((PKᵢ, SKᵢ, Enc(PKᵢ, (0, y₀, r, 0ⁿ); PRFᵢ(i−1)))\) or \((PKᵢ, SKᵢ, Enc(PKᵢ, (0, y₀, r, 0ⁿ)))\) when \(i = 1\) and \((PKᵢ, SKᵢ, Enc(PKᵢ, (1, 0ⁿ, r, s)))\), while we have that \(gᵢ[i, h, αᵢ, PK_{i+1}]\)(0, y₀, r, 0ⁿ) = \(gᵢ[i, h, αᵢ, PK_{i+1}]\)(1, 0ⁿ, r, s).

Now consider the intermediate hybrid \(H₂,i\) with the distribution given by the tuple \((PKᵢ, SKᵢ, Enc(PKᵢ, (0, y₀, r, 0ⁿ)))\). It is easy to see that an attacker distinguishing \(H₂,i\) and \(H₂,i₊₁\) for \(i \in \{1\cdots ℓ\}\) can be used to break the security of the PRF.

Next, since \(gᵢ[i, h, αᵢ, PK_{i+1}]\)(0, y₀, r, 0ⁿ) = \(gᵢ[i, h, αᵢ, PK_{i+1}]\)(1, 0ⁿ, r, s), therefore we can conclude that an attacker distinguishing between \(H₂,i\) and \(H₂,i₊₁\) can be used to break the indistinguishability security of the underlying FE scheme.

Note that hybrid \(H₂,ℓ\) is independent of \(y₀\). In other words, starting hybrid \(H₀\) with input \(y₁\) and making the same changes as above still yields hybrid \(H₂,ℓ\). This allows us to conclude that distribution from hybrid \(H₀\), namely \{PKₗ, SKₗ, ct₁ = Encₗ(PKₗ, y₀)\}, is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution \{PKₗ, SKₗ, ct₁ = Encₗ(PKₗ, y₁)\}.

### 8.6 Fully Black-Box Separation of IO from Functional Encryption

In contrast to Section 8.4 where we show that a monolithic construction of IO from short-output functional encryption is impossible, in this section we show that a fully black-box

\(^{5}\)Here \(n\) is the length of the input \(x\).
construction of IO from (not necessarily short output) functional encryption is impossible. More formally, we prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 8.6.1.** Assume the existence of one-way functions and that \( \text{NP} \not\subseteq \text{coAM} \). Then there exists no fully black-box construction of indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) from functional encryption.

To prove Theorem 8.6.1, we will apply Lemma 7.2.7 for the idealized random (non-extended) functional witness encryption (rFWE) model \( \Gamma \) (see Definition 8.4.2) to prove that there is no black-box construction of IO from any primitive \( P \) that can be constructed from \( \Gamma \) (with measure one over the oracle). In particular, we will do so for \( P \) that is the functional encryption primitive. Our task is thus twofold: (1) to prove that (non-extended) functional encryption can be constructed from \( \Gamma \) and (2) to show a simulatable compilation procedure that compiles out \( \Gamma \) from any IO construction. By Lemma 7.2.7, this would imply the separation result of IO from \( P \) and prove Theorem 8.6.1.

### 8.6.1 Single-Key (Non-Extended) Functional Encryption exists relative to \( \Gamma \)

In Section 8.4.2, we have shown that extended functional encryption is secure relative to an extended version of \( \Gamma \). This was done in two steps: we first proved that a secure construction of customized functional witness encryption relative to \( \Gamma \), then we proved that there exists a fully black-box construction of an extended functional encryption scheme from any customized functional witness encryption scheme.

We observe that the proof applied there also applies here in a direct sense, specifically because the (non-extended) functional encryption scheme only requires a non-extended functional witness encryption scheme (and one-way functions). Hence, for the first step, when we want to construct the (non-extended) FWE scheme using \( \Gamma \), we can use exactly Construction 8.4.10 and the proofs of correctness and security would follow directly from Claim 8.4.11 as this is a special case of the monolithic construction.

Furthermore, for the second step, we can also use Construction 8.4.15 to construct our (non-extended) functional encryption scheme but with the added restriction that \( F \), the functional family supported by the single-key FE scheme, is not allowed make oracle calls to \( \Gamma \). The proofs of correctness and security would follow directly from Claim 8.4.16 as this is a special case of the monolithic construction.

### 8.6.2 Compiling out \( \Gamma \) from IO

Similar to how we compiled out the extended oracle \( \Gamma \) in Section 8.4.5, we will apply the same techniques here for compiling out \( \Gamma \) in two steps: we first compile out some of the subroutines of \( \Gamma \) to get an approximate obfuscation in the random instance-revealing witness encryption oracle \( \Theta \) model then compile out \( \Theta \) to get an approximate obfuscator in the plain model. More formally, we prove the following claim.
Claim 8.6.2. Let $\Theta$ be a random instance-revealing witness encryption oracle. Then for any non-extended $\Gamma_{V,F,p} = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}_{V,F}, \text{Rev}, \text{RevMsg}_V)$ and $\Theta$, the following holds:

- For any IO in the non-extended $\Gamma_{V,F,p}$ ideal model, there exists a simulatable compiler with correctness error $\epsilon < 1/200$ for it that outputs a new obfuscator in the $\Theta$ oracle model.

- For any IO in the $\Theta$ oracle model, there exists a simulatable compiler with correctness error $\epsilon < 1/200$ for it that outputs a new obfuscator in the plain model.

Proof. As before, we will only prove the first part of the claim as the second part follows from Lemma 7.3.13. However, since this is a significantly simplified version of Claim 8.4.17, we will only give a high-level overview the compilation procedure and the proof of approximate correctness. The compiler will behave exactly as described in Section 8.4.5 but now we only consider $V$ that has $\text{Enc}$ gates and $F$ that does not make any oracle calls (only accepts plain circuits).

Recall that the emulation process that outputs $B \leftarrow \text{iO}^\Gamma(C)$ and the evaluations during the learning phase $\text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z_1), \ldots, \text{Ev}^\Gamma(B, z_\lambda)$, and final execution phase are all canonicalized as in Definition 8.4.4. Hence, since there are no queries that can be hidden during the learning and final execution phases (due to the canonicalization and the non-extended nature of $\Gamma$) the only error in correctness of the final execution will be due to asking Dec on an unknown ciphertext $c$ where $c$ was generated during the emulation of $\text{iO}^\Gamma(C)$. Note that asking a valid unknown ciphertext $c$ that was never generated happens with negligible probability due to the injectivity of $\text{Enc}$.

If we consider the combination of all the learning and final execution phases as one algorithm then, by Remark 8.4.5, for any unknown valid ciphertext $c$, there can be at most one query of the form $\text{Dec}(., c)$. Since we can upper bound the number of unknown ciphertexts by $\ell_O = |\text{iO}|$ to be the size of the obfuscator, we can apply the learning procedure for $k = 3\ell_O/\epsilon$ to get an $\epsilon$ error in the correctness of the new obfuscator. \qed
Chapter 9

Conclusion

In this dissertation we have made significant progress towards understanding the computational complexity of indistinguishability obfuscation (IO), which is an enabler of many sought-after powerful applications in cryptography. However, as useful as this object is, our work has provided an explanation behind the lack of candidate constructions of IO that are based on standard cryptographic assumptions (in fact, all currently known candidate constructions of IO are based on strong, unconventional assumptions of questionable security). In particular we have shown that standard classical assumptions, such as one-way functions and trapdoor permutations, cannot be used in a black-box way to get IO. Furthermore, we go even further and show that modern standard assumptions such as homomorphic encryption and predicate encryption are insufficient to obtain IO when used in a monolithic way that captures a large and natural class of non-black-box techniques. While our results lends evidence that IO may in fact require unorthodox tools and assumptions to realize, there still exists the possibility that it may be based on well-studied lattice-based assumptions such as the learning with errors problem, and we leave this as a highly interesting open question.

Furthermore, we strongly believe that the monolithic model, which was developed in this work as a means of proving separation results of IO from modern assumptions, will be a useful tool in proving separation results for other primitives that use their underlying components in some non-black-box way. In fact, one can also go as far as to extend existing classical impossibility results (e.g. black-box impossibility of public-key encryption from one-way functions) to possibly prove that a large class of non-black-box techniques are insufficient for achieving the desired primitive.
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190


193


194


195


