capabilities / virtual machines

Changelog

Changes not seen in first lecture:

- 23 April 2020: add index slides re: cases for priviliged instruction handling and introduction explaining syscalls as special case

last time (1)

network file system

stateful versus stateless servers

- stateless: server doesn't remember about clients between requests
- stateful: handling failure is harder, but can contact client proactively
- strategy to make stateless: send client info to send with next request

compromises with caching

- if stateless: need to contact server to update cache
- NFSv3 compromise: check on open, update on close

last time (2)

protection versus security

access control lists

user IDs and group IDs

- in process control blocks
- set by programs that handle authentication/etc.

superuser — UID that bypasses (most) security checks

set-user-ID applications — controlled access to superuser

time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) problems

ambient authority

POSIX permissions based on user/group IDs process has

- correct user/group ID — can read file
- correct user ID — can kill process

permission information "on the side"

- separate from how to identify file/process

sometimes called *ambient authority*

"there's authorization in the air..."

alternate approach: ability to address = permission to access

capabilities

token to identify = permission to access

(typically *opaque* token)

capabilities

token to identify = permission to access

(typically *opaque* token)

pro: "what object is this token" check = "can access" check:
simpler?

some capability list examples

file descriptors

list of open files process has access to

page table (sort of?)

list of physical pages process is allowed to access

some capability list examples

file descriptors

list of open files process has access to

page table (sort of?)

list of physical pages process is allowed to access

list of what process can access *stored with process*

handle to access object = key in permitted object table

impossible to skip permission check!

sharing capabilities

some ways of sharing capabilities:

inherited by spawned programs

- file descriptors/page tables do this

send over local socket or pipe

- Unix: usually supported for file descriptors!
  (look up `SCM_RIGHTS` — slightly different for Linux v. OS X v. FreeBSD v. ...)

Capsicum: practical capabilities for UNIX (1)

Capsicum: research project from Cambridge

adds capabilities to FreeBSD by extending file descriptors

opt-in: can set process to require capabilities to access objects

- instead of absolute path, process ID, etc.

capabilities = fds for each directory/file/process/etc.

more permissions on fds than read/write

- execute
- open files in (for fd representing directory)
- kill (for fd reporesenting process)
- ...

Capsicum: practical capabilities for UNIX (2)

capabilities = no global names

no filenames, instead fds for directories

- new syscall: `openat(directory_fd, "path/in/directory")`
- new syscall: `fexecv(file_fd, argv)`

no pids, instead fds for processes

- new syscall: `pdfork()`

recall: the virtual machine interface



system virtual machine
(VirtualBox, VMWare, Hyper-V, ...)

process virtual machine
(typical operating systems)

imitate physical interface
(of some real hardware)

chosen for convenience
(of applications)

recall: the virtual machine interface



system virtual machine
(VirtualBox, VMWare, Hyper-V, ...)

process virtual machine
(typical operating systems)

imitate physical interface
(of some real hardware)

chosen for convenience
(of applications)

system virtual machine

goal: imitate hardware interface

what hardware?

usually — whatever's easiest to emulate

system virtual machine terms

hypervisor or *virtual machine monitor*

something that runs system virtual machines

guest OS

operating system that runs as application on hypervisor

host OS

operating system that runs hypervisor

sometimes, hypervisor is the OS (doesn't run normal programs)

I'll often talk as if hypervisor is OS to keep things simpler

if hypervisor not OS: host OS will provide new system calls/etc.

imitate: how close?

full virtualization

> guest OS runs unmodified, as if on real hardware

paravirtualization

> *small* modifications to guest OS to support virtual machine
> might change, e.g., how page table entries are set
> application should still be unmodified

fuzzy line — custom device drivers sometimes not called paravirtualization

multiple techniques

today: talk about one way of implementing VMs

there are some variations I won't mention

...or might not have time to mention

one variation: extra HW support for VMs (if time)

one variation: compile guest OS machine code to new machine code

- not as slow as you'd think, sometimes

VM layering (intro)

conceptual layering



VM layering (intro)

conceptual layering



$\approx$ hypervisor's process

VM layering (intro)

conceptual layering



VM layering

conceptual layering



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

hypervisor tracks...

guest OS registers
page table: physical to machine addresses
I/O devices guest OS can access
...

VM layering

conceptual layering



hypervisor tracks...

guest OS registers
page table: physical to machine addresses
I/O devices guest OS can access
...

same as for normal process so far...

VM layering

conceptual layering



pretend user mode

pretend kernel mode

real kernel mode

hypervisor tracks...

guest OS registers
page table: physical to machine addresses
I/O devices guest OS can access
...

whether in user/kernel mode
guest OS page table ptr
guest OS exception table ptr
...

extra state to impl. pretend kernel mode
paging, protection, exceptions/interrupts

VM layering

conceptual layering



pretend user mode

pretend kernel mode

real kernel mode

hypervisor tracks...

guest OS registers
page table: physical to machine addresses
I/O devices guest OS can access
...

whether in user/kernel mode
guest OS page table ptr
guest OS exception table ptr
... virtual machine state

real ("shadow") page table ...

extra data structures to translate pretend kernel mode info to form real CPU understands

process control block for guest OS

guest OS runs like a process, but...

have extra things for hypervisor to track:

if guest OS thinks interrupts are disabled

what guest OS thinks is it's interrupt handler table

what guest OS thinks is it's page table base register

if guest OS thinks it is running in kernel mode

...

hypervisor basic flow

guest OS operations trigger exceptions

- e.g. try to talk to device: page or protection fault
- e.g. try to disable interrupts: protection fault
- e.g. try to make system call: system call exception

hypervisor exception handler tries to do what processor would "normally" do

- talk to device on guest OS's behalf
- change "interrupt disabled" flag for hypervisor to check later
- invoke the guest OS's system call exception handler

virtual machine execution pieces

making IO and kernel-mode-related instructions work

- solution: trap-and-emulate
- force instruction to cause fault
- make fault handler do what instruction would do
- might require reading machine code to emulate instruction

making exceptions/interrupts work

- 'reflect' exceptions/interrupts into guest OS
- same setup processor would do ...
- but do setup on guest OS registers + memory

making page tables work

- it's own topic

trap-and-emulate (1)

normally: privileged/special instructions trigger fault

- e.g. accessing device memory directly (page fault)
- e.g. changing the exception table (protection fault)

normal OS: crash the program

hypervisor: pretend it did the right thing

- pretend kernel mode: the actual privileged operation
- pretend user mode: invoke guest's exception handler

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privileged I/O flow



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

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

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

trap-and-emulate: psuedocode

```
trap(...) {
  ...
  if (is_read_from_keyboard(tf->pc)) {
      do_read_system_call_based_on(tf);
  }
  ...
}
```

idea: translate privileged instructions into system-call-like operations

usually: need to deal with reading arguments, etc.

recall: xv6 keyboard I/O

```
...
data = inb(KBDATAP);
/* compiles to:
     mov $0x60, %edx
     in %dx, %al <-- FAULT IN USER MODE
 */
...
```

in user mode: triggers a fault

`in` instruction — read from special 'I/O address'

but same idea applies to mov from special memory address + page fault

more complete pseudocode (1)

```
trap(...) {  // tf = saved context (like xv6 trapframe)
  ...
  else if (exception_type == PROTECTION_FAULT
            && guest OS in kernel mode) {
    char *pc = tf->pc;
    if (is_in_instr(pc)) {  // interpret machine code!
      ...
      int src_address = get_instr_address(instrution);
      switch (src_address) {
        ...
        case KBDATAP:
          char c = do_syscall_to_read_keyboard();
          tf->registers[get_instr_dest(pc)] = c;
          tf->pc += get_instr_length(pc);
          break;
          ...
      }
    }
  }
  ...
}
```

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normal OS: crash the program

hypervisor: pretend it did the right thing

- pretend kernel mode: the actual privileged operation
- pretend user mode: invoke guest's exception handler

trap and emulate (2)

guest OS should still handle exceptions for its programs

most exceptions — just "reflect" them in the guest OS

look up exception handler, kernel stack pointer, etc.

saved by previous privilege instruction trap

reflecting exceptions

```
trap(...) {
    ...
  else if ( exception_type == /* most exception types */
        && guest OS in user mode) {
    ...
    tf->in_kernel_mode = TRUE;
    tf->stack_pointer = /* guest OS kernel stack */;
    tf->pc = /* guest OS trap handler */;
  }
```

trap-and-emulate: system calls

system calls special case of privileged instruction:

system call exception:

pretend user mode: execute guest OS's system call handler
pretend kernel mode: execute guest OS's system call handler

returning from system call? priviliged operation to emulate

system call/exception flow (part 1)



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

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

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

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

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

system call/exception flow (part 2)



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

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

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

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

trap and emulate (3)

what about memory mapped I/O?

when guest OS tries to access “magic” device address, get page fault

need to emulate any memory writing instruction!

trap and emulate (3)

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when guest OS tries to access "magic" device address, get page fault

need to emulate any memory writing instruction!

(at least) two types of page faults for hypervisor

- guest OS trying to access device memory — emulate it
- guest OS trying to access memory not in *its* page table — run exception handler in guest

(and some more types — next topic)

exercise

guest OS running user program

makes system call write system call to write 4 characters to screen

write system call implementation does write by writing character at a time to memory mapped I/O address

how many exceptions occur on the real hardware?

trap and emulate not enough

trap and emulate assumption: can cause fault

priviliged instruction not in kernel

memory access not in hypervisor-set page table

...

until ISA extensions, on x86, not always possible

if time, (pretty hard-to-implement) workarounds later

terms for this lecture

virtual address — virtual address for guest OS

physical address — physical address for guest OS

machine address — physical address for hypervisor/host OS

three page tables



three page tables

page table pointer guest
set with privileged instruction
(x86: `mov …, %cr3`)
hypervisor records on protection fault



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

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

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

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

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

page table synthesis question

creating new page table = two PT lookups

- lookup in guest OS page table
- lookup in hypervisor page table (or equivalent)

synthesize new page table from combined info

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- lookup in hypervisor page table (or equivalent)

synthesize new page table from combined info

Q: when does the hypervisor update the shadow page table?

interlude: the TLB

Translation **L**ookaside **B**uffer — cache for page table entries

what the processor actually uses to do address translation with normal page tables

has the same problem

contents synthesized from the 'normal' page table

processor needs to decide when to update it

preview: hypervisor can use same solution

Interlude: TLB (no virtualization)



Interlude: TLB (no virtualization)



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

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

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

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

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

three page tables (revisited)



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

three page tables (revisited)



alternate view of shadow page table

shadow page table is like a *virtual TLB*

caches commonly used page table entries in guest

entries need to be in shadow page table for instructions to run

needs to be explicitly cleared by guest OS

implicitly filled by hypervisor

on TLB invalidation

two major ways to invalidate TLB:

when setting a new page table base pointer

- e.g. x86: `mov ..., %cr3`

when running an explicit invalidation instruction

- e.g. x86: `invlpg`

hopefully, both privileged instructions

nit: memory-mapped I/O

recall: devices which act as 'magic memory'

hypervisor needs to emulation

keep corresponding pages invalid for trap+emulate

page fault triggers instruction emulation instead

page tables and kernel mode?

guest OS can have *kernel-only* pages

guest OS in pretend kernel mode

- shadow PTE: marked as user-mode accessible

guest OS in pretend user mode

- shadow PTE: marked inaccessible

four page tables? (1)



four page tables? (2)

one solution: pretend kernel and pretend user shadow page table

alternative: clear page table on kernel/user switch

neither seems great for overhead

interlude: VM overhead

some things much more expensive in a VM:

I/O via priviliged instructions/memory mapping

- typical strategy: instruction emulation

exercise: overhead?

guest program makes read() system call

guest OS switches to another program

guest OS gets interrupt from keyboard

guest OS switches back to original program, returns from syscall

how many guest page table switches?

how many (real/shadow) page table switches (or clearing)?

backup slides

tagged TLBs

hardware sometimes includes "address space ID" in TLB entries

- address space ID $\approx$ process ID

helpful for normal OSes — faster context switching

useful for hypervisor

problem with filling on demand

many OSes: invalidate *entire TLB* on context switch

assumption: TLB only holds entries from one process

so, rebuild shadow page table on each guest OS context switch?

this is often unacceptably slow

want to cache the shadow page tables

problem: OS won't tell you when it's writing

aside: tagged TLBs

some TLBs support holding entries from multiple page tables

- entries "tagged" with page table they are from

...but not x86 until pretty recently

allows OSs to not invalidate entire TLB on context switch

starting to be used by OSes

would be really helpful for our virtual machine proposals

- lots of page table switches

problem with filling on demand



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

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

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

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

proactively maintaining page tables



proactively maintaining page tables



proactively maintaining page tables

if tagged TLB: can use TLB invalidation instructions to know when to make changes

otherwise, ***can still do this trick***:

track physical pages that are part of any page tables

- update list on page table base register write?
- update list while filling shadow page table on demand

make sure marked read-only in shadow page tables

use trap+emulate to handles writes to guest page tables

(...even if not current active guest page tables)

on write to page table: update shadow page table

pros/cons: proactive over on-demand

pro: work with guest OSs that make assumptions about TLB size

pro: maintain shadow page table for each guest process
can avoid reconstructing each page table on each context switch

pro: better fit with tagged TLBs

con: more instructions spent doing copy-on-write

con: what happens when page table memory recycled?

hardware hypervisor support

Intel's VT-x

HW tracks whether a VM is running, how to run hypervisor

- new VMENTER instruction
- instruction switches page tables, sets program counter, etc.

HW tracks value of guest OS registers as if running normally

new VMEXIT interrupt — run hypervisor when VM needs to stop

- exits 'VM is running mode', switch to hypervisor

hardware hypervsior support

VMEXIT triggered regardless of user/kernel mode

- means guest OS kernel mode can't do some things
- real I/O device, unhandled priviliged instruction, ...

partially configurable: what instructions cause VMEXIT

- reading page table base? writing page table base? ...

partially configurable: what exceptions cause VMEXIT

- otherwise: HW handles running guest OS exception handler instead

no VMEXIT triggered? guest OS runs normally (in kernel mode!)

HW help for VM page tables

already avoided two shadow page tables:

- HW user/kernel mode now separate from hypervisor/guest

but HW can help a lot more

nested page tables

virtual → physical → machine

hypervisor specifies two page table base registers

- guest page table base — as physical address
- hypervisor page table base — as machine address

guest page table contains physical (not machine) addresses

hardware walks guest page table using hypervisor page table

- guest page table contains physical addresses
- hardware translates each physical page number to machine page number

nested 2-level page tables: how many lookups?

nested 2-level tables





non-virtualization instrs.

assumption: priviliged operations cause exception instead

and can keep memory mapped I/O to cause exception instead

many instructions sets work this way

x86 is not one of them

POPF

POPF instruction: pop flags from stack

- condition codes — CF, ZF, PF, SF, OF, etc.
- direction flag (DF) — used by "string" instructions
- I/O privilege level (IOPL)
- interrupt enable flag (IF)
- ...

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- **I/O privilege level** (IOPL)
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- ...

some flags are privileged!

popf **silently** doesn't change them in user mode

PUSHF

PUSHF: push flags to stack

write actual flags, include privileged flags

hypervisor wants to pretend those have different values

handling non-virtualizable

option 1: patch the OS

- typically: use hypervisor syscall for changing/reading the special flags, etc.
- 'paravirtualization'
- minimal changes are typically very small — small parts of kernel only

option 2: binary translation

- compile machine code into new machine code

option 3: change the instruction set

- after VMs popular, extensions made to x86 ISA
- one thing extensions do: allow changing how push/popf behave

binary translation

compile assembly to new assembly

works without instruction set support

early versions of VMWare on x86

later, x86 added HW support for virtualization

multiple ways to implement, I'll show one idea

- similar to Ford and Cox, "Vx32: Lightweight, User-level Sandboxing on the x86"

binary translation idea

```
0x40FE00: addq %rax, %rbx
movq 14(%r14,4), %rdx
addss %xmm0, (%rdx)
...
0x40FE3A: jne 0x40F404
subss %xmm0, 4(%rdx)
...
je 0x40F543
ret
```

binary translation idea

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0x40FE00: addq %rax, %rbx
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```

```
subss %xmm0, 4(%rdx)
...
je 0x40F543
```

```
ret
```

divide machine code
into *basic blocks*
(= "straight-line" code)
(= code till
jump/call/etc.)

binary translation idea

```
0x40FE00: addq %rax, %rbx
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subss %xmm0, 4(%rdx)
...
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ret
```

generated code:

```
// addq %rax, %rbx
movq rax_location, %rdi
movq rbx_location, %rsi
call checked_addq
movq %rax, rax_location
...
// jne 0x40F404
... // get CCs
je do_jne
movq $0x40FE3F, %rdi
jmp translate_and_run
do_jne:
movq $0x40F404, %rdi
jmp translate_and_run
```

a binary translation idea

convert whole *basic blocks*

- code upto branch/jump/call

end with call to `translate_and_run`

- compute new simulated PC address to pass to call

making binary translation fast

only have to convert kernel code

- and only some of the kernel code

cache converted code

- `translate_and_run` checks cache first

patch calls to `translate_and_run` to jmp to cached code

do something more clever than `movq rax_location, ...`

- map (some) registers to registers, not memory

ends up being "just-in-time" compiler

alternative to per-process tables

file descriptors: different in every process

- use special functions to move between processes

alternate idea: same number in every process

- one big table

sharing token = copy number without OS help

but how to control access? make numbers hard to guess

example: use random 128-bit numbers

things VM needs

normal user mode intructions

- just run it in user mode

guest OS I/O or other privileged instructions

- guest OS tries I/O/etc. — triggers exception
- hypervisor translates to I/O request
- or records privileged state change (e.g. switch to user mode) for later

guest OS exception handling

- track "guest OS thinks it in kernel mode"?
- record OS exception handler location when 'set handler' instruction faults
- hypervisor adjust PC, stack, etc. when guest OS should have exception

guest OS virtual memory

- ???

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