### last time

private keys (never shared)

public keys (known to all, derived from private keys)

public-key encryption (encrypt w/ public, decrypt w/ private)

digital signatures (verify w/ public, sign w/ private)

certificate idea:

"X's public key is ..." message + signature signature from trusted 'certificate authority'

chains of certificates

## encryption/authentication

common to see symmetric "authenticated encryption"

usually combines *malleable* encryption (confidentiality) and MAC (authenticity)

sometimes this is just called "encryption" (but often encryption is missing authenticity)

if you take crypto theory course, more mathematically definite ideas than confidentiality/authenticity...

> (e.g. 'indistinguishably under chosen plaintext attack') (and some definitions overlap confidentiality/authenticity ideas)



exercise: how should website certificates verify identity?

## how do certificate authorities verify

for web sites, set by CA/Browser Forum

organization of:

everyone who ships code with list of valid certificate authorities Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, Opera, Cisco, Qihoo 360, Brave, ... certificate authorities

decide on rules ("baseline requirements") for what CAs do

## BR domain name identity validation

options involve CA choosing random value and:

sending it to domain contact (with domain registrar) and receive response with it, or

observing it placed in DNS or website or sent from server in other specific way

exercise: problems this doesn't deal with?

keep their private keys in tamper-resistant hardware

maintain publicly-accessible database of *revoked* certificates some browsers check these, sometimes

certificate transparency

public logs of every certificate issued some browsers reject non-logged certificates so you can tell if bad certificate exists for your website

'CAA' records in the domain name system can indicate which CAs are allowed to issue certificates in DNS (but CAs apparently not required to use DNSSEC (certificate infrastructure for signing domain name records) when looking this up)

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# additional crypto tools

cryptographic hash functions (summarize data)

'secure' random numbers

key agreement

## motivation: summary for signature

digital signatures typically have size limit

...but we want to sign very large messages

solution: get secure "summary" of message

# cryptographic hash

 $\mathsf{hash}(\mathsf{M}) = \mathsf{X}$ 

given X:

hard to find message other than by guessing

given X, M:

hard to find second message so that hash(second message) = X

example uses:

substitute for original message in digital signature building message authentication codes

# password hashing

cryptographic hash functions need (basically) guessing to 'reverse'

idea: store cryptographic hash of password instead of password attacker who gets hash doesn't get password but can still check entered password is correct

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idea: store cryptographic hash of password instead of password attacker who gets hash doesn't get password but can still check entered password is correct

problem: with fast hash function, can try lots of guesses fast

fix: special slow/resource-intensive cryptograph hash functions
 Argon2i
 scrypt
 PBKDF2

#### random numbers

need a lot of keys that no one else knows

common task: choose a *random* number

question: what does random mean here?

## cryptographically secure random numbers

security properties we might want for random numbers:

attacker cannot guess (part of) number better than chance

knowing prior 'random' numbers shouldn't help predict next 'random' numbers

compromising machine now shouldn't reveal older random numbers

## exercise: how to generate?

# /dev/urandom

Linux kernel random number generator

collects "entropy" from hard-to-predict events

- e.g. exact timing of I/O interrupts
- e.g. some processor's built-in random number circuit

turned into as many random bytes as you want

# turning 'entropy' into random bytes

lots of ways to do this; one (rough/incomplete) idea:

```
internal variable state
```

```
to add 'entropy'
state ← SecureHash(state + entropy)
```

to extract value:

```
random bytes \leftarrow SecureHash(1 + state)
give bytes that can't be reversed to compute state
```

```
state \leftarrow SecureHash(2 + state)
change state so attacker can't take us back to old state if compromised
```

# just asymmetric?

given public-key encryption + digital signatures...

why bother with the symmetric stuff?

symmetric stuff much faster

symmetric stuff much better at supporting larger messages

## key agreement

problem: A has B's public encryption key wants to choose shared secret

some ideas:

A chooses a key, sends it encrypted to B A sends a public key encrypted B, B chooses a key and sends it back

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alternate model:

both sides generate random values derive public-key like "key shares" from values use math to combine "key shares" kinda like A + B both sending each other public encryption keys

# Diffie-Hellman key agreement (1)

A and B want to agree on shared secret

- A chooses random value Y
- A sends public value derived from Y ("key share")
- B chooses random value Z
- B sends public value derived from Z ("key share")
- A combines Y with public value from B to get number
- B combines Z with public value from A to get number and b/c of math chosen, both get same number

# Diffie-Hellman key agreement (2)

math requirement:

some f, so f(f(X, Y), Z) = f(f(X, Z), Y)(that's hard to invert, etc.)

choose X in advance and: A randomly chooses Y A sends f(X, Y) to B A computes f(f(X, Z), Y)

B randomly chooses ZB sends f(X, Z) to A B computes f(f(X, Y), Z)

# Diffie-Hellman key agreement (2)

math requirement:

some f, so f(f(X,Y),Z) = f(f(X,Z),Y)(that's hard to invert, etc.)

choose X in advance and:


A randomly chooses Y

A sends f(X, Y) to B A computes f(f(X, Z), Y)

B randomly chooses Z  
B sends 
$$f(X, Z)$$
 to A example  
B computes  $f(f(X, Y), Z)$ 

 $f(a,b) = a^b \pmod{p}$ 















## **TLS:** after handshake

use key shares results to get **several** keys take hash(something + shared secret) to derive each key

separate keys for each direction (server  $\rightarrow$  client and vice-versa)

often separate keys for encryption and MAC

later messages use encryption + MAC + nonces

# things modern TLS usually does

(not all these properties provided by all TLS versions and modes)

```
confidentiality/authenticity
   server = one ID'd by certificate
   client = same throughout whole connection
```

#### forward secrecy

can't decrypt old conversations (data for KeyShares is temporary)

#### fast

most communication done with more efficient symmetric ciphers  $1 \ {\rm set}$  of messages back and forth to setup connection

# network security summary (1)

communicating securely with math

secret value (shared key, public key) that attacker can't have symmetric: shared keys used for (de)encryption + auth/verify; fast asymmetric: public key used by any for encrypt + verify; slower asymmetric: private key used by holder for decrypt + sign; slower

protocol attacks — repurposing encrypt/signed/etc. messages

certificates — verifiable forwarded public keys

key agreement — for generated shared-secret "in public" publish key shares from private data combine private data with key share for shared secret


# network security summary (2)

TLS: combine all cryptography stuff to make "secure channel"


(things we probably didn't get to:)

denial-of-service — attacker just disrupts/overloads (not subtle) firewalls

## simple CPU





# running instructions




0x100:	addq	%r8, %r9	
0x108:	mo∨q	0x1234(%r10),	%r11

•••	
%r8: 0x8	300
%r9: 0x9	900
%r10: 0	x1000
%r11: 0x	x1100






# Human pipeline: laundry




# Human pipeline: laundry




11:00		12:0	13:00			14:00	
Washer	whites	colors	sheets				
Dryer		whites	colors	sheets	5		
Folding Table			whites	colors		sheets	










# Waste (2)

11:00		12:00	13:00	14:00		
Washer	whites	colors	sheets			
Dryer		whites	colors	she	ets	
Folding Table			whites	colors		sheets


# Latency — Time for One

11:00		12:00		13:00		14:00		:00
Washer	whites	colors		sheets				
Dryer				colors		sheets		
Folding Table				whites		colors		


# Latency — Time for One




# Latency — Time for One




# **Throughput** — Rate of Many




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
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



# adding stages (one way)





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















# why registers?

example: fetch/decode

need to store current instruction somewhere  $\ldots while \ fetching \ next \ one$ 

# exercise: throughput/latency (1)

0x100: add %r8, %r9

0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11

0×110: ...

cycle # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 F D E M W %r11 F D E M W

...

suppose cycle time is 500 ps exercise: latency of one instruction? A. 100 ps B. 500 ps C. 2000 ps D. 2500 ps E. something else

#### exercise: throughput/latency (1)*cycle* # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 DE 0x100: add %r8, %r9 F Μ

0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11

0x110: ...

...

Ε

F

W

W

#### suppose cycle time is 500 ps

exercise: latency of one instruction? A. 100 ps B. 500 ps C. 2000 ps D. 2500 ps E. something else

#### exercise: throughput overall? A. 1 instr/100 ps B. 1 instr/500 ps C. 1 instr/2000ps D. 1 instr/2500 ps E. something else

# exercise: throughput/latency (2)

0x100: add %r8, %r9 0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11 0x110: ... cycle # 0 1 2 3 4 F D E M W F D E M

cycle  $\neq$  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 80x100: add %r8, %r9F1F2D1D2E1E2M1M2W1W0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11F1F2D1D2E1E2M1M2W0x110: ......

double number of pipeline stages (to 10) + decrease cycle time from 500 ps to 250 ps — throughput? A. 1 instr/100 ps B. 1 instr/250 ps C. 1 instr/1000ps D. 1 instr/5000 ps

E. something else

# backup slides

# denial of service (1)

so far: worried about network attacker disrupting confidentiality/authenticity

what if we're just worried about just breaking things

well, if they control network, nothing we can do...

but often worried about less

# denial of service (2)

if you just want to inconvenience...

attacker just sends lots of stuff to my server

my server becomes overloaded?

my network becomes overloaded?

but: doesn't this require a lot of work for attacker?

exercise: why is this often not a big obstacle

# denial of service: asymmetry

work for attacker > work for defender

how much computation per message? complex search query? something that needs tons of memory? something that needs to read tons from disk?

how much sent back per message?

resources for attacker > resources of defender

how many machines can attacker use?

## denial of service: reflection/amplification

instead of sending messages directly...attacker can send messages "from" you to third-party

third-party sends back replies that overwhelm network

example: short DNS query with lots of things in response

"amplification" =

third-party inadvertantly turns small attack into big one

#### firewalls

don't want to expose network service to everyone?

solutions:

service picky about who it accepts connections from filters in OS on machine with services filters on router

later two called "firewalls"

# firewall rules examples?

ALLOW tcp port 443 (https) FROM everyone

- ALLOW tcp port 22 (ssh) FROM my desktop's IP address
- BLOCK tcp port 22 (ssh) FROM everyone else

ALLOW from address X to address Y

# getting public keys?

browser talking to websites needs public keys of every single website?

not really feasible, but...

## certificate idea

let's say A has B's public key already.

if C wants B's public key and knows A's already:

A can generate "certificate" for B: "B's public key is XXX" AND Sign(A's private key, "B's public key is XXX")

B send copy of their "certificate" to C (most common idea)

if C trusts A, now C has B's public key if C does not trust A, well, can't trust this either

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# certificate authorities

websites (and others) go to *certificates authorities* (CA) with their public key

certificate authorities sign messages like: "The public key for foo.com is XXX."

signed message called certificate

send certificates to browsers to verify identity website can forward certificate instead of browser contacting CA directly

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# example web certificate (1)

Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 7b:df:f6:ae:2e:d7:db:74:d3:c5:77:ac:bc:44:bf:1b
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer:

countryName	= US
stateOrProvinceName	= MI
localityName	= Ann Arbor
organizationName	= Internet2
organizationalUnitName	= InCommon
commonName	= InCommon RSA Server CA
Validity	
Not Before: Apr 25 00:00:0	00 2023 GMT
Not After : Apr 24 23:59:5	59 2024 GMT
Subject:	
countryName	= US
stateOrProvinceName	= Virginia
organizationName	= University of Virginia
commonName	= canvas.its.virginia.edu

• • • •

X509v3 extensions:

. . . .

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:canvas.its.virginia.edu

# example web certificate (2)

```
. . . .
    Subject Public Key Info:
        Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
            RSA Public-Key: (2048 bit)
            Modulus:
                00:a2:fb:5a:fb:2d:d2:a7:75:7e:eb:f4:e4:d4:6c:
                94:be:91:a8:6a:21:43:b2:d5:9a:48:b0:64:d9:f7:
                f1:88:fa:50:cf:d0:f3:3d:8b:cc:95:f6:46:4b:42:
. . . .
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Value:
    24:3a:67:c8:0d:ef:eb:8c:eb:ba:8f:d5:11:d2:1e:ea:44:eb:
    fe:af:93:7d:d9:4a:2b:44:a3:7f:47:50:aa:d1:b3:9c:a8:a8:
```


```
. . . .
```

# certificate chains

- That certificate signed by "InCommon RSA Server CA"
- $\mathsf{C}\mathsf{A}=\mathsf{certificate} \text{ authority}$
- so their public key, comes with my OS/browser? not exactly...
- they have their own certificate signed by "USERTrust RSA Certification Authority"
- and their public key comes with your OS/browser?

(but both CAs now operated by UK-based Sectigo)

# certificate hierarchy



#### certificate hierarchy **USERTrust RSA** GlobalSign Root CA Certification Authority operated by GlobalSign nv-sa originally operated by USERTrust, Inc. subsid. of GMO Internet Group since 2007 acquired by Comodo, Inc (2004) Comodo's CA division renamed Sectigo (2018) GTS Root R1 - - operated by Google Trust Services LLC InCommon RSA Server CA ... operated by Sectigo GTS CA 1C3 ... on behalf of the Internet2 (not-for-profit) some "trust anchors" included with browsers and OSes (for GTS Root R1, only more recent browsers/OSes)

# how many trust anchors?

Mozilla Firefox (as of 27 Feb 2023) 155 trust anchors operated by 55 distinct entities

#### Microsoft Windows (as of 27 Feb 2023) 237 trust anchors operated by 86 distinct entities

# public-key infrastructure

ecosystem with certificate authorities and certificates for everyone

called "public-key infrastructure"

several of these:

for verifying identity of websites for verifying origin of domain name records (kind-of) for verifying origin of applications in some OSes/app stores/etc. for encrypted email in some organizations

•••

# key agreement and asym. encryption

can construct public-key encryption from key agreeement

private key: generated random value Y public key: key share generated from that Y

# key agreement and asym. encryption

can construct public-key encryption from key agreeement

private key: generated random value Y

public key: key share generated from that Y

PE(public key, message) =
 generate random value Z
 combine with public key to get shared secret
 use symmetric encryption + MAC using shared secret as keys
 output: (key share generated from Z) (sym. encrypted data) (mac tag)

# key agreement and asym. encryption

can construct public-key encryption from key agreeement

private key: generated random value Y

public key: key share generated from that Y

PE(public key, message) =
 generate random value Z
 combine with public key to get shared secret
 use symmetric encryption + MAC using shared secret as keys
 output: (key share generated from Z) (sym. encrypted data) (mac tag)

PD(private key, message) = extract (key share generated from Z) combine with private key to get shared secret, ... exercise: forwarding paths (2) *cycle* # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 addg %r8, %r9 suba %r8, %r9 ret (goes to andq) andg %r10, %r9 in subg. %r8 is \_\_\_\_\_ addg. in subg, %r9 is \_\_\_\_\_ addg. in andg, %r9 is \_\_\_\_\_ subg. in andg, %r9 is \_\_\_\_\_ addg. A: not forwarded from B-D: forwarded to decode from  $\{execute memory writeback\}$  stage of

55