CS 4630 logistics / terminology

lectures

via Zoom

recorded, attendance not required

some questions during lecture, using Zoom's poll feature not graded

prerequisities

CS 3710 — I understand there's some variation...

knowledge of C, C++, assembly

CS 2150 should be enough, but refresher

CS 3330 or similar might be better

homework assignments

many approx. one week assignments mostly due Friday at 11:59pm ET – but see calendar

some reverse-engineering oriented

several demonstrating an exploit

weekly quizzes

- weekly written quizzes
- released after Wednesday lecture
- due before Monday lecture

textbook

no required textbook

some lecture material based on textbook stuff Peter Szor, "The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense" (and may use other security textbooks)

office hours

posted on calendar on website

will be via Discord

using office hour queue sorts mainly by last-time-helped (w/ first-in, first-out queue for approx. 3 students)

Discord invite posted on Collab

I will be splitting my office hour time between OS and this course (so if it's not obvious why I'm not getting to you that fast...)

piazza, etc.

linked on Collab

TAs and I should be monitoring

use private questions if assignment code, etc. involved

On Ethics

don't use someone's computer without their permission or in excess of what they've permitted

don't assume it's just a harmless prank unintended (but likely) consequences

don't assume the system owner would give you permission if you're afraid to ask, it's not okay

On Law

probably illegal (Federal and/or State crime):

accessing computers without authorization even if nothing is done with the access

deliberately overloading a service

"backhacking" into a malware operator's machine

deploying a worm that patches security holes

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Prior to increasing the amount left:

167h 59m 00s



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- LocalBitcoins.com (WU) Buy Bitcoins with Western Union
- · Coincafe.com Recommended for fast, simple service. Payment Methods: Western Union, Bank of

malware

"evil software"

malware

- "evil software"
- display a funny message
- send passwords/credit card numbers to criminals
- take pictures to send to criminals
- delete data
- hold data hostage
- insert/replace ads in webpages

viruses

malware that inserts itself into another program

"infects" other programs when run usually modifies executables directly

macro viruses

Word, Excel, other office software support macros scripts embedded in Word/Excel/etc. documents

viruses written in a scripting language Visual Basic for Applications

spread to office documents, not executables easily spread in corporate environments

vendor reaction: macros disabled by default now



worms

independent program

usually "blends in" with system programs

copies itself to other machines or USB keys, etc.

sometimes configures systems to run it automatically

trojan (horse)s

...

useful-looking program that is malware:

'cracked' version of commerical software fake anti-virus software or looks like useful PDF doc

maybe is (or not), but also does something evil

common form for targeted attacks

Nearly 80 Chrome extensions caught spying -- how to protect yourself

By Nicholas Fearn June 18, 2020

79 malicious browser extensions booted by Google from the Chrome Web Store





(Image credit: Shutterstock)

More than 100 malicious and fake Google Chrome browser extensions have amassed around 33 million downloads in total, according to an investigation by security firm Awake.

Security researchers discovered 111 malicious extensions that were downloaded by users of the Google Chrome browser and spread dangerous spyware.

potentially unwanted programs

most commonly: programs bundled with other programs

sometimes disclosed but in (deceptive?) fine print

sometimes considered malware, sometimes not

bad behavior by 'normal' programs

some mostly-legitimate programs also do malware-like things

location info collected by cell phone apps?

advertisments injected by useful browser extensions?

Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They're Not Keeping It Secret

Dozens of companies use smartphone locations to help advertisers and even hedge funds. They say it's anonymous, but the data shows how personal it is.

By JENNIFER VALENTINO-DeVRIES, NATASHA SINGER, MICHAEL H. KELLER and AARON KROLIK DEC. 10, 2018

The millions of dots on the map trace highways, side streets and bike trails — each one following the path of an anonymous cellphone user.

One path tracks someone from a home outside Newark to a nearby Planned Parenthood, remaining there for more than an hour. Another represents a person who travels with the mayor of New York during the day and returns to Long Island at night.

what is malware...

opinion question:

if you're making anti-malware software, what should it do for...? (1) pre-installed browser extension that displays coupon codes but sends domain name of all websites to third-party to do so

(2) remote administration software that shows a subtle icon in the corner of the screen when used to monitor the machine

- A. remove it, no prompting
- B. prompt to remove it, default to yes
- C. prompt to remove it, default to no
- D. don't flag it
- E. something else (discuss?)

The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence

Rahul Chatterjee^{*}, Periwinkle Doerfler[†], Hadas Orgad[‡], Sam Havron[§], Jackeline Palmer[¶], Diana Freed^{*}, Karen Levy[§], Nicola Dell^{*}, Damon McCoy[†], Thomas Ristenpart^{*}

* Cornell Tech [†] New York University [‡] Technion [§] Cornell University [¶] Hunter College

	App types	Description	Examples	Capabilities	
Personal tracking	Find-my-phone	Locate phone remotely	Find my Android	Location tracking, remote locking and wiping	
	Anti-theft	Catch the phone thief	Wheres My Droid	Record location, photos & ambient audio; alert on SIM change	
	Call recorder	Record incoming / outgoing calls	Call Recorder	Record calls and back them up to a server	
	Data syncing	Sync data from phone to other device	mySMS	Sync SMS and call log, media, browser history	
	Phone control	Control phone remotely	TrackView	Full control with capabilities exceeding combination of data syncing and anti-theft	
Mutual tracking	Family tracking	Track location of family members	Family Tracker	Mutual location sharing	
	Couple tracking	Consensual sharing of location and more	Couple Tracker	Syncs location, media content, SMS and call logs	
	Friends tracking	Track friends if they are in vicinity	Friends Tracker	Like family tracker, and alerts if friend in vicinity	
Subordinate tracking	Employee tracking	Track employees whereabouts	Where's my Staff	Similar to anti-theft	
	Parental control	For parents to monitor their children	MMGuardian	Capabilities very similar to phone control	
	Overt spyware	Claims to be spying app	Cerberus, mSpy, HelloSpy	Surreptitious phone monitoring & control	

Fig. 5: Different categories of IPS-relevant apps and their typical capabilities.

dual-use, context-sensitivity

this class: mostly talking about clearly anti-user software ...and how it tries to be covert

but there are also problems of *dual-use* software phone tracking anti-theft software computer remote administration software

(also problems of intentionally 'evil' software masquarding as legit)
(e.g. marketted on "how to spy on your _____" blog)
(e.g. unnecessairily well hidden when installed)

ideally, prevent "bad" use somehow phone OS should prevent *covert* tracking? antimalware software should notice such software?

making money from malware

often malware authors trying to make money

adware — from ad revenue

ransomware — ransom user's files/usability of system

resell personal info

resell computation/network time advertising fraud distributed denial of service cryptocurrency minining

aside on malware statistics

most malware statistics come from antivirus companies

probably a biased data source

Category Mandiant analysts assign categories to malware samples based on their classification and behavior (Fig. 5). Each binary is placed into only one category. While a backdoor might have the ability to steal credentials, if the primary purpose of the malware was to function as a backdoor it would be counted as a backdoor. Inversely, something will only be labeled as a credential stealer only if it's primary function is to steal credentials.



Source: FireEye M-Trends Report 2020

Measuring Pay-per-Install: The Commoditization of Malware Distribution

Juan Caballero[†], Chris Grier^{*‡}, Christian Kreibich^{*‡}, Vern Paxson^{*‡} [†]IMDEA Software Institute *UC Berkeley [‡]ICSI juan.caballero@imdea.org {grier, vern}@cs.berkeley.edu christian@icir.org

FAMILY	Milked	Dist.	DAYS	CLASS	PPI
Rustock	61,017	15	31	spam	L
LoaderAdv-ack	60,770	62	31	ppi	L
CLUSTER: A	11,758	8	31	clickfraud	G
Hiloti	10,045	43	31	ppi	L
CLUSTER: B	8,194	9	31	?	G
Gleishug	7,620	15	31	clickfraud	L
Nuseek	5,802	2	30	clickfraud	G
Palevo2	16,101	21	29	botnet	G,L
Securitysuite	15,403	100	29	fakeav	L
Zbot	3,684	49	29	infosteal	G,L
CLUSTER: D	5,723	1	28	?	G
SmartAdsSol.	18,317	6	26	adware	L
Spyeye	4,522	16	25	infosteal	G,L
Securitysuite-avn	ı 4,732	45	20	fakeav	L
Grum	2,974	54	20	spam	G,L
Tdss	4,893	12	19	ppi	G,L
Otlard	677	7	16	botnet	G,L
Blackenergy1	1,135	15	15	ddos	L
Palevo	2,594	2	14	botnet	G
Harebot	1,617	13	14	botnet	G,L,V

Table 3: Top 20 malware families we milked during August 2010. The columns indicate the total number of executables milked, distinct executables per family, the number of days seen, the families' general class, and PPI services that distribute the family: *LoaderAdv* (L), *GoldInstall* (G), *Virut* (V).

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ad injection (1)

internet advertising is big business

... but you need to pay websites to add ads?

how about modifying browser to add/change ads

mostly bundled with legitimate software



From Thomas et al, "Ad Injection at Scale: Assessing Deceptive Advertisement Modifications"

ad injection (2)

5% of Google-accessing clients (2014)

>90% using code from VC-backed firm SuperFish:

\$19.3 M in investment (CrunchBase)

\$38M in revenue (Forbes, 2015)

defunct after Lenovo root CA incident (2015)

... but founders reported started new, similar venture (JustVisual; according to TechCrunch)

Google removes two Chrome ad blockers caught collecting user data

Nano Adblocker and Nano Defender have been removed from the official Chrome Web Store.



By Catalin Cimpanu for Zero Day | October 20, 2020 -- 13:45 GMT (06:45 PDT) | Topic: Security

The data collection code was added at the start of this month, in October 2020, after the original author sold the two extensions to "a team of Turkish developers."

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cryptolockers

encrypt files, hold for "ransom"

decryption key stored only on attacker-controlled server

possibly decrypt files if victim pays

many millions in revenues accurate numbers are hard to find

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other ransomware

we have your private data, pay us or it gets released

more targetted stealing/extortion

To Catch a Ratter: Monitoring the Behavior of Amateur DarkComet RAT Operators in the Wild

Brown Farinholt[†], Mohammad Rezaeirad[‡], Paul Pearce[§], Hitesh Dharmdasani[¶], Haikuo Yin[†] Stevens Le Blond[∥], Damon McCov^{††}, Kirill Levchenko[†]

Abstract—Remote Access Trojans (RATs) give remote attackers interactive control over a compromised machine. Unlike largescale malware such as botnets, a RAT is controlled individually by a human operator interacting with the compromised machine remotely. The versatility of RATs makes them attractive to actors of all levels of sophistication: they've been used for espionage, information theft, voyeurism and extortion. Despite their increasing use, there are still major gaps in our understanding of RATs and their operators, including motives, intentions, procedures, and weak points where defenses might be most effective.

to catch ratter results

 $2016/7 \ study$

61% attempt to access webcam; 26% microphone (both not present in experimenter's 'honeypot')

31% enable keylogger (passwords?)

approx. 5% harass legit user

approx. 2% try to phish legit user

the underground economy (1)

<A> Sell Cvv US(1\$ each),Uk(2\$ each)Cvv with SSN & DL(10\$ each)and ePassporte Account with 560\$ in acc(50\$),Hacked Host(7\$),Tut Scam CC Full in VP-ASP Shop(10\$).shopadmin with 4100 order(200\$), Tool Calculate Drive Licsence Number(10\$).... I'm sleeping. MSG me and I will reply U as soon as I can !

advertisment for stolen credentials on an IRC (Internet Relay Chat) server via Team Cymru, "The underground Economy: Priceless" (2006, Usenix ;login: magazine)

(CVV = card verification value — verification number on back of credit cards)(DL = driver's lie

the underground economy (2)

<A> i have wells and boa logins and i need to good drop manripper f#@! off

 <=== .Have All Bank Infos. US/Canada/ Uk ...Legit Cashiers Only Msg/me

<C> HELLO room... I am Ashley from the State... I got drops for US banks and i need a very trust worthy and understanding man to do deal with ... the share its 60/40...Msg me for deal

advertisements for 'drops' (bank accounts for money laundering) and for 'cashiers' (criminals who will clean out accounts) via Team Cymru, "The underground Economy: Priceless" (2006, Usenix ;login: magazine)

the underground econmomy (3)

t.	Spamvertised goods	Scareware	Clickfraud	l Fi	nancial fraud	Banking theft		
roduc							Theft	
ш	Specialized payloads	Spambot Grum, Storm, Me	Click gaD ZeroA	kbots Access	Banking Zeus, S	trojans _{SpyEye}	¢	
	Malware distribution	Exploit Nuclear, Bla	kits ackhole	PPI services GoldInstalls, LoaderAdv			asing depender	
	Traffic acquisition	Accou Email, social,	ints phishing	SEO, cloaking Backlinks, websites				
	Raw materials	Hosting, networking Human services Hosts, proxies, domains Captcha, SMS, content, mules				es t, mules	Incre	
Figure 2: Taxonomy of underground actors. Profit centers supply the revenue for all abuse, while support centers provide critical re- sources that streamline defrauding victims.								

via Thomas et al, "Framing Dependencies Introduced by Underground Commoditization" (2015)

targeted attacks / espionage

information gathering

SolarWinds (network monitoring software) attack ("supply chain") exploits via subject-specific links ("here's an interesting PDF")

sabotage

Stuxnet: Iranian enrichment controls

SolarWinds

supplier of network-monitoring software

... used by many big customers, including US Gov't

attacked by third-party to spy (?) on customers

Stuxnet

targeted Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities

- physically damaged centrifuges
- designed to spread via USB sticks
- publicly known 2010, deployed 2009
- US + Israel gov't developed according to press reports

why talk about why/what?

doesn't change malware much

(also, not a likely topic later in this course)

...but, attacking monetization is an effective strategy

vulnerabilities

for viruses, worms

for trojans + PUP that do more than is supposed to do be allowed e.g. getting location information without "permission"

software vulnerability

unintended program behavior that can be used by an adversary

vulnerability example

website able to install software without prompting

not intended behavior of web browser

software vulnerability classes (1)

memory safety bugs

problems with pointers big topic in this course

"injection" bugs — type confusion commands/SQL within name, label, etc.

 $integer \ overflow/underflow$

•••

software vulnerability classes (2)

not checking inputs/permissions
http://webserver.com/../../.ile-I-shouldn'
t-get.txt

almost any 's "undefined behavior" in $C/C{++}$

synchronization bugs: time-to-check to time-of-use

... more?

vulnerability versus exploit

exploit — something that uses a vulnerability to do something

proof-of-concept — something = demonstration the exploit is there example: open a calculator program

malware spreading with human help

- installed by other malware
- installed manually after illegitimate access
- including in deceptively marketted software

malware spreading without human help

vulnerable network-accessible services

shared files/folders autorun on USB sticks macros in Word/Excel/etc. files

email attachments

websites + browser vulnerabilities JavaScript interpreter bugs Adobe Flash Player bugs

malware defenses (1)

"antivirus" software:

Windows Defender

avast!

Avira

AVG

McAfee

•••

malware defenses (2)

app stores/etc. filtering (in theory) require developer registration program analysis? blacklisting after the fact?

"sandboxing" policies

don't let, e.g., game access your taxes don't let weather app access your microphone



"EasyDoc Converter.app" can't be opened because it is from an unidentified developer.

Your security preferences allow installation of only apps from the Mac App Store and identified developers.

Safari downloaded this file today at 9:19 PM from objective-see.com.





Allow Facebook to use your phone's storage?

This lets Facebook store and access information like photos on your phone and its SD card.

DENY ALLOW

malware defenses (3)

some email spam filters

blacklists for web browsers

Google Safe Browsing list (Chrome, Firefox) Microsoft SmartScreen (IE, Edge)

malware counter-defenses

malware authors tries to make it hard-to-detect

obfuscation:

make code harder to read make code different each time blend in with normal files/applications/etc.

VM

homework assignments

first assignment — get an appropriate VM working

VM environment

- 64-bit Ubuntu 20.04 LTS
- I'll make an effort for assignments to work in other 64-bit Linux envs
- but this is what we'll test in
 - (and some assignments are very sensitive to environment details)

related assignment

- assignment on website
- submission on Collab
- just get some suitable environment working

semester outline

assembly/reverse-engineering including binary formats hiding in innocent programs

heuristic malware detection cat-and-mouse game signature-based detection evading signature-based detection

memory-mismanagement exploits and mitigations

(less certain topics)

command-injection exploits and mitigations

timing attacks and mitigations

sandboxing

backup slides



MUST READ: Raspberry Pi 400: The inside story of how the \$70 Pi-powered PC was made

Some ransomware gangs are going after top execs to pressure companies into paying

Ransomware gangs are prioritizing stealing data from workstations used by executives in the hopes of finding and using valuable information to use in the extortion process.





By Catalin Cimpanu for Zero Day | January 9, 2021 -- 08:00 GMT (00:00 PST) | Topic: Security

web-camera blackmail

REGISTER

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Click to Print

Man gets 18 months for 'sextortion' of Miss Teen USA, others

2014-03-17 12:32:05



SANTA ANA – A man who hacked the computers of women including Miss Teen USA, then secretly took nude photos of them and extorted some into undressing during video chats, was sentenced Monday to 18 months in federal prison.

Jared James Abrahams, 20, of Temecula pleaded guilty in November to unauthorized computer access and extortion.

Before being sentenced, he read a statement in court apologizing for the

pain he'd caused, but said he did not set out to hurt anyone or be "mean."

Abrahams' parents and lawyer said he is autistic and has serious difficulties making friends or having normal social interactions. His parents said examinations have found he has the emotional maturity of a 12-year-old.

non-vulnerabilities?

with trojans/potentially unwanted software, problem is subtle

usually unintended consequence of designed-for level of access e.g. browser extensions supposed to be able to add content to webpages e.g. applications you install supposed to be able to change/delete files

not what we'll call a *vulnerability* but still a security problem

malware logistics: how?

what are they written in?

malware languages (1)

assembly language/machine code hand-coded or partially hand-coded

vulnerabilities deal with machine code/memory layout

often better for hiding malware from anti-malware tools
malware languages (2)

high-level scripting languages

fast prototyping maintainability/efficiency not priority sometimes malicious scripts non-machine-code parts can use anything!

sometimes specialized "toolkits" example: Virus Construction Kit

reselling others machines

botnets

making money from other people's computers/Internet connection

denial of service attacks

advertising fraud

sending spam

'mining' cryptocurrency

denial of service attacks

Attack Type	Attacks	Targets	Class
HTTP flood	2,736	1,035	А
UDP-PLAIN flood	2,542	1,278	V
UDP flood	2,440	1,479	V
ACK flood	2,173	875	S
SYN flood	1,935	764	S
GRE-IP flood	994	587	А
ACK-STOMP flood	830	359	S
VSE flood	809	550	А
DNS flood	417	173	А
GRE-ETH flood	318	210	А

Table 9: **C2 Attack Commands**—Mirai launched 15,194 attacks between September 27, 2016–February 28, 2017. These include [A]pplication-layer attacks, [V]olumetric attacks, and TCP [S]tate exhaustion, all of which are equally prevalent.

advertizing fraud

Measuring lower bounds of the financial abuse to online advertisers: A four year case study of the TDSS/TDL4 Botnet

Yizheng Chen ^a 은 쯔, Panagiotis Kintis ^a 쯔, Manos Antonakakis ^b 쯔, Yacin Nadji ^b 쯔, David Dagon ^a 쯔, Michael Farrell ^c 쯔

one of the most complex, sophisticated, and long-lived botnets: TDSS/TDL4. Using passive datasets from a large Internet Service Provider in the United States, we estimated conservative lower bounds of advertisers' loss caused by the botnet. Over its entire life span, less than 15% of TDSS/TDL4 population caused *at least \$346 million* in damages to advertisers, primarily due to impression fraud. This translates to an average of \$340 thousand daily loss to advertisers, which is three times the last reported estimate from the analysis of ZeroAccess botnet (Pearce et al., 2014) and more than ten times of the daily impact the DNSChanger botnet (Meng et al., 2013) had to the ad ecosystem. Our study is the first to reveal the extent of the abuse that botnets bring to the ad ecosystem from the outside: the edge of the Internet.